The princes of Transoxania had so long been accustomed to regard the Arabs as mere marauders that it was some time before they could realise the loss of their independence. Though necessity forced them at first to adopt a conciliatory spirit (as, for example, in their acceptance of Islam under ?Omar II), they were dismayed to find all the machinery of permanent occupation set in motion, and their authority flouted by tactless and greedy Arab officials. Such a state of affairs was tolerable only in the absence of any countering force. The situation was not stationary for long, however; even before Qutayba’s death other and disturbing factors had begun to enter. Our best clue to the complications in Transoxania during this period is the attitude of Ghurak, king of Sughd, of whose movements, fortunately, sufficient indications have been preserved. In maintaining a precarious balance between the TÜrgesh and the Arabs, his true statesman’s instinct seldom misled him in judging how and when to act to advantage throughout his troubled reign. In addition to this we have the evidence, unreliable in detail but confirmatory in the mass, of the embassies sent by the subject principalities to the Chinese court. Doubtless they were despatched in the guise of commercial missions and in many cases were truly so, but that they frequently possessed a political character can hardly be denied. The dates of these embassies as given in the authorities translated by Chavannes fall naturally into four periods. In the following list all embassies have been omitted in which the Arabs are known to have participated or whose object is known to have had no connection with the Arab conquests, as well as those which appear to be duplicated, and those from the minor states:

Number of Embassies from:—

These four periods, as will be seen, closely correspond to the fluctuations of Arab authority in Transoxania.

In the same year, 713, that Qutayba first led his army across the Jaxartes, a new era of westward expansion opened in China with the accession of Hiuen-Tsong. In 714 the Chinese intervened in the affairs of the Ten Tribes and obtained their immediate submission, while in the following year they restored the deposed king of Farghana. In 716, on the death of Me-chu?o, Khan of the Northern Turks, the powerful tribes of the TÜrgesh asserted their independence, and under their chief Su-Lu established, with Chinese assistance, a new kingdom in the Ili basin. The princes of Transoxania eagerly sought to profit by these developments to free themselves from the Arab yoke. In 718 a joint embassy was sent to China by Tughshada, Ghurak, Narayana king of Kumadh, and the king of Chaghanian. The first three presented petitions for aid against the Arabs, which are given in full in Chavannes’ Documents. Tughshada asked that the TÜrgesh might be ordered to attack the Arabs, Ghurak related the capture of Samarqand and asked for Chinese troops, Narayana complained of the seizure of all his treasures by the Arabs and asked that representations might be made to induce them to remit their crushing taxation. It is significant that the king of Chaghanian, acting for his suzerain, the Jabghu of Tukharistan, did not compromise himself by joining in these requests. But beyond “fair words” the son of Heaven took no action, and no Chinese forces appeared West of the Jaxartes, in spite of the repeated entreaties addressed by the princes to their self-elected suzerain.

The TÜrgesh, however, were not long in intervening on their own account. Whatever opportunity the Arab government had to pacify the Sughdians was lost by a succession of incompetent governors. Already in the reign of ?Omar II, as has been seen, they had withdrawn their allegiance from the weak ?Abdur-Rahman b. Nu?aym. For a moment the situation seemed to improve at the beginning of the governorship of Sa?id “Khudhayna” (102/720) owing to the firm handling of Samarqand by his lieutenant Shu?ba b. Zuhayr. But disturbances broke out and Shu?ba was recalled, perhaps in a vain attempt to appease the insurgents. It would seem that the Sughdians appealed to the new Turkish power in the East and Su-Lu, unable to make headway against the growing influence of China, willingly seized the opportunity of diverting his armies into Transoxania. A small TÜrgesh force was sent under KÖl-chur (called by Tabari Kursul)[75] to make common cause with the Sughdian rebels in the following spring (end of 102). Sa?id awoke to find the whole country in arms, a Turkish force marching on Samarqand, and the local princes, with few exceptions, aiding the invaders. The Arab commanders could not rely on their levies and a small garrison at Qasr al-Bahili was evacuated only with the utmost difficulty. The tale of their relief by a small force of volunteers is one of the most spirited narratives of adventure in Tabari. But such episodes did not affect the general success of the Turkish forces. Kursul continued his advance through Sughd without opposition, avoiding Samarqand, until at last Sa?id was roused by public reproach to march against the Turks. After a small initial success, which he refused to follow up, he was severely defeated and confined to the neighbourhood of Samarqand. The Turks were not strong enough to undertake a siege of the city, as the whole operation seems to have been little more than a reconnaissance in force combined with a raiding expedition. As the TÜrgesh retired, the Arab cavalry followed them up as far as Waraghsar, the head of the canal system of Sughd. Ghurak appears to have refrained from committing himself by openly aiding the rebels, and doubtless recognised that the Arabs were not so easily to be dislodged. From the fact that Sa?id’s camp was pitched at Ishtikhan, in close proximity to him, it may even be conjectured that he outwardly supported the Arabs.

But the new governor of ?Iraq, ?Omar b. Hubayra, was not the man to stand idly by in face of the danger that threatened Khurasan. The weakness shown by Khudhayna and the complaints of oppression from his subjects, were sufficient reason for his recall, and Sa?id b. ?Amr al-Harashi, a man of very different stamp, was installed in his place. The transfer may be placed in the late autumn of 103/721. The new governor’s first act was to summon the rebels to submit, but a large number of nobles and merchants, with their retainers, either fearing that they could expect no mercy, or anxious to free themselves altogether from the Arab yoke, prepared to emigrate to Farghana. Ghurak did his utmost to persuade them to remain, but without effect; their absence would no doubt affect the revenues, and a certain emphasis is laid on the point in Tabari’s account. Leaving hostages behind, the malcontents marched towards Farghana and opened negotiations with the king for the occupation of ?Isam. The majority settled in the interval at Khujanda, but other parties actually entered Farghana, and one body at least occupied a fortified position on the Zarafshan. Al-Harashi followed up his demands by marching into Sughd and encamped near Dabusia, where he was with difficulty persuaded to stay until sufficient contingents arrived. On advancing, he was met by a messenger from the king of Farghana, who, outwardly professing to assist the Sughdians, had secretly decided to rid himself of them by calling in the Arabs against them. Al-Harashi eagerly seized the opportunity and pressed forward, receiving the allegiance of Ushrusana as he passed. The emigrants, although urged by their leader Karzanj either to take active measures or to submit, decided to risk a siege in Khujanda, trusting to the protection of the king of Farghana. But when Sa?id set about the siege in earnest, and they realised that they had been betrayed, they surrendered on unexpectedly easy terms. Sa?id divided them, placing the nobles and merchants in a camp apart from the soldiers. By the execution of Thabit, a noble from Ishtikhan, he provoked a revolt, under pretext of which he massacred the nobles and the troops, sparing the merchants, who numbered four hundred, only in order to squeeze them of their wealth. Tabari’s account very thinly veils al-Harashi’s responsibility for this wanton act of atrocious cruelty, which could not fail to embitter the feelings of the whole population of Transoxania. It is curious that the Persian Tabari (Zotenberg IV. 268) has an entirely different story, which is found in none of the Arabic authorities. The refugees who escaped eventually took refuge with the Khaqan of the TÜrgesh, where they formed a regiment (no doubt continually recruited from new emigrants) which particularly distinguished itself in the war against the Arabs[76].

The expedition to Khujanda may be put in the spring and summer of 722 (end of 103, beginning of 104), though the chronology here, and indeed for all this period, is uncertain. The piecemeal reduction of the fortresses in Sughd occupied the remainder of the year, a series of operations whose difficulty is sufficient witness to the effect of the news from Khujanda in stiffening the resistance to the Arabs. The first fortress to be attacked was that of Abghar, in which a band of the emigrants had settled. The attack was entrusted to Sulayman b. Abi?s-Sari, with an army composed largely of native levies from Bukhara, Khwarizm, and Shuman, accompanied by their princes. Sulayman persuaded the dihqan to surrender, and sent him to al-Harashi, who at first treated him well in order to counteract the effect of the massacre of Khujanda, but put him to death after recapturing Kish and Rabinjan. The most inaccessible fortress and the crowning example of Al-Harashi’s perfidy were left to the last. The dihqan Subuqri still held out in the fortress of Khuzar, to the south of Nasaf; unable to take it by force, Al-Harashi sent Musarbal b. Al-Khirrit, a personal friend of Subuqri, to offer him a pardon. On his surrender, he was sent to Merv and put to death, although the amnesty, it is said, had been confirmed by ?Omar b. Hubayra.

The whole of Sughd was thus once more in the hands of the Arabs. The nearer districts, Khwarizm and Bukhara, had remained loyal and the Oxus basin seems to have been unaffected. But to make a solitude and call it peace did not suit the aims of the Arab government and Al-Harashi found that his “policy of thorough” only provided Ibn Hubayra with an excuse for superseding him. During the winter, therefore, he was replaced by Muslim b. Sa?id al-Kilabi, who, as the grandson of Aslam b. Zur?a, came of a house long familiar with Khurasan. The danger of the movement of revolt spreading to the Iranians of Khurasan seems to have preoccupied the Arab government during all this period. Sa?id Khudhayna had poisoned the too-influential Hayyan an-Nabati on suspicion of rousing the Persians against the government and that it was felt even in Basra may be seen from Ibn Hubayra’s advice to his new governor, “Let your chamberlain be one who can make peace with your mawali.” Muslim, in fact, favoured the Persians and did all in his power to appoint officials acceptable to them, the Mazdean Bahram Sis, for example, being appointed Marzuban of Merv[77]. But all such measures were merely palliatives and could not materially affect the growing discontent in Sughd and Tukharistan. During his first year of office it is recorded (if the narrative is not, as Wellhausen thinks, a duplicate of the raid on Farghana in the following year) that Muslim marched across the river but was met and pushed back into Khurasan by a Turkish army, narrowly escaping disaster. It is not improbable that the local forces were again assisted by TÜrgesh on this occasion. In the following year, however, before the close of 105, a second expedition gained some success at Afshina, near Samarqand. Meanwhile Hisham had succeeded Yazid II as Caliph, and ?Omar b. Hubayra, whose Qaysite leanings were too pronounced, was recalled in favour of Khalid b. ?Abdullah al-Qasri of Bajila. The transfer took place most probably in March (724), though another account places it some months later. Muslim was now preparing an expedition into Farghana, but the Yemenite troops at Balkh held back partly through dislike of the campaign and doubtless expecting the governor’s recall. Nasr b. Sayyar was sent with a Mudarite force to use compulsion; the mutinous Yemenites were defeated at Baruqan and unwillingly joined the army. It is noteworthy that troops from Chaghanian fought alongside Nasr in this engagement. Before leaving Bukhara Muslim learned that he was to be superseded, at the same time receiving orders to continue his expedition. Four thousand Azdites, however, took the opportunity of withdrawing. The remainder, accompanied by Sughdian levies, marched into Farghana, crossed the Jaxartes, and besieged the capital, cutting down the fruit trees and devastating the land. Here news was brought that Khaqan was advancing against them, and Muslim hurriedly ordered a retreat. The Arabic accounts graphically describe the headlong flight of the Arabs. On the first day they retired three stages, the next day they crossed the Wadi Sabuh, closely pursued by the TÜrgesh; a detachment, largely composed of mawali, which encamped separately, was attacked and suffered heavy losses, the brother of Ghurak being amongst the killed. After a further eight days’ march, continually harassed by the light Turkish horse, they were reduced to burning all the baggage, to the value of a million dirhems. On reaching the Jaxartes the following day, they found the way barred by the forces of Shash and Farghana, together with the Sughdians who had escaped from Sa?id al-Harashi, but the desperate and thirsty troops, hemmed in by the TÜrgesh from behind, cut their way through. The rearguard made a stand, but lost its commander. At length the remnants of the army reached Khujanda, where ?Abdur-Rahman b. Nu?aym took command on behalf of Asad b. ?Abdullah, and made good his retreat to Samarqand.

This disaster, which is known as the “Day of Thirst,” marks a period in the history of the Arab conquests. It was practically the last aggressive expedition of the Arabs into Transoxania for fifteen years, but of much greater importance was the blow which it struck at Arab prestige. The rÔles were reversed; from now onwards the Arabs found themselves on the defensive and were gradually ousted from almost every district across the Oxus. No wonder, therefore, that the memory of the “Day of Thirst” rankled even long after it had been avenged[78]. According to the Arab tradition, the TÜrgesh armies were led on this occasion not by Su-Lu himself, but by one of his sons. Unfortunately the accounts of Su-Lu in such Chinese works as have been translated are silent on his Western expeditions, and the Arab historians are our only authorities. The immediate result of the Arab defeat, not only in Sughd but in Tukharistan and the southern basin as well, was to stiffen the attitude of passive resistance to the Arabs to the point at which it only needed active support to break into a general conflagration. From this time, if not before, the subject princes regarded the TÜrgesh as the agents of their deliverance, commissioned by China in response to the urgent entreaties they had addressed to the Emperor for aid in their struggle. We find this actually expressed in a letter sent three years later by the Jabghu of Tukharistan, which is, in Chavannes’ words “but one long cry of distress”[79]. “I am loaded with heavy taxation by the Arabs; in truth, their oppression and our misery are extreme. If I do not obtain the help of the (Chinese) Kagan ... my kingdom will certainly be destroyed and dismembered.... I have been told that the Celestial Kagan has given this order to the Kagan of the TÜrgesh: To you I delegate the affairs of the Far West; you must at once send soldiers to drive out the Arabs.” The point of view here expressed is of course that of the ruling princes, whose resentment at the curtailment of their authority is understandable. Besides making allowance for some natural exaggeration, it would be dangerous to assume that this was as yet fully shared by the people. In all probability, if we may judge from historical analogies, there was also a pro-Arab party in Sogdiana, who felt that the best interests of the country lay, not in an opposition whose final issue could scarcely be in doubt, but in co-operation with their new masters as far as was possible. The tragedy of the Arab administration was that by alternately giving and refusing co-operation on its side, it drove its supporters in the end to make common cause with its opponents.

But though the situation was steadily deteriorating the decisive moment had not yet come. The new governor, Asad b. ?Abdullah, seems to have seen something of the danger though factional feeling was running so high that the administration was almost helpless in face of it. He tried to continue Muslim’s policy of conciliation by appointing agents of known probity. Tawba b. Abi Usayd, a mawla who had been intendant for Muslim, and who “treated the people fairly, made himself easily accessible, dealt uprightly with the army and maintained their supplies,” he persuaded to remain in office under him. Hani? b. Hani?, the financial intendant at Samarqand, was unpopular; he was recalled and Al-Hasan b. Abi?l-?Amarrata of Kinda, who was in sympathy with the mawali, appointed in his place. With him was associated Thabit Qutna, who had been a leader of some repute under Sa?id Khudhayna, “gallant warrior, distinguished poet, confidant of Yazid b. Muhallab, and universally popular”[80]. Still more significant is the fact that one of Asad’s earliest actions was to renew the practice, neglected since the days of ?Omar II, of sending an embassy to the Chinese court. As before, however, the Arabs resented the favour shown to the Persians, and the military weakness of Ibn Abi?l-?Amarrata roused them to open anger. Strong Turkish forces, probably guerilla bands swollen by refugees and malcontents from the wasted districts, spread over the country and appeared even before Samarqand. The governor made some show of opposition, but avoided coming to grips with them, thus intensifying his unpopularity.

Samarqand indeed was gradually becoming more and more isolated, but no assistance could be given from Khurasan. During his three years of office Asad’s attention was wholly engaged with the situation in Tukharistan and the South. Even here his constant expeditions, to Gharjistan, Khuttal, and elsewhere, met with no success. Worse still, in 108/726 he found his forces in Khuttal opposed by the Khaqan with his TÜrgesh. The princes of Tukharistan had taken to heart the lessons of the “Day of Thirst”, and the powerful chief who had already all but driven the Arabs out of Sogdiana was now called in to expel them from the Oxus basin as well. Asad visited his failure on the Mudarites, whom he may have suspected of treachery, but the indignation called out by his treatment of such men as Nasr b. Sayyar, ?Abdur-Rahman b. Nu?aym, Sawra b. Al-Hurr, and Al-Bakhtari, made his recall inevitable. Nor had his measures removed the distrust and hatred of the subject peoples. The land was wasted and desolate[81], the crushing taxation was not lightened, and all Persian governors were not of the stamp of Tawba; many of them were but too ready to rival their Arab rulers in greed and cruelty. Asad may have gained the friendship of many dihqans[82], but that was an easier matter than to placate the population. In such an atmosphere it was only to be expected that Shi?ite and ?Abbasid propaganda, though actively combated by the administration, found a fertile field among the Muslim converts in Khurasan and Lower Tukharistan, and was already beginning to undermine the whole fabric of Arab government.

For a moment the hopes of a radical change of policy entertained by the mawali and the clearer-sighted Arabs were raised to the highest pitch by the appointment (in 109) of Ashras b. ?Abdullah as-Sulami, accompanied by the separation of Khurasan from Khalid al-Qasri’s province of ?Iraq. It is unnecessary to recapitulate here the far-reaching concessions by which he hoped to secure, and actually did for a time secure the allegiance of the Sughdians, or the methods by which the local princes, especially Ghurak, succeeded in checking the movement[83]. It is generally assumed that the hostility of Ghurak was due to the serious fall in revenue which would result. Though this was doubtless the plea put forward and accepted by Ashras it can scarcely have been the true issue. Ghurak’s aim was not to maintain himself on good terms with the Arab governors but to recover his independence. If once the people became “Arabs” all hope of success must have been lost. It was a game with high stakes and Ghurak won. It must not be overlooked, however, that the account as we have it is traditional and may often be mistaken on the sequence of cause and effect. The astonishing reversal of the measures adopted by Ashras is more probably to be explained by pressure from above, not from below, and our tradition may really present only the popular view of the Caliph Hisham’s reorganization of the financial administration[84]. The Arabs resorted to brutal methods to wring the taxes from the new converts, and with incredible blindness selected the dihqans for special indignities. It is not unlikely that Narshakhi’s story of the martyrdom of native Muslims in Bukhara is connected with this event, though there are many other possible explanations, such as, for example, an attempted Harithite movement (see below, p. 76 f.) The reaction swung the whole population of Transoxania, dihqans and peasantry alike, into open rebellion. The first small party of emigrants who quitted Samarqand, although supported by a few Arabs, were induced to surrender and return[85], but within a few months the dreaded Khaqan with his TÜrgesh had joined forces with the rebels and swept the Arabs across the Oxus. Even Bukhara was lost[86] and only Samarqand with two minor posts on the Zarafshan, Kamarja and Dabusia, held out. Ghurak, however, still supported the Arabs, as Samarqand, although besieged, seems to have been in no danger, while his son Mukhtar, doubtless to keep a footing in the opposite camp, joined with the TÜrgesh.

The pressing danger sobered the Arabs and temporarily united all parties and factions. The army was concentrated at Amul but for three months was unable to cross the river in the face of the combined native and TÜrgesh armies. A small body under Qatan b. Qutayba which had already crossed and fortified itself before the arrival of the Turks was beleaguered. The Turkish cavalry even made raids on Khurasan with an excess of boldness which was punished by a mounted force under Thabit Qutna. At length Ashras got his forces across and, joining with Qatan b. Qutayba, advanced on Paykand. The enemy cut off the water supply, and had it not been for the gallantry and self-sacrifice of Harith b. Surayj, Thabit Qutna, and their companions, an even greater and more irretrievable “Day of Thirst” had resulted. In spite of their weakness, Qatan and the cavalry of Qays and Tamim charged the enemy and forced them back, so that Ashras was able to continue his advance towards Bukhara. In the heavy fighting the Muslim forces were divided, Ashras and Qatan gave each other up for lost, and Ghurak judged that the time had come to throw in his lot with the Turks. Two days later, however, the armies were reunited and on the retiral of the Turks encamped at Bawadara outside the walls of Bukhara, whence they prepared to besiege the city. Ghurak also retrieved his error and rejoined Ashras. The Khaqan withdrew towards Samarqand, but sat down before Kamarja, expecting to take it by storm in a few days at the most. The Arabic narratives of these events are confused in several places, which has given rise to many incorrect statements, such as that Ghurak was beleaguered with the Arabs in Kamarja and that the garrison consisted of Qatan and his forces. Kamarja was not in the neighbourhood of Paykand, as Wellhausen states, but a few farsakhs west of Samarqand[87]. When the garrison would not yield to assault Khaqan tried other methods. Accompanying his expedition was Khusru the son of Peroz and grandson of Yazdigird, heir of the Sasanid kings. This prince was sent to parley with the garrison, but when he claimed the restoration of his kingdom and promised them an amnesty, it is not surprising that the Arabs indignantly refused to hear him. Nor would the appearance of a Sasanid prince evoke much enthusiasm amongst the Iranians of Transoxania. As the Sasanid house had taken refuge in China, however, the presence of Khusru might be taken as an indication that the rebels were receiving encouragement from China also, though the Chinese records are silent on this expedition. Khaqan’s second proposal, that he should hire the Arabs as mercenaries, was rejected as derisively as the first. The siege was then pressed with renewed vigour, both sides putting their prisoners and hostages to death, but after fifty-eight days Khaqan, on the advice of the son of Ghurak and the other Sughdian princes, allowed the garrison to transfer either to Samarqand or Dabusia. On their choosing the latter, the terms were faithfully carried out after an exchange of hostages.

The fame of the defence of Kamarja spread far and wide, but it brought little relief to the pressure on the Arabs in Transoxania. Even Khwarizm was affected by the movement of revolt, but at the first symptoms of open rebellion it was crushed by the local Muslims, probably Arabs settled in the district, with the aid of a small force despatched by Ashras. The reference made in Tabari to assistance given to the rebels by the Turks is probably to be discounted, as is done by Ibn al-Athir. It is of course quite possible that the movement was instigated by the TÜrgesh, though no such explanation is necessary, but if any Turks were engaged they were probably local nomadic tribes. Ashras seems to have remained before Bukhara during the winter, possibly in Paykand; the TÜrgesh probably withdrew towards Shash and Farghana.

In the following year, 730/111-112[88], the attacks on the army of Ashras were renewed. The course of events can only be gathered from the accounts given of the difficulties experienced by the new governor, Junayd b. ?Abdur-Rahman al-Murri, in joining the army before Bukhara. His guide advised him to levy a force from Zamm and the neighbouring districts before crossing the Oxus but Junayd refused, only to find himself after crossing put to the necessity of calling on Ashras for a bodyguard of cavalry. This force narrowly escaped disaster on its way to meet Junayd and fought a second severe engagement on the return journey before reaching Paykand. The enemy are variously described as “men of Bukhara and Sughd” and “Turks and Sughdians”; it may therefore be assumed that they were the same forces against whom Ashras had fought the previous year. Wellhausen is probably correct in supposing that Ashras was practically beleaguered, though not in Bukhara. The recapture of this city and the retiral of Khaqan took place shortly after Junayd’s arrival, in circumstances which are not described[89]. The attitude of Tugshada during this episode is not recorded. It is practically certain, however, that he remained in Bukhara, and after the reconquest was able to make his peace with the Arabs, probably on the excuse of force majeure. At all events he retained his position, possibly because Junayd thought it impolitic in the face of the situation to victimise the nobles in the reconquered territories and thus provoke a more stubborn resistance in the rest of the country. The Arabs seem to have followed up the Turks towards Samarqand, probably to relieve the garrison; the two armies met again at Zarman, seven farsakhs from Samarqand, where the Arabs claimed a success, one of their prisoners being a nephew of Khaqan. From Sughd the army marched to Tirmidh where Junayd halted for two months in the friendly atmosphere of Chaghanian before returning to Merv. His intention was no doubt to make arrangements for the pacification or reconquest of Tukharistan and Khuttal; in the following year his troops were actually engaged in this direction when the TÜrgesh invasion of Sughd forced him to change his plans. Baladhuri quotes Abu ?Ubayda for the statement that Junayd reconquered certain districts in Tukharistan which had revolted.

How lightly even yet factional feeling was slumbering was shown after the return of the army, when the Bahilites of Balkh had a chance to retaliate on Nasr b. Sayyar for their discomfiture at Baruqan. Though Junayd was prompt to punish the offending governor, the incident throws a strong light on one cause of the weakness of the Arabs in these campaigns.

Early in 731/112-113, the TÜrgesh and Sughdians gathered their forces for the investment of Samarqand. Ghurak now openly joined the Khaqan. Sawra b. Al-Hurr, the governor of Samarqand, unable to face the enemy in the field, sent an urgent message to Junayd for assistance. The governor hastily recalled his troops, but crossed the river without waiting for them against the advice of his generals. “No governor of Khurasan,” said al-Mujashshar b. Muzahim, one of the ablest of the Arab commanders, “should cross the river with less than fifty thousand men.” Accompanied only by a small force, Junayd reached Kish, where he raised some local levies and prepared to march on Samarqand. The enemy in the meantime, after blocking up the water supplies on his road, interposed their forces between Samarqand and the army of relief. Junayd thereupon decided to follow the direct route across the Shawdar mountains in the hope of avoiding an engagement, but when only four farsakhs from Samarqand was surprised in the defiles by Khaqan. The advance-guard was driven in and the main body engaged in a furious struggle in which both sides fought to a standstill. The Arabs, hemmed in on all sides, were forced to entrench; stragglers, refugees, and baggage, collected near Kish, were attacked by a detachment of Turks and severely handled. Khaqan renewed his attacks on the camp the next day, all but overwhelming Junayd, and settled down thereafter to beleaguer him. In this predicament there was only one course open to Junayd. Had his force perished, Samarqand would certainly have fallen in the end and two disasters taken the place of one. He therefore adopted the more prudent, if unheroic, course of ordering Sawra to leave a skeleton garrison in Samarqand and march out to join him by way of the river: Sawra, however, took the short cut across the mountains, and was actually within four miles of Junayd, when the Turkish forces bore down on him. The battle lasted into the heat of the day, when the Turks, on Ghurak’s advice it is said, having first set the grass on fire, drew up so as to shut Sawra off from the water. Maddened by heat and thirst, the Arabs charged the enemy and broke their ranks, only to perish miserably in the fire, Turks and Muslims together. The scattered remnants were pursued by the Turkish cavalry and of twelve thousand men scarcely a thousand escaped. While the enemy were engaged with Sawra, Junayd freed himself from his perilous position in the defiles, though not without severe fighting, and completed his march to Samarqand. Tabari gives also a variant account of the “Battle of the Pass,” the main difference in which is the inclusion of the Jabghu on the side of the Turks. In view of the Arab expeditions into Tukharistan, it is improbable that the Jabghu, even if he was present personally, which is doubtful, was accompanied by any of his troops. The Persian Tabari also contains an entirely different version of the Battle of the Pass and the fate of Sawra. The original version is amply attested by contemporary poets, who show no mercy to Junayd. Whatever credit the Arabs gained in this battle is reflected on Nasr b. Sayyar and the mawali. Junayd remained at Samarqand for some time, recuperating his forces, while couriers were sent to Hisham with the news of the disaster. The Caliph immediately ordered twenty thousand reinforcements from Basra and Kufa to be sent to Khurasan, together with a large number of weapons and a draft on the treasury, at the same time giving Junayd a free hand in enlistment.

The Turks, disappointed in their attack on Samarqand, withdrew to Bukhara, where they laid siege to Qatan b. Qutayba. Here they were also on the natural lines of communication between Samarqand and Khurasan. Junayd held a council, and of three alternatives, either to remain in Samarqand and await reinforcements, or to retire on Khurasan via Kish and Zamm, or to attack the enemy, chose the last. But the morale of the Arabs was sadly shaken; a garrison of eight hundred men for Samarqand was scraped together only by granting a considerable increase in their pay, while the troops openly regarded the decision to face Khaqan and the Turkish hordes as equivalent to courting destruction. Junayd now marched with the utmost circumspection, however, and easily defeated a small body of the enemy in a skirmish near Karminia. The following day Khaqan attacked his rearguard near Tawawis (on the edge of the oasis of Bukhara), but the attack had been foreseen and was beaten off. As it was now well into November, the TÜrgesh were compelled to withdraw from Sogdiana, while Junayd entered Bukhara in triumph on the festival of Mihrjan. In Chaghanian he was joined by the reinforcements, whom he sent on to Samarqand, the remainder of the troops returning to their winter quarters.

Junayd seems to have been content with saving Samarqand and Bukhara. As no further expeditions are recorded of his two remaining years of office it must be assumed that the situation in Sughd remained unchanged and that the TÜrgesh irruptions also were suspended. Though the Arabs still held Samarqand and the territories of Bukhara and Kish, they were in all probability confined to these, while in the southern basin their authority hardly extended beyond Balkh and Chaghanian. Both sides may have awaited the first move by the other, but were surprised by the appearance of a new factor, which threatened the existence of Arab sovereignty in the Far East more seriously than any external danger. It is noteworthy that in his last year of office (115/733) Junayd resumed relations with the Chinese court. The Turkish title of the leader of the embassy, Mo-se-lan Tarkan, suggests that none of the ambassadors were actually Arabs, but that the governor had commissioned some dignitaries from the subject states to represent the Arab government. The only embassy recorded in this year from a native state, however, came from Khuttal. In the same year Khurasan was visited by a severe drought and famine, and to provide for the needs of Merv, Junayd commandeered supplies from all the surrounding districts. This, added to the military disasters of the last few years and the insinuations of Shi?ite propaganda, provoked open discontent in the district which had hitherto been outwardly faithful to Merv, namely the principalities of Lower Tukharistan. The leader of the malcontents was Al-Harith b. Surayj, who was flogged in consequence by the governor of Balkh. The discontent flared into open revolt on the death of Junayd in Muharram 716 (Feb. 734). Harith, assisted by the princes and people of Juzjan, Faryab, and Talaqan, marched on Balkh and captured it from Nasr b. Sayyar. The versions leave it uncertain whether Harith defeated Nasr and then captured the city or whether he entered the city first and beat off an attempt at recapture by Nasr. (Wellhausen’s reference to the Oxus is due to his so misunderstanding the “river of Balkh” in Tab. 1560. 2. That it refers here, as frequently, to the Dehas river is clear from the distance to the city (2 farsakhs, whereas the Oxus lay twelve farsakhs from Balkh) as well as from the mention of the bridge of ?Ata.) From Balkh he moved against the new governor ?Asim b. ?Abdullah al-Hilali, at Merv, capturing Merv-Rudh on the way. ?Asim found a large section of the inhabitants in league with Harith, but on his threatening to evacuate Merv and to call for Syrian troops, the local forces rallied round him. At the first reverse, the princes of Lower Tukharistan deserted Harith, whose army fell from sixty thousand to three thousand. He was thus reduced to making terms with ?Asim, but early in the following year renewed his revolt. ?Asim, hearing that Asad b. ?Abdullah was on the way as his successor, began to intrigue with Harith against him. The plan miscarried, however; Harith seized the governor and held him to ransom, so that Asad on his arrival found the rebels in possession of all Eastern Khurasan, and Merv threatened both from the East and from the South. Sending a force under ?Abdur Rahman b. Nu?aym towards Merv Rudh to keep Harith’s main body in check, he marched himself against the rebel forces at Amul and Zamm. These took refuge in the citadel of Zamm, and Asad, having thus checked the insurgents in this quarter, continued his march on Balkh. Meanwhile Harith seems to have retreated before ?Abdur-Rahman towards Balkh and thence across the Oxus, where he laid siege to Tirmidh. Lower Tukharistan returned to its allegiance; on the other hand Harith was now supported not only by the kings of Khuttal and Nasaf, but also, as appears from later events, by the Jabghu of Tukharistan. The government troops were unable to cross the Oxus in the face of Harith’s army; finding, however, that the garrison was well able to defend itself, they returned to Balkh, while Harith, after falling out with the king of Khuttal, seems to have retired into Tukharistan. Here, following the example of Musa b. Khazim at Tirmidh, he made a safe retreat for himself in Badakhshan.

The motives of Harith’s rebellion have been most variously estimated. In spite of the unctuous sentiments which he is represented as uttering on all occasions, it is hard to find in him the “pious Muslim, ascetic and reformer” whom van Vloten too sharply contrasts with the government officials[90]. In spite too of the prominent position given to him in the Arabic chronicles, it may even be questioned whether he and his small personal following were not rather the tools than the leaders of the elements making for the overthrow of the Umayyad administration in Khurasan. At all events the weakness of his hold over his temporary followers is much more striking than his transient success. Further evidence of this is given in a most important narrative prefaced by Tabari to his account of Asad’s expedition into Sughd. Except for the scantiest notices, the Arabic historians have nothing to say regarding the effects of the war in Khurasan on the situation in Transoxania. Wellhausen’s conclusion (based apparently on Tabari 1890. 6) that “Harith first unfurled the black flag in Transoxania in the last year of Junayd” is scarcely tenable. There is further no evidence at all for his assumption that Samarqand had fallen into the hands of the Harithites, especially as Bukhara remained loyal to the administration. That Asad’s expedition was not, in fact, directed against Harith follows in the clearest possible manner from the narrative referred to (Tab. 1585. 6-16).

“Then Asad marched towards Samarqand by way of Zamm, and when he reached Zamm, he sent to Al-Haytham ash-Shaybani, one of Harith’s followers, who was in Badhkar (the citadel of Zamm), saying “That which you have disowned in your own people is only their evil ways, but that does not extend to the women ... nor to the conquest by the unbelievers of such as Samarqand. Now I am on my way to Samarqand and I take an oath before God that no harm shall befall you on my initiative, but you shall have friendly and honourable treatment and pardon, you and those with you....” So Al-Haytham came out to join him on the condition of pardon which he had given him, and Asad pardoned him, and Al-Haytham marched with him to Samarqand and Asad gave them double pay.”