We have already stated that Ens is a p???a??? ?e??e??? — distinguished according to the ten figures or genera called Categories. The first is t? ?st??, or ??s?a (sensu dignissimo) — Essentia, Substantia (p. 1028, a. 15). The remaining Categories are all appendages of Essentia, presupposing it, and inseparable from it; whereas Essentia is separable from all of them, and stands first in reason, in cognition, and in time. All the other Categories are called Entia only because they are quantities, qualities, affections, &c., of this Essentia Prima. A man may even doubt whether they are Entia or Non-Entia, since none of them is either per se or separable. We ought hardly to say that a quality or an affection, enunciated abstractedly, is Ens at all — such as currere, sedere, sanitas: we ought more properly to say that currens equus, sedens homo, sanus miles, are Entia, enunciating along with the quality the definite Essence or Individual Substance to which it belongs (a. 24). The quality then becomes Ens, because the subject to which it belongs is an individual Ens (a. 27). Essentia Prima is first in reason or rational explanation (????, a. 34), because in the rational explanation of each of the rest that of Essentia is implicated. It is first also in cognition, because we believe ourselves to know any thing fully, when we are able to answer Quid est? and say that it is homo or ignis; not simply when we are able to answer Quale or Quantum est? So that in answering the great and often-considered question, Quid est Ens? we shall first understand it as meaning Essentia (hoc sensu dignissimo), and shall try to solve it so (b. 3, pe?? t?? ??t?? ??t??).

Essentia (understood in this sense) appears to belong in the most manifest manner to bodies: we predicate it of animals, plants, the parts thereof, the natural bodies such as fire, water, and such like, as well as the parts and aggregates thereof, such as the heaven and its parts, the stars, moon, and sun (p. 1028, b. 7-13). But are these the only Essences, or are there others besides? Or again, is it an error to call these Essences, and are all Essences really something different from these? This is a point to be examined. Some think that the limits of bodies (surface, line, point, monad) are Essences even more than the body and the solid: others admit no Essences at all beyond or apart from Percipienda; others again recognize other Essences distinct from and more eternal than the Percipienda; for example, Plato, who ranks Ideas or Forms, and the Mathematica, as two distinct Essences, while he places the Percipienda only third in the scale of Essence. Speusippus even enumerates a still greater number of Essences, beginning with the One, and proceeding to Numbers, Magnitudes, Soul, &c., with a distinct ???? or principle for each (b. 21). Some others hold that Forms and Numbers have the same nature, and that there are other things coming near to these, such as lines and surfaces, in a descending scale to the Heaven and the Percipienda (b. 24). We must thus investigate which of these doctrines are true or false, whether there are any Essences beyond the Percipienda; and, if so, how they exist: whether there is any separable essence apart from Percipienda, and, if so, how and why; or whether there is nothing of the kind. But first we must give a vague outline what Essence is generally (?p?t?p?sa?????, b. 31).

There are four principal varieties of meaning in this Essentia, ?????? or sensu dignissimo: (1) t? t? ?? e??a?, (2) t? ?a?????, (3) t? ?????, (4) t? ?p??e?e???.

We shall first speak about the fourth — Substratum — which is the subject of all predicates, but never itself the predicate of any subject. That which appears most of all to be Essentia is, t? ?p??e?e??? p??t??. This name applies, in one point of view, to Matter; in another, to Form; in a third, to the total result of the two implicated together (p. 1029, a. 1): e.g., the brass, the figure, and the complete statue of figured brass. If, therefore, the Form be prius, and more Ens, as compared with the Matter, it will be also prius and more Ens as compared with the complete result. We get thus far in the adumbration of Essentia — that it is the subject of all predicates, but never itself a predicate.

But this is not sufficient to define it: there still remains obscurity. It would seem that Matter is Essentia; and that, if it be not so, nothing else is discernible to be so; for, if every thing else be subtracted, nothing (save Matter) remains. All things else are either affections, or agencies, or powers, of bodies; and, while length, breadth, depth, &c., are quantities belonging to Essence, Quantity is not Essence, but something belonging to Essence as First Subject. Take away length, breadth, depth, and there will remain only that something which these three circumscribe; in other words, Matter — that which, in itself and in its own nature, is neither Quantity, nor Quality, but of which, Quantity, Quality, and the other Categories, are predicated. All these Categories are predicated of Essence, and Essence of Matter; so that Matter is the last remaining per se (p. 1029, a. 12-24). Take away Matter, and there remain neither affirmative nor negative predicates; for these negative predicates are just as much concomitants or accidents as the others (a. 25).

Upon this reasoning, it seems that Matter is the true Essence. Yet, on the other hand, this will be seen to be impossible. For the principal characteristic of Essence is to be separable and Hoc Aliquid. So that either Form, or the Compound of Form and Matter together, must be the true Essence. But this last, the Compound, may be dismissed as evidently unsuitable for the enquiry, not less than Matter separately; for it is manifestly posterior to either of the two components (p. 1029, a. 30). We must therefore investigate the Form, though it is full of difficulty (a. 33).

We shall begin the investigation from some of the Percipienda, which are acknowledged as Essence; for it is useful to go across from this starting-point to what is more cognizable (p?? ????? ??? t? etaa??e?? e?? t? ??????te??? — p. 1029, b. 3. These words ought properly to come immediately after ??t?t??? p??t?? — p. 1028, a. 35, and the intervening words now standing in the text, ?pe? d’ ?? ???? — pe?? a?t??, ought to be transferred to a more proper place some lines lower down, immediately before the words, ?a? p??t?? e?p?e? — p. 1029, b. 12. Bonitz has made this very just correction in his Observatt. pp. 129-130, referred to in his Notes on the Metaphysica.). Every man learns in this way — by proceeding from what is less cognizable by nature to what is more cognizable by nature. And the business (?????) of learning consists in making what is most cognizable to nature, most cognizable to ourselves also; just as, in practical matters, proceeding from what is good for each, to make what is good by nature good also for each man’s self. For it will often happen that things first and most cognizable to each man’s self, are only faintly cognizable, and have little or nothing of Ens (b. 9). Yet still, we must try to become cognizant of things fully knowable, by beginning with things poorly knowable, but knowable to us (b. 12).

Taking up these Percipienda, for the purpose of searching for Essentia in them, we shall first advert to t? ?? e??a?, which we discriminated as one of the characteristics of Essentia, saying something about the rational explanation or definition of it (p. 1029, a. 12). The t.?.e. of each subject is what is affirmed of it per se (?st? t? t.?.e. ???st? ? ???eta? ?a?’ a?t? — a. 13). Your essence is not to be musical; you are not musical by yourself: your essence is, what you are by yourself. Nor does it even include all that you are by yourself. Surface is not included in the essence of white; for the essence of surface is not the same thing as the essence of white. Moreover white surface, the compound of both, is not the essence of white; because white itself is included in the definition of white — which cannot be tolerated. The definition, which explains t.?.e., must not include the very word of which you intend to declare the t.?.e. If you intend to declare the t.?.e. of white surface by the words smooth surface, this does not declare it all: you only declare that white is identical in meaning with smooth (b. 22).

Now, since there are compounds in every one of the Categories, we must enquire whether there is a t.?.e. belonging to each of these. Is there, for example, a t.?.e. for white man? Let the meaning of these two words be included in the single word garment. Is there a t.?.e. for garment? What is it to be a garment? You cannot answer; for neither is this an enunciation per se (p. 1029, b. 29). Are we to say, indeed, that there are two distinct sorts of enunciation per se: one including an addition (?? p??s??se??), the other, not? You may define by intimating something to which the matter defined belongs; e.g., in defining white you may give the definition of white man. Or you may define by intimating something which is not essential but accessory to the matter defined; e.g., garment signifying white man, you may define garment as white. Whereas the truth is, that, though a white man is white, yet to be white is accessory and not essential to him (p. 1030, a. 1).

But can we in any way affirm that there is any t.?.e. to garment (taken in the above sense)? Or ought we to say that there is none (p. 1030, a. 2; Bonitz. Obss. p. 120)? For the t.?.e. is of the nature of t?de t? (?pe? ??? t?de t? ?st? t? t.?.e. — a. 3), or Hoc Aliquid, i.e., a particular concrete; but, when one thing is affirmed of another, as when we say white man, this is not of the nature of t?de t?, if t?de t? belongs to Essences alone (a. 5). Thus it appears that t?de t? belongs to all those matters of which the rational explanation can be given by Definition. For to give the equivalent of a name in many other words is not always to give a definition: if this were so, a paraphrase of any length, even the Iliad, might be called a definition. There can be no definition except of a primary something; which is affirmed, without being affirmed as something about another (a. 10). There will be no t.?.e., therefore, except for species of a genus; for in these alone what is affirmed is not an affection or an accessory or by way of participation. Respecting every thing besides, there will be no t.?.e. or definition, but there may be a rational explanation (?????) of what the name signifies, or a more precise explanation substituted in place of a simpler (a. 16).

Yet have we not gone too far in restricting the applicability of t.?.e. and Definition? and ought we not rather to say, that both the one and the other are used in many different senses (p. 1030, a. 18)? For the Quid est (t? t? ?st??) signifies in one way Essence and Hoc Aliquid, and in different ways all the other Categories each respectively. To all of them Est belongs, though not in like manner, but primarily to one and consequentially to the rest; so also Quid est belongs simply and directly to Essence, but in a certain way to the others (a. 21). Respecting Quale, Quantum, and the rest, we may enquire Quid Est? so that Quale also comes under the Quid est, though not absolutely or directly (??? ?p???, a. 25), but analogously to Non-Ens; for some assert in words that Est belongs to Non-Ens also though not absolutely, viz., Non Ens est Non-Ens — (a. 26).

Now we ought to be careful how we express ourselves about any particular matter, but we ought not to be less careful to determine how the matter itself really stands (p. 1030, a. 27: de? ?? ??? s??pe?? ?a? t? p?? de? ???e?? pe?? ??ast??, ?? ?? ????? ?e ? t? p?? ??e?. This contrast of p?? de? ???e?? with p?? ??e? appears to refer to what had been said two lines before: ??????? fas? t??e? e??a? t? ? ?? — verbal propositions distinguished from real.). The phraseology used just before is clear, and we must therefore recognize that t.?.e., as well as t? ?st?, belongs absolutely and primarily to Essentia, but in a secondary way to the other Categories; that is not absolutely, but p??? t.?.e., p?s? t.?.e., &c. (a. 31). For we must either declare the Categories to be simply Æquivoca, or we must recognize this addition and subtraction of the separate title of each, like the non-cognizable cognizable (?spe? ?a? t? ? ?p?st?t?? ?p?st?t?? — a. 33. I do not understand these words, nor does the Scholiast or Bonitz explain them satisfactorily.). But the truth is, that they are neither Æquivoca nor univoca, but in an intermediate grade of relation — not ?a?’ ??, but p??? ?? (b. 3.). People may express this in what phrases they like; but the truth is, that there is both t.?.e. and Definition, directly and primarily, of Essence; and of the other Categories also, but not directly and primarily. Of white man, you may give a rational explanation and a definition; but it will apply in a different manner to white and to the essence of man (b. 12).

There is a farther difficulty to be noticed. How are you to define any matter not simple but essentially compound, where two or more elements coalesce into an indivisible whole, like hollow-nosedness out of nose and hollowness. Here we have hollow-nosedness and hollowness belonging to the nose per se, not as an affection or accessory; not as white belongs to Kallias or man, but as male belongs to animal, or equal to quantity, i.e., per se (p. 1030, b. 20). The subject is implicated with the predicate in one name, and you cannot enunciate the one apart from the other. Such predicates belong to their subject per se, but in a different sense (see Bonitz’s note). You cannot properly define them, in the sense given above (b. 27). If definitions of such are to be admitted, it must be in a different sense: Definition and t.?.e. being recognized both of them as p???a??? ?e??e?a. Definition therefore is the mode of explanation which declares the t.?.e., and belongs to Essences, either exclusively, or at least primarily, directly, and chiefly (p. 1031, a. 7-14).

We have now to enquire — Whether each particular thing, and its t.?.e., are the same, or different (p. 1031, a. 15). This will assist us in the investigation of Essence; for apparently each thing is not different from its own Essence, and the t.?.e. is said to be the Essence of each thing.

In regard to subjects enunciated per accidens, the above two would seem to be distinct. White man is different from the being a white man. If these two were the same, the being a man would be the same as the being a white man; for those who hold this opinion affirm that man, and white man, are the same; and, if this be so, of course the being a man must also be the same as the being a white man. Yet this last inference is not necessary; for same is used in a different sense, when you say, Man and white man are the same, and when you say, The being a man and the being a white man are the same. But perhaps you may urge that the two predicates may become the same per accidens (i.e., by being truly predicated of the same subject); and that, because you say truly, Sokrates is white — Sokrates is musical, therefore you may also say truly, The being white is the same as the being musical. But this will be denied (d??e? d’ ?? — p. 1031, a. 28).

In regard to subjects enunciated per se, the case is otherwise: here each thing is the same with its t.?.e. Suppose, e.g., there exist any EssentiÆ (such as Plato and others make the Ideas) prior to all others; in that case, if the a?t?a?a??? were distinct from t? ??a?? e??a?, and the a?t????? distinct from t? ??? e??a?, there must be other Essences and Ideas anterior to the Platonic Ideas. If we believe t.?.e. to be Essentia, it must be an Essentia anterior and superior in dignity to these Ideas of Plato. Moreover, if the EssentiÆ or Ideas, and the t.?.e., be disjoined (?p??e????a? — p. 1031, b. 3), the first will be uncognizable, and the last will be non-existent (t? d’ ??? ?sta? — b. 4). For to have cognition of a thing, is, to know its t.?.e. This will be alike true of all t.?.e.; all of them are alike existent or alike non-existent (b. 9). If t? ??t? e??a? be not identical with t? ??, neither is t? ??a?? e??a? identical with t? ??a???, &c. But that of which t? ??a?? e??a? is not truly predicable, is not ??a??? (b. 11).

Hence we see that of necessity t? ??a??? is one and the same with t? ??a?? e??a?; likewise t? ?a???, with t? ?a?? e??a?; and so in all cases where the term enunciates a subject primarily and per se, not a predicate of some other and distinct subject (p. 1031, b. 13: ?sa ? ?at’ ???? ????ta?, ???? ?a?’ a?t? ?a? p??ta). This last is the characteristic and sufficient mark, even if the Platonic Ideas be not admitted; and even more evidently so, if they be admitted (b. 14). It is at the same time clear that, if the Ideas be what Plato declares them to be, the individual perceivable subjects here cannot be Essences; for the Ideas are necessarily Essences, but not as predicable of a subject. If they were Essences, in this last sense, they would be Essences per participationem; which is inconsistent with what is said about them by Plato (?s??ta? ??? ?at? ??e??? — b. 18).

These reasonings show that each separate thing, enunciated per se and not per accidens, is the same with its t.?.e.; that to know each thing, is, to know its t.?.e.; that, if you proceed to expose or lay them out, both are one and the same (?ste ?at? t?? ???es?? ?????? ?? t? e??a? ?f? — p. 1031, b. 21; with Bonitz’s explanation of ???es?? in his Note).

But that which is enunciated per accidens (e.g., album, musicum) cannot be truly affirmed to be one and the same with its t.?.e., because it has a double signification: it signifies both the accident and the subject to which such accident belongs; so that in a certain aspect it is identical with its t.?.e., and in another aspect it is not identical therewith (p. 1031, b. 26). The being a man, and the being a white man, are not the same; but the subject for affection is the same in both (b. 28: ?? ta?t?, p??e? d? ta?t? — obscure). The absurdity of supposing, that the t.?.e. of a thing is different from the thing itself, would appear plainly, if we gave a distinct name to the t.?.e. For there must be another t.?.e. above this, being the t.?.e. of the first t.?.e.; and it would be necessary to provide a new name for the second t.?.e.; and so forward, in an ascending march ad infinitum. What hinders us from admitting some things at once, as identical with their t.?.e., if the t.?.e. be Essentia? (b. 31). We see from the preceding reasoning that not only the thing itself is the same with its t.?.e., but that the rational explanation (?????) of both is the same; for One, and the being One, are one and the same not per accidens, but per se (p. 1032, a. 2). If they were different, you would have to ascend to a higher t.?.e. of the being One; and above this, to a higher still, without end (a. 4).

It is therefore clear that, in matters enunciated per se and primarily, each individual thing is one and the same with its t.?.e. The refutations brought by the Sophists against this doctrine, and the puzzles which they start, e.g., Whether Sokrates and the being Sokrates are the same, — may be cleared up by the explanations just offered (p. 1032, a. 8). It makes no difference what particular questions the objector asks: one is as easy to solve as another (a. 10).

Of things generated, some come by Nature, some by Art, some Spontaneously. All generated things are generated out of something, by something, and into or according to something (p. 1032, a. 12). The word something applies to each and all the Categories. Natural generation belongs to all the things whose generation comes from Nature (?? f?se??); having t? ?? ?? — what we call Matter, t? ?f’ ?? — one of the things existing by nature (t?? f?se? t? ??t?? — a. 17), and t? t?, such as a man, a plant, or the like, which we call Essences in the fullest sense (???sta ??s?a?). All things generated either by Nature or Art have Matter: it is possible that each of them may be, or may not be; and this is what we call Matter in each (a. 20). As an universal truth (?a?????), Nature includes (1) That out of which, or Matter; (2) That according to which (?a?’ ?), every thing which is generated having a definite nature or Form, such as plant or animal; That by which, or nature characterized according to the Form, being the same Form as the thing generated but in another individual; for a man begets a man (a. 24).

The other generations are called Constructions (p???se??), which are either from Art, or from Power, or from Intelligence. It is with these as with natural generations: some of them occur both by spontaneity and by chance (?a? ?p? ta?t??t?? ?a? ?p? t???? — p. 1032, a. 29; the principle of these last is apparently d??a??, the second of the three principia announced just before (?)); both in the one and in the other, some products arise without seed as well as with seed, which we shall presently advert to.

The generations from Art are those of which the Form is in the mind. By Form I mean the t.?.e. of each thing and its First Essence (t?? p??t?? ??s?a?, p. 1032, b. 1). For, in a certain way, the Form even of contraries is the same; since the essence of privation is the opposite essence: for example, health is the essence of disease; for disease is declared or described as absence of health, and health is the rational notion existing in the mind and in science. Now a healthy subject is generated by such an antecedent train of thought as follows (????eta? d? t? ????? ???sa?t?? ??t?? — b. 6):— Since health is so and so, there is necessity, if the subject is to attain health, that such and such things should occur, e.g., an even temperature of the body, for which latter purpose heat must be produced; and so on farther, until the thought rests upon something which is in the physician’s power to construct. The motion proceeding from this last thought is called Construction (b. 10), tending as it does towards health. So that, in a certain point of view, health may be said to be generated out of health, and a house out of a house; for the medical art is the form of health and the building art the form of the house: I mean the t.?.e., or the Essence without Matter, thereof (b. 14). Of the generations and motions here enumerated, one is called Rational Apprehension, viz., that one which takes its departure from the Principle and the Form; the other, Construction, viz., that which takes its departure from the conclusion of the process of rational apprehension (?p? t?? te?e?ta??? t?? ???se?? — b. 17). The like may be said about each of the intermediate steps: I mean, if the patient is to be restored to health, he must be brought to an even temperature. But the being brought to an even temperature, what is it? It is so and so; it will be a consequence of his being warmed. And this last again — what is it? So and so; which already exists potentially, since it depends upon the physician to produce it, the means being at his command (t??t? d’ ?d? ?p’ a?t? — b. 21).

We see thus that the Constructive Agency (t? p?????) and the point from which the motion towards producing health takes its origin, is, when the process is one of Art, the Form present in the mind; and, when the process is one of Spontaneity, it proceeds from that which would be the first proceeding of the artist, if Art had been concerned. In the medical art, e.g., the artist begins by imparting warmth. He does this by rubbing. But this warmth might perhaps arise in the body without any such rubbing or interference by the artist. The warmth is the prime agent, in the case of spontaneous production. The warmth is either a part of health, or a condition to the existence of health, as bricks are to that of a house (p. 1032, b. 30).

Nothing can be generated, if nothing pre-existed — as has been already said before. Some part of what is generated must exist before: Matter pre-exists, as in-dwelling and not generated (? ??? ??? ????· ???p???e? ??? ?a? ????eta? a?t? — p. 1033, a. 1. I do not understand these last words: it ought surely to be — ???p???e? ??? ?a? ?? ????eta? a?t?. Bonitz’s explanation suits these last words better than it suits the words in the actual text.).

But something of the Form or rational explanation (t?? ?? t? ????) must also pre-exist. In regard to a brazen circle, if we are asked, Quid est? we answer in two ways: We say of the Matter — It is brass; We say of the Form — It is such and such a figure. And this is the genus in which it is first placed (p. 1033, a. 4).

The brazen circle has Matter in its rational explanation. But that which is generated, is called not by the name of the Matter out of which it is generated, but by a derivative name formed therefrom; not ??e???, but ??e??????. A statue is called not ?????, but ???????. But, when a man is made healthy, he is not said to be the Matter out of which the health is generated; because that which we call the Matter is generated out of Privation along with the subject. Thus, both the man becomes healthy, and the patient becomes healthy; but the generation is more properly said to come out of Privation: we say, Sanus ex Ægroto generatur, rather than, Sanus ex homine generatur (p. 1033, a. 12). In cases where the Privation is unmarked and unnamed, as, in the case of brass, privation of the spherical, or any other, figure, and, in the case of a house, the privation of bricks or wood, the work is said to be generated out of them like a healthy man out of a sick man (a. 14). Nevertheless the work is not called by the same name as the material out of which it is made, but by a paronym thereof; not ????? but ??????? (a. 18). In strict propriety, indeed, we can hardly say that the statue is made out of brass, nor the house out of wood; for the materia ex qu ought to be something which undergoes change, not something which remains unchanged (a. 21).

It was remarked that in Generation there are three things or aspects to be distinguished —1. ?? ?f’ ??, ??e? ? ???? t?? ?e??se??.

2. ?? ?? ?? — rather ??? than st???s??.

3. ?? ????eta?.

Having already touched upon the two first, I now proceed to the third. What is it that is generated? Neither the Matter, nor the Form, but the embodiment or combination of the two. An artisan does not construct either the brass or the sphere, but the brazen sphere. If he be said to construct the sphere, it is only by accident (?at? s?e????), since the sphere in this particular case happens to be of brass. Out of the entire subject-matter, he constructs a distinct individual Something (p. 1033, a. 31). To make the brass round, is not to make the round, or to make the sphere, but to make a something different: that is the Form (of sphericity) embodied in another thing (a. 32). For, if the artisan made the round or the sphere, he must make them out of something different, pre-existing as a subject: e.g., he makes a brazen sphere, and in this sense — that he makes out of that Matter, which is brass, this different something, which is a sphere. If he made the sphere itself — the Form of sphere — he must make it out of some pre-existent subject; and you would thus carry back ad infinitum the different acts of generation and different pre-existent subjects (b. 4).

It is, therefore, clear that t? e?d??, or by whatever name the shape of the percipiend is to be called, is not generated, nor is generation thereof possible; nor is there any t.?.e. thereof; that is, of the Form abstractedly: for it is this very t.?.e. which is generated or becomes embodied in something else, either by nature, or by art, or by spontaneous power (p. 1033, b. 8). The artisan makes a brazen sphere to exist, for he makes it out of brass (Matter), and the sphere (Form): he makes or embodies the Form into this Matter, and that is a brazen sphere (b. 11). If there be any generation of the sphere per se (t?? sfa??? e??a?), it must be Something out of Something; for the Generatum must always be resolvable into a certain Matter and a certain Form. Let the brazen sphere be a figure in which all points of the circumference are equidistant from the centre; here are three things to be considered: (1) That in which what is constructed resides; (2) That which does so reside; (3) The entire Something generated or constructed — the brazen sphere. We see thus plainly that what is called the Form or Essence itself is not generated, but the combination called according to the Form is generated; moreover that in every Generatum there is Matter, so that the Generatum is in each case this or that (b. 19).

Can it be true, then, that there exists any sphere or house beyond those which we see or touch (i.e., any Form or Idea of a sphere, such as Plato advocates)? If there existed any such, it could never have become or been generated into Hoc Aliquid. It signifies only tale. It is neither This nor That nor any thing defined: but it (or rather the Constructive Agency) makes or generates ex hoc tale; and when this last has been generated, it is Tale Hoc (p. 1033, b. 22), and the entire compound is Kallias, or Sokrates, or this brazen sphere, while man, animal, &c., are analogous to brazen sphere generally. Even if there exist Platonic Forms by themselves, they could be of no use towards generation or the production of Essences. Frequently it is obvious that the Generans is like the Generatum, only a different individual. There is no occasion to assume the Platonic Form as an Exemplar; for the generating individual is quite sufficient of itself to be the cause of the Form in a new mass of Matter. The entire result is the given Form in these particular bones and flesh — called Kallias or Sokrates: each is different so far as Matter, but the same in the Form; for the Form is indivisible (p. 1034, a. 7).

But how does it happen that there are some things which are generated sometimes by art, sometimes spontaneously (e.g., health), while in other things (e.g., a house) spontaneous production never takes place? The reason is, that, in the first class of cases, the Matter which governs the work of generation by the artist, and in which itself a part of the finished product resides, is of a nature to be moved or modified by itself, while, in the second, this is not the fact; and to be moved, besides, in a certain manner and direction; for there are many things which are movable by themselves, but not in such manner and direction as the case which we are supposing requires. For example, stones are incapable of being moved in certain directions except by some other force, but they are capable of being moved by themselves in another direction; the like with fire. It is upon this that the distinction turns between some results which cannot be realized without an artist, and others which may perhaps be so realized (a. 17).

It is plain from what has been said that, in a certain sense, everything is generated from something of the same name, as natural objects are (e.g., a man); or from something in part bearing the same name (as a house out of the ideal form of a house), or from something which possesses that which in part bears the same name; for the first cause of the generation is itself part of the thing generated. The heat in the motion generates heat in the body; and this is either health, or a part of health, or the antecedent of one or other of these; hence it is said to produce or generate health, because it produces that of which health is concomitant and consequent (p. 1034, a. 30; see Bonitz’s correction in his Note). Essence is in these cases the beginning or principle of all generations, just as in Demonstration it is the beginning or principle of all syllogisms (a. 33). In the combinations and growths of Nature, the case is similar. The seed constructs, as Art constructs its products; for the seed has in it potentially the Form, and that from which comes the seed is, in a certain manner, of the same name with the product (b. 1). For we must not expect to find all generations analogous to that of man from man — woman also is generated from man, moreover, mule is not generated from mule — though this is the usual case, when there is no natural bodily defect (b. 3). Spontaneous generation occurs in the department of Nature, as in that of Art, wherever the Matter can be moved by itself in the same manner as the seed moves it: wherever the Matter cannot be so moved by itself, there can be no generation except the natural, from similar predecessors (b. 7, ?? a?t?? — compare Bonitz's note: “non ex ipsis, sed ?? a?t?? t?? p?????t??”).

This doctrine — That the Form is not generated, does not belong to Essence alone, but also to all the other Categories alike — Quality, Quantity, and the rest (p. 1034, b. 9). It is not the Form Quality per se which is generated, but tale lignum, talis homo: nor the Form Quantity per se, but tantum lignum or animal (b. 15). But, in regard to Essence, there is thus much peculiar and distinctive as compared with the other Categories: in the generation of Essence, there must pre-exist as generator another actual and complete Essence; in the generation of Quality or Quantity, you need nothing pre-existing beyond a potential Quality or a potential Quantity (b. 16).

A difficult question arises in this way: Every definition is a rational explanation consisting of parts; and, as the parts of the explanation are to the whole explanation, so are the parts of the thing explained to the whole thing explained. Now is it necessary or not, that the rational explanation of the parts shall be embodied in the rational explanation of the whole (p. 1034, b. 22)? In some cases it appears to be so; in others, not. The rational explanation of a circle does not include that of its segments; but the rational explanation of a syllable does include that of its component letters. Moreover, if the parts are prior to the whole, and if the acute angle be a part of the right angle, and the finger a part of the man, the acute angle must be prior to the right angle, and the finger to the man. Yet the contrary seems to be the truth: the right angle seems prior, also the man; for the rational explanation of acute angle is given from right angle, that of finger from man: in respect to existing without the other, right angle and man seem priora. In fact the word part is equivocal, and it is only one of its meanings to call it — that which quantitatively measures another (b. 33). But let us dismiss this consideration, and let us enquire of what it is that Essence consists, as parts (b. 34). If these are (1) Matter, (2) Form, (3) The Compound of the two, and if each of these three be Essence, Matter must be considered, in a certain way, as a part of something, yet in a certain way as not so; in this latter point of view, nothing being a part except those elements out of which the rational explanation of the Form is framed (p. 1035, a. 2). Thus, flesh is not a part of flatness, being the matter upon which flatness is generated or superinduced, but flesh is a part of flat-nosedness; the brass is a part of the entire statue, but not a part of the statue when enunciated as Form, or of the ideal statue. You may discriminate and reason separately upon the statue considered as Form (apart from the complete statue); but you cannot so discriminate the material part per se, or the statue considered as Matter only (a. 7). Hence the rational explanation of the circle does not contain that of the segments of the circle; but the rational explanation of the syllable does contain that of the component letters. The letters are parts of the Form, and not simply the Matter upon which the Form is superinduced; but the segments are parts in the sense of being the Matter upon which the Form of the circle is superinduced (a. 12): they are, however, nearer to the Form than the brass, when the Form of a circle or roundness is generated in brass (a. 13). In a certain way, indeed, it cannot be said that all the letters are contained in the rational explanation of the syllables; e.g., the letters inscribed in wax are not so contained, nor the sounds of those letters vibrating in the air; both these are a part of the syllable, in the sense of being the perceivable matter thereof (a. 17: ?? ??? a?s??t?). If a man be destroyed by being reduced to bones, ligaments, and flesh, you cannot for that reason say, that the man is composed of these as of parts of his Essence, but as parts of his Matter: they are parts of the entire man, but not of the Form, nor of what is contained in the rational explanation; accordingly they do not figure in the discussions which turn upon rational explanation, but only when the discussions turn upon the entire or concrete subject (a. 23). Hence, in some cases, things are destroyed into the same principia out of which they are formed; in other cases, not. To the first class, belong all things which are taken in conjunction with Matter, such as the flat-nosed or, the brazen circle; to the second class, those which are taken disjoined from Matter, with Form only. Objects of the first class, (i.e., the concretes) have thus both principia and parts subordinate; but neither the one nor the other belong to the Form alone (a. 31). The plaster-statue passes when destroyed into plaster, the brazen circle into brass, Kallias into flesh and bones; and even the circle, when understood in a certain sense, into its segments, for the term circle is used equivocally, sometimes to designate the Form of a circle, sometimes to designate this or that particular circle — particular circles having no name peculiar to themselves (b. 3).

That which has been already said is the truth; yet let us try to recapitulate it in a still clearer manner (p. 1035, b. 4). The parts of the rational explanation or notion, into which that notion is divided, are prior to the notion, at least in some instances. But the notion of a right angle is prior to that of an acute angle or is one of the elements into which the notion of an acute angle is divided; for you cannot define an acute angle without introducing the right angle into your definition, nor can you define the semicircle without introducing the circle, nor the finger without introducing the man — the finger being such and such a part of the man. The parts into which man is divided as Matter, are posterior to man; those into which man is divided as parts of his Form or Formal Essence, are prior to man — at least some of them are so (b. 14). Now, since the soul of animals (which is the Essence of the animated being — b. 15) is the Essence and the Form and the t.?.e. of a suitably arranged body; and, since no good definition of any one part can be given, which does not include the function of that part, and this cannot be given without the mechanism of sense (b. 18), it follows that the parts of this soul, or some of them at least, are prior to the entire animal, alike in the general and in each particular case. But the body and its parts are posterior to the soul or Form, and into these, as parts, the entire man (not the Essence or Form) is divided. These parts are, in a certain sense, prior to the entire man, and, in a certain sense, not; for they cannot even exist at all separately (b. 23): the finger is not a finger unless it can perform its functions, i.e., unless it be animated by a central soul; it is not a finger in every possible state of the body to which it belongs; after death, it is merely a finger by equivocation of language. There are, however, some parts, such, as the brain or heart, to which the Form or Essence is specially attached which are neither prior nor posterior but simul to the entire animal (b. 25).

Man, horse, and such like, which are predicated universally of particular things, are not Essentia; they are compounds of a given Form and a given Matter (but of that first Matter) which goes to compose Universals. It is out of the last Matter, which comes lowest in the series, and is already partially invested with Form, that Sokrates and other particular beings are constituted (p. 1035, b. 30).

Thus, there are parts of the Form or t.?.e., parts of the Matter, and parts of the Compound including both. But it is only the parts of the Form that are included as parts in the rational explanation or notion; and this notion belongs to the Universal; for circle and the being a circle, soul and the being a soul — are one and the same (p. 1036, a. 2). Of the total compound (this particular circle), no notion, no definition, can be given: whether it be a particular circle perceivable by sense, in wood or brass, or merely conceivable, such as the mathematical figures. Such particular circles are known only along with actual perception or conception (a. 6. ??e?? here means the equivalent of ?fa??e?? = ?????e?? t? d?a???? — “die ThÄtigkeit des Abstrahirens, durch welche das Mathematische gewonnen wird” — Schwegler ad loc. Comm., p. 101, Pt. II.): when we dismiss them as actualities from our view or imagination, we cannot say clearly whether they continue to exist or not; but we always talk of them and know them by the rational explanation or definition of the universal circle (a. 7: ?pe????ta? d’ ?? t?? ??te?e?e?a? ?? d???? p?te??? p?t? e?s?? ? ??? e?s??, ???’ ?e? ?????ta? ?a? ????????ta? t? ?a????? ????. I apprehend that Aristotle is here speaking of the ?????? ???t?? only, not of the ?????? a?s??t?? or ?a????? ??????. He had before told us that, when the ?a????? ?????? passes out of ??te???e?a or f?e??eta?, it passes into ?a????. He can hardly therefore mean to say that, when the ?a????? ?????? passes out of ??te???e?a, we do not clearly know whether it exists or not. But respecting the ?????? ???t?? or mathematical circle, he might well say that we did not clearly know whether it existed at all under the circumstances supposed: if it cease to exist, we cannot say e?? ? f?e??eta?). Matter is unknowable per se (?a?’ a?t?? — a. 9, i.e., if altogether without Form). One variety of Matter is perceivable by sense, as brass, wood, and all moveable matter; another variety is conceivable, viz., that which exists in the perceivable variety, but not qu perceivable — the mathematical figures (???t? d? ? ?? t??? a?s??t??? ?p?????sa ? ? a?s??t?, ???? t? a??at??? — a. 12; i.e., making abstraction of the acts of sense, or of what is seen and felt by sense, viz., colour by the eye, resistance by the touch; and leaving behind simply the extension or possibility of motion, which is a geometrical line).

We have now laid down the true doctrine respecting Whole and Part, Prius and Posterius. And, if any one asks whether the right angle, the circle, the animal, is prior or not to the parts into which it is divided and out of which it is formed, we cannot answer absolutely either Yes or No. We must add some distinguishing words, specifying what we assert to be prior, and to what it is prior (p. 1036, a. 19). If by the soul you mean the Form or Essence of the living animal, by the circle, the Form of the circle, by the right angle, the Form or Essence thereof, — then this Form is posterior in regard to the notional parts of which it is constituted, but prior in regard to the particular circle or right angle. But, if by soul you meant the entire concrete animal, by right angle or circle, these two figures realized in brass or wood, then we must reply that any one of these is prior as regards the material parts of which it is constituted (a. 25).

Another reasonable doubt arises here (?p??e?ta? d’ e???t?? — p. 1036, a. 26) as to which parts belong to the Form alone, which to the entire Concrete. Unless this be made clear, we can define nothing; for that which we define is the Universal and the Form, and, unless we know what parts belong to the Matter and what do not, the definition of the thing can never be made plain (a. 30). Now, wherever the Form is seen to be superinduced upon matters diverse in their own Form, the case presents no difficulty: every one sees circles in brass, stone, wood, &c., and is well aware that neither the brass, nor the stone, belongs to the Form or Essence of the circle, since he easily conceives a circle without either. But, if a man had never seen any circles except brazen circles, he would have more difficulty in detaching mentally the circle from the brass, and would be more likely to look upon brass as belonging to the Form of circle; although, in point of fact, he would have no more logical ground for supposing so than in the case just before supposed; for the brass might still belong only to the Matter of circle (b. 2). This is the case with the Form of man. It is always seen implicated with flesh, bones, and such like parts. Are these parts of the Form of man? Or are they not rather parts of the Matter, though we are unable to conceive the Form apart from them, because we never see it in conjunction with any other Matter? This is at least a possibility, and we cannot see clearly in what cases it must be admitted. Some theorists are so impressed by it as to push the case farther, and apply the same reasoning to the circle and triangle. These theorists contend that it is improper to define a circle and a triangle by figure, lines, continuity, &c., which (they affirm) are only parts of the Matter of circle and triangle; as flesh and bones are parts of the Matter of man. They refer all of them to numbers as the Form, and they affirm that the definition of the dyad is also the definition of a line (b. 12). Among the partisans of Ideas, some call the dyad a?t???a? others call it the Form of a line; saying that in some cases the Form and that of which it is the Form are the same, as the dyad and the Form of the dyad, but that this is not true about line. (These two opinions seem to be substantially the same, and only to differ in the phrase. ??t???a? means the same as t? e?d?? t?? ??a??: it seems to have been a peculiar phrase adopted by some Platonists, but not by all. Others preferred to say t? e?d?? t?? ??a??.) These reasonings have already misled the Pythagoreans, and are likely to mislead others also: they would conduct us to the recognition of one and the same Form in many cases where the Form is manifestly different: they lead us even to assume one single Form universally, reducing every thing besides to be no Form, but merely Matter to that one single real Form. By such reasoning, we should be forced to consider all things as One (b. 20), which would be obviously absurd.

We see from hence that there are real difficulties respecting the theory of Definition, and how such difficulties arise. It is because some persons are forward overmuch in trying to analyse every thing and in abstracting altogether from Matter; for some things include Matter along with the Form, or determined in a certain way, i.e., this along with that, or these things in this condition (p, 1036, b. 22). The comparison which the younger Sokrates was accustomed to make about the animal is a mistaken one (b. 24): it implies that man may be without his material parts, as the circle may exist without brass. But this analogy will not hold; animal is something perceivable by sense and cannot be defined without motion; of course, therefore, not without bodily members organized in a certain way (b. 30). The hand is not a part of man, when it is in any supposable condition, but only when it can perform its functions, that is, when it is animated; when not animated, it is not a part (b. 32). Clearly the soul is the first Essence or Form, the body is Matter, and man or animal is the compound of both as an Universal; while Sokrates, Koriskus &c., are as particulars to this Universal, whether you choose to take Sokrates as soul without body, or as soul with body (p. 1037, a. 5-10: these words are very obscure).

Respecting Mathematical Entia, why are not the notions of the parts parts of the notion of the whole? e.g., why is not the notion of a semi-circle part of the notion of a circle? Perhaps it will be replied that this circle and semi-circle are not perceivable by sense: but this after all makes no difference; for some things even not perceivable by sense involve Matter along with them, and indeed Matter is involved in every thing which is not t.?.e. and Form a?t? ?a?’ a?t?. The semi-circles are not included as parts of the notion of the universal circle; but they are parts of each particular circle: for there is one Matter perceivable and another cogitable (p. 1036, a. 34. — Bonitz remarks that these words from p. 1036, a. 22 to p. 1037, a. 5, are out of their proper place). Whether there be any other Matter, besides the Matter of these Mathematical Entia, and whether we are to seek a distinct Form and Essence for them — such as numbers, must be reserved for future enquiry. This has been one of our reasons for the preceding chapters about perceivable Essences; for these last properly belong to the province of Second Philosophy — of the physical theorist (t?? f?s???? ?a? de?t??a? f???s?f?a? ????? — p. 1037, a. 15). The physical philosopher studies not merely the Matter, but the Form or notional Essence even more (a. 17).

We are now in a position to clear up what was touched upon in the Analytica (Anal. Poster. II. p. 92, a. 27; also, De Interp. v. p. 17, a. 13), but not completed, respecting Definition. How is it that the definition is One? We define man animal bipes: How is it that this is One and not Many? Man and white are two, when the latter does not belong to the former: when it does so belong to and affects the former, the two are One — white man (p. 1037, b. 16): that is, they are One ?at? p????. But the parts included in the definition are not One ?at? p????, nor are they one ?at? ??e???; for the Genus cannot be said to partake of the DifferentiÆ. If it did, it would at one and the same time partake of Opposita, for the DifferentiÆ are Opposita to each other. And, even if we say that the Genus does partake of the DifferentiÆ, the same difficulty recurs, when the DifferentiÆ are numerous. The Genus must partake alike and equally of all of them; but how is it that all of them are One, and not Many? It cannot be meant that all of them belong essentially to the thing; for, if that were so, all would be included in the definition, which they are not. We want to know why or how those DifferentiÆ which are included in the definition coalesce into One, without the rest: for we call the definiend ?? t? ?a? t?de t? (b. 27).

In answering this question, we take, as a specimen, a definition which arises out of the logical subdivision of a Genus (p. 1037, b. 28). Definition is given by assigning the Genus and Difference: the Genus is the Matter, the Difference is the Form or Essence; the two coalesce into one as Form and Matter. In the definition of man — animal bipes — animal is the Matter and bipes the Form; so that the two coalescing form an essential One. It does not signify through how many stages the logical subdivision is carried, provided it be well done; that is, provided each stage be a special and appropriate division of all that has preceded. If this condition be complied with, the last differentia will include all the preceding, and will itself be the Form of which the genus serves as Matter. You divide the genus animal first into ???? ?p?p??? — ???? ?p???; you next divide ???? ?p?p??? into ???? ?p?p??? d?p??? — ???? ?p?p??? p???p???; or perhaps into ???? ?p?p??? s????p?? — ???? ?p?p??? ?s??st??. It is essential that the next subdivision applied to ???? ?p?p??? should be founded upon some subordinate differentia specially applying to the feet (p. 1038, a. 14: a?ta? ??? d?af??a? p?d??· ? ??? s????p?d?a p?d?t?? t??). If it does not specially apply to the feet, but takes in some new attribute (e. g., pte??t??, ?pte???), the division will be unphilosophical. The last differentia ???? d?p??? includes the preceding differentia ?p?p???: to say ???? ?p?p??? d?p??? would be tautology. Where each differentia is a differentia of the preceding differentiÆ, the last differentia includes them all and is itself the Form and Essence, along with the genus as Matter (a. 25). The definition is the rational explanation arising out of these differences, and by specifying the last it virtually includes all the preceding (a. 29: ? ???s?? ????? ?st?? ? ?? t?? d?af????, ?a? t??t?? t?? te?e?ta?a? ?at? ?e t? ?????).

In the constituents of the Essence, there is no distinctive order of parts; no subordination of prius and posterius; all are equally essential and coordinate (t???? d’ ??? ?st?? ?? t? ??s?? — p. 1038, a. 33).

As we are treating now about Essence, it will be convenient to go back to the point from which we departed, when we enumerated the four varieties recognized by different philosophers. These were (1) The Subject — Substratum — Matter, which is a subject of predicates in two different ways: either as already an Hoc Aliquid and affected by various accidents, or as not yet an Hoc Aliquid, but simply Matter implicated with Entelechy (p. 1038, b. 6); (2) Form — Essence — the t.?.e.; (3) The Compound or Product of the preceding two; (4) The Universal (t? ?a?????). Of these four, we have already examined the first three; we now proceed to the fourth.

Some philosophers consider the Universal to be primarily and eminently Cause and Principle (p. 1038, b. 7). But it seems impossible that any thing which is affirmed universally can be Essence. For that is the First Essence of each thing which belongs to nothing but itself; but the Universal is by its nature common to many things. Of which among these things is it the Essence? Either of all or of no one. Not of all certainly; and, if it be the Essence of any one, the rest of them will be identical with that one; for, where the Essence is one, the things themselves are one (b. 15). Besides, the Essence is that which is not predicated of any subject: but the Universal is always predicated of a subject.

Perhaps, however, we shall be told, that the Universal is not identical with t.?.e., but is Essence which is immanent in or belongs to t.?.e., as animal in man and horse. But this cannot be admitted. For, whether we suppose animal to be definable or not, if it be essence of any thing, it must be the essence of something to which it belongs peculiarly, as homo is the essence of man peculiarly; but, if animal is to be reckoned as the essence of man, it will be the essence of something to which it does not peculiarly belong; and this contradicts the definition of Essence (p. 1038, b. 15-23. This passage is very obscure, even after Bonitz and Schwegler’s explanatory notes. I incline to Schwegler, and to his remark, Comm. II. p. 115, that the text of b. 23 ought to be written ?? ? ? ?? ?d??? ?p???e?.).

Again, it is impossible that Essence, if composed of any elements, can be composed of what is not Essence, as of Quality; for this would make Quality prius as regards Essence; which it cannot be, either in reason (????), or in time, or in generation. If this were so, the affections would be separable from Essences (p. 1038, b. 28). Essence, if composed of any thing, must be composed of Essence.

Once more, if the individual man or horse are Essences, nothing which is in the definition of these can be Essence; nor apart from that of which it is Essence; nor in any thing else. There cannot be any man, apart from individual men (p. 1038, b. 34).

Hence we see clearly that none of the universal predicates are Essence: none of them signify Hoc Aliquid, but Tale. To suppose otherwise, would open the door to many inadmissible consequences, especially to the argument of the ‘Third Man’ (p. 1039, a. 2).

Another argument to the same purpose:— It is impossible that Essence can be composed of different Essences immanent in one Entelechy. Two in the same Entelechy can never be One in Entelechy. If indeed they be two in potentiÂ, they may coalesce into one Entelechy, like one double out of two potential halves. But Entelechy establishes a separate and complete existence (p. 1039, a. 7); so that, if Essence is One, it cannot be made up of distinct Essences immanent or inherent. Demokritus, who recognized only the atoms as Essences, was right in saying, that two of them could not be One, nor one of them Two. The like is true about number, if number be, as some contend, a synthesis of monads. For either the dyad is not One; or else the monads included therein are not monads ??te?e?e?? (a. 14).

Here however we stumble upon a difficulty. For, if no Essence can be put together out of Universals, nor any compound Essence out of other Essences existing as Entelechies, all Essence must necessarily be simple and uncompounded, so that no definition can be given of it. But this is opposed to every one’s opinion, and to what has been said long ago, that Essence alone could be defined; or at least Essence most of all. It now appears that there can be no definition of Essence, nor by consequence of any thing else. Perhaps, however this may be only true in a certain sense: in one way, definition is possible; in another way, not. We shall endeavour to clear up the point presently (p. 1039, a. 22. — Schwegler says in his note upon this passage: “Die von Aristoteles hÄufig berÜhrte, doch nie zur abschliessenden LÖsung gebrachte, Grundaporie des aristotelischen Systems” — Comm. II. p. 117).

Those who maintain that Ideas are self-existent are involved in farther contradictions by admitting at the same time that the Species is composed out of Genus and Differentia. For, suppose that these Ideas are self-existent and that a?t????? exists both in man and horse: a?t????? is, in these two, either the same or different numerically. It is, of course, the same in definition or notion (????); of that there can be no doubt. If it be numerically same (?spe? s? sa?t?) in man and in horse, how can this same exist at once in separate beings, unless we suppose the absurdity that it exists apart from itself (p. 1039, b. 1)? Again, are we to imagine that this generic Ens, a?t?????, partakes at the same time of contrary differentiÆ — the dipod, polypod, apod? If it does not, how can dipodic or polypodic animals really exist? Nor is the difficulty at all lessened, if, instead of saying that the generic Ens partakes of differentiÆ, you say that it is mixed with them, or compounded of them, or in contact with them. There is nothing but a tissue of absurdities (p??ta ?t?a — b. 6).

But take the contrary supposition and suppose that the a?t????? is numerically different in man, horse, &c. On this admission, there will be an infinite number of distinct beings of whom the a?t????? is the Essence; man, for example, since animal is not accidental, but essential, as a constituent of man (p. 1039, b. 8). ??t????? will thus be Many (“ein Vielerlei” — Schwegler); for it will be the Essence of each particular animal, of whom it will be predicated essentially and not accidentally (?? ??? ??t’ ???? ???eta? — i.e., this is not a case where the predicate is something distinct from the subject). Moreover all the constituents of man will be alike Ideas (e.g., not merely ????, but d?p???): now the same cannot be Idea of one thing and Essence of another; accordingly, a?t????? will be each one of the essential constituents of particular animals (d?p???, p???p???, b. 14).

Again, whence comes a?t????? itself, and how do the particular animals arise out of it? How can the ???? which is Essence, exist apart from and alongside of a?t? t? ????? (p. 1039, b. 15.)

These arguments show how impossible it is that there can exist any such Ideas as some philosophers affirm (p. 1039, b. 18).

We have already said that there are two varieties of Essence: (1) The Form alone, (2) The Form embodied in Matter. The Form or Essence in the first meaning, is neither generable nor destructible; in the second meaning it is both. ?? ????? e??a? is neither generable nor destructible; t? t?de t? ????? e??a? is both the one and the other (p. 1039, b. 25). Of these last, therefore, the perceivable or concrete Essences, there can be no definition nor demonstration, because they are implicated with Matter, which is noway necessary, or unchangeable, but may exist or not exist, change or not change. Demonstration belongs only to what is necessary; Definition only to Science, which cannot be to-day Science and to-morrow Ignorance. Neither Science, nor Demonstration, nor Definition, applies to such things as may be otherwise: these latter belong to Opinion (t?? ??de?????? ????? ??e?? — p. 1040, a. 1). You cannot have Science or Demonstration or Definition about particular or perceivable things, because they are destroyed and pass out of perception, so that you do not know what continues to be true about them; even though you preserve the definition in your memory, you cannot tell how far it continues applicable to them (a. 7). Any definition given is liable to be overthrown.

Upon the same principle, there cannot be any definition of the Platonic Ideas; each of which is announced as a particular, distinct, separable, Ens (p. 1040, a. 8). The definition must be composed of words — of the words of a language generally understood — and of words which, being used by many persons, are applicable to other particulars besides the definiend (you define Alexander as white, thin, a philosopher, a native of Aphrodisias, &c., all of which are characteristics applicable to many other persons besides). The definer may say that each characteristic taken separately will apply to many things, but that the aggregate of all together will apply to none except the definiend. We reply however, that ???? d?p??? must have at least two subjects to which it applies — t? ???? and t? d?p???. Of course this is all the more evident about eternal Entia like the Platonic Ideas, which are prior to the compound and parts thereof (???? and d?p??? are each prior and both of them parts of a?t??????p??), and separable, just as a?t??????p?? is separable (a. 14-20); for either neither of them is separable, or both are so. If neither of them is separable, then the Genus is nothing apart from the Species, and the Platonic assumption of self-existent Ideas falls to the ground; if both are separable, then the Differentia is self-existent as well as the Genus (a. 21): there exist some Ideas prior to other Ideas. Moreover, the Genus and Differentia, the component elements of the Species, are logically prior to the Species: suppress the Species, and you do not suppress its component elements; suppress these, and you do suppress the Species (a. 21). We reply farther that, if the more compound Ideas arise out of the less compound, the component elements (like ???? d?p???) must needs be predicable of many distinct subjects. If this be not so always, how are we to distinguish the cases in which it is true from those in which it is not? You must assume the existence of some Idea which can only be predicated of some one subject, and no others. But this seems impossible. Every Idea is participable (a. 27).

These philosophers do not reflect that definition is impossible of eternal Essences (which the Platonic Ideas are), especially in cases where the objects are essentially unique, as Sun, or Moon, or Earth (p. 1040, a. 29). When they try to define Sun, they are forced to use phrases which are applicable to many in common; but Sun, (and each Idea) is particular and individual, like Kleon or Sokrates. Why does none of them produce a definition of an Idea? If any one tried, he would soon see the pertinence of the above remarks (b. 3). (Alexander, Bonitz, and Schwegler, all observe incidentally that the reasoning of what immediately precedes is weak and sophistical. Bonitz, p. 352, gives a good summary of the chapter, concluding: “Hoc capite non id ipsum demonstrat, res singulas non esse substantias, sed rerum singularum non esse definitionem neque scientiam; nimirum quum substantiÆ vel unice vel potissimum esse definitionem demonstratum sit, c. 4, hoc si comprobat, illud simul est comprobatum.”)

It is farther evident that many apparent Essences are not strictly and truly Essences; for example, the parts of animals; since not one of them is separated from the whole (????? ??? ?e????s???? a?t?? ?st?? — p. 1040, b. 6; Alexander says ad loc.: ??s?a? ??e??? fae? ?sa ?a?’ a?t? ??ta d??ata? t? ???e??? ????? ?p?te?e??· ??s?a ??? ??d?? ???? ?st?? ? t? ?f’ ?? t? ???st?? ????? ??p?????ta?· ??s?a ??? ?a? e?d?? S????t??? ? t?? S????t??? ????, ?f’ ?? a?t? t? t?? ?????p?? ? ?????p?? ????? ??p??????). When any one of them is separated, it exists only in the character of Matter — earth, fire, air; none of them, in this separate condition, being an unity, but only like a heap of grains of gold or tin before they are melted and combined into one. We might suppose, indeed, that the parts of the body, and the parts of the soul, of animated beings, come near to Essence, both one and the other, alike potentially and actually (b. 12), because they have principles of motion in their turnings (?apa??), so that in some cases they continue separately alive after division. Still the functions of the part alone must be really regarded as nothing more than potential, wherever the oneness and continuity of the whole is the work of Nature (b. 15), and not a mere case of contact or forcible conjunction.

Nevertheless the being One, or Unity (p. 1040, b. 16), is not itself the Essence of things. Unum is predicated in the same manner as Ens; the two may always be predicated together: the Essence of Unum is One; and things of which the Essence is Unum Numero, are themselves numerically one. Neither Unum nor Ens is the Essence of things any more than the being an Element, or the being a Principle, can be the Essence thereof: we have farther to enquire what the Principle is, in order to bring the problem into a more cognizable shape (b. 20). Unum and Ens are more near to Essence than either Element, Principle, or Cause; nevertheless neither Unum nor Ens is Essence; for nothing which is common to many things is Essence. Essence belongs only to itself and to that which has itself. Farther, Unum cannot be in many places at once; but that which is common is in many places at once. It is thus plain that nothing Universal exists apart or separate from particulars (b. 27).

The advocates of the (Platonic) Ideas are right in affirming them to be separate, if they be Essences; but they are wrong in calling that which is predicable of many things (the Universal) an Idea (p. 1040, b. 29). When asked, What are these indestructible Essences of which you speak, as apart from the visible individual objects? — they had no intelligible answer to give. Accordingly they were forced to make these Essences the same specifically with the destructible (individual) objects; for these we do know (b. 33). They simply prefixed the word a?t? to the names of sensible objects — a?t??????p??, a?t??pp??. But these Ideas might still exist, even though we knew not what they were; just as eternal Essences like the stars would still exist, even though we had never seen them (p. 1041, a. 2).

Let us again examine what we call Essence, and what sort of thing it is; and let us take another point of departure, which may perhaps help us to understand what that Essence is which is apart and separate from perceivable Essences (p. 1041, a. 9). We know that Essence is a certain variety of Principle or Cause; and from this premiss we will reason (a. 10). Now the enquiry into Cause, or the Why, always comes in this shape: Why does one thing belong to another? The enquiry, Why a thing is itself? is idle. The fact — the ?t? — must be assumed to be clear and known in the first instance. You know that the moon is eclipsed, as matter of fact; you proceed to enquire into the cause thereof (a. 11-24). Why does it thunder? or, to enunciate the same question more fully, Why is there noise in the clouds? The quÆsitum is always one thing predicated of another (a. 26). Why are these materials, bricks and stones, a house? Here the answer sought is, the Cause; and that is the t.?.e., speaking in logical or analytical phraseology (??????? — i.e., that which belongs to the ????? t?? ??s?a?). In some cases, this quÆsitum is a Final Cause, as in the case of a bed or a house; in others, an Efficient or Movent Cause; for that also is a variety of Cause, generally sought for in regard to things generated or destroyed; but the other (viz., t? t.?.e., “ipsa rei forma ac notio, aut concepta in animo artificis, aut inclusa d???e? in ips natur ac semine rei” — Bonitz, Comm. p. 359) is sought for in regard to e??a?.

The true nature of the quÆsitum is often unperceived, when the problem is announced without stating distinctly the subject and predicate in their mutual relations (?? t??? ? ?ata?????? ?e???????, p. 1041, a. 33). For example, ?????p?? d?? t? ?st??; is ambiguous by imperfect enunciation. As it stands, it might be supposed to be intended as ?????p?? d?? t? ?st?? ?????p??; which would be a question idle or null. To make it clear, you ought to distinguish the two members to which the real quÆsitum refers (b. 2), and say d?? t? t?de ? t?de ?st?? ?????p??; your real enquiry is about the ??? or Matter, why it exists in this or that manner. Why are these materials a house? Because the Essence of a house belongs to them (b. 6). Some t.?.e., some sort of e??a?, must belong to the Matter (b. 4). Why is this Matter a man? or why is the body disposed in this particular way a man? Here we enquire as to the Cause which acts upon a certain Matter; and that is the Form whereby the thing is; which again is the Essence (b. 8).

Hence it is plain that a distinction must be taken between the Simple and the Compound. The enquiry above described, and the teaching above described, cannot apply to the Simple, which must be investigated in another way (p. 1041, b. 9). Compounds are of two sorts — aggregates like a heap (mechanical), and aggregates like a syllable (organic or formal). In these last there are not merely the constituent elements, but something else besides (b. 16). The syllable ba is something more than the letters b and a; flesh is something more than fire and earth, its constituent elements. Now this something more cannot be itself a constituent element; for, if that were so, flesh would be composed of three constituent elements instead of two, and we should still have to search for the something beyond, and this ulterior process might be repeated ad infinitum (b. 22). Nor can the something beyond be itself a compound of several elements, for we should still have to find the independent something which binds these into a compound. It is plain that this something beyond must be in its nature quite distinct from an element, and must be the cause why one compound is flesh, another compound a syllable, and so about all the remaining compounds. Now this is the Essence of each compound — the First Cause of existence to each (b. 25). The Element (st???e???) is that into which the compound is separated, as included Matter (???p????? ?? ????): b and a, in the syllable ba (b. 32). There are some things which are not the Essences of objects (white, for example, is not of the Essence of man, but an attribute); but, in all cases where compounds have come together according to Nature and by natural process, that Nature also which is not Element but Principle is the Essence (b. 28: ?pe? d’ ???a ??? ??s?a? t?? p?a??t??, ???’ ?sa? ??s?a? ?at? f?s?? ?a? f?se? s??est??as?, fa?e?? ?? ?a? a?t? ? f?s?? ??s?a, ? ?st?? ?? st???e??? ???’ ????. Schwegler in his note, p. 135, proposes to correct this passage by striking out ?a? before the words a?t? ? f?s?? ??s?a. But, if this were done, it would make the passage mean that ??? or st???e??? is not ??s?a, and that the other f?s?? which is not st???e???, is to be regarded exclusively as ??s?a. Now this is certainly not the doctrine of Aristotle, who expressly declares ??? to be ??s?a; see H, p. 1042, a. 32. Retaining the ?a?, the passage will then mean that not merely ???, but also f?s?? which is not ???, is ??s?a).