It is alleged by the orthodox world that man's moral nature and reasoning faculties, both became depraved by the fall. "Totally depraved" has been the doctrine; but the gradual expansion and enlightenment of the mind by progressive science have modified the doctrine with some of the churches, and they have substituted "moral depravity" for "total depravity."

But neither assumption can be scientifically or logically sustained. The assumption that our reason is depraved is made the pretext for urging the superiority of revelation, and making reason subordinate to it. We are told, that, as our reason is depraved, we can not safely rely upon it to judge and criticise the Bible or the doctrine of the churches. Mr. Moody recently exclaimed, in a religious controversy, "I never reason on religion. None but the disciples of devils reason. It is dangerous to reason on religion." Unconscious of his ignorance, Mr. Moody assumed a very ludicrous position.—By the exercise of his reason on religion, Mr. Moody came to the conclusion that it is wrong to reason on religion, thus committing the very sin he condemns in others. He reasons on religion to convince people that it is wrong to reason on religion, and thus violates his own principles. His case is analogous to that of the town council which attempted to keep the prisoners of the county in the old jail while they erected a new jail with the timbers of the old one,—rather a difficult task to achieve, but not more so than Mr. Moody's attempt to keep his reason in chains while he is trying to exercise it. Or, rather, he insults his auditors by saying to them virtually, "I will use my reason on matters of religion, but you must not use yours." As a reasoning being he reasons with reasonable beings, and addresses their reason to convince them they ought not to reason on certain subjects. He uses logic to prove that logic is dangerous, and should not be used. By reasoning against reason he pulls both ways, like the Scotchman who attempted to lift himself by his ears. He commits logical suicide when he attempts to show there is any case in which reason should not be used. The truth is, a person can not think on the subject of religion without beginning to reason on it, because his reasoning faculties and his thinking faculties are both one. He thinks with his intellect, and he reasons with his intellect; and, the very moment he begins to think, he begins to reason. And therefore, if it is wrong to reason on religion, it is wrong to have any religion. We should not allow it to occupy our thoughts for a single moment, and thus we would banish religion from the world; which, however, would be no great loss if it is too absurd to bear the test of reason. And, if it is wrong to reason on religion, it is wrong to reason on any subject. The more important the subject, the more necessary to use reason upon it, that we may make no mistakes in regard to it. The truth is, reason is the only faculty with which a man can comprehend religion, revelation, or the Bible. This would prove again that it is wrong to have any religion, if it is wrong to submit it to the judgment, and test it by our reasoning faculties. Reason is the principal faculty which distinguishes us from the brute; and, therefore, to discard it if to approximate to the condition of the brute. What a pity Mr. Moody had not been consulted in his creation that he might have had his reasoning faculties left out! then he would not be under the necessity of sinning daily by exercising his reason in his attempts to stop its exercise. And then there are other serious difficulties growing out of the reverend gentleman's position. His reason being "depraved," we can place no confidence in its exercise or decision in this case, so as to assume that his judgment and conclusions are correct when he declares against reason. If he reaches his conclusions through a depraved reason, they can be of no account. The verdict can not transcend the judge or court which makes it. The reasoner being depraved, his reasoning and decision in the case must be depraved also, and therefore worthless. Verily the gentleman is in a bad position, and rather a serious quandary; and every struggle to get out only sinks him deeper. He is in the predicament of a dog running round after his tail. And then we should like to ask the gentleman, If our reason is not to be depended upon in matters of religion, how is it to be depended upon in any case? And how does he know, or how can he know, but that, his reason being depraved, it has lead him off the track, in this case, in his attempts to put it in chains? Will the reverend gentleman furnish a rule by which we can know in what case our reason can be trusted, and in what cases we are to doff our moral manhood, and lie prostrate in the dust with the brute? And then the rule, being the product of a depraved reason, could not be relied upon. Really the reverend gentleman is in an inextricable quandary. The case furnishes an illustrative proof of the extent a man can make a fool of himself when he attempts to shipwreck his reason, and a proof that orthodoxy is a conglomeration of absurdities, and is entirely out of place in an age of progressive thought, and an age of reason and science. The only evidence we have ever had of the truth of the depravity of human reason is found in the fact that men professing to have common sense and reason can believe it to be true. And the fact that our moral sense instinctively repels the doctrine of total depravity or moral depravity, and our reason rises up in rebellion against it, is proof positive of its absurdity.

The thought is here suggested, that, if God could not get along without the adoption of an expedient calculated to corrupt our moral nature and deprave our reason, he should not and would not have implanted in us such an instinctive horror to the doctrine. This natural feeling of repugnance is alone sufficient to condemn it, and prove that it is a slander upon Infinite Wisdom, and a libel upon human nature, to assume its existence. And such doctrine is evidently calculated to demoralize society. An old Roman proverb teaches us, "Call a man a dog, and he will be a dog." Call a child depraved, and it will feel depraved; and, feeling so, it will act so. On the other hand, teach the child he possesses the grand principle and feeling of an inherent nobility, and he will rise to the dignity of moral manhood. Such is the difference in the moral value of the two doctrines.