Early in April, when war was imminent, Governor Wolcott, with two officers of his staff, sat down to the study of a war-map of the Massachusetts coast which had been prepared and carefully revised to meet existing conditions. It is no exaggeration to say that this map furnished material for the most serious thought. The map pitilessly showed that from the Merrimac River, on the northern boundary, to the Taunton River, on the southern, there were on navigable waters, open to some of the many forms of naval attack—whether by fleet bombardment, cruiser raid, or torpedo-boat dash—no less than forty-one cities and towns, none with less than one thousand of population, whose inhabitants aggregated one million seventy-seven thousand, or over forty-three per cent. of the population of the State. Furthermore, it appeared that, at a low estimate, the property interests exposed in these towns reached the enormous sum of $1,586,775,000—surely a tempting bait for any adventurous naval commander in the service of a desperate and bankrupt enemy.

But the map relentlessly showed more than this: it demonstrated the absolutely defenceless condition of this rich strip of coast. At Boston there were indications of a rudimentary defence; at New Bedford stood the obsolete granite walls of old Fort Rodman; Fall River was protected by the guns at Fort Adams and the batteries at Dutch Island; but elsewhere along the coast there was not to be found even the pretence of preparation for the surely coming war.

The obsolete defenses, however, were not alone in giving cause for grave concern. The question of manning them had to be considered. As a matter of record, there were scattered along the coast from Fort Preble, Me., to Fort Trumbull, Conn., eight batteries—one ("F") a light battery—of the Second Artillery, whose duty-strength on the 16th of April may have been approximately six hundred men. There were but three of these batteries on duty on the Massachusetts coast—"C" (Schenck's) and "M" (Richmond's) at Fort Warren; "G" (Niles') at the yet incomplete battery at Long Island Head, Boston Harbor. Where more trained gunners were to be had was problematical. The bill providing for the organization of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments of regular artillery had been passed by Congress as late as March 7th, and these new commands were only in process of evolution. It was not until the 16th of May that the first of the newly raised batteries took station in New England, and even then its standard of efficiency was low, owing to the heavy percentage of recruits in its ranks.

The condition of affairs in Boston Harbor was most interesting. Here was a city with an estimated population of five hundred and fifty thousand; with an assessed valuation of $1,012,750,000; with business interests to be reckoned by daily bank-clearings of $20,000,000; with annual exports and imports of $189,879,839—in short, the second seaport of the country in commercial rank. Naturally it would be expected that the general Government, which hardly could be ignorant of the enormous interests just shown, would have made some pretence at giving them adequate protection. But what were the grim facts in the case?

In 1886, the so-called Endicott Board on Fortifications—whose scheme of defence, with some minor modifications, still remains the standard project for the erection of our coast works—recommended an expenditure of $10,910,250 for the defenses of Boston Harbor. This sum covered the cost of guns, mounts, emplacements, submarine mines, and a flotilla of eighteen torpedo-boats for local service. Large as it may seem, it yet represents a levy of but one and seven-hundredths per cent. on the assessed valuation of the property exposed at this port, and furthermore it was intended that its expenditure should be distributed through a period of ten years. How faithfully this programme was carried out by the authorities at Washington may be shown by the following table, in which the first column of figures indicates the number of breech-loading rifles and mortars required by the complete scheme of defence, while the second exhibits those actually mounted for service during the late war:

In other words, of the projected scheme of defence—so far as concerned the main element, gun and mortar fire—there remained to be put into operation the trifling matter of eighty-six per cent.! In twelve years elapsing since the exhaustive report of the Endicott Board, the Congress of the United States had doled out appropriations barely sufficient to complete thirteen and seven-tenths per cent. of the required guns, mounts, and emplacements. The essential matter of the torpedo-boat flotilla had been put calmly aside without even the courtesy of consideration. Funds at the disposal of the Engineers had enabled them, as early as March 1st, to begin the work of submarine mining, but at no time during the war was the complete system of mines installed. And, last of all, when war actually had been declared, the garrisons of the three main defensive positions of the harbor—Fort Warren, Long Island Head, and the Mortar Battery at Winthrop—aggregated less than two hundred and fifty officers and men for duty.