Title: Torpedo War, and Submarine Explosions Author: Robert Fulton Language: English Character set encoding: ISO-8859-1 E-text prepared by MWS, Tom Cosmas, |
Note: | Images of the original pages are available through Internet Archive/American Libraries. See https://archive.org/details/torpedowarsub00fultrich |
Page | |
TORPEDO WAR, &c. | 5 |
PLATE I | 7 |
PLATE II | 10 |
PLATE III | 13 |
PLATE IV, Fig. 1 | 15 |
Fig. 2 | 17 |
PLATE V, Fig. 1 & 2 | 17 |
Fig. 3 | 20 |
THOUGHTS — On the probable effect of this invention | 30 |
Estimate of the Force to Attack so Formidable a Blockade Fleet | 32 |
Manner of Arranging the Boats Until Wanted | 33 |
First Mode of Attack | 35 |
Second Mode of Attack | 36 |
ON — the imaginary inhumanity of Torpedo war | 40 |
A VIEW — of the political economy of this invention | 43 |
In view of the prominent part played in the present World War by torpedoes and submarines, the subject of our Extra No. 35 is peculiarly timely.
The original of 1810 is very scarce, only one copy having been sold at auction in many years: nor are copies to be found in any but a few of our libraries. Fulton's claims for his invention have been fully substantiated and some of his predictions, made more than a century ago, are remarkably interesting, in view of the events of the past five months. His estimate of our population in 1920 has already been exceeded in fact, and only his plan of affixing torpedoes to their prey by means of harpoons seems—for it was made in the days of wooden ships—fantastic, in these days of iron clads. He could not foresee that almost exactly a century would elapse before his invention would be extensively used—though he cautiously says "it is impossible to foresee to what degree torpedoes may be improved and rendered useful."
In the Joline collection of autograph letters, sold this month, was an extremely interesting letter of Fulton's, addressed to Gen. William Duane. A part reads:
"New York, March 1, 1813
I am happy to find you continue the firm friend to torpedoes; an infant art which requires only support and practice to produce a change in Maritime affairs of immence (sic) importance to this country. Expecting the enemy here, I have not been idle, I have prepared 9 torpedoes with locks that strike fire by concussion, and four with clockwork locks."
The letter is of great interest throughout, and tells of his plans for blowing up the enemy or driving them from New York waters, his regret that he had not enough torpedoes for the Chesapeake; and contains a list of the cost of various sorts, &c.
We regret that we could not secure permission to copy the whole of it.
To JAMES MADISON, Esq. President of the United States, and to the Members of both Houses of Congress.
Gentlemen,
In January last, at Kalorama, the residence of my friend Joel Barlow, I had the pleasure of exhibiting to Mr. Jefferson, Mr. Madison, and a party of gentlemen from the senate and house of representatives, some experiments and details on Torpedo defence and attack; the favourable impression which the experiments appeared to make on the minds of the gentlemen then present; and my conviction that this invention, improved and practised to the perfection which it is capable of receiving, will be of the first importance to our country, has induced me to present you in the form of a pamphlet a description of my system, with five engravings, and such demonstrations as will give each of you an opportunity to contemplate its efficacy and utility at your leisure; and enable you to form a correct judgment on the propriety of adopting it as a part of our means of national defence. It being my intention to publish hereafter a detailed account of the origin and progress of this invention, and the embarrassments under which I have laboured to bring it to its present state of certain utility; I will now state only such experiments and facts as are most important to be known, and which, proving the practicability of destroying ships of war by this means, will lead the mind to all the advantages which we may derive from it. I believe it is generally known that I endeavoured for many years to get torpedoes introduced into practice in France, and in England; which, though unsuccessful, gave me the opportunity of making numerous very interesting experiments on a large scale; by which I discovered errors in the combinations of the machinery and method of fixing the torpedoes to a ship; which errors in the machinery have been corrected: and I believe I have found means of attaching the torpedoes to a vessel which will seldom fail of success. It is the result of my experience which I now submit to your consideration; and hoping that you will feel an interest in the success of my invention, I beg for your deliberate perusal and reflection on the following few pages. Gentlemen who have traced the progress of the useful arts, know the years of toil and experiment, and difficulties which frequently pass, before the utility and certain operation of new discoveries have been established; hence it could not be expected, that torpedoes should be rendered useful without encountering many difficulties; and I am aware, that in the course of farther essays other difficulties will appear; but from my past experience I feel confident, that any obstacle which may arise can be surmounted by attention and perseverance: of this gentlemen will be better able to judge, after examining the following facts and details:
From which a comparative estimate may be made of their expence, and the expence of armed Torpedo boats; also the degree of protection which a given sum would effect, expended in either way.
Guns | 54 |
First cost, dollars | 302,718 |
Annual expence when in commission, dollars | 100,000 |
Draft of water, feet | 23 |
Guns | 18 |
First cost, dollars | 60,000 |
Annual expence in commission, dollars | 38,000 |
Draft of water, feet | 15 |
First cost, fitted for sea, dollars | 12,000 |
Annual expence in commission, dollars | 11,000 |
Men | 36 |
Number of gun boats of the United States | 167 |
This Work having been published in haste, the errors of the press, and those of diction, shall be corrected in the second edition.
(For tables, see pages 54-55)
To convince Mr. Pitt and lord Melville that a vessel could be destroyed by the explosion of a Torpedo under her bottom, a strong built Danish brig, the Dorothea, burthen 200 tons, was anchored in Walmer road, near Deal, and within a mile of Walmer Castle, the then residence of Mr. Pitt. Two boats, each with eight men, commanded by lieutenant Robinson, were put under my direction. I prepared two empty Torpedoes in such a manner, that each was only from two to three pounds specifically heavier than salt water; and I so suspended them, that they hung fifteen feet under water. They were then tied one to each end of a small rope eighty feet long: thus arranged, and the brig drawing twelve feet of water, the 14th day of October was spent in practice. Each boat having a Torpedo in the stern, they started from the shore about a mile above the brig, and rowed down towards her; the uniting line of the Torpedoes being stretched to its full extent, the two boats were distant from each other seventy feet; thus they approached in such a manner, that one boat kept the larboard the other the starboard side of the brig in view. So soon as the connecting line of the Torpedoes passed the buoy of the brig, they were thrown into the water, and carried on by the tide, until the connecting line touched the brig's cable; the tide then drove them under her bottom. The experiment being repeated several times, taught the men how to act, and proved to my satisfaction that, when properly placed on the tide, the Torpedoes would invariably go under the bottom of the vessel. I then filled one of the Torpedoes with one hundred and eighty pounds of powder, and set its clockwork to eighteen minutes. Every thing being ready, the experiment was announced for the next day, the 15th, at five o'clock in the afternoon. Urgent business had called Mr. Pitt and lord Melville to London. Admiral Holloway, Sir Sidney Smith, Captain Owen, Captain Kingston, Colonel Congreve, and the major part of the officers of the fleet under command of Lord Keath were present; at forty minutes past four the boats rowed towards the brig, and the Torpedoes were thrown into the water; the tide carried them, as before described, under the bottom of the brig, where, at the expiration of eighteen minutes, the explosion appeared to raise her bodily about six feet; she separated in the middle, and the two ends went down; in twenty seconds, nothing was to be seen of her except floating fragments; the pumps and foremast were blown out of her; the fore-topsail-yard was thrown up to the cross-trees; the fore-chain plates with their bolts, were torn from her sides; the mizen-chain-plates and shrouds, being stronger than those of the foremast, or the shock being more forward than aft, the mizenmast was broke off in two places; these discoveries were made by means of the pieces which were found afloat.
The experiment was of the most satisfactory kind, for it proved a fact much debated and denied, that the explosion of a sufficient quantity of powder under the bottom of a vessel would destroy her.[A] There is now no doubt left on any intelligent mind as to this most important of all facts connected with the invention of Torpedoes; and the establishment of this fact alone, merits the expenditure of millions of dollars and years of experiment, were it yet necessary, to arrive at a system of practice which shall insure success to attacks, with such formidable engines. For America, I consider it a fortunate circumstance that this experiment was made in England, and witnessed by more than a hundred respectable and brave officers of the Royal navy; for, should Congress adopt Torpedoes as a part of our means of defence, lords Melville, Castlereagh, and Mulgrave, have a good knowledge of their combination and effect. Lord Grenville, Earls Gray and St. Vincent[B], have on their minds a strong impression of their probable consequences. Sir Home Popham, Sir Sidney Smith, and Colonel Congreve, the latter now celebrated for his ingenious invention of Pyrotecnic arrows or rockets, were my friends and companions in the experiments; they are excellent and brave men, and from my knowledge of those noblemen and gentlemen, and their sentiments on this subject, I can predict that they would feel much disposed to respect the rights, nor enter the waters of a nation who should use such engines with energy and effect.
[A] Twenty minutes before the Dorothea was blown up, Capt. Kingston asserted, that if a Torpedo were placed under his cabin while he was at dinner, he should feel no concern for the consequence. Occular demonstration is the best proof for all men.
[B] The morning of my first interview with Earl St. Vincent he was very communicative. I explained to him a Torpedo and the Dorothea experiment. He reflected for some time, and then said, Pitt was the greatest fool that ever existed, to encourage a mode of war which they who commanded the seas did not want, and which, if successful, would deprive them of it.
This fortunate experiment left not the least doubt on my mind that the one which I made in the harbour of New-York in August 1807, would be equally successful. The brig was anchored, the Torpedoes prepared and put into the water in the manner before described; the tide drove them under the brig near her keel, but in consequence of the locks turning downwards, the powder fell out of the pans and they both missed fire. This discovery of an error in the manner of fixing the locks to a Torpedo, has been corrected. On the second attempt, the Torpedo missed the brig; the explosion took place about one hundred yards from her, and threw up a column of water ten feet diameter sixty or seventy feet high. On the third attempt she was blown up: the effect and result much the same as that of the Dorothea before described. About two thousand persons were witnesses to this experiment. Thus, in the course of my essays, two brigs, each of two hundred tons, have been blown up. The practicability of destroying vessels by this means, has been fully proved. It is also proved, that the mechanism will ignite powder at any required depth under water within a given time. It now remains to point out means by which Torpedoes may be used to advantage with the least possible risque to the assailants.
Represents the anchored Torpedo, so arranged as to blow up a vessel which should run against it; B is a copper case two feet long, twelve inches diameter, capable of containing one hundred pounds of powder. A is a brass box, in which there is a lock similar to a common gun-lock, with a barrel two inches long, to contain a musket charge of powder: the box, with the lock cocked and barrel charged, is screwed to the copper case B. H is a lever which has a communication to the lock inside of the box, and in its present state holds the lock cocked and ready to fire. C is a deal box filled with cork, and tied to the case B. The object of the cork is to render the Torpedo about fifteen or twenty pounds specifically lighter than water, and give it a tendency to rise to the surface. It is held down to any given depth under water by a weight of fifty or sixty pounds as at F: there is also a small anchor G, to prevent a strong tide moving it from its position. With Torpedoes prepared, and knowing the depth of water in all our bays and harbours, it is only necessary to fix the weight F at such a distance from the Torpedo, as when thrown into the water, F will hold it ten, twelve, or fifteen feet below the surface at low water, it will then be more or less below the surface at high water, or at different times of the tide; but it should never be so deep as the usual draught of a frigate or ship of the line. When anchored, it will, during the flood tide, stand in its present position; at slack water it will stand perpendicular to the weight F, as at D; during the ebb it will be at E. At ten feet under water the waves, in boisterous weather, would have little or no tendency to disturb the Torpedo; for that if the hollow of a wave should sink ten feet below what would be the calm surface, the wave would run twenty feet high, which I believe is never the case in any of our bays or harbours. All the experience which I have on this kind of Torpedo is, that in the month of October 1805, I had one of them anchored nine feet under water, in the British Channel near Dover; the weather was severe, the waves ran high, it kept its position for twenty-four hours, and, when taken up, the powder was dry and the lock in good order. The Torpedo thus anchored, it is obvious, that if a ship in sailing should strike the lever H, the explosion would be instantaneous, and she be immediately destroyed; hence, to defend our bays or harbours, let a hundred, or more if necessary, of these engines be anchored in the channel, as for example, the Narrows, to defend New-York.
The figure to the right of the plate is an end view of the Torpedo H. H shews its lever forked, to give the better chance of being struck.
Having described this instrument in a way which I hope will be understood, I may be permitted to put the following question to my readers, which is, knowing that the explosion of one hundred pounds of powder, or more if required, under the bottom of a ship of the line, would destroy her, and seeing, that if a ship in sailing should strike the lever of an anchored torpedo, she would be blown up, would he have the courage, or, shall I say, temerity, to sail into a channel where one or more hundred of such engines were anchored? I rely on each gentleman's sense of prudence and self-preservation, to answer this question to my satisfaction. Should the apprehension of danger become as strong on the minds of those who investigate this subject as it is on mine, we may reasonably conclude that the same regard to self-preservation, will make an enemy cautious in approaching waters where such engines are placed; for, however brave sailors may be, there is no danger so distressing to the mind of a seaman, or so calculated to destroy his confidence, as that which is invisible and instantaneous destruction.
The consideration which will now present itself, is, that the enemy might send out boats to sweep for and destroy the Torpedoes. It is therefore proper to examine the nature of such an operation, and its chance of success. Suppose two hundred Torpedoes to be placed in three miles of channel, the enemy's boats, in attempting to sweep for them, would be exposed to the fire of our land batteries, or necessitated to fight our boats, for whenever they leave their ships and take to boats, we can be as well armed and active at boat fighting as they; and thus opposed by batteries and boats, they would have three or more square miles of channel to sweep, which, even if successful, would be a work of time, and were they to get up some of the Torpedoes, they could not ascertain if all were destroyed, for they could not know whether five or five hundred had been put down; nor could they prevent our boats throwing in additional numbers each day and night. It therefore amounts to an impossibility for an enemy to clear a channel of Torpedoes, provided it were reasonably guarded by land batteries and row boats. Added to the opposition which might be made to the enemy, there is a great difficulty in clearing a channel of Torpedoes with any kind of sweep or drag, so as to establish full confidence in sailing through it. It is only they who put them down and know the number, that could tell when all were taken up. To facilitate the taking of them up, I have, since Plate II was engraved, thought of a very useful and simple piece of mechanism which, being screwed to the box C, will hold the Torpedo under water at any given depth, and for any number of days. They may be set to stay under water a day, week, month, or year, and on the day which shall be previously determined, they will rise to the surface; at the same instant each will lock its lever H so that it cannot strike fire, and the Torpedo may be handled with perfect safety. Not having time to engrave this improvement, it shall be exhibited to Congress in a working model, by which it will also be better understood.
I will now suppose the enemy to be approaching a port; a signal announces them; our boats run out and throw into the channel two hundred Torpedoes, set each to 15 days. Should the enemy sail among them, the consequence will teach future caution; should they cruise or anchor at a distance, what could they do? They not knowing the number of Torpedoes which were put down, nor the day on which they were to rise to the surface, could not have their boats out exposed to our fire, and waiting from day to day for a time uncertain. Whereas, our officers, knowing the number which were put down, and the day they were to rise to the surface, would have their boats ready to take them in, and at the same time replace them with others set for ten, fifteen, twenty, or more days. Viewing this subject in all its bearings, the impression on my mind is, that it would be impossible for an enemy to enter a port where anchored Torpedoes were thus used, without their incurring danger of such a kind, that courage could not guard them from its consequences. Prudence and justice would warrant their abandoning such an enterprise; and the probability is, that knowing us to be thus prepared, they never would attempt it, or should they, and only one vessel were to be destroyed, we might calculate on its good effect to protect us from future hostile enterprises.
B is a copper case to contain one hundred or more pounds of powder; C a cork cushion to give the whole Torpedo such a buoyancy, that it will be only from two to three pounds heavier than salt water. To ascertain such weight, when it is charged with powder and the lock screwed on, it is put into a large tub of sea water. C is to have fifteen or twenty inch-holes bored in its sides and top, to let the water rush in and the air out, otherwise, the air would prevent its immediately sinking. A is a cylindric brass box, about seven inches diameter and two inches deep, in which there is a gun-lock with a barrel two inches long, to receive a charge of powder and a wad, which charge is fired into the powder of the case B. In the brass box A there is also a piece of clockwork moved by a spring, which being wound up and set, will let the lock strike fire in any number of minutes which may be determined within one hour. K is a small line fixed to a pin, which pin holds the clockwork inactive; the instant the pin is withdrawn the clockwork begins to move, and the explosion will take place in one, two, three, or any number of minutes for which it has been set; the whole is so made as to be perfectly tight and keep out the water, although under a pressure of twenty-five or thirty perpendicular feet. D is a pine box two feet long, six or eight inches square, filled with cork; it is ten or fifteen pounds lighter than water, and floats on the surface; the line from it to the Torpedo is the suspending line, which must be of a length in proportion to the estimated draft of water of the vessel to be attacked; vessels of a certain number of guns usually draw within a few feet of the same draft of water; the suspending line should be from four to eight feet longer than the greatest draft of the vessel, that it may bend round the curve of her side, and lay the Torpedo near her keel. From the Torpedo and the float D, two lines, each twenty feet long, are united at E, from thence one line goes to the harpoon, the total length of the line from the Torpedo to the harpoon being about fifty feet, according to the length of the vessel to be attacked, will, when the ship is harpooned in the bow, bring the Torpedo under her bottom near midship. See the harpoon. It is a round piece of iron, half an inch diameter and two feet long, the butt one inch diameter, the exact calibre of the harpoon-gun; in the head of the harpoon there is an eye, the point six inches long is barbed, the line of the Torpedo is spliced into the eye of the harpoon, a small iron or tough copper link runs on the shaft of the harpoon, to the link the Torpedo-line is also tied, and at such a distance, that when the harpoon is in the gun it will form a loop as at H, but when fired, the link will slide along to the butt of the harpoon, and, holding the rope and harpoon parallel to each other, the rope will act like a tail or rod to a rocket, and guide it straight; without this precaution, the butt of the harpoon would turn foremost, and make a very uncertain shot. F is the harpoon-gun, made strong, and to work on a swivel in a stanchion fixed in the stern-sheets of a boat. My experience with this kind of harpoon and gun, is, that I have harpooned a target of six feet square fifteen or twenty times, at the distance of from thirty to fifty feet, never missing, and always driving the barbed point through three inch boards up to the eye, which practice was so satisfactory, that I did not consider it necessary to repeat it. The object of harpooning a vessel on the larboard and starboard bow, is, to fix one end of the Torpedo-line, then, if the ship be under sail, her action through the water will draw the Torpedo under her; if she be at anchor, the tide will drive it under her, where, at the expiration of the time for which the clockwork was set, the explosion will destroy her.
This being the kind of Torpedo and clockwork by which the Dorothea in Walmer roads, and the brig in New-York harbour were blown up, and the harpoon having succeeded to fix the line to the target, these two experiments shall be combined, and the mode of practice, with the prospect of success and risque to the assailants, examined.
Represents the stern of a row-boat; a platform about four feet long, three feet wide, is made on her stern on a level with the gunwale, and projecting over the stern fifteen or eighteen inches, so that the Torpedo, in falling into the water, may clear the rudder. On the platform, the Torpedo and its suspending line of cork are to be laid, and the harpoon-line carefully coiled as at F, so that when the harpoon is fired, the line may develope with ease: very pliable well greased, or white line would be best for this purpose. The harpoon and gun are so well engraved as require no explanation. B is the copper case to hold one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder. C, the box of cork to diminish its tendency to sink and bring it to a specific gravity of only two or three pounds more than sea-water. Its suspending box of cork explained in Plate III is not seen in this figure, lest the drawing should be confused; it can be imagined in its proper place. A, is the brass box with the clockwork lock; D, the pin which prevents the clockwork moving; the line from the pin is tied to a bolt, or otherwise fixed to the boat as at E. Thus fastened, when the Torpedo is pulled into the water, the pin D will remain in the boat, and the clockwork will begin to act. The man who shall be stationed at the gun, and who may be called the harpooner, is to steer the boat and fire when sufficiently near. If he fixes his harpoon in the bow of the enemy, it will then only be necessary to row away; the harpoon and line being fixed to the ship, will pull the Torpedo out of the boat, and at the same instant set the clockwork in motion. This reduces the attack of each boat to one simple operation, that only of firing with reasonable attention. Should the harpooner miss the ship, he can save his Torpedo and return to the attack. While I was with the British blockading fleet off the coast of Boulogne in 1804 and 1805, I acquired some experience on the kind of row-boat best calculated for active movements, and which I now believe well adapted to a harpooning and Torpedo attack; hence I propose clinker-built boats, each twenty-seven feet long, six feet extreme breadth of beam, single banked, and six long oars; one blunderbuss, on a swivel, on the larboard and one on the starboard bow; one ditto on the larboard and one on the starboard quarter, total four, for which cartridges should be prepared, each containing twelve half-ounce balls. To work the blunderbusses, in case of need, two mariners should be placed in the bow, two in the stern; each of those men to be provided with a horse-pistol and cutlass, and each oarsman a cutlass, in case of coming to close quarters with a boat of the enemy.
1 | Harpooner. | |
1 | Bowman. | |
4 | Marines. | |
6 | Oarsmen. | |
Total | 12 | Men. |
Such boats would be active well armed, and, if good men, may be said to be strong handed, and well prepared to make good a retreat, or act on the defensive, in case of encountering the enemy's boats.
A, is a bird's eye view of a vessel at anchor; B, her cable; EE, two Torpedoes; CD, is their coupling line, about 120 feet long; it is here represented touching the cable collapsing, and the Torpedoes driving by the tide under the vessel. This is the manner in which the Dorothea in Walmer roads, and the brig in New-York harbour, were blown up.
A, shews a Torpedo, with the harpoon-line fixed to the centre of its end; when the line is thus fixed, the tide cannot drive the Torpedo under a vessel, for the pressure of the current being equal on both sides, it will hang perpendicular to its suspending box of cork C, Fig. 2, and remain as at B, where, exploding, it would blow the water perpendicular to C, and up the side of the ship; the lateral movement of the water from B to E would give her a sudden cant to one side, but do her no injury. This has been proved by the following practice.
On the first of October, 1805, captain Siccombe, in a galley with eight men and his coxswain, placed two Torpedoes in the manner described, Plate IV, Fig. 2, between the buoy and cable of a French gun-brig, in Boulogne roads. The tide drove them until they both lay perpendicular to her sides. When the French saw captain Siccombe advancing without answering the countersign, they exclaimed that the infernal machines were coming, and fired a volley of musketry at his boat, but without touching a man.[C] The moment the French fired, fearing the effect of the explosions, they all ran aft and were in the greatest confusion. The tide drove captain Siccombe's boat so far down, that he was obliged to cross under the brig's stern, where, seeing her men collected, and expecting another volley, he discharged at them two blunderbusses, each containing fifteen half-ounce balls[D], and was rowing away, when both Torpedoes exploded, but, to his astonishment, the brig was not destroyed. On the same night, lieutenant Payne, of captain Owen's ship l'Immortality, placed two Torpedoes across the bow of another French gun-brig; he received their fire, had one man wounded, rowed to some distance, and waited till he saw the explosion of the Torpedoes, which did not appear to do any injury to the vessel. When captain Siccombe called on me in the morning and reported these circumstances, I was much at a loss to account for the brig not being blown up. Defective in the experience which this failure gave me, I had not reflected, that if the copper case, with the clockwork and powder, weighed specifically fifteen or twenty pounds more than water, it would hang like a heavy pendulum to its suspending cork-box C, and if the coupling line were fixed in the centre of the end, as at A, Fig. 1, the action of the tide being equal on both sides, would have no tendency to sheer or drive it from its perpendicular position. After about half an hour's consideration, I was forcibly impressed with this error in arrangement, as the real cause of captain Siccombe's and lieutenant Payne's failure.
[C] They had got some idea of these machines, from an attempt which had been made with them against the Boulogne flotilla, in Oct. 1804, called the Catamaran expedition.
[D] The report on this attack in the French papers, acknowledged that the brig had five men killed and eight wounded: this from two blunderbusses shews that the persons in the vessel attacked have to fear the small arms of the Torpedo boats.
I immediately had a large tub made, then filling a copper case with powder, I screwed on to it the clockwork lock, and tied to it the pine box C, then suspending the whole Torpedo by a line in the tub of seawater; the end of the suspending line was tied to one end of a scale-beam. I then filled the pine box C with cork, until the whole volume of the Torpedo and box of cork would, when just covered with water, hold three pounds in equilibrio in the scale on the other end of the beam. The Torpedo being then three pounds heavier than water, had a sufficient tendency to sink; and being so balanced, would, while under water, be easy moved by a slight pressure to either side. Then, instead of tying the coupling line to the end of the Torpedo, as at A, I tied it to a bridle, as at B, which presenting the side on an angle to the tide, the pressure of the current in the direction of the arrow, would cause the Torpedo to sheer from B to G. This arrangement perfectly succeeded to sheer the Torpedo from its perpendicular C, and the side of the vessel to E, near the keel, a position, near which it should be to do execution. In this situation, the explosion being under the vessel, would have a great body of water to remove laterally, before it could get out by a line curving round her side. The water, when acted on in so instantaneous a manner as by the explosion of one hundred or one hundred and fifty pounds of powder, does, for the instant, operate like a solid body; hence the explosion raises the vessel up with a great force, acting on a small portion of her bottom, which portion giving way, is the same in effect, as though a high sea had lifted her fifteen or twenty feet, and let her down on the point of a rock of three or four feet diameter. This, I believe, accounts for the certain destruction which will follow all explosions that take place near the keel. In all cases when the explosion is under water, the action will be perpendicular to the surface, as from B to C, for in the perpendicular, there are less particles to remove, and less resistance than in any diagonal, as for example, from B to D.
The French papers, giving an account of the attack of captain Siccombe and lieutenant Payne, acknowledged that the Torpedoes blew up along side of the gun-brigs, but gave them only a violent shock and cant to one side; they spoke of the engines as things of little consequence and not to be feared. It is now, however, evident, that they owed the safety of the two brigs to the trifling circumstance of the Torpedoes not being properly balanced in water, and the coupling lines not being tied to a bridle, so as to make the Torpedoes sheer under the bottoms of the brigs.
Is a bird's eye view of a ship of the line, either at anchor or under sail, and the Torpedo boats rowing on to the attack. I am sensible that there are strong prejudices against the possibility of row-boats attacking a ship or ships of the line, with any reasonable hope of success; I will, therefore, commence my reasoning and demonstrations by the following questions. What is the basis of the aggression and injustice of one nation towards another? Is it not a calculation on their power to enforce their will? What is the basis of all courage and obstinate perseverance in battle? Is it not a calculation on some real or presumed advantage? A frigate of 30 guns is not expected to engage a ship of eighty guns, for every rational calculation is against her, and to strike her colours would be no dishonour. If I now prove that all the calculations are in favour of the Torpedo boats, it shall hereafter be no dishonour for a ship of the line to strike her colours, and tamely submit to superior science and tactics.
I will run my calculations against a third rate, an 80 gun ship, she being the medium between first rates of 110 guns and fifth rates of 44 guns. I will suppose her to enter one of our ports or harbours in a hostile manner; her draft of water, when loaded, is twenty-two feet; her full complement of men six hundred. Were we to oppose to the enemy an 80 gun ship, she would cost four hundred thousand dollars; we would also have to give her a full complement of six hundred men. If she engaged the enemy, the chances are equal that she would be beaten; if an obstinate engagement, she might have from one to two hundred men killed and wounded, and be so shattered as to require repairs to the amount of forty or fifty thousand dollars; she might be taken and lost to the nation, and add to the strength of the enemy. It is now to be seen if six hundred men and a capital of four hundred thousand dollars, the value of an eighty gun ship, cannot be used to better advantage in a Torpedo attack or defence.
600 | men at 12 to a boat, would man 50 boats, | |
50 | boats at one hundred dollars each | $5,000 |
50 | Torpedoes complete, one hundred and fifty dollars each, powder included | 7,500 |
50 | harpoon-guns, thirty dollars each | 1,500 |
200 | blunderbusses, twenty dollars each | 4,000 |
100 | pair of pistols, fifteen dollars a pair | 1,500 |
600 | cutlasses, three dollars each | 1,800 |
Contingencies | 3,000 | |
Total | $24,300 |
The pay and provisions for six hundred men, whether in an 80 gun ship or in Torpedo boats, may be estimated, for the present, to amount to the same sum annually.
Here is an establishment of fifty boats with their Torpedoes, and armed complete, for 24,300 dollars; the economy 375,700 dollars.[E] It is evident the ship could not put out fifty boats to contend with our fifty; she could not, in fact, put out twenty; therefore, as to boat fighting, the enemy could have no chance of success, and would have to depend for protection on her guns and small arms. Unless in a case of great emergency, the attack should be in the night, for if an enemy came into one of our harbours to do execution, the chances would be much against her getting out and to any great distance before night. In a night usually dark, rowboats, if painted white, and the men dressed in white, cannot be seen at the distance of three hundred yards; and there are nights so dark, that they cannot be seen if close under the bow. I might here draw into my calculations on chances that an enemy, who understood the tremendous consequences of a successful attack with Torpedoes, would not like to run the risk of the night being dark. But in any night, the fifty boats closing on the vessel in all direction, would spread or divide her fire, and prevent it becoming concentered on any one or more boats. Boats which row five miles an hour, and which all good boats can do for a short time, run at the rate of one hundred and forty yards a minute. At the distance of three hundred yards from the ship, they take the risque of cannon shot, which must, from necessity, be random and without aim, on so small a body as a boat, running with a velocity of one hundred and forty yards a minute. At two hundred yards from the ship, the boats must take the chance of random discharges of grape and cannister shot; and at one hundred yards from the ship, they must run the risque of random musket; each boat will, therefore, be two minutes within the line of the enemy's fire before she harpoons, and two minutes after she has harpooned before she gets out of the line of fire, total, four minutes in danger[F]: the danger, however, is not of a very serious kind, for, as before observed, no aim can be taken in the night at such quick moving bodies as row-boats; yet some men might be killed, and some boats crippled[G]; in such an event, the great number of boats which we should have in motion, could always help the unfortunate. But what would be the situation of the enemy, who had their six hundred men in one vessel? The Torpedo boats closing upon her, twenty-five on the larboard and twenty-five on the starboard bow, some of them would certainly succeed to harpoon her between the stem and main chains, and if so, the explosion of only one Torpedo under her would sink her, killing the greatest part of the people who were between decks, and leave those who might escape to the mercy of our boats to save them.