While the work of settling the regiment at its new station was in progress, its officers found themselves confronted by a new and serious cause for apprehension. Up to the time of arriving at the fort, there had been a marked lack of definite information as to the future service of the command. Only two facts seemed assured: that the President had called for one hundred and twenty-five thousand volunteers, and that the hurried ordering out of the First had been in partial answer to that call. Before the enthusiasm attending the prompt assembly of the regiment had died away, there came to Fort Warren a bit of news which literally dumbfounded its officers and men. Word was received from the State House that General Corbin, in assigning the quota of Massachusetts, had made requisition for four regiments of infantry, and but three batteries of heavy artillery!

The effect of this announcement may be better imagined than described. Here was a regiment which since 1882 had received desultory instruction in artillery work, and since 1892 had devoted itself seriously to the study of the duties of this arm; year by year it had improved in discipline and gained in efficiency until its officers and men, beyond any doubt or question, were fully capable of serving intelligently and well the secondary armament—even if not the most modern ordnance—in any works on the coast; it had annually, in its encampments, been brought into contact with regulars, and had become thoroughly familiar with the surroundings of permanent fortifications; moreover, it was the only regiment of militia heavy artillery in the entire country—and yet a single telegram from Washington threatened to overthrow the work of long years, and to destroy by a stroke of the pen an organization to whose up-building patriotic men unselfishly had given their time, their money, and their most earnest effort.

It hardly need be said that on the receipt of this intelligence the officers of the regiment, from the Chief to the last subaltern, passed through the successive stages of astonishment, humiliation, and bitter chagrin, to a final condition of supreme disgust. It seemed evident that the First Massachusetts, after its half-century of honorable service in peace and war, either had been forgotten, or else was destined to be entirely ignored. The action of the War Department seemed inexplicable under the circumstances. The country suddenly had become involved in a war in which attacks on its coast cities were possible, if not imminent; while wofully lacking in trained troops of all arms, it stood most distressingly in need of garrison artillery; Massachusetts, alone among the States, was ready and waiting to offer a regiment of fairly disciplined and fairly trained artillerymen—and was called upon for but three batteries! And this, it should be noted, in the face of an exigency which compelled the Commanding Officer of the Department of the East (General Orders, No. 21, 6th June, 1898) to issue such instructions as these: "In case the regular artillery troops at any post are not sufficient properly to man all the guns, the commanding officer will apply for such officers, companies, or details from the infantry supports, to be assigned to these duties, as may be necessary. At fortifications where no artillery troops are stationed, the post commander will select such companies or number of troops as shall be necessary, and assign them to that duty." It is a matter of record that such assignments had to be made, and that the raw troops used for the purpose not only were absolutely useless as artillerists, but even, in some instances, proved themselves incapable of properly caring for the expensive artillery material placed under their control.

The War Department should not have been in ignorance of the existence of this regiment, or of its condition of comparative efficiency. Yearly, from 1892 to 1897, reports upon its progress had been compiled by Colonel Miller, of the Third United States Artillery, and by Colonel Kline, of the Twenty-first United States Infantry—both of whom, to the satisfaction of those in the Massachusetts service, since have become general officers—and these reports had shown uniform commendation of the conscientious work that was being done. In 1896 Colonel Kline reported: "With this year's work, Massachusetts has a corps (the First Regiment) for coast-defence. Should an emergency arise necessitating the immediate reËnforcement of Fort Warren, the whole of this fine regiment could in twenty-four hours be sent to the post, and would now be of invaluable service." And in his report for 1897, submitted at a time when war was almost in sight, he repeated with added emphasis his comment of the preceding year: "The Legislature of the State of Massachusetts, recognizing the advisability of a coast-defence reserve, promptly legislated the transfer of one of the infantry regiments (First) for this duty. The wisdom of this legislation cannot be questioned. Under adverse conditions the regiment has labored; without the means of receiving proper instruction, save such as could be given by officers when released from their duties, given freely and unstintedly, yet they have succeeded in fitting the organization as a reserve force that could now be of invaluable service." In both these extracts the italics are those found in the original report, as printed by the Military Information Division at Washington.

Apparently the emergency requiring the immediate reËnforcement of Fort Warren had arrived; in less than twenty hours from the time orders reached the men, the regiment had reported at the post, armed, uniformed, rationed, and equipped; officers and men stood ready to render the invaluable services for which an inspecting officer of the Government had declared them fit—and yet now, at a time when hastily raised and untrained infantry was to be thrown headlong into artillery posts, there came word from Washington that the First Massachusetts Heavy Artillery, as an organization, would receive no consideration as a part of the volunteer army of the United States.

It was small wonder that this verdict was received with something very like consternation. If it could not be reversed, the destruction of the regiment was certain. For years the men had been schooled in the belief that they were in fact, if not in name, essentially a part of the army of the United States; every enlistment had been made on the understanding that in time of peace faithful service was to be rendered to Massachusetts, in time of war, to the United States. The splendid esprit de corps of the command had been carefully built up upon this supposition, and the men had been taught to believe that the hard training to which they were subjected was intended to fit them for something more than mere parade and ceremony, for something beyond possible riot duty—in short, for something no less serious than the defence of their country in the hour of need.

All this was at once made known to Governor Wolcott, who instantly appreciated the disastrous effect of the proposed action, and set himself to the task of finding a remedy. By his direction, Colonel Sohier, A.D.C., of his staff, hurried on to Washington, where by personal effort he succeeded in securing a reversal of the decision first made by General Corbin, who not only accepted the regiment as then organized, but even further directed that its term of service should date from April 26th—thus officially recognizing the command as first in the field for the war. The regimental pay-rolls subsequently were made up from this date, and officers and men were paid accordingly.

But though Colonel Sohier was successful in his mission so far as concerned saving the regiment for the national service, it was found impossible to secure permission to recruit the command to war strength, for the absurd reason that to do so would exceed the quota of volunteers allotted to Massachusetts. From a purely technical point of view, this decision seems inexplicable. There was crying need, at the time, for garrison artillery, while it was not expected that any serious demands would be made upon the infantry of the army before autumn; why, then, the proportion was not maintained by recruiting the First, and accepting one of the regiments of Massachusetts infantry temporarily on its peace strength, must always remain beyond the comprehension of those unfortunate enough to have had a professional knowledge of the coast-defence conditions prevailing at the opening of the late war.