The Situation in Rhodesia

The Situation in Mashonaland—Action taken respectively by Watts, Jenner, Tennent, MacMahon, Alderson, and Evans—A General Surrender of Rebels consequent thereon—Arrangements for Safeguarding the Country—The Situation in Matabeleland—Conditions of Surrender—Mr. Rhodes is called a “Bull”—The Prospects of the Future—The Spirit of “Playing the Game” the true Basis of Discipline and Co–operation on Service—The Strength of Forces employed during the Campaign—The Butcher’s Bill—The Lee–Metford Rifle—Out of recent Evils, Good may come to South Africa—The Growth of Civilised Power—The Native Reserves and Labour Question—A Sense of Insecurity and Mutual Jealousies at present Check Development in South Africa.

1st December.—The situation in Mashonaland is now as follows:—

In the south–east, Makoni has been attacked by Major Watts, defeated, and captured. Owing to a risk of an attempt being made to rescue him, Watts had him tried by court–martial, and he was condemned to be shot. For this execution Watts was subsequently placed in arrest by the High Commissioner at Cape Town, but was eventually acquitted.

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During the early part of October, Major Jenner, D.S.O., had taken a column of 180 men against Umtigeza, south of Salisbury, had captured the chief and destroyed his stronghold, losing three men killed and three wounded in the action.

Captain Tennent, Mashonaland Field Force, with 160 men, had made a successful raid on Simbansotas, capturing the stronghold and numerous kraals, with a loss of two killed and three wounded.

Captain Sir Horace MacMahon, with 200 men, finally cleared the country north of Salisbury in the Mazoe district, and destroyed the cave strongholds there, losing one killed and three wounded.

Lieutenant–Colonel Alderson conducted an expedition, 500 strong, into the country west and south–west of Salisbury, the Lomagundi district; he captured and destroyed Mashingombi’s, Chena’s, and Zimban’s Kraals, and blew up the strongholds. He lost four killed and thirteen wounded.

Major Evans, with 88 men, attacked and took Gatzi’s stronghold, near the Salisbury–Umtali road. He was most unfortunately himself shot dead during the attack.

The effect of these expeditions has been that the rebels have been visited in every part of Mashonaland and smashed, and in consequence are now giving in on every side.

De Moleyns, who was appointed to organise the armed police, is getting together his corps to the number of 580. These are destined to garrison three towns and twelve forts, which latter have now been established in the most important centres of the country.

The men are being recruited in Natal and the Cape Colony; and, pending their arrival up here, we are engaging volunteers to take over their duty in the interim. In this way we shall be able to relieve the Imperial troops, and to get them out of the country before the rains set in fully, and block the roads, and bring the fever.

In Matabeleland the situation is as follows:—

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Six hundred police have been posted in the four towns and sixteen forts about the country, while two hundred of the 7th Hussars are stationed at Buluwayo.

Plumer’s Matabeleland Relief Force and the Cape Boys have been withdrawn from the country, and the local forces disbanded.

Natives are giving up their arms in good numbers, and are settling down to cultivate the lands assigned to them by the Native Commissioners. They have been told by Lord Grey that if they still have any lingering ideas of ultimately driving out the whites, they might at once dismiss such thoughts for ever; that the railway will shortly be up to Buluwayo, ready to import thousands of troops, if necessary; that certain chiefs will be reinstated as their immediate rulers; that grievances will be inquired into, and set right wherever it is possible; and that the Chief Native Commissioner (Taylor) will be the head to whom they will have to refer. This plan has been grasped by them, and agreed to after nearly two months’ havering. Rhodes, who had arranged the peace with them, they have nicknamed “Umlanulang Mkngi”—the bull who separates the fighting–bulls; and Colenbrander, his fidus Achates in the matter, they have called the “tickbird”—a bird which in this country always accompanies a bull, to relieve him of superfluous ticks.

So that throughout Rhodesia war is over, and there is no prospect of any further outbreak on the part of the people. They have had a heavy lesson, which will be further accentuated by the scarcity of food which must result for the next few months, owing to their not having sown their crops. The Chartered Company, having this in view, are making every effort to get up supplies of seed–corn and food, with which they will be able to stave off actual famine from the natives.

All that remains to be done in the immediate future is police work: in getting hold of those among the late rebels who are guilty of murders, and in getting hold of the arms that remain still undelivered. This is a matter of time, and may in some cases necessitate small armed expeditions; but there is no likelihood of any further general rising. So far, about four hundred rifles and four thousand assegais have been handed in.

The ultimate arrangements for their government are practically those explained by Lord Grey to the chiefs in the Matopos: The country will be divided into numerous districts, each under its own induna, who will be paid by the Government, and will be held responsible for the conduct of his district; each induna will have about twelve thousand people under him. Native Commissioners will be assigned to the districts, acting under the orders of the Chief Native Commissioners (one in Matabeleland and the other in Mashonaland), and the success of the scheme very much depends upon the efficiency of these officers. The greatest care will have to be taken in their selection and appointment—a point which has in some cases been overlooked in the past, with the recent direful results.

That the white settlers were not entirely overwhelmed in the first mad, blood–thirsting rush of relentless savagery is a matter for marvel; and that they contrived to hold their own for so long, until assistance came, is, as the Times has lately said, due not merely to the superior armament of the British, but to their dogged pluck and determination.

For your Englishman (and by him I mean his Colonial brother as well) is endowed by nature with the spirit of practical discipline, which is deeper than the surface veneer discipline of Continental armies. Whether it has been instilled into him by his public–school training, by his football and his “fagging,” or whether it is inbred from previous generations of stern though kindly parents, one cannot say; but, at any rate, the goodly precepts of the game remain as best of guides: “Keep in your place,” and “Play, not for yourself, but for your side.”

It is thus that our leaders find themselves backed by their officers playing up to them; not because they are “——well ordered to” (as I heard Tommy express it), nor because it may bring them crosses and rewards, but simply—because it is the game.

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Had it not been that this spirit permeated the forces, the campaign might have dragged out interminably, and very probably part at least of the country would have had to be evacuated for a time.

As it was, the operations have lasted for eight months; but in that time the small forces available—amounting to less than five thousand at their very strongest state—have reconquered a country equal in size to Italy, France, and Spain put together, and held by nearly thirty thousand warriors.

The whole of our combined forces amounted to a little over five thousand men (3000 in Matabeleland, 2200 in Mashonaland). This included 1200 Imperial troops, composed of detachments of the 7th Hussars, the Special Service Mounted Infantry, the infantry and mounted infantry detachments of the West Riding and York and Lancaster Regiments, some Royal Engineers and Artillery, Medical Staff, etc.

The local forces included 4200 men—English, Dutch, and Cape Boys; organised in local field forces for each town; also Plumer’s Matabeleland Relief Force, the Natal Troop, and the Cape Boys Corps.

In addition to these, we had nearly four thousand eight hundred friendly natives; but, as a rule, they were practically useless to us.

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But these, together with the transport employÉs, etc., brought up the number of mouths in the forces to be fed to nearly twelve thousand.

The casualties among the troops (not including the native levies) were as follows:—

¹ Chiefly mishandling loaded rifles, and also from a dynamite explosion at Buluwayo.

Of the above casualties, 14 officers and 39 men belonged to the Imperial troops.

In addition to the above, the number of persons murdered or missing were—in Matabeleland, 140; in Mashonaland, 118; total, 258.

One of the interesting experiences of the campaign, to a soldier, has been the test of the Lee–Metford rifle in action; and, though a great admirer of the Martini–Henry myself, I have to admit that the new weapon has come through the ordeal right well. It is an excellent gun, more especially in the carbine form. Its accuracy is great, and its liability to jam practically nonexistent. The only fault that appears, is the non–“stopping” power of the bullet, which, if it strikes a non–vital spot, does not do much damage to the enemy at the moment. The new bullet will, however, remedy this, its one possible defect. With this rifle the Imperial troops certainly won the admiration of their Colonial brothers–in–arms, Dutchmen as well as English, for their accurate shooting as much as for their fire–discipline.

The recent troubles may, after all, bring good in their train, not only to Rhodesia, but to South Africa generally.

They have shown up in a very strong light, firstly, how utterly higgledy–piggledy were the measures and arrangements for military safeguarding some of the most valuable portions of the country, owing to the fact that a false sense of civilisation had lulled everybody into a feeling of security. Then, in the second place, the eyes of all have been opened to the immense distances that now divide the portions of civilised Central South Africa, and which demand a more than usually efficient protective organisation, instead of the scattered, disconnected measures that have been deemed sufficient up till now.

Until some guarantee of a better security for all classes and industries be given,—especially with the recent troubles fresh in their experience,—it will be difficult to re–develop enterprise on the part of capitalists and others up north.

But once that guarantee is provided, another link will have been forged in the chain of events which are building the fast–growing Dominion of South Africa.

Within the last twenty years we have had the reduction of the Zulu power by force of arms, in 1876, which gave security to the Transvaal, and opened it to civilisation. In 1881 the Boers practically won their independence at Majuba Hill, and were in a position to make use of this security we had obtained for them.

Their filibustering raids in Stellaland and Goschen resulted in the annexation to Great Britain of the slice of territory along their western frontier,—Bechuanaland,—and its protectorate in Khama’s country, which brought our borders up to Matabeleland.

Three years later, Zululand again broke out, and was finally gathered into our system, thereby extending our border up to Swaziland, upon the south–east of the South African Republic. Mr. Moffat then checkmated an attempt on the part of the Boers to get Lobengula’s country.

In 1889 Colonel Pennefather’s “trek” of “pioneers” took up Mashonaland for the Chartered Company, along the northern face of the Transvaal.

Thus penned on every side, the Boers made a despairing effort out towards the east, and Swaziland was given over to their hand, but not the coast they coveted. Tongaland, the last remaining land between them and the sea, became a new protectorate of England.

And to the north, under Mr. Rhodes’ direction, the Company extended far and wide its sway. In 1890 it crossed the Zambesi, and, adding Barotseland within its sphere, moved up its borders to Nyassaland.

In 1893 inevitable conflict between the rival powers north of the Limpopo came to a head, with the inevitable result—the power of Lobengula, King of the Matabele, went down before the white pioneers of civilisation.

And while the white power of South Africa was thus spreading its far–reaching arms to enfold these enormous possessions, its heart was gaining strength and power in Kimberley and Johannesburg. Enterprise, backed by gold, is a life–current in the veins of a developing country whose value cannot be denied. But when the child is overgrowing itself, it is a dangerous experiment to endeavour to increase the functions of the heart by tinkering at its valves. Nature, if left to herself, will bring it right in the end.

The aim of the higher policy of South Africa is the amity and co–operation, if not the absolute confederation, of her various white states for their mutual good. The effect of the Raid will merely be to put back the consummation for some years longer.

That higher policy is a matter which, apart from its present money aspect, should be of deepest interest to the people of England. Our Colonial expansion, especially in South Africa, is not undertaken with any idea of show–off, but for the actual use of our overflow population now, and, more especially, in the near future. Rhodesia comprises all that is worth having in the unoccupied parts of South Africa, and its ultimate development is perfectly assured, without the addition of the riches even of Johannesburg. Ten years back Kimberley was the heart and centre of South African wealth, as Johannesburg is to–day; and there is no reason why, within the next decade, an entirely new centre should not have sprung up in the virgin territories of Rhodesia. The chances are, in fact, largely in its favour. Even without a special boom, that part—and, indeed, the whole of civilised South Africa—will press steadily and rapidly forward; and it is even possible that out of the late evil good may come, and the lessons learned in the past few months may be of greatest value in guiding the steersmen in the future.

No doubt the two foremost obstacles to development in this part of the world are: firstly, insecurity; secondly, want of labour. And these are evils that seem to be capable of remedy.

In the matter of labour, the situation in South Africa is briefly this—in the mining and agricultural centres of the west and north, native labour is scarce; whereas in the south and east, where there is little demand for it, native material is lying idle in masses. The problem before the local statesmen is, how to effect a redistribution that would remedy this, and readjust the balance of supply and demand. The system which at present obtains in the east is to herd the natives together in “reserves,” where, assured of a certain amount of land and perfect security, they settle themselves down to what is their ideal of life—namely, to bask on a sunny blanket, while their women raise the food. There is not the slightest incentive offered them to work or to improve themselves. They merely increase their numbers and hatch grievances, and thus become a danger in the land. In Natal they number nearly three millions, against the six hundred thousand whites. Various plans have been considered for the amelioration of this state of affairs. It has been proposed so heavily to tax them, as to force them to work in order to raise the necessary cash; or to grant them freeholds for farming; or to transplant bodily whole reserves to mining centres; and so on. Whether one plan or many should be tried is a moot point; but it is very certain that some move in this direction is necessary for the development of the almost boundless resources of the country. White labour, if it were content to labour, and not to strive at once for fortunes, would, in that climate, thrive and do well; but it is a dream which, at present, does not work in practice. Were this otherwise, South Africa would prove a richer agricultural garden than Canada.

The sense of insecurity, which is the other stumbling–block to African development, arises from various causes, all of which seem open to remedy. The chief of these is the mutual jealousy and bad feeling between races and countries which are here crowded together. In addition to the native danger from Zulus, Swazis, Kaffirs, Basutos, Matabele, and others, there are conflicting white interests. From the mining centres the Boers find themselves elbowed out by the capitalists; these, in their turn, are stirring against each other in the struggle for wealth,—German Jews competing with British prospectors, American experts against French financiers, and so on. And, outside, colonies are mutually working against each other—Cape Colony against Natal, Chartered Company against the Transvaal,—all against all. Result, general war of rates, freights, and customs, to the great detriment of the trade of each and the whole. Could the local statesmen rise above their present petty jealousies, and take a broad survey of the whole question of South African progress and prosperity, what a vast stride it might bring about in their mutual well–being, and in abolishing the present situation, where some parts of the country are intoxicated with wealth, while others are parched for want of it!