James W. Gerard A few days after the events narrated in Chapter XII, von Jagow called to see me at the Embassy and invited me to visit the Emperor at the Great General Headquarters; but he did not state why I was asked, and I do not know to this day whether the Chancellor and those surrounding the Emperor had determined on a temporary settlement of the submarine question with the United States and wished to put that settlement out, as it were, under the protection of the Emperor, or whether the Emperor was undecided and those in favour of peace wished me to present to him the American side of the question. I incline to the latter view. Von Jagow informed me that an officer from the Foreign Office would accompany me and that I should be allowed to take a secretary and the huntsman (Leibjaeger), without whom no Ambassador ever travels in Germany. Mr. Grew, our counsellor, was very anxious to go and I felt on account of his excellent work, as well as his seniority, that he was entitled to be chosen. Lieutenant von Prittwitz, who was attached to the Foreign Office as a sort of special aide to von Jagow, was detailed to accompany us. We were given a special salon car and left on the evening of Friday, April twenty-eighth. As we neared the front by way of the line running through Saar Brucken, our train was often halted because of long trains of hospital cars on their way from the front to the base hospitals in the rear; and as we entered France there were many evidences of the obstinate fights which had raged in this part of the country in August, 1914. Parts of the towns and villages which we passed were in ruins, and rough trench lines were to be discerned on some of the hillsides. At the stations, weeping French women dressed in black were not uncommon sights, having just heard perhaps of the death, months before, of a husband, sweetheart or son who had been mobilised with the French army. The fortress city of Metz through which we passed seemed to be as animated as a beehive. Trains were continuously passing. Artillery was to be seen on the roads and automobiles were hurrying to and fro. The Great General Headquarters of the Kaiser for the Western Front is in the town of Charleville-MÉziÈres, situated on the Meuse in the Department of the Ardennes, which Department at that time was the only French Department wholly in the possession of the Germans. We were received at the railway station by several officers and escorted in one of the Kaiser's automobiles, which had been set apart for my use, to a villa in the town of Charleville, owned by a French manufacturer named Perin. This pretty little red brick villa had been christened by the Germans, "Sachsen Villa," because it had been occupied by the King of Saxony when he had visited the Kaiser. A French family servant and an old gardener had been left in the villa, but for the few meals which we took there two of the Emperor's body huntsmen had been assigned, and they brought with them some of the Emperor's silver and china. The Emperor had been occupying a large villa in the town of Charleville until a few days before our arrival. After the engineer of his private train had been killed in the railway station by a bomb dropped from a French aeroplane, and after another bomb had dropped within a hundred yards of the villa occupied by the Kaiser, he moved to a red brick chÂteau situated on a hill outside of Charleville, known as either the ChÂteau Bellevue or Bellaire. Nearly every day during our stay, we lunched and dined with von Bethmann-Hollweg in the villa of a French banker, which he occupied. About ten people were present at these dinners, the Chancellor's son-in-law, Zech, Prittwitz, two experts in international law, both attached to the Foreign Office, and, at two dinners, von Treutler, the Prussian Minister to Bavaria, who had been assigned to represent the Foreign Office near the person of the Kaiser and Helfferich who, towards the end of our stay, had been summoned from Berlin. I had been working hard at German and as von Bethmann-Hollweg does not like to talk English and as some of these persons did not speak that language we tried to carry on the table conversation in German, but I know that when I tried to explain, in German, to Helfferich the various tax systems of America, I swam out far beyond my linguistic depth. During our stay here I received cables from the Department of State which were transmitted from Berlin in cipher, and which Grew was able to decipher as he had brought a code book with him. In one of these it was expressly intimated that in any settlement of the submarine controversy America would make no distinction between armed and unarmed merchant ships. We formed for a while quite a happy family. The French owners of the villa seemed to have had a fondness for mechanical toys. After dinner every night these toys were set going, much to the amusement of von Bethmann-Hollweg. One of these toys, about two feet high, was a Hoochi-Koochi dancer and another successful one was a clown and a trained pig, both climbing a step ladder and performing marvellous feats thereon. Grew, who is an excellent musician, played the piano for the Chancellor and at his special request played pieces by Bach, the favourite composer of von Bethmann-Hollweg's deceased wife. One day we had tea in the garden of the villa formerly occupied by the Emperor, with the Prince of Pless (who is always with the Kaiser, and who seemed to be a prime favourite with him), von Treutler and others, and motored with Prince Pless to see some marvellous Himalayan pheasants reared by an old Frenchman, an ex-jailer, who seemed to have a strong instinct to keep something in captivity. The Kaiser's automobile, which he had placed at my disposal, had two loaded rifles standing upright in racks at the right and left sides of the car, ready for instant use. On one day we motored, always, of course, in charge of the officers detailed to take care of us, to the ancient walled city of Rocroy and through the beautiful part of the Ardennes forest lying to the east of it, returning to Charleville along the heights above the valley of the Meuse.

The feeding of the French population, which is carried on by the American Relief Commission, was a very interesting thing to see and, in company with one of the members of the French committee, we saw the workings of this system of American Relief. We first visited a storehouse in Charleville, the headquarters for the relief district of which Charleville may be called the capital.

For relief purposes Northern France is divided into six districts. From the central distribution point in each district, food is sent to the commune within the district, the commune being the ultimate unit of distribution and each commune containing on the average about five hundred souls. We then motored to one of the communes where the distribution of food for the week was to take place that afternoon. Here in a factory, closed since the war, the people of the commune were lined up with their baskets waiting for their share of the rations. On entering a large room of the factory, each stopped first at a desk and there either paid in cash for the week's allowance of rations or signed an agreement to pay at some future date. The individuals who had no prospect of being able to pay received the rations for nothing. About one-third were in each class. The money used was not always French, or real money, but was, as a rule, the paper money issued in that part of Northern France by each town and redeemable after the war.

Signs were hung up showing the quantity that each person was entitled to receive for the next fifteen days and the sale price per kilo to each inhabitant. For instance, in this particular period for the first fifteen days of the month of May, 1916, each inhabitant could, in this district, receive the following allowances at the following rates:

In addition to these articles each inhabitant of the commune which we visited, also received on the day of our visit a small quantity of carrot seed to plant in the small plot of ground which each was permitted to retain out of his own land by the German authorities.

The unfortunate people who received this allowance looked very poor and very hungry and very miserable. Many of them spoke to me, not only here but also in Charleville, and expressed their great gratitude to the American people for what was being done for them. Those in Charleville said that they had heard that I was in their town because of trouble pending between America and Germany. They said they hoped that there would be no war between the two countries because if war came they did not know what would become of them and that, in the confusion of war, they would surely be left to starve.

In Charleville notices were posted directing the inhabitants not to go out on the streets after, I think, eight o'clock in the evening, and also notices informing the population that they would be allowed a small quantity of their own land for the purpose of growing potatoes.

After visiting the factory building where the distribution of rations was taking place, we motored to Sedan, stopping on the way at the hamlet of Bazeilles, and visiting the cottage where Bismarck and Emperor Napoleon the Third had their historic interview after the battle of Sedan.

The old lady who owns this house received us and showed us bullet marks made on her house in the war of 1870, as well as in the present war. She apologised because she had had the window-pane, broken by a rifle shot in this war, replaced on account of the cold. As a girl, she had received Bismarck and Napoleon and had shown them to the room upstairs where they had held their consultation. I asked her which chair in this room Bismarck had sat in, and sat in it myself, for luck. I also contributed to the collection of gold pieces given to her by those who had visited her cottage.

In Sedan we visited an old mill where stores of the relief commission were kept, and in the mayor's office were present at a sort of consultation between the Prussian officers and members of the French Committee of Sedan in which certain details relative to the feeding of the population were discussed.

The relief work is not, of course, carried on right up to the battle line but we visited a small village not many kilometres in the rear of the German line. In this village we were, as before, shown the stores kept for distribution by the relief commission. As there were many soldiers in this village I said I thought that these soldiers must have stores of their own but, in order to be sure that they were not living on the supplies of the relief commission, I thought it only fair that I should see where the soldiers' stores were kept. I was taken across the railroad track to where their stores were kept and, judging from the labels on the barrels and boxes, I should say that a great many of these stores had come from Holland.

During this trip about the country, I saw a number of women and girls working, or attempting to work, in the fields. Their appearance was so different from that of the usual peasant that I spoke to the accompanying officers about it. I was told, however, that these were the peasants of the locality who dressed unusually well in that part of France. Later on in Charleville, at the lodging of an officer and with Count Wengersky, who was detailed to act as sort of interpreter and guide to the American Relief Commission workers, I met the members of the American Relief Commission who were working in Northern France and who had been brought on a special train for the purpose of seeing me to Charleville. This Count Wengersky spoke English well. Having been for a number of years agent of the Hamburg American Line in London, he was used to dealing with Americans and was possessed of more tact than usually falls to the lot of the average Prussian officer. We had tea and cakes in these lodgings, and then some of the Americans drew me aside and told me the secret of the peculiar looking peasants whom I had seen at work in the fields surrounding Charleville.

It seems that the Germans had endeavoured to get volunteers from the great industrial town of Lille, Roubeix and Tourcoing to work these fields; that after the posting of the notices calling for volunteers only fourteen had appeared. The Germans then gave orders to seize a certain number of inhabitants and send them out to farms in the outlying districts to engage in agricultural work. The Americans told me that this order was carried out with the greatest barbarity; that a man would come home at night and find that his wife or children had disappeared and no one could tell him where they had gone except that the neighbours would relate that the German non-commissioned officers and a file of soldiers had carried them off. For instance, in a house of a well-to-do merchant who had perhaps two daughters of fifteen and seventeen, and a man servant, the two daughters and the servant would be seized and sent off together to work for the Germans in some little farm house whose location was not disclosed to the parents. The Americans told me that this sort of thing was causing such indignation among the population of these towns that they feared a great uprising and a consequent slaughter and burning by the Germans.

That night at dinner I spoke to von Bethmann-Hollweg about this and told him that it seemed to me absolutely outrageous; and that, without consulting with my government, I was prepared to protest in the name of humanity against a continuance of this treatment of the civil population of occupied France. The Chancellor told me that he had not known of it, that it was the result of orders given by the military, that he would speak to the Emperor about it and that he hoped to be able to stop further deportations. I believe that they were stopped, but twenty thousand or more who had been taken from their homes were not returned until months afterwards. I said in a speech which I made in May on my return to America that it required the joint efforts of the Pope, the King of Spain and our President to cause the return of these people to their homes; and I then saw that some German press agency had come out with an article that I had made false statements about this matter because these people were not returned to their homes as a result of the representations of the Pope, the King of Spain and our President, but were sent back because the Germans had no further use for them. It seems to me that this denial makes the case rather worse than before.

At the Chancellor's house in the evenings we had discussions on the submarine situation and I had several long talks with von Bethmann-Hollweg alone in a corner of the room while the others listened to music or set the mechanical toys in motion. These discussions, without doubt, were reported to the Emperor either by the Chancellor or by von Treutler who at that time was high in favor with his Majesty.

I remember on one evening I was asked the question as to what America could do, supposing the almost impossible, that America should resent the recommencement of ruthless submarine warfare by the Germans and declare war. I said that nearly all of the great inventions used in this war had been made by Americans; that the very submarine which formed the basis of our discussion was an American invention, and so were the barbed wire and the aeroplane, the ironclad, the telephone and the telegraph, so necessary to trench warfare; that even that method of warfare had been first developed on something of the present scale in our Civil War; and that I believed that, if forced to it, American genius could produce some invention which might have a decisive effect in this war. My German auditors seemed inclined to believe that there was something in my contentions. But they said, "While possibly you might invent something in America, while possibly you will furnish money and supplies to the Allies, you have no men; and the public sentiment of your country is such that you will not be able to raise an army large enough to make any impression." I said that possibly if hostilities once broke out with the Germans, the Germans might force us by the commission of such acts as had aroused England, to pass a law for universal military service. This proposition of mine was branded by the Germans as absolutely impossible; and, therefore, I am sure that the adoption by the United States of universal service in the first round of the war struck a very severe blow at the morale of Germany.

The Chancellor always desired to make any settlement of the submarine question contingent upon our doing something against England; but I again and again insisted that we could not agree to do anything against some other power as a condition of obtaining a recognition of our rights from the German Empire.

During my stay at the General Headquarters, General Falkenhayn, although he was there at the time, carefully avoided me, which I took to be a sign that he was in favour of war with America. In fact, I heard afterwards that he had insisted on giving his views on the subject, but that a very high authority had told him to confine himself to military operations.

After we had been a day or so at Charleville, the Vice-Chancellor, Helfferich, arrived. I have always believed that he was sent for to add his weight to the arguments in favour of peace and to point out that it was necessary for Germany to hate the friendship of America after the war, so as to have markets where she could place her goods. And I am convinced that at this time, at any rate, the influence of Helfferich was cast in the scale in favour of peace.

Finally, I was told that on the next day, which was Monday, May first, I was to lunch with the Emperor. Grew was invited to accompany me, and the Chancellor said that he would call for me about an hour before the time set for lunch as the Emperor desired to have a talk with me before lunch. In the afternoon an extract from the log of a German submarine commander was sent to me in which the submarine commander had stated that he had sighted a vessel which he could easily have torpedoed, but as the vessel was one hundred and twenty miles from land, he had not done so because the crew might not be able from that distance to reach a harbour. When the Chancellor called for me the following morning, he asked me if I had read this extract from the submarine officer's log, and noted how he had refrained from torpedoing a boat one hundred and twenty miles from land. I told the Chancellor that I had read the extract, but that I had also read in the newspaper that very morning that a ship had been torpedoed in stormy weather at exactly the same distance from land and the crew compelled to seek safety in the ship's boats; that, anyway, "one swallow did not make a summer," and that reports were continually being received of boats being torpedoed at great distances from land.

We then got in the motor and motored to the chÂteau about a mile off, where the Kaiser resided. We got out of the motor before going into the courtyard of the chÂteau, and immediately I was taken by the Chancellor into a garden on the gently sloping hillside below the chÂteau. Here the Emperor, dressed in uniform, was walking.

As I drew near the Emperor, he said immediately, "Do you come like the great pro-consul bearing peace or war in either hand?" By this he referred, of course, to the episode in which Quintus Fabius Maximus, chief of the Roman envoys sent to Hannibal in the Second Punic War, doubled his toga in his hand, held it up and said: "In this fold I carry peace and war: choose which you will have." "Give us which you prefer," was the reply. "Then take war," answered the Roman, letting the toga fall. "We accept the gift," cried the Carthaginian Senator, "and welcome."

I said, "No, your Majesty, only hoping that the differences between two friendly nations may be adjusted." The Emperor then spoke of what he termed the uncourteous tone of our notes, saying that we charged the Germans with barbarism in warfare and that, as Emperor and head of the Church, he had wished to carry on the war in a knightly manner. He referred to his own speech to the members of the Reichstag at the commencement of the war and said that the nations opposed to Germany had used unfair methods and means, that the French especially were not like the French of '70, but that their officers, instead of being nobles, came from no one knew where. He then referred to the efforts to starve out Germany and keep out milk and said that before he would allow his family and grand-children to starve he would blow up Windsor Castle and the whole Royal family of England. We then had a long discussion in detail of the whole submarine question, in the course of which the Emperor said that the submarine had come to stay, that it was a weapon recognised by all countries, and that he had seen a picture of a proposed giant submarine in an American paper, the Scientific American. He stated that, anyway, there was no longer any international law. To this last statement the Chancellor agreed. He further said that a person on an enemy merchant ship was like a man travelling on a cart behind the battle lines--he had no just cause of complaint if injured. He asked me why we had done nothing to England because of her alleged violations of international law,--why we had not broken the British blockade.

In addition to the technical arguments based on international law, I answered that no note of the United States had made any general charge of barbarism against Germany; that we complained of the manner of the use of submarines and nothing more; that we could never promise to do anything to England or to any other country in return for a promise from Germany or any third country to keep the rules of international law and respect the rights and lives of our citizens; that we were only demanding our rights under the recognised rules of international law and it was for us to decide which rights we would enforce first; that, as I had already told the Chancellor, if two men entered my grounds and one stepped on my flower beds and the other killed my sister, I should probably first pursue the murderer of my sister; that those travelling on the seas in enemy merchant ships were in a different position from those travelling in a cart behind the enemy's battle lines on land because the land travellers were on enemy's territory, while those on the sea were on territory which, beyond the three-mile limit, was free and in no sense enemy's territory. We also discussed the position taken by the German Government in one of the Frye Notes, in which the German expert had taken the position that a cargo of food destined for an armed enemy port was presumed to be for the armies of the enemy, and therefore contraband. The Emperor spoke of the case of the Dacia with some bitterness, but when I went into an explanation the Chancellor joined in the conversation and said that our position was undoubtedly correct. I said that it was not our business to break the blockade--that there were plenty of German agents in the United States who could send food ships and test the question; that one ship I knew of, the Wilhelmina, laden with food, had been seized by the British, who then compromised with the owners, paying them, I believed, a large sum for the disputed cargo. And in taking up the doctrine of ultimate destination of goods, i.e., goods sent to a neutral country but really destined for a belligerent, I said I thought that during our Civil War we had taken against England exactly the same stand which England now took; and I said I thought that one of the decisions of our Supreme Court was based on a shipment to Matamoras, Mexico, but which the Supreme Court had decided was really for the Confederacy.

Discussing the submarine question, the Emperor and Chancellor spoke of the warning given in the Lusitania case; and I said: "If the Chancellor warns me not to go out on the Wilhelmplatz, where I have a perfect right to go, the fact that he gave the warning does not justify him in killing me if I disregarded his warning and go where I have a right to go." The conversation then became more general and we finally left the garden and went into the chÂteau, where the Emperor's aides and guests were impatiently waiting for lunch.

This conversation lasted far beyond lunch time. Anxious heads were seen appearing from the windows and terraces of the chÂteau to which we finally adjourned. I sat between the Emperor and Prince Pless. Conversation was general for the most of the time, and subjects such as the suffragettes and the peace expedition of Henry Ford were amusingly discussed.

After lunch, I again had a long talk with the Emperor but of a more general nature than the conversation in the garden.

That night about eleven o'clock, after again dining with the Chancellor, we left Charleville in the same special salon car, arriving at Berlin about four P. M. the next day, where at the station were a crowd of German and American newspaper correspondents, all anxious to know what had happened.

At this last dinner at the Chancellor's he took me off in a corner and said, "As I understand it, what America wants is cruiser warfare on the part of the submarines." And I said, "Yes, that is it exactly. They may exercise the right of visit and search, must not torpedo or sink vessels without warning, and must not sink any vessel unless the passengers and crew are put in a place of safety."

On the morning of the third of May, I heard that the German note had been drafted, but that it would contain a clause to the effect that while the German submarines would not go beyond cruiser warfare, this rule, nevertheless, would not apply to armed merchantmen.

As such a proposition as this would, of course, only bring up the subject again, I immediately ordered my automobile and called on the Spanish Ambassador, stating to him what I had heard about the contents of the note; that this would mean, without doubt, a break with America; and that, as I had been instructed to hand the Embassy over to him, I had come to tell him of that fact. I gave the same information to other colleagues, of course hoping that what I said would directly or indirectly reach the ears of the German Foreign Office. Whether it did or not, I do not know, but the Sussex Note when received did not contain any exception with reference to armed merchantmen.

With the receipt of the Sussex Note and the President's answer thereto, which declined assent to the claim of Germany to define its attitude toward our rights in accordance with what we might do in regard to the enforcement of our rights against England, the submarine question seemed, at least for the moment, settled. I, however, immediately warned the Department that I believed that the rulers of Germany would at some future date, forced by public opinion, and by the von Tirpitz and Conservative parties, take up ruthless submarine war again, possibly in the autumn but at any rate about February or March, 1917.

In my last conversation with the Chancellor before leaving the Great General Headquarters, when he referred to the cruiser warfare of the submarines, he also said, "I hope now that if we settle this matter your President will be great enough to take up the question of peace." It was as a result of intimations from government circles that, after my return to Berlin, I gave an interview to a representative of a Munich newspaper, expressing my faith in the coming of peace, although I was careful to say that it might be a matter of months or even years.

Thereafter, on many occasions the Chancellor impressed upon me the fact that America must do something towards arranging a peace and that if nothing was done to this end, public opinion in Germany would undoubtedly force a resumption of a ruthless submarine war.

In September of 1916, I having mentioned that Mrs. Gerard was going to the United States on a short visit, von Jagow insistently urged me to go also in order to make every effort to induce the President to do something towards peace; and, as a result of his urging and as a result of my own desire to make the situation clear in America, I sailed from Copenhagen on the twenty-eighth of September with Mrs. Gerard, on the Danish ship, Frederick VIII, bound for New York. I had spent almost three years in Berlin, having been absent during that time from the city only five or six days at Kiel and two week-ends in Silesia in 1914, with two weeks at Munich in the autumn, two days at Munich and two days at Parten-Kirchen in 1916, and two week-ends at Heringsdorf, in the summer of the same year, with visits to British prison camps scattered through the two and a half years of war.

On the Frederick VIII were Messrs. Herbert Swope of the New York World and William C. Bullitt of the Philadelphia Ledger, who had been spending some time in Germany. I impressed upon each of these gentlemen my fixed belief that Germany intended shortly, unless some definite move was made toward peace, to commence ruthless submarine war; and they made this view clear in the articles which they wrote for their respective newspapers.

Mr. Swope's articles which appeared in the New York World were immediately republished by him in a book called "Inside the German Empire." In Mr. Swope's book on page ninety-four, he says, "The campaign for the ruthless U-boat warfare is regarded by one man in this country who speaks with the highest German authority, as being in the nature of a threat intended to accelerate and force upon us a movement toward peace. Ambassador Gerard had his attention drawn to this just before he left Berlin but he declined to accept the interpretation."

On page eighty-eight he writes, "Our Embassy in Berlin expected just such a demonstration as was given by the U-53 in October when she sank six vessels off Nantucket, as a lesson of what Germany could do in our waters if war came."

On page seventy-four he says further, "Throughout Germany the objection for the resumption of ruthless U-boat warfare of the Lusitania type grows stronger day by day. The Chancellor is holding out against it, but how long he can restrain it no one can say. I left Germany convinced that only peace could prevent its resumption. And the same opinion is held by every German with whom I spoke, and it is held also by Ambassador Gerard. The possibility was so menacing that the principal cause of the Ambassador's return in October was that he might report to Washington. The point was set out in press despatches at that time."

I wrote a preface to Mr. Swope's book for the express purpose of informing the American public in this way that I believed that Germany intended at an early date to resume the ruthless V-boat warfare.

Our trip home on the Frederick VIII was without incident except for the fact that on the ninth day of October, Swope came to the door of my stateroom about twelve o'clock at night and informed me that the captain had told him to tell me that the wireless had brought the news that German submarines were operating directly ahead of us and had just sunk six ships in the neighbourhood of Nantucket. I imagine that the captain slightly changed the course of our ship, but next day the odour of burning oil was quite noticeable for hours.

These Danish ships in making the trip from Copenhagen to New York were compelled to put in at the port of Kirkwall in the Orkney Islands, north of Scotland, where the ship was searched by the British authorities. On the occasion of our visit to Kirkwall, on this trip, a Swede, who had been so foolish as to make a sketch of the harbour and defences of Kirkwall from the top deck of the Frederick VIII, was taken off the boat by the British. The British had very cleverly spotted him doing this from the shore or a neighbouring boat, through a telescope.

Ships can enter Kirkwall only by daylight and at six o'clock every evening trawlers draw a net across the entrance to the harbour as a protection against submarines. A passage through this net is not opened until daylight the following morning.

Captain Thomson of the Frederick VIII, the ship which carried us to America and back to Copenhagen, by his evident mastery of his profession gave to all of his passengers a feeling of confidence on the somewhat perilous voyage in those dangerous waters.

When I reached America, on October eleventh, I was given a most flattering reception and the freedom of the City of New York. Within a few days after my arrival, the President sent for me to visit him at Shadow Lawn, at Long Branch, and I was with him for over four hours and a quarter in our first conference. I saw him, of course, after the election, before returning to Germany, and in fact sailed on the fourth of December at his special request.

Before I left I was impressed with the idea that he desired above all things both to keep and to make peace. Of course, this question of making peace is a very delicate one. A direct offer on our part might have subjected us to the same treatment which we gave Great Britain during our Civil War when Great Britain made overtures looking towards the establishment of peace, and the North answered, practically telling the British Government that it could attend to its own business, that it would brook no interference and would regard further overtures as unfriendly acts.

The Germans started this war without any consultation with the United States, and then seemed to think that they had a right to demand that the United States make peace for them on such terms and at such time as they chose; and that the failure to do so gave them a vested right to break all the laws of warfare against their enemies and to murder the citizens of the United States on the high seas, in violation of the declared principles of international law.

Nevertheless, I think that the inclination of the President was to go very far towards the forcing of peace.

Our trip from New York to Copenhagen was uneventful, cold and dark. We were captured by a British cruiser west of the Orkneys and taken in for the usual search to the port of Kirkwall where we remained two days.

The President impressed upon me his great interest in the Belgians deported to Germany. The action of Germany in thus carrying a great part of the male population of Belgium into virtual slavery had roused great indignation in America. As the revered Cardinal Farley said to me a few days before my departure, "You have to go back to the times of the Medes and the Persians to find a like example of a whole people carried into bondage."

Mr. Grew had made representations about this to the Chancellor and, on my return, I immediately took up the question.

I was informed that it was a military measure, that Ludendorf had feared that the British would break through and overrun Belgium and that the military did not propose to have a hostile population at their backs who might cut the rail lines of communication, telephones and telegraphs; and that for this reason the deportation had been decided on. I was, however, told that I would be given permission to visit these Belgians. The passes, nevertheless, which alone made such visiting possible were not delivered until a few days before I left Germany.

Several of these Belgians who were put at work in Berlin managed to get away and come to see me. They gave me a harrowing account of how they had been seized in Belgium and made to work in Germany at making munitions to be used probably against their own friends. I said to the Chancellor, "There are Belgians employed in making shells contrary to all rules of war and the Hague conventions." He said, "I do not believe it." I said, "My automobile is at the door. I can take you, in four minutes, to where thirty Belgians are working on the manufacture of shells." But he did not find time to go.

Americans must understand that the Germans will stop at nothing to win this war, and that the only thing they respect is force.

While I was in America von Jagow, as had been predicted by his enemies in Berlin, had fallen and Zimmermann had been given his place.

I remained a day in Copenhagen, in order to arrange for the transportation to Germany of the three tons of food which I had brought from New York, and, also, in order to lunch with Count Rantzau, the German Minister, a most able diplomat.

Therefore, the President's peace note arrived in Berlin just ahead of me and was delivered by Mr. Grew a few hours before my arrival. Joseph C. Grew, of Boston, was next in command during all my stay in Berlin. He most ably carried on the work of the Embassy during my absence on the trip to America, in the autumn of 1916; and at all times was of the greatest assistance to me. I hope to see him go far in his career. This note was dated December eighteenth, 1916, and was addressed by the Secretary of State to the American Ambassadors at the capitals of the belligerent powers. It commenced as follows: "The President directs me to send you the following communication to be presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the government to which you are accredited.

"The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the (here is inserted a designation of the government addressed) a course of action in regard to the present war which he hopes that the government will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit, etc."

In the note which was sent to the Central Powers it was stated: "The suggestion which I am instructed to make, the President has long had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this particular time because it may now seem to have been prompted by a desire to play a part in connection with the recent overtures of the Central Powers."

Of course, the President thus referred to the address made by Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag in December, in which, after reviewing generally the military situation, the Chancellor said: "In a deep moral and religious sense of duty towards this nation and beyond it towards humanity, the Emperor now considers that the moment has come for official action towards peace. His Majesty, therefore, in complete harmony and in common with our Allies decided to propose to the hostile powers to enter peace negotiations." And the Chancellor continued, saying that a note to this effect had been transmitted that morning to all hostile powers, through the representatives of these powers to whom the interests and rights of Germany in the enemy States had been entrusted; and that, therefore, the representatives of Spain, the United States and Switzerland had been asked to forward the note.

Coincidently with this speech of the Chancellor's, which was December twelfth, 1916, the Emperor sent a message to the commanding generals reading as follows: "Soldiers! In agreement with the sovereigns of my Allies and with the consciousness of victory, I have made an offer of peace to the enemy. Whether it will be accepted is still uncertain. Until that moment arrives you will fight on."

I return to the President's note.

The President suggested that early occasion be sought to callout from all the nations now at war an avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might be concluded, and the arrangements which would be deemed satisfactory as a guarantee against its renewal.

He called the attention of the world to the fact that according to the statements of the statesmen of the belligerent powers, the objects which all sides had in mind seemed to be the same. And the President finally said that he was not proposing peace, not even offering mediation; but merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that all nations might know how near might be the haven of peace for which all mankind longed.

Shortly after the publication of this note Secretary Lansing gave an interview to the representatives of the American press in which he stated that America was very near war. This interview he later explained.

As soon as possible after my return to Berlin I had interviews with Zimmermann and the Chancellor. Zimmermann said that we were such personal friends that he was sure we could continue to work, as we had in the past, in a frank and open manner, putting all the cards upon the table and working together in the interests of peace. I, of course, agreed to this and it seemed, on the surface, as if everything would go smoothly.

Although the torpedoing without warning of the Marina, while I was in the United States, had resulted in the death of a number of Americans on board, nevertheless there seemed to be an inclination on the part of the government and people of the United States to forget this incident provided Germany would continue to keep her pledges given in the Sussex Note. During all the period of the war in Germany I had been on good terms with the members of the government, namely, the Chancellor, von Jagow, Zimmermann and the other officials of the Foreign Office, as well as with Helfferich, Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister, Kaempf, the President of the Reichstag and a number of the influential men of Germany such as von Gwinner, of the Deutsche Bank, Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank, Dr. Walter Rathenau, who for a long time was at the head of the department for the supply and conservation of raw materials, General von Kessel, Over-Commander of the Mark of Brandenburg, in spite of many tiffs with him over the treatment of prisoners, Theodor Wolff, editor of the Tageblatt, Professor Stein, Maximilian Harden and many others.

For a long time the fight waged by the Chancellor was America's fight and a fight for peace, so much so that the newspapers which attacked the Chancellor were the same ones which had attacked President Wilson, America and Americans in general, and which had very often included me in their attacks. During every crisis between America and Germany I had acted with von Jagow and Zimmermann in a most confidential way, looking forward always to one object, namely, the preservation of peace between our respective countries. Many suggestions were made which, I think, materially aided up to that time in the preservation of peace.

The Chancellor and the Foreign Office, however, through sheer weakness did nothing to prevent the insults to our flag and President perpetrated by the "League of Truth"; although both under the law and the regulations of the "State of Siege" this gang could not operate without the consent of the authorities. So far as I was concerned personally, a few extra attacks from tooth carpenters and snake dancers meant nothing, but certainly aroused my interest in the workings of the Teutonic official brain.

On my return everyone in official life,--the Chancellor, Zimmermann, von Stumm who succeeded Zimmermann, von der Busche, formerly German Minister in the Argentine, who had equal rank with Stumm in the Foreign Office--all without exception and in the most convincing language assured me that cases like that of the Marina, for example, were only accidents and that there was every desire on the part of Germany to maintain the pledges given in the Sussex Note.

And the great question to be solved is whether the Germans in making their offers of peace, in begging me to go to America to talk peace to the President, were sincerely anxious for peace, or were only making these general offers of peace in order to excuse in the eyes of the world a resumption of ruthless submarine warfare and to win to their side public opinion in the United States, in case such warfare should be resumed.

Had the decision rested with the Chancellor and with the Foreign Office, instead of with the military, I am sure that the decision would have been against the resumption of this ruthless war. But Germany is not ruled in war time by the civilian power. Hindenburg at the time I left for America was at the head of the General Staff and Ludendorf, who had been Chief of Staff, had been made the Quartermaster General in order that he might follow Hindenburg to General Headquarters.

Hindenburg, shortly before his battle of the Masurian Lakes, was a General living in retirement at Hanover. Because he had for years specialised in the study of this region he was suddenly called to the command of the German army which was opposing the Russian invasions. Ludendorf, who had been Colonel of a regiment at the attack on LiÈge, was sent with him as his Chief of Staff. The success of Hindenburg in his campaigns is too well known to require recapitulation here. He became the popular idol of Germany, the one general-in fact the one man--whom the people felt that they could idolise. But shortly before my trip to America an idea was creeping through the mind of the German people leading them to believe that Hindenburg was but the front, and that the brains of the combination had been furnished by Ludendorf. Many Germans in a position to know told me that the real dictator of Germany was Ludendorf.

My trip to America was made principally at the instance of von Jagow and the Chancellor, and, in my farewell talk with the Chancellor a few days before leaving, I asked if it could not be arranged, since he was always saying that the civilian power was inferior to that of the military, that I should see Hindenburg and Ludendorf before I left. This proposed meeting he either could not or would not arrange, and shortly after my return I again asked the Chancellor if I could not see, if not the Emperor, at least Hindenburg and Ludendorf, who the Chancellor himself had said were the leaders of the military, and, therefore, the leaders of Germany. Again I was put off.

In the meantime and in spite of the official assurance given to me certain men in Germany, in a position to know, warned me that the government intended to resume ruthless submarine war. Ludendorf, they said, had declared in favour of this war and, according to them, that meant its adoption.

At first I thought that Germany would approach the resumption of ruthless submarine war via the armed merchantman issue.

The case of the Yarrowdale prisoners seemed to bear out this theory. A German raider captured and sunk a number of enemy vessels and sent one of the captured boats, the Yarrowdale, with a prize crew to Swinemunde. On board, held as prisoners, were a number of the crews of the captured vessels; and among those men I learned "under the rose," were some Americans. The arrival of the Yarrowdale was kept secret for some time, but as soon as I received information of its arrival, I sent note after note to the Foreign Office demanding to know if there were any Americans among the prisoner crews.

For a long time I received no answer, but finally Germany admitted what I knew already, that Americans taken with the crews of captured ships were being held as prisoners of war, the theory of the Germans being that all employed on armed enemy merchant ships were enemy combatants. I supposed that possibly Germany might therefore approach the submarine controversy by this route and claim that armed merchantmen were liable to be sunk without notice.

Instructed by the State Department, I demanded the immediate release of the Yarrowdale prisoners. This was accorded by Germany, but, after the breaking of relations, the prisoners were held back; and it was not until after we left Germany that they were finally released.

I asked permission to visit these prisoners and sent Mr. Ayrault and Mr. Osborne to the place where I knew they were interned. The permission to visit them arrived, but on the same day orders were given to remove the prisoners to other camps. Mr. Osborne and Mr. Ayrault, however, being on the ground, saw the prisoners before their removal and reported on their conditions.

On January sixth the American Association of Commerce and Trade gave me a dinner at the Hotel Adlon. This was made the occasion of a sort of German-American love-feast. Zimmermann, although he had to go early in the evening to meet the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, was present; Helfferich, Vice-Chancellor and Secretary of the Interior; Dr. Solf, the Colonial Minister; Sydow, Minister of Commerce; Dernburg; von Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank; Gutmann of the Dresdener Bank; Under Secretary von der Busche of the Foreign Office; the Mayor and the Police President of Berlin; the President of the Berlin Chamber of Commerce; Under Secretary von Stumm of the Foreign Office; and many others of that office. There were present also Under Secretary Richter of the Interior Department; Lieutenant Colonel Doeutelmoser of the General Staff; the editors and proprietors of the principal newspapers in Berlin; Count Montgelas, who had charge of American affairs in the Foreign Office; naval officers like Captain Lans; the American correspondents in Germany; and Prince Isenburg; rubbing shoulders with the brewers, George Ehret and Krueger, of New York and Newark. There were literary lights like Ludwig Fulda, Captain Persius, Professor Hans DelbrÜck, Dr. Paasche, Vice-President of the Reichstag, and many others equally celebrated as the ones that I have named. Speeches were made by Mr. Wolf, President of the American Association of Commerce and Trade, Helfferich, Zimmermann, von Gwinner and me. A tone of the greatest friendliness prevailed. Zimmermann referred to our personal friendship and said that he was sure that we should be able to manage everything together. Helfferich in his speech said that I, by learning German and studying the life of the German people, was one of the few diplomats that had come to Germany who had learned something of the real life and psychology of the Germans. Von Gwinner made a speech in English that would have done credit to any American after-dinner speaker; and I, in my short address, said that the relations between the two countries had never been better and that so long as my personal friends like Zimmermann and other members of the government, who I named, were in office, I was sure that the good relations between the two countries would be maintained. I spoke also of the sums of money that I had brought back with me for the benefit of the widows and orphans of Germany.

The majority of the German newspapers spoke in a very kindly way about this dinner and about what was said at it. Of course, they all took what I said as an expression of friendliness, and only Reventlow claimed that, by referring to the members of the government, I was interfering in the internal affairs of Germany.

The speeches and, in fact, this dinner constituted a last desperate attempt to preserve friendly relations. Both the reasonable men present and I knew, almost to a certainty, that return to ruthless submarine war had been decided on and that only some lucky chance could prevent the military, backed by the made public opinion, from insisting on a defiance of international law and the laws of humanity.

The day after the dinner the Chancellor sent for me and expressed approval of what I said and thanked me for it and on the surface it seemed as if everything was "as merry as a marriage bell." Unfortunately, I am afraid that all this was only on the surface, and that perhaps the orders to the submarine commanders to recommence ruthless war had been given the day preceding this love-feast.

The Germans believed that President Wilson had been elected with a mandate to keep out of war at any cost, and that America could be insulted, flouted and humiliated with impunity. Even before this dinner we had begun to get rumours of the resumption of ruthless submarine war and within a few days I was cabling to the Department information based not upon absolute facts but upon reports which seemed reliable and which had been collected through the able efforts of our very capable naval attachÉ, Commander Gherardi.

And this information was confirmed by the hints given to me by various influential Germans. Again and again after the sixth of January, I was assured by Zimmermann and others in the Foreign Office that nothing of the kind was contemplated.

Now were the German moves in the direction of peace sincere or not?

From the time when the Chancellor first spoke of peace, I asked him and others what the peace terms of Germany were. I could never get any one to state any definite terms of peace and on several occasions when I asked the Chancellor whether Germany was willing to withdraw from Belgium, he always said, "Yes, but with guarantees." Finally in January, 1917, when he was again talking of peace, I said, "What are these peace terms to which you refer continually? Will you allow me to ask a few questions as to the specific terms of peace? First are the Germans willing to withdraw from Belgium?" The Chancellor answered, "Yes, but with guarantees." I said, "What are these guarantees?" He said, "We must possibly have the forts of Liege and Namur; we must have other forts and garrisons throughout Belgium. We must have possession of the railroad lines. We must have possession of the ports and other means of communication. The Belgians will not be allowed to maintain an army, but we must be allowed to retain a large army in Belgium. We must have the commercial control of Belgium." I said, "I do not see that you have left much for the Belgians except that King Albert will have the right to reside in Brussels with an honor guard." And the Chancellor said, "We cannot allow Belgium to be an outpost (Vorwerk) of England"; and I said, "I do not suppose the English, on the other hand, wish it to become an outpost of Germany, especially as von Tirpitz has said that the coast of Flanders should be retained in order to make war on England and America." I continued, "How about Northern France?" He said, "We are willing to leave Northern France, but there must be a rectification of the frontier." I said, "How about the Eastern frontier?" He said, "We must have a very substantial rectification of our frontier." I said, "How about Roumania?" He said, "We shall leave Bulgaria to deal with Roumania." I said, "How about Serbia?" He said, "A very small Serbia may be allowed to exist, but that is a question for Austria. Austria must be left to do what she wishes to Italy, and we must have indemnities from all countries and all our ships and colonies back."

Of course, "rectification of the frontier" is a polite term for "annexation."

On the twenty-second of January, 1917, our President addressed the Senate; and in his address he referred to his Note of the eighteenth of December, sent to all belligerent governments. In this address he stated, referring to the reply of the Entente Powers to his Peace Note of the eighteenth of December, "We are that much nearer to the definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war."

He referred to the willingness of both contestants to discuss terms of peace, as follows: "The Central Powers united in reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace. The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details, the arrangements, guarantees and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war." The President further referred to a world concert to guarantee peace in the future and said, "The present war must first be ended, but we owe it to candour and to a just regard for the opinion of mankind to say that so far as our participation in guarantees of future peace is concerned, it makes a great deal of difference in what way and upon what terms it is ended." He said that the statesmen of both of the groups of nations at war had stated that it was not part of the purpose they had in mind to crush their antagonists, and he said that it must be implied from these assurances that the peace to come must be "a peace without victory."

In the course of his address he said: "Statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland." In another place he said: "So far as practicable, moreover, every great people now struggling toward a full development of its resources and its powers should be assured a direct outlet to the highways of the sea." Where this cannot be done by cession of territory it can no doubt be arranged by the neutralisation of direct rights of way; and he closed by proposing in effect that the nations of the world should adopt the Monroe Doctrine and that no nation should seek to explain its policy for any other nation or people.

After the receipt of the Ultimatum of January thirty-first from Germany, the Chancellor, in a conversation I had with him, referred to this Peace Note of December eighteenth and to the speech of January twenty-second.