“Your money lend and lose a friend” is an adage that the former comrades in arms have been ruefully recalling ever since the stirring days of the World War, when they were borrowing and spending with no thought of the day of reckoning. We kept no books in which were charged up to one another’s account the expenditure in human lives. We gave our own lives and our son’s lives, and expected nothing in return. The appalling loss of life and the human wreckage were cheerfully accepted; for that was traditionally the expected sacrifice of war. Each member of the coalition contributed without stint, for service on all the fronts, all the fighting men it could muster; and if there was ever any haggling about quotas, the public knew nothing about it. But when it came to money and material wealth there were no free-will offerings, no pooling of resources. Although money and credits furnished the sinews of war and were used as weapons to crush the common enemy, books were All the warring nations had internal obligations to meet. In the period of reconstruction as well as during the actual war years, successive loans had been floated, partly by pyramiding, at increasing rates of interest. In every country the national debt had grown beyond belief. Most of it was owed at home, but millions of people had patriotically invested their own savings and reserve funds and the capital essential to their business enterprises. Governments had to meet the interest charges, and, because they needed to borrow still more money, their people had to be assured that all that had been advanced would be paid back. In many of the countries staggering In four years French money dropped to one-third of par, Belgian between one-third and one-fourth, Italian one-fourth, Czechoslovak one-eighth, Jugoslav one-twelfth, and Rumania one-fifteenth. Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish money kept well above Rumanian. Poland, on the other hand, shared with Russia, Austria, and (after the invasion of the Ruhr) Germany the problem of keeping the paper money from becoming altogether valueless. Hungary and the Baltic Republics (except Finland) gave up the struggle of For a time the English-speaking peoples looked upon the decreasing values of Continental European moneys with indifference or amusement. Trade with the Continent, which could not pay pounds sterling or dollar prices, fell off and threatened us with a crisis of over-production. This was a danger to which we quickly adjusted ourselves, with the consoling thought that the business would have had to be done on credit anyway. Who could afford to sell on credit to countries already virtually bankrupt and with a constantly falling currency? The English-speaking peoples had the rest of the world to trade with, and it seemed that there was nothing to do but to wait until some of the countries affected by chaotic financial conditions became bankrupt and repudiated their worthless paper money, as revolutionary France had repudiated the assignats and the American Southern States had seen their Confederate dollars become worthless. The more stable European countries could in time conquer the problem of inflation and rebalance their budgets. Were it not for the two intimately related problems of reparations and interallied debts, Great Britain and the United States would probably not The American Government was unwilling to accept the thesis set forth in the Balfour note of August 1, 1922, that Great Britain’s debt to the United States should be considered in connection with the debts of Continental Europe to Great Britain. It was unwilling, also, to defer the payment of the Rhine occupation bill until the general Of the Continental European nations Finland alone has arranged to repay her obligation to the United States. The United States holds sufficient German assets to cover reparations, and a German-American commission met in Washington, in March, 1923, to adjudicate the claims of American citizens against the German Government. No progress has been made in the matter of claims against other enemy countries. France, Italy, and the smaller European countries, except Finland, have made no move to pay the interest and amortize the principal of the loans advanced by the United States. What has happened, however, as we have already seen, is that our European debtors have announced the policy of making reimbursement to the United States dependent upon the collection of reparations from Germany and the other vanquished nations. The argument by which they American public opinion, while sympathetic to France and Belgium in the Ruhr occupation, feels that debts should be paid all around, and is unwilling to accept as valid the contention of contingent payments or to realize that our European friends have the right to expect us to let up on them if they let up on Germany. Europeans ask: “Why should the conquerors pay, while the conquered go scot-free? Are we not the victims? Were they not the aggressors? It is incredible to expect us to forgive our enemies when you are unwilling to forgive your friends?” The Americans retort, “Why should we pay the German reparations, for this is what your proposal amounts to?”
According to the ratio finally decided at the Spa Conference, France, Great Britain, and Italy are to receive respectively 52, 26, and 10 per cent of whatever reparations Germany finally pays, while Belgium is a preferred creditor of Germany, and Italy has a lien on the major part of Austrian and Hungarian reparations. The figures are only approximate, for they do not take into account compounded interest; and there is some doubt as to the propriety of including the Russian obligations to France, most of which date from before the war and are owing French nationals and not the French Government. Roughly speaking, the United States is the largest creditor, with $11,000,000,000 owing her, When we consider the short time that the United States was in the war, its cost was staggering. And we must remember that the United States lent no money out of surplus, but that her ability to grant the huge credits to her associates in the World War was due to the successive Liberty loans and the Victory loan, which are internal obligations the interest and amortization charges of which are being carried in our national budget. On the other hand, the money did not actually leave the country, but was spent by the borrowing Governments for goods and food-stuffs manufactured and raised in the United States. The repayment of Great Britain’s debt does not work great hardship either on the British or ourselves; for Great Britain and her Dominions are large holders of American securities and have extensive investments in Mexico and Central and South America. The Continental European belligerents sold most of their North and South The transfer of surpluses of wealth from one country to another is an economic problem of both reparations and interallied debts that has not yet been solved. In the midst of all our discussion of the insistence upon the settlement of reparations and interallied indebtedness, where is the economist who has shown us how this can be done without the willingness of French markets to absorb German goods and American markets to absorb European goods? However little it may appeal to us on first sight as a business proposition to cancel French and Italian debts in return for the sweeping modification by these two nations of indemnity demands upon Germany, we may yet come to see that such a course would be not only a magnificent contribution to world peace but also good business for ourselves. Is it not the alternative to a low tariff and dumping? Will it not lead to the economic rehabilitation of Europe, to which reparations and interallied debts are now the barriers? For our Interallied indebtedness has also its psychological side. “Your money lend and lose a friend” is a true saying. The attitude of the American people on interallied indebtedness is a serious obstacle to Franco-American and Italo-American friendship. We cannot exact payment of the sums owing us without creating dislike, antagonism, and resentment. This may be a sad fact, but it is none the less true. In conclusion, there are two points upon which Americans have the right to insist, and it would be foolish to cancel interallied indebtedness without insisting upon them. The material advantages the United States gained from the World War were far less than those gained by the other victorious participants. Putting aside as hypothetical the argument that Germany, had she won, would have attacked us next (for it is an argument that does not take into proper consideration the importance of sea-power), we can say to our European comrades in arms, including Great Britain, that they ought to take into account not only the intangible rewards of victory, such as crippling a powerful adversary and competitor, but also the spoils—reparations Even when the idea of reparations was enlarged to cover pensions, the United States did not lay claim to a share. This was in itself a generous contribution to our European associates. Nor did we ask for a sphere of influence in Turkey or a share in the German colonies. Our attitude was one of complete disinterestedness and of an unselfishness unparalleled in the history of peace-making by victorious coalitions. If we are now asked to make an additional contribution, should we not insist first of all upon a quid pro quo for our money in the form of definite understanding about the open door in Africa and Asia, especially in the mandated territories? Ought we not also to insist upon the military and naval neutralization of European possessions on the American continent and reciprocity in trade agreements between all these possessions and the countries of North, Central, and South America?
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