In discriminating the meanings of Ens, we noticed one ?at? d??a?? ?a? ?????e?a? (apart from Ens according to the Categories). We shall now proceed to discuss these two terms d??a?? and ??te???e?a = ?????e?a (p. 1045, b. 35).

It is elsewhere mentioned (?. p. 1019) that d??a?? has many senses, of which some (like the geometrical, &c.) are equivocal or metaphorical, so that we shall pass them over here (p. 1046, a. 6). But there is one first and proper sense of d??a??, from which many others diverge in different directions of relationship or analogy (a. 10). That first and proper sense is — a principle of change in alio vel quatenus aliud, or a principle of change ab alio vel quatenus aliud (???? eta???? ?? ???? ? ? ???? — ???? eta???? ?p’ ????? ? ? ???? — a. 11, 14. The same definition is given in terms somewhat different at p. 1048, a. 28: t??t? ????e? d??at?? ? p?f??e ???e?? ???? ? ???e?s?a? ?p’ ?????, ? ?p??? ? t??p?? t???. This Aristotle calls ? ?at? ????s?? d??a?? — expressed by Bonitz, Comm., p. 379: “agendi patiendive nisum quendam.”). The notion of d??a?? however extends more widely than this first sense of d??a?? ?at? ????s??. It includes other cases, as where we say that Hermes is d???e? in the wood, and that the half foot is d???e? in the whole foot (p. 1048, a. 33; Bonitz distinguishes this last sense as MÖglichkeit, from the first sense as VermÖgen, p. 379).

We begin by speaking about the first and proper sense — d??a?? ? ?at? ????s??. One variety thereof is, when a thing has power of being passively affected so and so — when there resides in the thing a principle of passive change (???? eta???? pa??t???? — p. 1046, a. 13) by something else or by itself quatenus something else. (These last words are added because a sick man has the d??a?? of being cured either by a physician, or by himself if he be a physician; but then in this last case he is to be looked upon in two different characters, as physician and as patient: he cures himself as physician, he is cured as patient.) Another variety of d??a?? ?at? ????s?? is, when a thing has power of resisting change for the worse or destruction by any exterior principle of change (a. 14); as hardness in iron. Sometimes this d??a?? is restricted to the cases in which a person can do the thing in question well: no man is said to have the power of speaking or singing unless he can perform these functions pretty well (a. 18).

In all these varieties, the general notion of d??a?? ?at? ????s?? is included (p. 1046, a. 16). The active and passive d??a?? are, in one sense, one and the same; in another sense, distinct and different. For one of them resides in the patient, the other in the agent (a. 27): sometimes the two come by nature together in the same thing; yet the patient does not suffer from itself as patient, but from itself as agent. Impotence (?d??a?a) is the privation contrary to this d??a??. Privation has many different meanings (a. 32).

Among these principles of change, some reside in the inanimate substances, others in the animated; not only in the soul generally, but also in the rational branch of the soul (p. 1046, a. 38). Accordingly some d???e?? are Rational, others Irrational. All arts and constructive sciences are d???e?? (or ???a? eta??t??a? ?? ???? ? ? ???? — b. 3). In the rational capacities, the same capacity covers both contraries; in the irrational, each bears upon one of the two contraries exclusively; thus, fire will only heat but not chill, while the medical art will produce either sickness or health. The reason is, that Science is based upon rational explanations or definitions; and the same rational explanation declares both the thing itself and the privation thereof; though not indeed in the same manner: it declares, in a certain way, both together, and, in a certain way, chiefly the positive side (b. 10). Accordingly these sciences are sciences of both the contraries at once: namely, per se, of one side of the Antiphasis; not per se, of the other side; since the rational explanation also declares, directly and per se, only one side, while it declares the other side in a certain way indirectly, mediately, per accidens — i.e., by negation and exclusion (?p?f?se? ?a? ?p?f???. — b. 14). For the Contrary is the highest grade of privation; and this is the exclusion of one side of the alternative (? ??? st???s?? ? p??t? t? ??a?t???, a?t? d’ ?p?f??? ?at???? — p. 1046 b. 15; Bonitz says that t? ??a?t??? is the subject of this proposition, and ? st???s?? the predicate). Both of two contraries cannot reside, indeed, in the same subject; but Science is a d??a?? through rational explanation or reason in the soul which has within it a principle of motion; accordingly the soul can bring to pass either of the two contraries, through reference to the same rational notion or explanation which comprises both (b. 22).

The Megaric philosophers recognize no d??a?? apart from ?????e?a; affirming that no one has any power, except at the moment when he is actually exercising it. These philosophers are wrong (for various reasons indicated: p. 1046, b. 30 — p. 1047, a. 20). Power and Act are distinct. A particular event is possible to happen, yet it does not happen; or possible not to happen, yet it does happen (p, 1047, a. 22). That is possible, to which, if the act supervene whereto such possibility relates, nothing impossible will ensue (a. 25). The name ?????e?a, appended to that of ??te???e?a (? p??? t?? ??te???e?a? s??t??e??? — a. 30), has come to be applied to other things chiefly from reference to motions; for motion is par excellence ?????e?a. Hence Non-Entia are never said to be moved, though other predicates may be applied to them: we may call them d?a???t? and ?p????t?, but never ?????e?a; for, if we did, we should be guilty of contradiction, saying that things which are not ??e??e?? are ??e??e??. Among the Non-Entia there are some which are Entia d???e?: we call them Non-Entia, because they are not ??te?e?e?? (b. 2).

If the definition above given of t? d??at?? be admitted, we see plainly that no one can say truly: This is possible, yet it will never happen (p. 1047, b. 3, seq.).

Among all the various d???e??, some are congenital, such as the perceptive powers (a?s??se?? — p. 1047, b. 31); others are acquired by practice, such as playing the flute; others by learning, like the arts: these two last varieties we cannot possess without having previously exercised ourselves in them actively (b. 34), but the others, which are more of a passive character, we may possess without such condition. This distinction coincides with that which was drawn previously between the rational and the irrational d???e?? or capacities: the rational capacities belonging only to a soul, and to the rational branch thereof. Now every d??at?? has its own specialities and conditions: it is itself a given something, and it is surrounded with concomitants of special time, place, neighbourhood, &c. (p. 1048, a. 1). The irrational capacities must necessarily pass into reality, whenever the active and the passive conditions come together, because there is but one reality to arise; but the rational capacities not necessarily, because they tend to either one of two contrary realities, both of which cannot be produced. Which of the two contraries shall be brought to reality, will depend upon another authority — the appetency or deliberate resolution of the soul: to whichsoever of the two, each possible, such sovereign appetency tends, that one will be brought to pass, when agent and patient come together and both are in suitable condition (a. 11); and under those circumstances, it will necessarily (?????? — a. 14) be brought to pass. We need not formally enunciate the clause — “if nothing extrinsic occurs to prevent it”: for this is already implied in the definition of d??a?? which is never affirmed as absolute and unconditional, but always under certain given conditions (a. 18: ?st? d’ ?? p??t??, ???’ ????t?? p??). Accordingly the agent will not be able to bring about both sides of the alternative at once, even though appetite or deliberate resolution may prompt him to do it (a. 21).

Having thus gone through the variety of d??a?? called ? ?at? ????s??, we shall now give some explanations of ?????e?a; in the course of which we shall be able to illustrate by contrast, the other variety of d??a??, which was indicated above (p. 1048, a. 30). ?????e?a is used when the thing exists, not d???e?: meaning by d???e? such as Hermes in the wood or the half-yard in the whole yard. We shall explain our meaning, by giving an induction of particulars; for definition cannot be given of every thing. We must group into one view the analogies following (?? de? pa?t?? ???? ??te??, ???? ?a? t? ???????? s?????? — a. 37): As the person now actually building is to the professional builder not so engaged; as the animal awake is to the animal asleep; as the animal seeing is to the animal possessed of good eyes but having them closed; as that which is severed from matter is to matter (t? ?p??e??????? — b. 3); as the work completed is to the material yet unworked; — so is ?????e?a to d??a??. The antithesis is not similar in all these pairs of instances, but there is a relationship or analogy pervading all (?? t??t? ?? t??t? ? p??? t??t?, t?d’ ?? t?de ? p??? t?de — b. 8). In some of the pairs, the antithesis is the same as that of ????s?? p??? d??a??; in others, it is the same as that of ??s?a p??? t??a ???? (b. 9). In one member of each pair, we have ? ?????e?a ?f???s???; in the other t? d??at?? (b. 5 — ?????e?a here is reality severed and determinate, as contrasted with d??a?? potentiality huddled together and indeterminate. — See Schwegler’s note: “PotenzialitÄt und AktualitÄt sind reine VerhÄltnissbegriffe” — p. 172, seq.). But in all the above-named examples, that which is now d???e? may come actually to be ??e??e??: the person now sleeping may awake; the person whose eyes are now closed may open them and see; the Hermes now in the wood may be brought out of the wood and exist as a real statue. It is otherwise with The Infinite, Vacuum, &c. These exist d???e? only, and can never come to exist ??e??e??, or independently. The Infinite can exist ??e??e?? only for our cognition. The fact that the bisection thereof is never exhausted — that we may go on dividing as long as we choose — gives to the potential Infinite a certain actuality, though it cannot be truly separated (b. 16).

We must farther explain in what cases it is proper to say that a thing is d???e?, and in what cases it is not proper. You cannot properly say that earth is potentially a man: you may perhaps say that the semen is potentially a man; yet even this not certainly, since other conditions besides semen are required (p. 1049, a. 2). The physician cannot cure every patient, yet neither is the cure altogether a matter of chance (?p? t???? — a. 4): there is a certain measure of cure possible, and that is called t? ???a???? d???e?. The definition thereof, taken from the side of the agent, would be — that which will come to pass if he wills it, without any impediment from without; from the side of the patient — when no impediment occurs from within him (a. 8). In like manner, a house exists d???e?, when all the matter for it is brought together, without need either of addition or subtraction or change, and when there is no internal impediment; and so with other products of art, where the principle of generation is extrinsic to themselves. In natural products, where the principle of generation is intrinsic, we treat them as potentially existing, when this principle is in a condition to realize itself through itself, assuming no external impediments to interfere. Thus we do not call the semen potentially a man, because, before it becomes such, it must undergo change in something else, and therefore stands in need of some other principle; we call it so only when it is in such conditions that its own principle suffices. Earth is not said to be a statue d???e?, until it has first been changed into brass (a. 17). We call the product not by the name of the Matter itself, but by an adjective appellation derived from the next adjacent Matter; thus we call a box, not wood, but wooden: wood is then a box d???e?. But we say this only of the proximate or immediate Matter, not of the remote or primary Matter. We must go back through successive stages to the first or most remote Matter; thus wood is not earth, but earthy: earth therefore is potentially wood. The earth may be aeriform; the air may be fiery; the fire has no analogous adjective whereby it can be called, and is thus the first or last Matter. But it is not said to be potentially any thing except the s???et?? combined with Form immediately above it. Matter may be either proximate or remote: Potentiality is affirmed only of the proximate Matter.

Since all the different meanings of Prius have been enumerated and distinguished, it is plain that in all those meanings Actuality is prius as compared with Potentiality: whether the d??a?? be ???? eta??t??? ( = ????t???) ?? ???? ? ????, like Art; or ???? ????t??? ? stat??? ?? a?t? ? a?t?, like Nature (p. 1049, b. 5-10). Actuality is prius both ???? and ??s??: it is also prius ????? in a certain sense, though not in a certain other sense.

It is prius ????, because the Actual is included in the definition of the Potential; that is, it must be presupposed and foreknown, before you can understand what the Potential is (p. 1049, b. 17). You explain ????d????? or ??at???? by saying that he is d???e??? ????d?e?? ? ????: you explain ??at?? by saying that it is d??at?? ???s?a?: t? d??at??, in its first and absolute meaning, is d??at?? because it may come into Actuality (b. 13).

It is prius ????? in the sense that the Potential always presupposes an Actual identical specie, though not identical numero, with that Actual to which the Potential tends. Take a man now existing and now seeing, or corn now ripe in the field: these doubtless, before they came into their present condition, must have pre-existed in Potentiality; that is, there must have pre-existed a certain matter — seed or a something capable of vision — which at one time was not yet in a state of Actuality (p. 1049, b. 23). But prior to this matter there must have existed other Actualities, by which this matter was generated: the Actual is always generated out of its Potential by a prior Actual, e.g., a man by a man, a musical man by a musical man; there being always some prior movent, which must be itself already in Actuality (b. 27). We have already declared that every thing generated is something generated out of something, and by something which is identical in species with the thing generated (b. 29). Hence it seems that there can be no builder who has built nothing, no harper who has never harped; for the man who is learning to harp learns by harping (b. 32); which gave occasion to the sophistical puzzle — That one, who does not possess the knowledge, will nevertheless do that to which the knowledge relates. The learner does not possess the knowledge; yet still he must have possessed some fragments of the knowledge: just as, in every thing which is in course of generation, some fraction must have been already generated; in every thing which is moved, some fraction has been already moved (b. 36).

Lastly, Actuality is prius as compared with Potentiality (not merely ????, ?a? ????? ?st?? ??, but also) ??s?? (p. 1050, a. 4). In the first place, that which is latest in generation is first in Form and in Essence; a man compared with a child, man as compared with semen. Man already possesses the Form, semen does not. Next, every thing generated marches or gradually progresses towards its principle and towards its end. The principle is the ?? ??e?a, and the generation is for the sake of the end. Now the end or consummation is Actuality, and for the sake of this the Potentiality is taken on (?a??eta? — a. 10). Animals do not see in order that they may have sight; they have sight in order that they may see: they do not theorize in order that they may possess theoretical aptitude, but the converse; except indeed those who are practising as learners. Moreover, Matter is said to exist potentially, because it may come into Form; but, when it exists actually, it is then in Form (a. 16). (Alexander says: ?ste ??? t??t? p??t??a (? ?????e?a) ?? ?fet?? ?a? t?ss?? ?a? e?? ??s?? ???? d???e?? — p. 559, 10, Bon.) The case is the same where the end is nothing beyond a particular mode of motion (e.g., dancing): the dancing-master has attained his end when he exhibits his pupil actually dancing. In natural productions this is no less true than in artificial: Nature has attained her end, when the product comes into ?????e?a; that is, when it is actually at work, from whence the name ?????e?a is derived (t? ??? ????? t????, ? d? ?????e?a t? ????? — ?a? s??te??e? p??? t?? ??te???e?a? — a. 23).

In some cases (as we have often remarked) the ultimatum is use, without any ulterior product distinct from the use, e.g., the act of seeing is the ultimatum of the visual power (p. 1050, a. 24); in other cases there is something ulterior and distinct as a house from the building power. In the former of these cases, Actuality is the end of d??a??; in the latter it is more the end than d??a??. (??? ????? ?tt?? ???a ?? t???? ???a d? ????? t???? t?? d???e?? ?st??· ? ??? ????d??s?? ?? t? ????d??????, ?a? ?a ????eta? ?a? ?st? t? ????? — a. 29. This passage is obscure: see the comments of Alexander, with the notes of Schwegler and Bonitz, who accuse Alexander of misunderstanding it; though it appears to me that neither of them is quite clear. I understand Aristotle to reason as follows:— ??as?? is the t????, the ?????e?a, the consummation of the visual power called ????; but ????d??s??, is not the t????, the ?????e?a, the consummation of the building power called ????d????. This last has its t????, ?????e?a, consummation, in the ulterior product ????a. Nevertheless ????d??s??, residing as it does ?? t? ????d??????, and coming into existence simultaneously with the house, is more the end, more akin to the end or consummation than the building power called ????d????.)

In cases where there is an ulterior product beyond and apart from the exercise of the power, the Actuality (consummation) resides in that product (p. 1050, a. 31). In cases where is no such ulterior product, the Actuality resides in the same subject wherein the power resides. Thus sight resides in him who sees, and life in the soul. Hence also happiness resides in the soul; for happiness is a certain kind of life (b. 1).

It is thus plain that Actuality is the Essence and the Form, and that it is prius t? ??s?? compared with Potentiality. And, as has been already remarked, one Actuality always precedes another, in time, up to the eternal Prime Movent (p. 1050, b. 5). Moreover, ?????e?a is prius to d??a?? in respect to speciality and dignity (?????t???? — b. 6). For eternal things are priora in essence to destructible things, and nothing is eternal d???e?, as the reason of the case will show us (b. 8).

All Potentiality applies at once to both sides of the Antiphasis — to the affirmative as well as to the negative. That which is not possible, will never occur to any thing; but every thing which is possible may never come to Actuality (t? d??at?? d? p?? ??d??eta? ? ??e??e?? — p. 1050, b. 10). That which is possible to be, is also possible not to be. Now that which is possible not to be, may perhaps not be (??d??eta? ? e??a? — b. 13); but that which may not be, is destructible, either absolutely (that is, in respect to Essence), or in respect to such portions of its nature as may not be, that is, in respect to locality or quantity or quality. Accordingly, of those things which are absolutely, or in respect to Essence, indestructible, nothing exists d???e? absolutely or in respect to Essence, though it may exist d???e? in certain respects, as in respect to quality or locality); all of them exist ??e??e?? (b. 18). Nor does any thing exist d???e?, which exists by necessity; yet the things which exist by necessity are first of all (i.e., priora in regard to every thing else); for, if they did not exist, nothing would have existed. Moreover, if there be any Eternal Motion, or any Eternal Motum, it cannot be Motum d???e? except in respect to whence and whither; in that special respect, it may have Matter or Potentiality (b. 21).

Accordingly, the Sun, the Stars, and the whole Heaven, are always at work, and there is no danger of their ever standing still, which some physical philosophers fear (?e? ??e??e? ? ????? — p. 1050, b. 22); nor are they fatigued in doing this. Motion with them is not a potentiality of both members of the Antiphasis, either to be moved or not to be moved. If the fact were so — if their Essence were Matter and Power, and not Act — the perpetual continuity of (one side of the alternative) motion would be toilsome to them; but it is not toilsome, since Actuality is their very Essence (b. 28). Likewise mutable things (which are destructible), such as earth and fire, imitate these indestructible entities, being ever at work; for these elements possess motion by themselves and in themselves, each changing into another (b. 30; compare De Gen. et Corr. p. 337, a. 2). But the other d???e?? are all potentialities of both sides of the Antiphasis, or of both alternatives. The rational d???e?? can cause motion in such and such way, or not in such and such way; the irrational d???e?? may be present or absent, and thus embrace both sides of the alternative (b. 33).

Hence we draw another argument for not admitting the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, affirmed by the dialecticians (?? ?? t??? ?????? — p. 1050, b. 35). If there existed such Ideas, they would be only d???e?? in respect to the ?????e?a existing in their particular embodiments. Thus an individual cognizing man would be much more cognizant than a?t?ep?st??; a particular substance in motion would be much more in motion than ????s?? or a?t?????s?? itself. For a?t?ep?st?? or a?t?????s?? are only d???e?? to the ?p?st??? t? or the ?????e??? t?, which belong to ?????e?a (b. 36). (We may remark that in the Platonic Parmenides, p. 134, C., an argument the very opposite to this is urged. It is there contended that Cognitio per se (the Idea) must be far more complete and accurate than any cognition which we possess.)

It is thus plain that ?????e?a is prius to d??a??, and to every principle of change (p. 1051, a. 2). It is also better and more honourable than d??a?? even in the direction of good. We have already observed that d??a?? always includes both of two contraries, in the way of alternative: one of these must be the good, the other the bad. Now the actuality of good is better than the potentiality of good; the actuality of health is better than the potentiality of health, which latter must also include the potentiality of sickness, while the actuality of health excludes the actuality of sickness. On the other hand, the actuality of evil is worse than the potentiality of evil; for the potentiality is neither of the two contraries or both of them at once (a. 17). Hence we see that evil is nothing apart from particular things; since it is posterior in its nature even to Potentiality: there is therefore neither evil, nor error, nor destruction, in any of the principia or eternal Essences (a. 19). (The note of Bonitz here is just:— “Quem in hac argumentatione significavi errorem — judicium morale de bono et malo immisceri falso iis rebus, a quibus illud est alienum — ei non dissimilem Arist. in proxim argumentatione, si recte ejus sententiam intelligo, videtur admisisse, quum quidem malum non esse pa?? t? p???ata, seorsim ac per se existens, demonstrare conatur.” Aristotle here as elsewhere confounds the idea of Good, Perfection, Completeness, &c., with that of essential Priority. But what he says here — ??? ?st? t? ?a??? pa?? t? p???ata — can hardly be reconciled with what he says in the Physica (pp. 189, 191, 192) about st???s??, which he includes among the three ???a?, and which he declares to be ?a??p???? — p. 192, a. 15.)

Lastly, we discover geometrical truths by drawing visible diagrams, and thus translating the Potentialities into Actuality. If these diagrams were ready drawn for us by nature, there would be no difficulty in seeing these truths; but, as the case stands, the truths only inhere in the figures potentially (p. 1051, a. 23: e? d’ ?? d???????a, fa?e?? ?? ??· ??? d’ ???p???e? d???e?). If the triangle had a line ready drawn parallel to its side, we should have seen at once that its three angles were equal to two right angles. Potential truths are thus discovered by being translated into Actuality. The reason of this is, that the Actuality is itself an act of cogitation, so that the Potentiality springs from Actuality (a?t??? d’ ?t? ???s?? ? ?????e?a· ?st’ ?? ??e??e?a? ? d??a?? — a. 30. It is not therefore true — what the Platonists say — that the mathematical bodies and their properties are ??s?a? ?a? ??e??e?a?: they are only d???e??, and they are brought into being by our cogitation or abstraction). It is true that each individual diagram drawn is posterior to the power of drawing it (a. 32).

Having gone through the discussion of Ens according to the first of the ten Categories, and of Ens Potential and Actual, we have now to say something about Ens as True or False in the strictest sense of the words (t? d? ?????tata ?? ?????? ? ?e?d?? — p. 1051, b. 1). These words mean, in reference to things, either that they are conjoined or that they are disjoined. To speak truth is to affirm that things which are disjoined or conjoined in fact, are disjoined or conjoined; to speak falsely, the reverse. The appeal is to the fact: it is not because we truly call you white, that you are white; it is because you really are white, that we who call you white speak truth (b. 9). If there are some things which are always conjoined, others always disjoined, others again sometimes conjoined sometimes disjoined, propositions in reference to the first two classes affirming conjunction or disjunction, will be always true or always false, while in reference to the third class propositions may be either true or false, according to the case (b. 10).

But what shall we say in regard to things Uncompounded? In respect to them, what is truth or falsehood — to be or not to be? (t? ?s???eta — p. 1051, b. 18). If we affirm white of the wood, or incommensurability of the diagonal, such conjunction of predicate and subject may be true or false; but how, if there be no predicate distinct from the subject? Where there is no distinction between predicate and subject, where the subject stands alone, — in these cases, there is no truth or falsehood in the sense explained above: no other truth except that the mind apprehends and names the subject, or fails to do so. You either know the subject, or you do not know it: there is no alternative but that of knowledge or ignorance; to be deceived is impossible about the question Quid est (t? ?? ???e?? ?a? f??a? ??????, ?? ??? ta?t? ?at?fas?? ?a? f?s??, t? d’ ????e?? ? ??????e??· ?pat????a? ??? pe?? t? t? ?st?? ??? ?st?? ???’ ? ?at? s?e???? — b. 25. The last words are thus explained by Bonitz: “nisi forte per abusum quendam vocabuli ipsam ignorantiam dixeris errorem” — p. 411.). All these uncompounded subjects exist actually, not potentially: if the latter had been true, they would have been generated and destroyed; but Ens Ipsum (t? ?? a?t? — b. 29) is neither generated nor destroyed; for, if it had been, it must have been generated out of something. Respecting all those things which exist in Essence and Actuality, you cannot be deceived: you may apprehend them in cogitation, or fail to apprehend them. The essential question respecting them is, whether they exist in such or such manner or not; as it is respecting the One and the Uncompounded — whether, being an existent, it exists thus and thus or not (b. 35). Truth consists in apprehending or cogitating them (p. 1052, a. 1): the contrary thereof is non-apprehension of them or ignorance (?????a), yet not analogous to blindness; for that would be equivalent to having no apprehensive intelligence (?? ?? e? t? ???t???? ???? ? ???? t?? — a. 3; one is not absolutely without ???t????, but one’s ???s?? does not suffice for apprehending these particular objects).

Respecting objects immoveable and unchangeable, and apprehended as such, it is plain that there can be no mistake as to the When (?at? t? p?t? — p. 1052, a. 5; i.e., a proposition which is true of them at one time cannot be false at another time). No man will suppose a triangle to have its three angles equal to two right angles at one time, but not at another. Even in these unchangeables, indeed, a man may mistake as to the What: he may suppose that there is no even number which is a prime number, or he may suppose that there are some even numbers which are prime, others which are not so; but, respecting any particular number, he will never suppose it to be sometimes prime, sometimes not prime (a. 10).

(In respect to the meaning of t? ?s???eta — p. 1051, b. 17 — Bonitz and Schwegler differ. Bonitz says, Comm. p. 409: “CompositÆ quas dicit non sunt intelligendÆ eÆ quÆ ex pluribus elementis coaluerunt, sed eÆ potius, in quibus cum substantia conjungitur accidens aliquod, veluti homo albus, homo sedens, diagonalis irrationalis, et similia.” Schwegler says, p. 187: “Unter den ? s???eta? ??s?a? versteht Arist. nÄher diejenigen Substanzen, die nicht ein s???et?? oder s?????? sondern ??e? ???? (?? d???e?) und schlechthin ??e??e??, also reine Formen sind, und als solche kein Werden und Vergehen haben.” Of these two different explanations, I think that the explanation given by Bonitz is the more correct, or at least the more probable.)