Skirmishing is the art of fighting, with numbers insufficient to occupy, in close order, the ground contested.

In light infantry or skirmishing drill, as in all other instruction, the principal art is, to dwell forcibly on things really essential; moderately on things merely important; and lightly on things nearly indifferent.

To good skirmishing there are eight essentials:—

1. Active Intelligence.

2. Correct Firing.

3. Daring Courage.

4. Making the best of Cover.

5. Presenting the smallest possible Marks to the Enemy’s Fire.

6. Maintaining Extension from, and Dependence on, a given File of Direction.

7. Preserving a sufficient Readiness to resist Cavalry.

8. A judicious Employment of Supports and Reserves.

Very deficient in any of these qualifications, skirmishers cannot be of the first order. Possessing them all in reasonable proficiency, skirmishers must be very good, let the character of their other attainments and systems of drill be whatever it may.

I.

The life and especial mark of the good skirmisher is Active Intelligence.

In the ranks, the closer men attain to a state of unreflecting mechanism, with nothing of mind but attention, the nearer they are to true soldier-like perfection. Not a thought should arise, an eye-ball turn, or a finger tremble, but in obedience, and that obedience should be accurate and instantaneous as the word. Not so the skirmisher; within certain limits he is his own general, and must think for himself. From the moment that he “shakes out” from the elbows of his right and left comrades, reflection must awake, and, in due dependence on a broad established system, be energetically directed to gain every advantage on the opposing foe.

The French as skirmishers excel in active intelligence. Every man manoeuvres as if the fate of the day depended upon his conceptions. Their ability, in this particular, may spring in a great degree from the looseness of their instruction practice of all field exercise. This, while it is ill calculated to make steady soldiers at close order, is well adapted to give free scope to the natural intelligence of skirmishers.

The mechanical stiffness, formerly much seen in British light infantry, arose, there can scarcely be a question, from the formality of our old ordinary mode of applying the system of light infantry drill. The automatonism, proper to the ranks, was extended to skirmishers, and they also were taught to move only as they were wound up. The indignation of the drill instructor was poured out, not upon men who failed in the first-rate essentials of good skirmishing, but upon those who erred a foot in dressing or in distance—who did not step off, halt, or fire, precisely at the sound of the whistle or elevation of the signal fire-lock—whose unmusical ears refused to distinguish amid the endless variety of bugled orders—who could not run like racers, or who ran bewildered in some of the intricate evolutions, which were supposed to crown the very pinnacle of skirmishing perfection. Some corps did not drill according to this erroneous method, others did not carry it to its full extent; but, taking the army as a whole, unreflecting precision in the details of skirmishing was its system, and to this day that system has its votaries.

It is no small proof of the strength of natural intelligence in British soldiers, that, when brought into actual service, they broke through the fettered stiffness of their instruction drill, let go what was indifferent in it, clung to that which was important, and soon rivalled their intelligent and experienced opponents.

The true summit of perfection in skirmishing is, the preservation of order in disorder and of system in confusion; for the circumstances which accompany skirmishes of necessity produce, almost always, more or less mixture, inversion, and general irregularity. In hot contests over large extents of intricate ground, men of different companies regiments, brigades, and even divisions, mingle with each other. Soldiers should therefore be drilled, not indeed to fall into such irregularities on principle, but to be ready for them in practice. They should be made at times to skirmish in inverted companies, mixed companies, and mixed regiments—to form good skirmishing lines out of confused masses—to concentrate from similar mixed bodies into squares to resist cavalry, or into lines or columns for the purposes of charging or defending streets of villages, or other defiles—to extend again rapidly, and to perform every necessary evolution as if no mixture or irregularity had occurred.

Such movements, when inculcated as necessary exceptions to good order, do not unfit soldiers for more regular manoeuvres; but, by the contrast, increase order and intelligence in them.

Soldiers who have not been drilled on this principle, or who have not acquired it by experience, are, when extended under fire, continually liable to be transformed into unmanageable mobs. Skirmishers who understand it, will always show a formidable front, be ready for every changing event, and, under the worst possible circumstances, act together in the mighty energy of mutual confidence.

Unreflecting mechanical precision is at direct variance with such practice, active intelligence and a wise well-defined general system are its component elements. Active intelligence, therefore, in every point of view, is invaluable to the skirmisher; and the attention of all drill superintendents and instructors should be unremittingly directed to stamp it on his mind and to mix it with his practice.

II.

The soldier at close order always has, or should have, a large mark for his fire. Nothing can be more unsteady or unsoldierlike than for a closed body to pour a volley upon mere skirmishers: from troops concentrated, no object but an opposing mass or line within 200 yards should provoke a single shot.^[4] The skirmisher has not this advantage, his mark is generally small and often indistinct; besides which, the temptation to careless aim is much greater to him, who fires away sixty or one hundred and twenty rounds over hedge and ditch without intermission, than to the battalion soldier, who seldom expends more than twenty at any one time. Hence the peculiar necessity for practising light troops to cool steady aim and accurate firing.

The immense importance of very great attention to the ball practice^[5] of this branch of the service, is too obvious to require an enforcing observation; but it ought to be impressively remarked, that good practical aim is not to be acquired only in front of the target, but to the full as much in the every day drill firings, with or without blank cartridge.

It is not the case that careful firing is provoked by the sight of an enemy; on the contrary, arithmetical calculation has repeatedly proved, to the blush of the good soldier, that under no circumstances are balls so wildly and carelessly thrown away as in those moments when the fortunes of empires are thrown away along with them. In action, the greater number of the musquets are pointed generally at masses of dust and smoke, and not precisely at the dark active figures which they envelop.

For these reasons, on the drill field, instead of the loose careless practice too common in this particular, the soldier, and especially the skirmisher, should be unsparingly compelled to go through the motions of aiming and firing at a precise object, as accurately as if at actual ball practice, until the habit be engraven too deep on his mind to be obliterated by any circumstances of confusion.

III.

Daring courage, as an acknowledged essential to the thorough soldier of every class, it would scarcely have been necessary to have noticed in the present enumeration, did not an opinion appear to obtain, much on the continent and with some in Great Britain, that light troops are required to exercise it in a less desperate degree than men at close order.

Foreigners, when extended, often spend systematically much time in long shots and shy fighting, and give way, as a matter of course, before troops in weightier formations. In the British service this opinion does not prevail; there is no good reason why it should, and it is of great importance to the thorough efficiency of skirmishers that it should not.

The British soldier is as much a grenadier at heart, with a green tuft in his cap skirmishing through a wood, with no close support but his tried and trusty rear-rank man, as he is in designation, when mounting a breach, under a black bear-skin, with ten thousand bayonets at his back.

In extended order he is just as ready, as at any other time, to fix his bayonet and dash to close quarters, if the enemy, on tolerably equal terms, will stand for him; and if his piquet be pressed by a heavy attacking column, he sees no more reason than at any other time, to surrender an inch of ground, as long as he can stand upon it. Very remarkable instances of this kind occurred during the Peninsular war.^[6]

It is well that it should be so; for if it be indeed true, as some insinuate, that the British soldier falls somewhat below his continental brethren in the policy of skirmishing, this important essential, persevering unflinching courage, will ever, as it always has done, make up for minor deficiencies, and carry him triumphantly through.

It is useful to observe, how much the flinching practice of foreign light infantry has influenced, and perhaps been influenced by, their systems of drill. The old method, which we borrowed from them, of firing advancing by alternate ranks or files, may be practicable with long shots and cautious movements, but is only partially applicable to the service practice of British light infantry, who, even when close to their enemy, count it most unsoldier-like to fire without an immediately important purpose in view; who seldom fire at all until within two hundred yards of their object;^[7] and who, after a few quiet shots to get within the length of their breath and to draw on the enemy’s fire, dash at the opposing line of defence with that peculiar rush which may be called “the skirmishers’ charge.”^[8]

The present established mode of advancing firing by “single line,” is that into which daring skirmishers always do, and of necessity always must, fall. On the drill ground, when required, this mode may be completed to a perfect copy of “the skirmishers’ charge,” by the sound “double quick” at about eighty yards from the supposed enemy’s line of defence. The whole then, still partially firing, dash on at an accelerated pace, until, the cover gained, “the halt” is sounded, to take breath behind it, and prepare for another forward effort.

IV.

Conduct which in some cases, under fire, is disgraceful, in others is meritorious. The man in the ranks who shrinks away from a shell or cannon ball, or who goes out of his commanded course to cover himself from musquetry, has little claim to the name of a brave soldier; while he who in a trench or battery does not bow low at the cry “shot,” or fall prostrate before a blazing shell, or who in a skirmish neglects to make the best of every foot of cover, has no right, to the title of a wise one.

The difference arises from the line of military perfection being struck, not according to what will suit or save the individual, but by that which will benefit the general service.

Between the duties peculiar to compact fighting and skirmishing, the distinction should be drawn broad and deep on the drill field; because on the battle field, it is natural on either side to be forgetful.

There are two kinds of cover—ball proof cover, and mere concealing cover. Ragged rocks, large trees, brick and stone walls and buildings, stout fences and thick mud-banks, constitute generally the first class; young plantations, gorse and underwood, hedges, abattis, slight fences and narrow sand hills, the second.

It is for the first that the eye of the good skirmisher continually seeks. The second, after fire completely opens, turned even to best advantage, is worth but little more than no cover at all; and is worse than no cover at all, if the men, which they are much disposed to do, collect in groups behind it.

In this way, that very frequent out-lying piquet defence, abattis across roads, is often more injurious to friends than to foes. Instead of being planted, as an obstacle to the enemy, 100 yards in front of the intended line of defence, it is but too commonly placed on that line, and when the struggle comes, is thickly occupied as a sort of rampart. On such striking objects the enemy’s fire concentrates, every ball goes through, and the loss behind is severe.

Skirmishers must not only seek for cover, but make the best of it. Good cover loses half its advantages if stupidly occupied, and ingenuity will often make bad cover ball-proof.

However, notwithstanding all that may be said in favour of “making the best of cover,” it must be thoroughly remembered, that this duty, at the moment of a close attack, is altogether secondary to those of courage and activity.

When it comes to short distances, the quicker the affair is settled the less will be the loss of the assailants; and the more daring the front exhibited, the greater the probabilities of success.

At every change of situation supports should, if possible, be placed under cover by their commanders; if exposed, as large bodies they form most inviting marks to the enemy’s long shots. This precaution, when opportunities offer, should not be forgotten on the drill field.^[9]

V.

One man at 200 yards^[10] is a very small mark. Two abreast together, a tolerably good one; three abreast together should almost always be hit, and four never be missed. Our opponents, therefore, in skirmishing, cannot serve us better than by grouping together; and that which we would wish them to do, we ourselves must carefully avoid. Skirmishers should move in single files,^[11] except in thick “concealing cover,” when two or three together may, without exposure, increase mutual confidence; or behind patches of “ball-proof cover,” on which small groups may concentrate as to temporary breast-works; in either case extending again at once when good cover ceases. Even in single files, men loading should incessantly cover with precision their file leaders, so as to offer marks of but one in front.

In skirmishing, more than in any other branch of warfare, men may be uselessly thrown away; and therefore in this, more than in any other, economy of life and limb should form a paramount object of attention.

On British soldiers also, perhaps more than on any others, it is important to impress these observances; for there is in them such a peculiarly strong national perception of that great military maxim, “concentration is strength,” that overlooking its exceptions, they are always powerfully impelled the hotter the fire to group the closer together.

Nothing but deeply impressed instruction, or dearly bought experience, can break in them the bonds of a propensity so thoroughly at variance with good skirmishing.

VI.

In all systems of movement composed of many distinct bodies, there must be a common centre of direction, connexion and extension, or unity of purpose and effect must cease, and confusion, dispersion or concentration ensue. Such a centre there is in the minutely regular mighty moving system of the universe; and from it, down through every degree of importance, to that in the more mob-like progress of a swarm of bees.

Perhaps the greatest defect in modern skirmishing is, that, in extensive affairs, this principle of an established point of direction is not well maintained. However much it may be recognised in mere theory, it is not, in instruction, explained in sufficient fulness, or required with sufficient rigour; and from these neglects arise, in a great degree, the inversions, mixtures, and other irregularities in actual service before noticed.

It is most injudicious to encumber the minds of men and officers with a multitude of intricate or non-essential recollections; but the principle in point involves nothing of this character; it is at the same time very simple and highly essential.

For all skirmishers of the same battalion acting together, until they become thoroughly mixed with other corps—in all cases of movement, excepting only those of changes of front on the principle of the wheel on the fixed pivot, and those of taking ground to a flank obliquely or directly; the centre, or right centre file^[12] of their own battalion skirmishers is THE POINT OF DIRECTION, unless at the time OTHERWISE ESPECIALLY ORDERED.

When detachments from several battalions skirmish together, the battalion of direction for the line in rear, is that of direction for the skirmishers in front, unless at the time otherwise ordered. If no such battalion has been pointed out, the officer commanding the extended line names to the officers in command of detachments the battalion skirmishers of direction, and takes care to keep these last to their true course and object.

Every officer in command of the skirmishers of a battalion has the option, in responsible dependence on the maintenance of the general alignement and proper communication, of changing his point of direction, by order at and for the time being, to the flank file nearest to the battalion skirmishers of direction, or otherwise as circumstances may appear to require.

In all changes of front on the principle of the wheel on a fixed pivot, that pivot is, of necessity, during the evolution, the file of direction.

In taking ground to a flank obliquely or directly, the leading file always becomes, during this movement, and no longer, unless especially ordered at the time, the file of direction.

When skirmishers become mixed and unmanageable, and there is neither time nor opportunity for re-forming them at close order on their covering serjeants, the officer in command fixes upon any man as a point of direction, the others instantly extend away right and left (unless at the time especially ordered to extend to either flank in particular), without regard to their original proper places—double into files—take up the general alignment—officers and non-commissioned officers with alertness take charge of proper portions, and the whole move and act upon this new centre, as if no inversion or mixture had occurred.

Upon such simple rules, well impressed and strictly maintained, any number of skirmishers may fight over large extents of the most intricate ground, perfectly in hand and without confusion. Or, should extraordinary events produce irregularity, officers in command may easily, in an instant, under the worst circumstances, restore good fighting order, until leisure permits a more regular formation.

In extensive skirmishes, the eyes and feelings of men retiring are powerfully drawn towards the most apparently important points of defence; and upon these, without direct orders, they more or less concentrate. Assailants follow the same impulse, and direct their force principally against these identical strongly occupied points.

Hence follow of necessity on both sides a massing into large marks for the fire of opposing musquetry, sometimes even of artillery—great unnecessary bloodshed in violent struggles, and a neglect on the defensive side of ground which ought to be occupied, and on the assailing side of points which ought to be attacked. Nothing but keeping men in hand by the principle of well understood and well maintained centres of direction can prevent similar evils.

Supports, in their movements, should be guided by the same general principle as skirmishers—that is, the centre or right centre support of each battalion should be, unless otherwise ordered, the support of direction, except in the cases of wheeling on a fixed pivot, or of taking ground to a flank. In the first exception, all conform to the pivot, and in the last to the leading division, unless at the time otherwise ordered. Supports, not belonging to the battalion of direction, except in the two cases just noticed, conform under the orders of their senior officer to the movements of those which do belong to it, with due regard to their primary duty—the proper support of their own skirmishers.

VII.

Skirmishers, by the looseness of their formation, are dangerously exposed to charges from small parties of the enemy’s light cavalry; and in districts destitute of continuous fences, but abounding in hollows, isolated patches of wood, or other features convenient for concealment, such attacks may burst forth with most confusing suddenness. Except in ground absolutely impracticable for cavalry, skirmishers must move in constant expectation of them.

The eye of the officer should be accustomed to recognise habitually those frequently occurring posts of defence against cavalry, copses, walls, hedges, ditches, &c., which are preferable to small squares; and the minds of men should be well prepared by previous instruction and explanation, to recollect, in an instant, in what their strength in such cases consists, and to be undaunted in it.

Against great charges of cavalry, large squares are unquestionably the safest and most efficient; but, in opposition to the small dashes which occur in skirmishing, large squares are often impracticable, and small ones more advisable, as being more rapidly formed and broken up.

Squares have a moral strength in proportion to the mutual acquaintance of the men and officers who compose them. Men of the same company stand better together than those of mixed companies, and men of the same regiment better than those of different corps. However, as in the field thorough mixtures do occur, and as they, if observed, are likely above all other things to bring on charges from the enemy’s cavalry, squares of mixed masses should, in instruction, at times be practised.

It is not necessary to describe the different modes by which, on the drill field, men may be thrown into confusion. When this state of things has been brought about, mixed, irregular, rallying squares can be formed by adding the “double quick” to the ordinary sounds for squares against cavalry.^[13]

The “double quick” is required to mark the necessity for instantaneous irregular masses, in contradistinction to the more regular squares, which on the drill field skirmishers should always endeavour to form, unless at the time otherwise ordered. It cannot be too constantly upheld as a permanent principle that, even in skirmishing, order is the rule and irregularity the exception.

On the signal “double quick” in immediate succession to the sounds established for the formation of squares,^[14] officers, exercising most actively their intelligence, in proper numbers and at proper distances, hold up their swords or caps, and the men rush round them into masses of defence without any regard to company or other distinctions.

These mixed squares, as well as all others, may “commence firing”—“cease firing”—“advance”—“retire”—“take ground to a flank,”—or “close” to any particular square, by order, or by the simple sounds for these movements. The “close” may be important to form a large square from several small ones, the cavalry still hovering near.

To these mixed squares also, the word or sound to “extend” may be given. The men then, without regard to regular places, extend away to the right and left from each square, and double into files.

When the ground is nearly occupied, the officer in command fixes on a point of direction, to which the whole conform.

In the event of infantry skirmishers pressing forward to harass a square, or of cavalry endeavouring to prevent its movements by hovering near without charging, one or two ranks from the rear face may, by order, move briskly round by the right and left—double into files—cover the front at a short distance, and rush round again to their places whenever there appears a necessity for the square itself to fire.

In drill in general, and in that of light infantry in particular, instructors confine themselves by far too closely to mere formal directions, to the neglect of pithy practical explanations. In nothing is this last addition more required than in reference to charges of cavalry.

A column of horsemen, coming rapidly on with all its denseness, its height, its dust, its shouts, and its clangour, appears to the untrained mind as altogether irresistible. But appearances are not in themselves realities—let cavalry to the utmost stretch of mortal might,—

one thing only will be required to enable squares of infantry, like deep-rooted rocks, to disperse these wild winds and waves, right and left, in dust, froth, and confusion—a well impressed knowledge of their own strength; accompanied as a natural consequence, by a deliberate employment of that, when properly used, most destructive weapon, the musket.^[15] Nor can more blame attach to cavalry for such results, than would apply to infantry for failing, in clear day-light, before well-barricadoed buildings or well-scarped redoubts. Neither in similar cases owe success, when they get it, to their own conduct or efficiency, but to the needless panic of their enemy.

Such conclusions as to the relative strength of cavalry, are established by a string of facts more or less evident, stretching from Ilium, through Pharsalia, to Waterloo; and every fact is worth a thousand opposing ingenious speculations.

VIII.

Contending without a reserve is desperate risk in struggles of all kinds, civil and military. In such predicaments, if fortune frown, well nigh all is lost.

In skirmishes, reserves, including in the first place supports, are not only of great importance as rallying points, in extraordinary cases of misfortune, but also as necessary aids to the ordinary movements of the extended line.

In attacks, supports are useful for filling up accidental gaps in the front line—for prolonging its flanks or covering them obliquely or perpendicularly—for strengthening the skirmishers at any moment that these may find their numbers unequal to important work before them—for relieving them when they or their ammunition become exhausted—for coming up in close order to charge bridges, streets, villages, or other defiles, too strongly occupied to be forced by the skirmishers, and to serve as bases, when time allows it, for the formation of squares against cavalry.

In defences, in addition to the foregoing duties reversed as to bodies retiring, supports have the highly important responsibilities of leading the skirmishers in the true and best line of retreat—of opening that line in all suitable places for their convenient passage, and of taking care that it be not intercepted by the enemy.

Reserves, particularly so called, supply the places of supports when necessary, and go to the front for any object requiring the intervention of a particularly strong, steady, and concentrated force.

Without express orders, supports should not move forward to occupy accidental gaps in the extended line, except on ground so intricate, or under circumstances so emergent, that the skirmishers themselves cannot readily regain their lost communications.

In most movements, set unvarying sentences of command promote alertness and prevent mistakes.

For prolonging in the same direction the flanks of the extended line—for covering them perpendicularly or obliquely—for strengthening the skirmishers by mixing others with them, or for relieving them; the following set, concise orders to supports obviously present themselves:—

No. —— Support.: Prolong the —— Flank.
In the same direction as the general line understood.

Do. —— Do.: Cover the —— Flank,
perpendicularly; with moderate licence, according to the features of the ground, understood.

Do. —— Do.: Cover obliquely the —— Flank.
An obliquity of one-eighth of the circle, with the same licence, understood.

Do. —— Do.: Strengthen No. ——.
To prevent mistakes, the word “strengthen” to be repeated with sufficient distinctness by the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Support to which it is given, when they arrive near to the skirmishers or the skirmishers near to them.

Do. —— Do.: Relieve No. ——.
The word “relieve” to be repeated in like manner, for the same reason.

With regard to strengthening the extended line by mixing its supports with it, it may be objected that, in such cases, when there are no reserves at hand, the great rule of never fighting without them is rejected. It is true, the rule is violated; the party if actually engaged is fighting at a desperate risk, but there are cases in which desperate risks are wise and lawful ventures. These are in the not uncommon events with skirmishers of desperate extremities; at such moments methodical prudence is ill-masked imbecility.

On the 10th of December, 1813, some of the piquets of the light division, in thick weather and a close country, were suddenly assailed by the heads of heavy columns. The division in the rear was scattered in straggling houses. One of the companies on piquet was forced back upon another in support, near the point of junction of two important roads leading directly into the cantonments. Both companies were instantly extended, without any support, into a thick skirmishing line; nothing less would have been effectual. The ground was held with little variation for at least two hours—two heavy attacks were repulsed, every round of ammunition was expended, the brigade immediately in the rear allowed to pack and send off its baggage, and steadily to take up its fighting position, and the piquets to fall back upon it without further molestation. Similar circumstances have no doubt occurred, and may often occur again. The great maxim alluded to therefore has its exceptions, and these, if carefully marked as exceptions, may sometimes with propriety be admitted into instruction skirmishing.

To attack or defend, with concentrated supports, a bridge, the street of a village, or other peculiarly important point, the word is simply passed, “Supports, close on No. ——,” the support in front of, or on, that point. Near this division of formation the officer in command places himself; and as each severally arrives gives his direction—“line,” “double column,” “open,” “close,” “quarter distance,” “half distance column,” or otherwise, as may be thought necessary. The support of formation in all cases standing fast as the basis.

To break up the formation, “Supports to your proper places, threes right and left shoulders forward, quick march,” will speedily restore all to common skirmishing order.

No duties of supports are more important than those in retrograde movements, of leading their skirmishers in proper lines of retreat; and of opening those lines sufficiently, but not more than sufficiently, for their passage. Circumstances have actually occurred, and, in intricate countries, are likely often to be repeated, of fine fellows, slowly retiring before an overwhelming enemy, their whole attention absorbed upon their front, suddenly finding further retreat intercepted by impassable obstacles, with no alternative remaining but to surrender, or fight their way right and left at the risk of almost utter destruction.

The principles advanced in the foregoing remarks, are not, in the main, of a character to be limited to the details of particular movements; but are rather to be kept continually on the mind, for the purpose of being thrown into effect as circumstances may require. Practical differs from formal skirmishing, even more by the style than by the method of its execution.

Not one sentence, it is believed, will be found to stand in opposition to the British established system. The few points in which they may at first sight appear to differ from it, consist simply in an application of principles already established to a practical extent somewhat beyond that usually adopted. If an officer who did not act upon this extent of application, were to succeed in the command of a corps to one who had adopted it, neither he nor those under him would experience any difficulty from the previous practice.

It should not be forgotten, that the thorough spirit of practical skirmishing is not to be communicated or maintained, with only one or two companies at a time, on the level, restricted, drill field. Soldiers, after having been thoroughly grounded in elementary details and permanent principles, should be often taken out in large bodies to skirmish, with strict, universal and incessant attention to the duty, across extensive and intricate tracts of country.

Such tracts are often to be found without restrictions in foreign stations; and at proper seasons of the year, a little management and promises of repairing damages will generally procure access to admirable skirmishing ground from British farmers and landed proprietors.

The writer is conscious that he can have advanced little, if anything, that must not have occurred to officers who have had experience in this branch of warfare, or that may not have been brought into instruction practice by them. He has not, however, seen the foregoing practical application of essential principles thrown broadly into print; and it appears to him important that it should be so exhibited, in order that the spirit of actual skirmishing may not be confined to the regimental locality, or cease with the regimental employment of those who witnessed it.