We have to speculate respecting Essence; for that which we are in search of is the principles and causes of Essences (p. 1069, a. 18). If we look upon the universe as one whole, Essence is the first part thereof: if we look upon it as a series of distinct units (e? t? ?fe???, a. 20), even in that view ??s?a stands first, p???? next, p?s?? third; indeed these last are not Entia at all, strictly speaking (a. 21) — I mean, for example, qualities and movements, and negative attributes such as not-white and not-straight; though we do talk of these last too as Entia, when we say Est non-album. Moreover Essence alone, and none of the other Categories, is separable. The old philosophers (?? ???a???) are in the main concurrent with us on this point, that Essence is prius to all others; for they investigated the principles, the elements, and the causes of Essence. The philosophers of the present day (Plato, &c.) declare Universals, rather than Particulars, to be Essences; for the genera are universal, which these philosophers, from devoting themselves to dialectical discussions, affirm to be more properly considered as Principles and Essences (a. 28); but the old philosophers considered particular things to be Essences, as fire and earth, for example, not the common body or Body in general (?? t? ?????? s?a — a. 30).

Now there are three Essences. The Perceivable includes two varieties: one, the Perishable, acknowledged by all, e.g., animals and plants; the other Eternal, of which we must determine the elements, be they many or one. There is also the Immoveable, which some consider to be separable (???? d? ?????t?? ?a? ta?t?? t???? e??a? fas? ????st?? — p. 1069, a. 33; ??s?a ???t? ?a? ?????t?? — Schwegler’s note): either recognizing two varieties thereof, distinct from each other — the Forms and Mathematical Entia; or not recognizing Forms as separable Entia, but only the Mathematical Entia (a. 36). Now the first, or Perceivable Essences, belong to physical science, since they are moveable or endued with motion; the Immoveable Essences, whether there be two varieties of them or only one, belong to a science distinct from physical. The Perceivable and the Immoveable Essences have no common principles (b. 2).

The Perceivable Essence is subject to change (eta??t?). Since change takes place either out of Opposites or out of Intermediates, and not out of every variety of Opposites, but only out of Contraries (?? t?? ???e?a? ?p?f?se??, ?? t?? ???e?a? ste??se?? — Alexander, pp. 644, 645, Bon.; the voice, e.g., is not white, yet change does not take place from voice to white, these being disparates, or of different genera: t? ???e? d?af????ta ??? ??e? ?d?? e?? ?????a — I. iv. p. 1055, a. 6), there must of necessity be a certain Substratum which changes into the contrary condition; for contraries do not change into each other. The substratum remains, but the contraries do not remain: there is therefore a third something besides the contraries; and that is Matter (p. 1069, b. 9). Since then the varieties of change are four: (1) ???es?? and f???? (?at? t? t?), (2) a???s?? ?a? f??s?? (?at? t? p?s??), (3) ??????s?? (?at? t? p???? or ?at? t? p????), (4) f??? (?at? t?p?? or ?at? t? p??), each of these changes will take place into its respective contrary: the Matter will necessarily change, having the potentiality of both contraries (b. 14). Ens being two-fold, all change takes place out of Ens Potenti into Ens Actu, e.g., out of potential white into actual white; and the like holds for Increase and Decrease. Thus not only may there be generation from Non-Ens accidentally but all generation takes place also out of Ens; that is, out of Ens PotentiÂ, not Ens Actu (b. 20). This Ens Potenti is what Anaxagoras really means by his Unum, which is a better phrase than ??? p??ta; what Empedokles and Anaxagoras mean by their ??a; what Demokritus means when he says ??? p??ta. They mean that all things existed at once potentially, though not actually; and we see that these philosophers got partial hold of the idea of Matter (?ste t?? ???? ?? e?e? ????? — b. 24). All things subject to change possess Matter, but each of them a different Matter; even the eternal things which are not generated but moved in place, possess Matter — not generated, but from whence whither (i.e., the Matter of local movement pure and simple — direction: ?a? t?? ??d??? ?sa ? ?e???t? ????t? d? f???, ???’ ?? ?e???t?? (????), ???? p??e? p?? — b. 26).

Since there are three varieties of Non-Ens (p. 1069, b. 27; Alexander and Bonitz explain this t????? differently), it may seem difficult to determine, out of which among the three Generation takes place. But the answer is, that the Potential Ens is not potential of every thing alike and at haphazard, but potential in each case from something towards something (e? d? t? ?st? d???e?, ???’ ??? ?? t?? t????t??, ???’ ?te??? ?? ?t???? — b. 29). Nor is it enough to tell us that all things are huddled together (??? p??ta ???ata — b. 30); for they differ in respect to Matter or Potentiality. If this were not so, how is it that they are of infinite diversity, and not all One? The NoÛs (i.e., according to the theory of Anaxagoras) is One; so that, if the Matter were One also, it would become in actuality that which it was at first in potentiality, and the result would be all One and the Same (b. 32).

The Causes are thus three and the Principles are three: the pair of Contraries, one of them Form (????? ?a? e?d??), the other Privation, and the third Matter (p. 1069, b. 35). But we must keep in mind that neither Materia Prima nor Forma Prima is generated. For in all Change, there is something (the Matter) which undergoes change; something by which the change is effected (the Prime Movent, ?f’ ?? ??, t?? p??t?? ??????t?? — p. 1070, a. 1); and something into which the change takes place (the Form). The brass becomes round; but, if both the brass becomes and the round becomes, you will be condemned to an infinite regression: you must stop somewhere (?????? d? st??a? — a. 4). Moreover, every Essentia is generated out of another Essentia of the same name and form (?? s??????? — a. 5). All generated things proceed either from Nature, Art, Fortune, or Spontaneity. It is Nature, where the principle or beginning is in the subject itself; it is Art, where the principle or beginning is in something apart from the subject; Fortune is the privation of Art; Spontaneity is the privation of Nature (a? d? ???pa? a?t?a? ste??se?? t??t?? — a. 9). EssentiÆ are threefold: (1) Matter, which appears to be Hoc Aliquid but is not so, for detached members or fragments, simply touching each other without coalescing, are matter and substratum (i.e., prepared for something ulterior); (2) Nature, which is really Hoc Aliquid — a certain definite condition, into which generation takes place (? d? f?s?? ?a? t?de t?, e?? ??, ?a? ???? t?? — a. 12); (3) The Concrete of the two preceding — the individual object called Sokrates or Kallias. In some cases there is no Hoc Aliquid except in this Concrete or Compound; thus in artificial objects or productions, such as a house or health, there is no Form except the Art itself: the ideal house, pre-existing in the mind of the builder, is generated and destroyed in a different sense from the real house. It is in the case of natural objects, if in any case, that there exists a Hoc Aliquid independent of the concrete individual (a. 17).

Hence Plato was not wrong in saying that Forms were coextensive with natural objects (?p?sa f?se? — p. 1070, a. 18), if there are Forms distinct from these objects: such as fire, flesh, head, which are all properly Matter. The Last Matter (or that which has come most under the influence of Form) belongs to that which is in the fullest sense Essentia (or the individual concrete named Sokrates or Kallias — a. 20). The Moving Causes pre-exist, as real individual beings or objects: the Formal Causes come into existence simultaneously with the individual real compound. When the patient becomes well, then health comes at the same time into existence: when the brazen sphere comes, the sphericity of it comes at the same time (a. 24). Whether any thing of the Form continues after the dissolution of the individual compound, is a problem to be investigated (a. 25). In some cases nothing hinders but what it may continue; for example, the soul may be of such a nature: I do not mean every soul — for every soul perhaps cannot continue — but the ???? or rational soul (a. 27). Still it is plain that this affords no support to the theory of self-existent separate Ideas; for every individual man is begotten by another individual man. In like manner also with respect to the arts; for the medical art affords the Form or rational explanation of health (a. 30; i.e., health is generated, not by the Idea of Health, but by the medical art, or by the artist in whom that art is embodied).

Causes and principles, in one point of view, are different: different subjects; but in another point of view, they are the same for all; that is, if we speak generally and according to analogy (if we confine ourselves to the most general terms, Form, Privation, Matter, &c.). In respect to Essentia, Relatio, and the remainder of the Categories, a difficulty arises to say whether the causes, elements, and principles of all the Categories are the same. It would be strange if they were all the same; because then EssentiÆ, as well as Relata, would proceed out of the same causes and elements. For, what can these latter be? They cannot be extra-categorical; since there exists no general class apart from or besides Essentia and the other Categories (p. 1070, b. 1). Nor can any one Category be the element of the others: for the element is prius to that of which it is the element. Nor again can Essentia be the element of Relata; nor is any one of the nine Categories the element of Essentia. Again, how is it possible that the elements of all the Categories can be the same? No element can be the same as that compound of which it is an element: neither B nor A can be the same as B A. If, therefore, there were such elements, they must be extra-categorical; which is impossible. Nor can the element in question (the supposed one and the same) be any cogitable, such as Ens or Unum; for every individual Concrete is both Ens and Unum and the element cannot be identical with the compound put together out of it. Neither Essentia nor Relatio could be said to exist, if Ens were the element out of which they are composed; but these Categories exist necessarily: therefore there is no one and the same element common to all the Categories (b. 9).

Yet we ought perhaps rather to repeat, what was observed before, that in one sense, the elements of all are the same; in another sense, different. Take for example the perceivable bodies. We find here hot as the Form, cold as the Privation; as Matter, there is that which is, primarily and per se, both hot and cold potentially: the hot and the cold are both EssentiÆ; likewise other things of which these are the principles, e.g., flesh and bone, which of necessity are different from the principles out of which they proceed (b. 15). Flesh and bone have these elements and principles; other things have other elements and principles. The same specific principles cannot be assigned to all, but only principles analogous to these in each case, as saying, in general terms, that there are three principles — Form, Privation, Matter. Each of these is different in every different genus; thus in colour, the principles are white, black, surface, light, darkness, air, and out of these are generated day and night (b. 21).

The three preceding causes are all intrinsic or immanent (???p?????ta). But there are other causes also extrinsic, such as the Movent. So that Principle and Element are not exactly identical; for Principle as well as Cause includes all the four: t? ?????? ? ?st?? is a Principle, and is itself an Essentia (p. 1070, b. 25). Thus the analogous Elements are three, while the Principles or Causes are four; but the four are specifically different in each different case. Thus, health is Form; sickness is Privation; body is Matter; the medical art is Movent. House is Form; disorder of a certain sort is Privation; bricks are Matter; the building art is Movent. We thus make out four Causes; yet, in a certain sense, there will be only three (b. 32). For, in natural products, a man is the Movent Cause of a man; in artificial products (?? t??? ?p? d?a???a?) the Movent is Form or Privation. In a certain sense, the medical art is health, and the building art is the Form of a house, and a man begets a man. And farther, over and above these special movent causes, there is the Primum Movens of all (b. 35).We distinguish what is separable from what is not separable. Now EssentiÆ, and they only, are separable; accordingly they are the causes of every thing else, since without EssentiÆ there cannot be either affections or movements (p. 1071, a. 2). Such causes would be soul and body, or reason, appetite, and body. Again, in another sense, the principles of all things are generically the same, though specifically different; such are Potentia and Actus. In some cases, the same thing exists now potentially, at another time actually; thus wine, though actually wine, is potentially vinegar; flesh is actually flesh, potentially a man, Potentia and Actus will merge in the above-mentioned causes — Form, Privation, Matter, Movent (a. 7). For the Form (if it be separable), the Concrete (of Form and Matter), and Privation (like darkness or sickness) — all these exist actually; while Matter exists potentially, capable either of Form or Privation. Things differ potentially and actually sometimes through difference in the Matter, sometime through difference in the Form. Thus, the cause of a man is, in the way of Matter, the elements fire and earth; in the way of Form his own Form, and the same Form in another individual — his father and besides these, the Sun with its oblique motion; which last neither Matter, nor Form, nor Privation, nor the like Form in another individual, but a Movent Cause (???? ??????ta — a. 17).

We must remember, besides, that some things may be described in general terms, others cannot be so described. The first principles of all things are, speaking in general terms, Hoc Primum Actu and Aliud Primum PotentiÂ. These universals do not really exist (p. 1071, a. 19), for the principium of all individuals is some other individual. Man indeed is the principium of the Universal Man but no Universal Man exists (a. 21). Peleus is the principium of Achilles; your father, of you; this B, of that B A; B, the universal, of B A the universal. Next (after the Movent) come the Forms of Essences; but the different genera thereof (as has been already stated), colours, sounds, essences, quantities, &c., have different causes and elements, though the same when described in general terms and by analogy; also different individuals in the same species have different causes and elements, not indeed different in species, but different individually; that is, your Matter, your Movent, your Form, are different from mine, though in general terms and definition they are the same (t? ?a????? d? ???? ta?t? — a. 29).

When therefore, we enquire, What are the principles or elements of Essences, of Relata, of Qualities &c., and whether they are the same or different? it is plain that, generically speaking (allowing for difference of meaning — p???a???, p. 1071, a. 31), they are the same in each; but, speaking distributively and with reference to particulars, they are different, and not the same. In the following sense (?d? — a. 34), they are the same, namely, in the way of Analogy (t? ????????). They are always Matter, Form, Privation, the Movent; hence the causes of Essences are causes of all other things, since, when Essences disappear, all the rest disappears along with them: besides all these, there is the Primum Movens Actuale, common to all (?t? t? p??t?? ??te?e?e?? — a. 36). In the following sense, again, they are different — when we cease to speak of genera, and pass from equivocal terms to particulars: wherever there are different opposites (as white and black, health and sickness) and wherever there are different Matters (?a? ?t? a? ??a? — p. 1071, b. 1; ??a? in the plural, rare).

We have thus declared, respecting the principles of Perceivable Essences, what and how many they are; in what respect the same, and in what respect they are different. Essences are threefold; two Physical and one Immoveable. We shall proceed to speak of this last. There exists, of necessity, some Eternal, Immoveable Essence. For Essences are the first of all existent things; and, if they all be perishable, every thing is perishable. But it is impossible that Motion can ever have been generated or can ever be destroyed; for it always existed: it is eternal. There is the like impossibility about Time: for, if Time did not exist, there could be nothing prius and nothing posterius (p. 1071, b. 8). Both Motion and Time are thus eternal; both are also continuous; for either the two are identical, or Time is an affection (p????) of Motion. Now no mode of Motion is continuous except local motion; and that in a circle (for rectilinear motion cannot be continuous and eternal). There must be a Movent or Producent Principle (????t???? ? p???t???? — b. 12); but, if the Movent existed potentially and not actually, there could not be motion continuous and eternal; for that which has mere power may never come into act. There will be no use therefore in such eternal Essences as Plato assumes in his Ideas, unless there be along with them some principle of potential change (e? ? t?? d??a??? ???sta? ???? eta???e?? — b. 15). Nor indeed will even that be sufficient (i.e., any principle of merely potential change), nor any other Essence (such as Numbers — Schwegler) besides or along with the Platonic Ideas; for, if this principium shall not come into Actuality (e? ? ??e???se? — b. 17), the motion which we postulate, continuous and eternal, will not result from it. Nor will it even be sufficient that the Movent Principle should be supposed to be in actuality or operation (??d’ e? ??e???se?, p. 1071, b. 18), if its Essence be Potentiality: the motion resulting therefrom cannot be eternal; for that which exists potentially may perhaps not exist at all. The Movent Principles therefore must be something of which the Essence is Actuality (b. 19), and which shall be without Matter, for they must be eternal, otherwise nothing else can be eternal. They must therefore be essential Actualities (b. 22).

Here however, a difficulty suggests itself. It seems that every thing which is in actuality must also be in potentiality, but that every thing which is in potentiality does not in every case come into actuality: so that Potentiality seems the prius of the two (d??e? ??? t? ?? ??e????? p?? d??as?a?, t? d? d???e??? ?? p?? ??e??e?? — p. 1071, b. 24; Bonitz compares p. 1060, a. 1: ???? ??? t? s??a?a?????). But, if this were true, no Entia could exist; for it may be that they exist potentially, but not yet exist actually (b. 26). There is the like impossibility, if we adopt the theory of those theologians (Orpheus, Hesiod, &c.) who take their departure from Night, or of those physical philosophers who begin with a chaotic huddle of all things. In both cases such original condition is one of mere potentiality; and how can it ever be put in motion, if there is to be no cause in actuality (e? ???? ?sta? ??e??e?? a?t??? — b. 29)? Matter will never cause motion in itself, but must wait for the carpenter’s art; nor will the earth, but must wait for seed.

It is for this reason that some philosophers, like Plato and Leukippus, represent Actuality as eternal; for they say that motion has always existed. But they do not say what variety of motion, nor why that variety, to the exclusion of others. For nothing is moved at haphazard; there must always be some reason why it is moved in one way rather than another: for example, by nature in one way; by other causes, such as violence or NoÛs, in some other way (p. 1071, b. 36). But it is not competent to Plato to assume what he sometimes does assume as principium (p. 1072, a. 2 — allusion to Plato PhÆdrus 245, E), viz., a Self-Movent; for Plato affirms (in TimÆus 34, B) that the soul is posterius, and coÆval with the Kosmos. The doctrine just mentioned — That the Potential is prior to the Actual — is true in one sense, but not true in another; we have already explained how (e???ta? d? p?? — a. 4. Schwegler thinks, note p. 254, that this e???ta? refers to what has been said in Book T, p. 1049, b. 3, seq.; and this seems probable, though Bonitz in his note contests it, and refers to his own theory, set forth in his Prooemium pp. 24, 25, that Book ? is a separate treatise of Aristotle, completely distinct from all the rest of the Metaphysica. This theory of Bonitz may be in the main true; but it is still possible that Book T may have been written previously, and that Aristotle may here refer to it, as Schwegler supposes.).

That Actuality is prior to Potentiality, is conformable to the doctrine of Anaxagoras, NoÛs in his doctrine existing in Actuality; also to that of Empedokles, who introduces Friendship and Enmity; and again, to that of Leukippus, who affirms Motion to be eternal. So that Chaos or Night (i.e., mere Potentiality) did not prevail for an infinite anterior time, but the same things came round in perpetual vicissitude or rotation; which consists with the doctrine that Actuality is prior to Potentiality. If the same condition comes round periodically, we must necessarily assume something Actual, which perpetually actualizes in the same manner (de? t? ?e? ??e?? ?sa?t?? ??e????? — p. 1072, a. 10). Again, if generation and destruction are to take place, we must assume something else Actual, which actualizes in a manner perpetually changing (???? de? e??a? ?e? ??e????? ????? ?a? ????? — a. 12). This last must actualize sometimes per se, sometimes in a different way; that is, according to some other influence, or according to the First (or Uniform) Actual. But it will necessarily actualize according to the First Actual; which will thus be a cause both to itself, and to the variable Actual. Now the First Actual is the best; for it is the cause of perpetual sameness, while the other is cause of variety; both together are the cause of unceasing variety. But this is how the motions really stand. Why then, should we look out for other principles (a. 18)?

Now, since the preceding views are consistent with the facts and may be true (?pe? d’ ??t? t’ ??d??eta? — p. 1072, a. 18) — and, if they be not true, we shall be compelled to admit that every thing proceeds either from Night, or from confused Chaos or Non-Ens — we may consider the problem as solved. There exists something always in unceasing circular motion: this is evident not merely from reason, but from fact. The First Heaven (AplanÊs or Fixed Star sphere) will therefore be eternal. There must therefore exist something which causes this unceasing motion, or some Prime Movent. But, since Movens Immobile, Movens Motum, Motum non Movens, form a series of three terms, and since the two last of these certainly exist, we may infer that the first exists also; and that the Prime Movent, which causes the motion of the AplanÊs, is immoveable (a. 20-25. — This passage perplexes all the commentators — Schwegler, Bonitz, Alexander, &c. It can hardly be construed without more or less change of the text. I do not see to what real things Aristotle can allude under the description of Mota which are not Moventia. There is much to be said for Pierron and ZÉvort’s translation, p. 220: “Comme il n'y a que trois sortes d’Êtres — ce qui est mu, ce qui meut, et le moyen terme entre ce qui est mu et ce qui meut: c’est un Être (i.e., this middle term is an Être) qui meut sans Être mu.” — Bonitz disapproves this interpretation of the word ?s??, and it is certainly singular to say that between Movens and Motum, the term Movens sed non Motum forms a medium: Motum sed non Movens would form just as good a medium.). This Prime Movent, which causes motion without being itself moved, must be eternal, must be Essentia, and must be an Actuality.

Now both the Appetibile (t? ??e?t??) and the Cogitabile (t? ???t??) cause motion in this way, i.e., without being moved themselves; moreover the Primum Appetibile and the Primum Cogitabile are coincident or identical (p. 1072, a. 27). For that which appears beautiful, is the object of desire; but that which is beautiful, is the first object of will (a. 28). Cogitation is the principium of the two (the primary fact or fundamental element): we will so and so, because we think it good; it is not true that we think it good because we will it (??e??e?a d? d??t? d??e?, ????? ? d??e? d??t? ??e??e?a — a. 29). Now the Cogitant Mind (????) is moved by the Cogitabile, and, in the series of fundamental Contraries, the members of one side of the series are Cogitabilia per se (while those of the other side are only Cogitabilia per aliud — ???t? d’ ? ?t??a s?st????a ?a?’ a?t?? — a. 31; see Alex., p. 668, 16, Bon.). These Cogitabilia per se are first as to Essentia (i.e., compared with the Cogitabilia per aliud, they are logically priora): and again, among EssentiÆ, that variety which is simple and actual comes first (i.e., it is logically prius, as compared with the compound and the potential). Now Unum is not identical with Simplex: Unum signifies that which is a measure of something else, while Simplex denotes a peculiar attribute of the subject in itself (a. 34). But the Pulchrum and the Eligibile per se belongs to the same side of the series of Contraries, as the Cogitabilia per se: and the Primum Pulchrum or Eligibile is the Best or akin thereunto, in its own particular ascending scale (b. 1).

That t? ?? ??e?a is among the Immoveables, may be seen by our Treatise De Bono, where we give a string of generic and specific distributions (? d?a??es?? d???? — p. 1072, b. 2; see the interpretation of Alexander, adopted both by Schwegler and by Bonitz). For t? ?? ??e?a is used in a double sense: in one of the two senses it ranks among the Immoveables: in another it does not (?st? ??? d?tt?? t? ?? ??e?a, b. 3 — d?tt?? is Schwegler’s correction, adopted by Bonitz). It causes motion, in the manner of a beloved object; and that which it causes to move, causes motion in the other things (???e? d? ?? ???e???· t? d? ?????e??? t???a ???e? — b. 3; t? d? ?????e??? is the conjecture of Schwegler and Bonitz).

Now, if any thing be moved, there is a possibility that it may be in a condition different from that in which it actually is. If the first actuality of the Moveable be translation or motion in space, there is a possibility that it may be otherwise than it is as to place, even though it cannot be otherwise than it is as to Essentia (p. 1072, b. 7).

But, as to the Prime Movent, which is itself immoveable, and which exists in actuality, it is impossible that that can be other than what it is, in any respect whatever (p. 1072, b. 8). For the first of all changes is local motion, or rotation in a circle, and this is exactly what the Prime Movent imparts (but does not itself possess). It exists by necessity, and by that species of necessity which implies the perfect and beautiful: and in this character it is the originating principle. For there are three varieties of necessity: (1) That of violence, in contradiction to the natural impulse; (2) That without which good or perfection cannot be had; (3) That which is what it is absolutely, without possibility of being otherwise. From a principle of this nature (i.e., necessary in the two last senses) depend the Heaven and all Nature (b. 14).

The mode of existence (d?a????) of this Prime Movent is for ever that which we enjoy in our best moments, but which we cannot obtain permanently; for its actuality itself is also pleasure (p. 1072, b. 16). As actuality is pleasure, so the various actualities of waking, perceiving, cogitating, are to us the pleasantest part of our life; while hopes and remembrances are pleasing by derivation from them (but these states we men cannot enjoy permanently and without intermittence). Cogitation per se (i.e., cogitation in its most perfect condition) embraces that which is best per se; and most of all when it is most perfect. The NoÛs thus cogitates itself through participation of the Cogitabile: for it becomes itself cogitable by touching the Cogitabile and cogitating: so that Cogitans and Cogitabile become identical. For NoÛs in general (the human NoÛs also) is in potentiality the recipient of the Cogitabile, and of Essentia or Forms; and it comes into actuality by possessing these Forms. So that what the Prime Movent possesses is more divine than the divine element which NoÛs in general involves; and the actuality of theorizing is the pleasantest and best of all conditions (???t?? ??? ????eta? ???????? ?a? ????, ?ste ta?t?? ???? ?a? ???t??. t? ??? de?t???? t?? ???t?? ?a? t?? ??s?a? ????. ??e??e? d? ????· ?st’ ??e??? ????? t??t?? ? d??e? ? ???? ?e??? ??e??, ?a? ? ?e???a t? ?d?st?? ?a? ???st?? — b. 24. This is a very difficult passage, in which one cannot be sure of interpreting rightly. None of the commentators are perfectly satisfactory. The pronoun ??e??? seems to refer to ? ???s?? ? ?a?’ a?t?? — three lines back. The contrast seems to be between the Prime Movent, and NoÛs in general, including the human NoÛs. ?? de?t???? cannot refer to the Prime Movent, which has no potentiality, but must refer to the human NoÛs, which is not at first, nor always, in a state of actuality. ?????? seems equivalent to ?e??te???. The human NoÛs has ?e??? t?, by reason of its potentiality to theorize.).

Thus it is wonderful, if God has perpetually an existence like that of our best moments; and still more wonderful, if he has a better. Yet such is the fact. Life belongs to him: for the actuality of NoÛs is life, and God is actuality. His life, eternal and best, is actuality per se (or par excellence). We declare God to be an Animal Optimum Æternum, so that duration eternal and continuous (a??? s??e???) belongs to him: for that is God (t??t? ??? ? ?e?? — p. 1072, b. 30).

The Pythagoreans and Speusippus are mistaken in affirming that Optimum and Pulcherrimum is not to be found in the originating principle (?? ????); on the ground that the principles of plants and animals are indeed causes, but that the beautiful and perfect appears first in the results of those principles. For the seed first proceeds out of antecedent perfect animals: the first is not seed, but the perfect animal. Thus we must say that the man is prior to the seed: I do not mean the man who sprang from the seed, but the other man from whom the seed proceeded (p. 1073, a. 2).

From the preceding reasonings, it is evident that there exists an Essence eternal, immoveable, and separated from all the perceivable Essences. We have shown (in Physica; see Schwegler’s note) that this Essence can have no magnitude; that it is without parts and indivisible (p, 1073, a. 6). For it causes in other subjects motion for an infinite time; and nothing finite can have infinite power. For this reason the Prime Movent cannot have finite magnitude; but every magnitude is either finite or infinite, and there is no such thing as infinite magnitude; therefore the Prime Movent can have no magnitude at all. We have also shown that it is unchangeable in quality, and without any affections (?pa??? ?a? ??a?????t??). For all other varieties of change are posterior as compared with locomotive change or motion in space, which is the first of all. As the Prime Movent is exempt from this first, much more is it exempt from the others (a. 13).

We must now consider whether we ought to recognize one such Movent or Essence only, or several of the same Essences? and, if several, how many? Respecting the number thereof we must remember that our predecessors have laid down no clear or decisive doctrines (?p?f?se??, p. 1073, a. 16). The Platonic theory of Ideas includes no peculiar research on this subject (a. 18). The Platonists call these Ideas Numbers: about which they talk sometimes as if there were an infinite multitude of them, sometimes as if they were fixed as reaching to the dekad and not higher — but they furnish no demonstrative reason why they should stop at the dekad. We shall proceed to discuss the point consistently with our preceding definitions and with the nature of the subjects (a. 23). The Principium, the First of all Entia, is immoveable both per se and per accidens: it causes motion in another subject, to which it imparts the first or locomotive change, one and eternal (a. 25). The Motum must necessarily be moved by something; the Prime Movent must be immoveable per se; eternal motion must be caused by an eternal Movent; and one motion by one Movent (a. 30). But we see that, over and above the simple rotation of the All (or First Heaven), which rotation we affirm to be caused by the Primum Movens Immobile, there are also other eternal rotations of the Planets; for the circular Celestial Body, as we have shown in the Physica, is eternal and never at rest (a. 32). We must therefore necessarily assume that each of these rotations of the Planets is caused by a Movent Immoveable per se — by an eternal Essence (a. 35). For the Stars and Planets are in their nature eternal Essences: that which moves them must be itself eternal, and prior to that which it causes to be moved; likewise that which, is prior to Essence must itself be Essence, and cannot be any thing else (a. 37). It is plain, therefore, that there must necessarily exist a number of Essences, each eternal by nature, immoveable per se, and without magnitude, as Movents to the Heavenly Bodies and equal in number thereto (a. 38). These Essences are arranged in an order of first, second, &c., corresponding to the order of the planetary rotations (b. 2), But what the number of these rotations is, we must learn from Astronomy — that one among the mathematical sciences which is most akin (???e??t?t??) to the First Philosophy; for Astronomy theorizes about Essence perceivable but eternal, while Arithmetic and Geometry do not treat of any Essence at all (pe?? ??de??? ??s?a? — b. 7). That the rotations are more in number than the rotating bodies, is known to all who have any tincture of Astronomy; for each of the Planets is carried round in more than one rotation (b. 10). But what the exact number of these rotations is, we shall proceed to state upon the authority of some mathematicians, for the sake of instruction, that the reader may have some definite number present to his mind: for the rest, he must both investigate for himself and put questions to other investigators; and, if he learns from the scientific men any thing dissenting from what we here lay down, he must love both dissentients but follow that one who reasons most accurately (f??e?? ?? ?f?t?????, pe??es?a? d? t??? ????est????? — b. 16).

Aristotle then proceeds to unfold the number and arrangement of the planetary spheres and the corrective or counter-rolling (??e??tt??sa?) spheres implicated with them (p. 1073, b. 17 — p. 1074, a. 14). He afterwards proceeds: Let the number of spheres thus be forty-seven; so that it will be reasonable to assume the Immoveable Movent Essences and Principles to be forty-seven also, as well as the perceivable spheres (a?s??t?? — p. 1074, a. 16): we say reasonable (e??????), for we shall leave to stronger heads to declare it necessary. But, since there cannot be any rotation except such as contributes to the rotation of one of the Planets, and since we must assume that each Nature and each Essence is exempt from extraneous affection and possessed per se of the Best as an end, so there will be no other Nature besides the forty-seven above enumerated, and this number will be the necessary total of the Essences (a. 21). For, if there were any others, they would cause motion by serving as an end for some rotation to aspire to (?????e? ?? ?? t???? ??sa? f???? — a. 23); but it is impossible that there can be any other rotation besides those that have been enumerated.

We may fairly infer this from the bodies which are carried in rotation (?? t?? fe?????? — p. 1074, a. 24). For, if every carrier exists naturally for the sake of the thing carried, and if every current or rotation is a current of something carried, there can exist no current either for the sake of itself or for the sake of some other current. Every current must exist for the sake of the Planets, and with a view to their rotation. For, if one current existed for the sake of another, this last must exist for the sake of a third, and so on; but you cannot go on in this way ad infinitum; and therefore the end of every current must be, one or other of the Divine Bodies which are carried round in the heavens (a. 31).

That there is only one Heaven, we may plainly see. For, if there were many heavens, as there are many men, the principium of each would be one in specie, though the principia would be many in numero (p. 1074, a. 33). But all things that are many in number, have Matter, and are many, by reason of their Matter; for to all these many, there is one and the same Form (?????) — definition or rational explanation: e.g., one for all men, among whom Sokrates is one (a. 35). But the First Essence has no Matter; for it is an Actual (t? d? t? ?? e??a? ??? ??e? ???? t? p??t??· ??te???e?a ??? — a. 36). The Primum Movens Immobile is therefore One, both in definition and in number; accordingly, the Motum — that which is moved both eternally and continuously — is One also. There exists therefore only one Heaven (p. 1074, a. 38).

Now it has been handed down in a mythical way, from the old and most ancient teachers (p. 1074, b. 1) to their successors, that these (Eternal Essences) are gods, and that the divine element comprehends all nature (?t? ?e?? t? e?s?? ??t?? ?a? pe????e? t? ?e??? t?? ???? f?s?? — b. 3). The other accompaniments of the received creed have been superadded with a view to persuading the multitude and to useful purposes for the laws and the common interest (b. 4); wherefore the gods have been depicted as like to men and to some other animals, combined with other similar accompaniments. If a man, abstracting from these stories, accepts only the first and fundamental truth — That they conceived the First Essences as gods, he will consider it as a divine doctrine (?e??? ?? e???s?a? ???se?e? — b. 9), preserved and handed down as fragments of truth from the most ancient times. For probably all art and philosophy and truth have been many times discovered, lost, and rediscovered. To this point alone, and thus far, the opinion of our fathers and of the first men is evident to us (b. 14).

There are however various difficulties connected with the NoÛs; for it would seem to be more divine than the visible celestial objects, and yet we do not understand what its condition can be to be such (p. 1074, b. 17). For, if it cogitates nothing but is in the condition of slumber and inaction, what ground can there be for respecting it (t? ?? e?? t? se??? — b. 18)? And, if it cogitates something actually, yet if this process depends upon something foreign and independent (i.e., upon the Cogitatum), the NoÛs cannot be the best Essence; since it is then essentially not Cogitation in act, but only the potentiality of Cogitation; while its title to respect arises from actual Cogitation. Again, whether we assume its Essence to be Cogitation actual or Cogitation potential, what does it cogitate? It must cogitate either itself, or something different from itself; and, if the latter, either always the same Cogitatum, or sometimes one, sometimes another. But is there no difference whether its Cogitatum is honourable or vulgar? Are there not some things which it is absurd to cogitate? Evidently the NoÛs must cogitate what is most divine and most honourable, without any change; for, if it did change, it must change for the worse, and that very change would at once (?d?) be a certain motion; whereas the NoÛs is essentially immoveable (b. 27). First of all, if the Essence of the NoÛs be, not Cogitation actual but Cogitation potential, we may reasonably conceive that the perpetuity of Cogitation would be fatiguing to it (b. 29); next, we see plainly that there must exist something else more honourable than the NoÛs; namely, the Cogitatum; for to cogitate, and the act of cogitation, will belong even to one who cogitates the vilest object. If cogitation of vile objects be detestable (fe??t??, b. 32) — for not to see some things is better than to see them — Cogitation cannot be the best of all things (i.e., Cogitation absolutely, whatever be the Cogitatum).

Since the NoÛs is itself the best of all things, it must employ its cogitation upon itself and nothing else. Its cogitation will thus be Cogitation of Cogitation (a?t?? ??a ??e?, e?pe? ?st? t? ???t?st??, ?a? ?st?? ? ???s?? ???se?? ???s?? — p. 1074, b. 35). Yet, if we look to the human mind, Cognition, Perception, Opinion, Mental Discourse, &c., appear always as having direct reference to something else, and as referring each to itself only in an indirect and secondary way (?e? ????? — a?t?? d’ ?? pa????? — b. 36); and farther, if to cogitate is one thing and to be cogitated another thing, in which of the two points of view will the bene of the NoÛs consist? To be Cogitation, and to be a Cogitatum, are not logically the same (??d? ??? ta?t? t? e??a? ???se? ?a? ??????? — b. 38).

But may we not meet these difficulties by replying that there are some things in which Cognition is identical with the Cognitum? that is, in those Cognita which are altogether exempt from Matter? In Constructive cognitions without Matter, the Form and the t.?.e. is both Cognitum and Cognitio; in Theoretical cognitions without Matter, the Notion and the Cogitation is itself the Cognitum (? ????? t? p???a ?a? ? ???s??). Since it appears, therefore, that, wherever there is no Matter, Cogitatum and NoÛs are not different, the same will be true of the divine NoÛs: its Cogitatio and its Cogitatum will be identical (p. 1075, a. 5).

One farther difficulty remains, if we suppose the Cogitatum to be a Compound (s???et??); for, on that supposition, the Cogitans would change in running through the different parts of the whole. But the reply seems to be, that every thing which has not Matter is indivisible and not compound (p. 1075, a. 7). As the human NoÛs, being that which deals with compounds, comports itself for a certain time — for it does not attain its bene in cogitating this or that part of the compound, but in apprehending a certain total or completion which is something different from any of the parts — so does the divine NoÛs, engaged in cogitation of itself, comport itself in perpetuity (a. 10).

Another point to be considered is — in what manner the nature of the Universe (? t?? ???? f?s?? — p. 1075, a. 11) includes Bonum and Optimum. Is Bonum included as something separate and as an adjunct by itself transcendent? Or is it immanent, pervading the whole arrangement of the constituent parts? Or does it exist in both ways at once, as in the case of a disciplined army; for, in this latter, Bonum belongs both to the array and to the general, and indeed more to the latter, since the array is directed by the general, not the general by the array. All things in the universe are marshalled in a certain orderly way — the aquatic creatures, the aËrial, and the plants; but all things are not marshalled alike. The universe is not such that there is no relation between one thing and another: there is such a relation; for every thing is marshalled with a view to one end, though in different degrees. As, in a family, the freemen have least discretion left to them to act at haphazard, but all or most of their proceedings are regulated, while slaves and oxen are not required to do much towards the common good, but are left for the most part to act at hazard, — in this way the principium of each is arranged by nature (a. 23). For example, every thing must necessarily come to the termination of one individual existence to make room for another: there are also some other facts and conditions common to all things in the universe (???? d’ ???? e?? ?e t? d?a??????a? ?????? ?p?s?? ???e?? — a. 23; see the explanation of d?a??????a?, given by Bonitz, Comm. p. 519 — not very certain).

In concluding this exposition, we must not lose sight of the absurdities and impossibilities which attach to all other, nor what is advanced by the most ingenious philosophers before us, nor which of their theories carries with it the fewest difficulties (p. 1075, a. 27).

That all things proceed from Contraries, all these philosophers agree in affirming. But it is not true that all things are generated, nor that they are generated from contraries; for the celestial substance is not generated at all, nor has it any contrary. Moreover, in those cases where there really are contraries, these philosophers do not teach us how generation can take place out of them; for contraries themselves have no effect upon each other. Now our doctrine solves this difficulty reasonably, by introducing a tertium quid (p. 1075, a. 31) — Matter. Some of these philosophers erroneously consider Matter to be itself one of the contraries: they consider the Unequal as matter or substratum to the Equal; or the Many as matter or substratum to the One; (Evil, as opposed to Good). We resolve this in the same way: our Matter is one, is contrary itself to nothing, but may be potentially either of two contraries. Farthermore, if we admit the doctrine that Evil itself is Matter or one of the elements, the inference will follow that every thing whatever, except the Unum itself, partakes of Evil (a. 6).

Some philosophers do not admit either Good or Evil to be principles at all; but they are manifestly wrong; for in all things Good is most of all the principle (p. 1075, a. 37). Others again are so far right that they recognize Good as a principle: but they do not tell us how it is a principle — whether as End, or as Movent, or as Form.

Empedokles lays down a strange doctrine: he makes Friendship to be the Good (p. 1075, b. 2). But, in his theory, Friendship is principle partly as Movent, for its function is to bring together (s????e? ??? — b. 3); partly as Matter, for it is itself a portion of the mixture (????? t?? ??at?? — b. 4). Now, even granting the possibility that the same thing may be per accidens (?at? s?e???? — b. 5, i.e., by special coincidence in any one particular case) principle as Movent, and also principle as Matter, nevertheless the two are not the same logically and by definition. Under which of the two, therefore, are we to reckon Friendship? It is moreover another strange feature in the theory of Empedokles, that he makes Enmity to be indestructible; for this very Enmity is with him the nature and principle of Evil (b. 8).

Anaxagoras declares Good to be the principle as Movent; for, in his theory, NoÛs causes motion; but it causes motion with a view to some end, which is of course different from itself; so that the real principle is different from NoÛs: unless indeed he adopted one of our tenets; for we too say that, in a certain sense, the medical art is health (p. 1075, b. 10; Z. vii. p. 1032, b. 10). It is moreover absurd, that Anaxagoras does not recognize any contrary to Good and to the NoÛs (b. 11). (Bonitz remarks, Comm. p. 522:— Aristotle means that Anaxagoras was wrong, because he failed “ad eam devenire rationem, ut intellectum sui ipsius intelligentiam ideoque sui ipsius t???? esse statueret”; farther, he remarks, on the line b. 10 — ?t?p?? d? ?a? t? ??a?t??? ? p???sa? t? ??a?? ?a? t? ??: “Quid enim? nonne pariter et eodem jure ???? ?????, quem posuit Anaxagoras, ab omni contrarietate et oppositione immunis sit, ac primus motor apud Aristotelem?” — Aristotle would have replied to this: “I recognize principles of Evil under the names of ??? and st???s??; the last of the two being directly opposed to Form (Regularity or Good), the first of the two being indifferent and equally ready as a recipient both for evil and for good. My Prime Movent acts like an ???e??? in causing motion in the Celestial Substance: the motion of this last is pure Good, without any mixture of Evil. But, when this motion is transmitted to the sublunary elements, it becomes corrupted by ??? and st???s??, so that Evil becomes mingled with the Good. Anaxagoras recognizes no counteracting principles, analogous to ??? and st???s??, so that Evil, on his theory, remains unexplained.”)Those philosophers who lay down Contraries as their principles, do not make proper use of these Contraries, unless their language be improved or modified (p. 1075, b. 12). Nor do they tell us why some things are destructible, other things indestructible; for they trace all things to the same principles. Some make all things to proceed from Non-Ens; others, to escape that necessity, make all things One (and thus recognize no real change or generation at all — the Eleates, b. 16). Again, not one of them tells us why generation must always be, or what is the cause of generation. Once more, those who recognize two contrary principles must necessarily recognize a third superior to both (b. 18); and the Platonists with their Ideas are under the like necessity. For they must assign some reason why particular things partake of these Ideas.

Other philosophers, moreover, must consistently with their theories recognize something contrary to Wisdom and to the most venerable Cognition. But we are under no such necessity; for there is nothing contrary to the First (t? p??t?). All contraries involve Matter, and are in potentiality the same: one of the two contraries is ignorance in regard to the other; but the First has no contrary (p. 1075, b. 24).

Again, if there be no Entia beyond the Perceptibilia, there can be no beginning, no arrangement in order, no generation, no celestial bodies or proceedings (i.e., all these will remain unexplained). There will always be a beginning behind the beginning, ad infinitum; as there is in the theories of all the theologians and physical philosophers (p. 1075, b. 27). And, even if we recognize, beyond the Perceptibilia, Ideas or Numbers, these are causes of nothing; or, if causes of any thing, they are certainly not causes of motion. How, moreover, can Magnitude, and a Continuum arise out of that which has no Magnitude? Number cannot, either as Movent or as Form, produce a Continuum (b. 30).

Again, (Contraries cannot be principles, because) no Contrary can be essentially Constructive and essentially Movent (p. 1075, b. 31); for Contraries involve Matter and Potentiality, and may possibly, therefore, not exist. And, if there be Potentiality, it will come prior to Actuality: upon that supposition therefore (i.e., of Contraries as the fundamental principles) Entia could not be eternal. But Entia are eternal; therefore these theories must be in part amended: we have shown how (b. 34).

Farther, none of these theories explains how it is that numbers coalesce into One; or soul and body into One; or Form and Matter into one Concrete. Nor can they explain this, unless they adopt our doctrine, that the Movent brings about this coalition (p. 1075, b. 37).

Those philosophers (like Speusippus) who recognize many different grades and species of Entia (first the Mathematical Number, &c.), with separate principles for each, make the Essence of the Universe to be incoherent (?pe?s?d??d? — p. 1076, a. 1) and set up many distinct principles; for none of these Essences contributes to or bears upon the remainder, whether it exists or does not exist. Now Entia are not willing to be badly governed (t? d? ??ta ?? ???eta? p???te?es?a? ?a???. “??? ??a??? p???????a???· e?? ????a???.” — p. 1076, a. 4).