  Telegram from Secretary of War—Go to Richmond—Declined Going to Vicksburg—Gen. Longstreet—He Starts for Suffolk—Suffolk—Capture of a Fort and Garrison—No Report Made of the Capture—Statement of Lieut. George Reese—Longstreet Ordered to Join Lee—Dispatches—Battle of Chancellorsville—Withdraw from Suffolk—An Impertinent Note—Court of Inquiry Asked for and Refused—Possible Result Had Longstreet Obeyed Orders—Ten Dispatches to Longstreet—Orders to Report to Gen. Johnston. On March 1, 1863, I received a telegram from the Secretary of War stating that he wished to see me in regard to a change of service. The day following I called at the office of the Secretary, Hon. J. A. Seddon, and he expressed a desire that I would go to the city of Vicksburg to assist in the defense of that place. I did not give my assent, preferring to consider the matter. On the 3d I rode around the line of defensive works that I had constructed around Petersburg with Gen. Longstreet, and did not get back until 3 P.M. I have already stated that on my return from Wilmington on the 23d of February, 1863, I found Gen. Longstreet in Petersburg in command of the divisions of Gens. Hood and Pickett. The main object of his coming was to provision his troops and forage his animals (until active service commenced requiring him to join Gen. Lee or otherwise) from the supplies in the adjoining counties of Virginia and the counties of North Carolina in the northeastern portion of the State, and be in readiness to join Gen. Lee promptly, which he said was arranged before he left Fredericksburg. (See Longstreet's "Memoirs," page 329.) That the trains might move in safety, it was necessary to confine the Federal forces in the works around Suffolk and Norfolk. Accordingly about the middle of April Longstreet moved with his two divisions and one of mine on Suffolk. The approach of our troops was not discovered until the advance was in open view of the defenses around the city. Their pickets were quietly captured, and the lookout sentinel in an observatory on a platform in the top of a large pine tree in front of the city might have been captured also had it not been for the desire of The circumvallation of the city, in part, was made by Pickett's division on the right, mine in the center, and Hood's on the left, and thus the siege of Suffolk began. When Gen. Longstreet had been in Petersburg some time, he said to me one day that he purposed to attack Suffolk after his preparations were made, and to take the trains and send them down into the seaboard counties for provisions. The next thing I knew, April 9, he put his command in motion, and took from me a division and a number of batteries, and was on his way to Suffolk without informing me in any way of his designs, or of his wishes.[23] The next day I put a staff officer in charge of the department headquarters, and with my other staff officers rode to Suffolk and took command of my own troops there that had been removed without sending the order through my office as courtesy required. No doubt the object of such proceedings was to give the command of a division to Gen. M. Jenkins, a worthy and gallant officer, who had distinguished himself in the seven days' fight around Richmond. On the morning of the 13th I took command of my own troops, the brigades of Pettigrew, Jenkins, and Davis, and my batteries. I found Gen. Longstreet down near the front, where there was considerable artillery firing and skirmishing on the advanced line. Longstreet asked me to accept the command of all the artillery, which I refused to do. I told him I did not intend to give up the command of my division to any one, but that I was willing to give all the assistance I could, personally and through the Tuesday, 14th. Heavy skirmishing; rode to Pickett's Division and to the extreme right of the line, and met Gen. Armstead there. Wednesday, 15th. Started down the river with some artillery to endeavor to destroy the gunboats; found but one in the river, and it was too far below. After getting guns in position withdrew them. Day very rainy. Thursday, 16th. Rode down the river and examined it for positions for defense; met Longstreet at Mr. Riddick's place; then went to Mr. Le Compte's house. We were invited to stay for dinner, but before it was ready a gunboat opened fire on the house while we were resting in the yard behind it and while the family were in it. After the second shot, which went through it, we rode out into the field by the side of the house in open sight. They did not fire at us (myself and four of my staff), but all the while continued the attack on the dwelling, and over the heads of the little children, who were on the lawn in front waving white handkerchiefs. The dwelling was built of brick, and was riddled with large holes. The wonder to me was how the children escaped. As we were leaving the field and the doctor had his hands on the latch of the gate to open it, it was opened by a three-hundred-pound shell striking the post that the gate was hung to, demolishing it. 17th. Last night I gave my consent that two guns from Stribbling's battery be put in an old work that was to be garrisoned by two companies of Gen. Law's Brigade, and some guns from Martin's battery were put in another work. A gunboat came up and opened fire on the fort where the two Alabama companies were, without damage. 18th. Passed all day down the river. Got the two thirty-two pounders in position, ready to open to-morrow. 19th. This forenoon the gunboats came up, and the thirty-two pounder fired on them and drove them back. They were also attacked by some sharpshooters. Just before sunset the gunboats and several batteries of artillery opened a very severe cross fire on the fort and over the plain in the rear of the fort, where the two guns from Stribbling's battery had been placed to aid the garrison. Pending this attack the enemy landed a strong infantry force, under cover of some timber, on our side of the river, carried the place by a sudden assault, and captured the garrison, consisting of Companies A and B, Forty-Fourth Alabama Regiment, and a squad of artillerymen. I heard the distant firing about sunset, and at 9 P.M. I heard in camp that one of the forts in Hood's command had been captured. I went over to Longstreet's headquarters, and he asked me to go down and take command. On arrival I found on the ground there Gens. Hood and Law with Robertson's Brigade and Connelly's Fifty-Fifth North Carolina Regiment, and took command as I was ordered. The Fifty-Fifth North Carolina Regiment was advanced, but it was driven back in the darkness by the cross fire of the gunboats and the enemy in the captured works. It was so plain to any one who had a knowledge of the art of war that the enemy would not hold an isolated work on our side of the river, that I was not inclined to make an assault which would have sacrificed so many lives uselessly. Yet such was the order given by Longstreet. 20th. Remained in position till morning, when Longstreet arrived. Both Gens. Hood and Law strenuously insisted that no attack should be made to capture the works while the troops would be subjected to the severe cross fire over the neck of land from the enemy's fleet of vessels and the troops in the redoubt and artillery opposite on the other side of the river. At 1 P.M. I turned the command over to Hood, or rather left him in command of his own troops, advising him to wait and let the enemy abandon the place, which they did. Soon after this Capt. Cussons, commander of Law's scouts, with a few men and a loud "yell," ran in the enemy's pickets, and entered the works with them. They went on out, and left Cussons to hold the empty fort. 22d. If that redoubt, which gave support to our left flank (that otherwise would have been "in air"), was worth a great sacrifice of life to recapture it, as ordered by Longstreet, then certainly it was in accord with the science of war to place two guns on the works to strengthen and protect the left flank of his army.[24] I am tired of volunteering against gunboats any more, and declined having anything to do with the line defended by Gen. Hood because of a communication received from the general commanding saying I was "in charge of the river defenses." To have charge of the river defenses involves more or less the command of all the army. I really had officially nothing to do with the river defenses, only I voluntarily placed two large siege guns in position to be used in attacking any boats passing up or down the river. Connally's Regiment was a support for these two guns. 23d. Confined myself to the immediate command of my division, and took no more interest in Hood's line, and ordered Connally's Regiment to join his brigade. 24th and 25th. There was some skirmishing. 26th. Rode down with Gen. Longstreet to the Whitemarsh road. Gone all day. The line there is commanded by Gen. Armstead. And now come the Richmond papers proclaiming: "From Suffolk—Gen. French lost Stribbling's battery." Mark you, no mention of the capture of the fort; no mention of the capture of the two companies that garrisoned it. It would not do to have it reported that the Yankees crossed the Nansemond yesterday and captured a fort on our side of the river by assault. The garrison, composed of two companies of the Forty-Fourth Alabama Regiment of Law's Brigade, Hood's Division, were taken prisoners and the two guns were lost. But it will not do to let this be known. No, no; write it down thus: "Yesterday Gen. French lost Stribbling's battery." The world is too busy to inquire, and the world will believe it. The truth is, I was never in the fort, never saw it. I had no authority over the garrison, and I was in no way responsible for the loss of the redoubt, the garrison, or guns. The most remarkable feature of this little affair is the persistency with which headquarters proclaimed that "French lost Stribling's battery," and were silent about the infantry garrison captured, etc. I will give two letters here from the War Records: Headquarters Near Suffolk, April 21, 1863. Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, Goldsboro. Gen. Longstreet is closely engaged to-night, and he has asked me to write you briefly the particulars of the affair of Sunday night which resulted in the capture by the enemy of Stribbling's battery. Several batteries had been planted on the Nansemond to hold the river against the passage of gunboats and transports. Stribbling's occupied an old uninclosed work on Hill's Point, a tongue of land a little above the confluence of Western Branch and Nansemond. About dark on the evening of the 19th the enemy opened a severe fire from his field batteries planted opposite, and his gunboats above and below the fort, entirely sweeping with a cross fire the plain in the rear of the work. Under cover of this fire and The artillery on the river was directly under the management of Maj. Gen. French. There were five guns, fifty-five artillerists, and seventy infantry (sharpshooters) in the fort, which all fell into the hands of the enemy. The affair is regarded as a most remarkable and discreditable instance of an entire absence of vigilance. A regiment (Fifty-Fifth North Carolina and seven hundred strong) which Gen. Longstreet had particularly ordered to the vicinity for the protection of the battery was not posted in supporting distance. No official report of the affair has yet been received from Gen. French. The captured guns were carried across the river. It is some consolation that only the guns and ammunition chests were lost. The horses and ammunition carriages, being considerably in the rear of the battery, were saved. We are otherwise quite comfortable here. The quartermasters and commissaries are actively engaged in getting out supplies. I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant, G. M. Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant General.[25] This letter comes from the headquarters of Gen. Longstreet, and should be a careful account; whereas it contains errors in stating occurrences well known at the time it was written. I will point out some of the errors: 1. Only a small part of Stribbling's battery was captured by the enemy. 2. Stribbling's battery was not in the redoubt, as stated, in numbers. 3. The estimate that the enemy's force was not over one hundred and fifty differs very much from that of Lieut. George Reese, who was an officer of one of the companies forming the garrison that was captured, who writes it was near one thousand. 4. "The artillery on the river was directly under the command of Maj. Gen. French" is an error, as I declined it the day of my arrival, only I voluntarily offered to assist in checking the gunboats passing up or down the river. 5. It states that "there were five guns, fifty-five artillerists, and seventy infantry captured by the enemy;" whereas it was known to the entire army by the 21st, the date of this letter, that only two guns and about eighteen artillerists were lost when 6. Gen. Longstreet did not particularly order the Fifty-Fifth North Carolina Regiment to that vicinity for the protection of the battery. It was one of the regiments of my command, and I sent it down to support two thirty-two-pounders that Col. Cunningham had mounted at a place we had selected farther down the river. The "protection" to the two guns at the fort was the garrison Hood sent to the fort and such other as he directed. The better explanation is, the guns were asked of me to aid the garrison. 7. The statement that "no official report of the affair has yet been received from Gen. French" is misleading, and a report from me would have been supererogatory. The report of that "affair" was strictly a matter between the general commanding and Gen. Hood, who commanded the division and placed the garrison in the fort to protect his extreme left, then "in air." 8. When headquarters announced that "it was some little consolation that only five guns and ammunition chests were lost," it may have been joyous that only the garrison was lost instead of the whole of Hood's Division, of which it formed a part. 9. I must give Gen. Longstreet's adjutant general the manliness to be the only officer in Longstreet's Corps who has, in any manner or form, put on record the fact, directly or indirectly, that there was a garrison placed in that redoubt by order of Longstreet, or Hood, or both, and it was captured by the enemy, and with the garrison went the two guns. To the world has the publication gone that Gen. French lost Stribbling's battery. 10. If it be creditable for headquarters to publish that "this affair is regarded as a most remarkable and discreditable instance of an entire absence of vigilance" on my part, then I claim it is proper for me to remark that this effusion from the head of this army may be also "regarded as a most remarkable and discreditable instance of an entire absence of correctness in stating that affair." There was no doubt a want of vigilance; and if Gen. Longstreet had desired, he could have learned whether the commander Like the ghost of Banquo, Stribbling's battery rises up again at headquarters and will not out. Headquarters Near Suffolk, April 20, 1863, 7 P.M. Brig. Gen. H. L. Benning, Commanding Brigade. Your communication of 3 A.M. to-day has been received.... The cannonade that you heard last night arose from a successful effort of the enemy to capture one of our batteries on the river. Under cover of darkness and the fire of his gunboats and land batteries he landed a force near Hill's Point, and took possession of Stribbling's battery by a surprise. I am, General, very respectfully your obedient servant. G. M. Sorrel, Assistant Adjutant General.[26] I now will continue my diary: 27th, 28th, and 29th. Passed most of the day examining the line between my right and Gen. Garnett. Reported to Gen. Longstreet. Spoke's Run is no barrier to infantry. To-day, the 29th, orders came for Gen. Longstreet to join Gen. Lee immediately. He sent for me and told me he was ordered to join Gen. Lee with his two divisions; but that he could not go, as his wagons sent for supplies had not returned. I made no reply, but thought it strange, considering all the company wagons, etc., he required to move were in the camp. 30th. "Waiting for the wagons" is still the song. Terrible thunderstorm. Lightning injured a number of men. Friday, May 1. This afternoon about 4 P.M. the enemy was found in line of battle. One regiment, said to have been the Fifty-Ninth New York, advanced on my picket lines and were handsomely repulsed by Col. Connally's regiment. In supporting his men in the pits he lost ten men. The enemy shelled the plain furiously for an hour and a half in my front. Courier came and said they were advancing on the Fifty-Fifth and fighting like h—l. I rode over to Jenkins, and we galloped to the front. Ordered Connally to send support to his pickets, and it was done valiantly. The enemy lost over forty men. By sunset all was quiet. This was a demonstration in favor of Hooker, who was now at Chancellorsville. May 2. All was quiet last night, more so than usual, and now up to 6 P.M. all is still save an occasional gun and a little picket-firing, and this continued during the night. Received to-day general instructions to withdraw to the Blackwater. May 3. This morning sent to the rear all spare articles, baggage, etc. At 11 A.M. Gen. Longstreet started for Franklin, and left me in command of the army to withdraw it. Heavy firing down the river, and the enemy is shelling the railroad crossing. Captured men report Gen. Dix in command in Suffolk. Some Yankees came over the river with sugar and coffee to trade. The skirmishing on the left was very heavy, and I sent down one regiment to support Gen. Anderson, and moved Davis's Brigade to the left about a mile. I am now informed that Gen. Longstreet did not go at 11 A.M. as he expected to do. At sunset the firing on the left still continued, and the order to withdraw was countermanded. About 7 P.M. I received orders from Maj. Latrobe to withdraw in half an hour. I then ordered up the supports from the railroad, and directed the men in the advanced rifle pits to be withdrawn at 11:20. At 10 the column was in motion, and we marched steadily the distance of six miles.... Arriving at the junction of the South Quay and Summerton roads, I learned that all Maj. Mitchell's trains had crossed the Blackwater, and Pickett's wagons were now passing on to the river to cross. Being thus advised, the division was halted, and I rode on to look for a good position to form line of battle to defend the crossing in case the enemy should pursue. I found an admirable position, and disposed my forces accordingly. Pickett's Division came up, and I left Col. Bratten, with two regiments and a battery of artillery, to remain with the cavalry to guard the South Quay road. This was on the morning of the 4th. 4th. In the afternoon received orders to cross over the river, and that when all were over to ride up to see him (Longstreet). The orders of the General left me but two brigades for the defense of the line from the James river to the Chowan river. 5th. Started this morning for Ivor; posted Davis at the Blackwater bridge.... Rode on to Zuni. I found Longstreet was in Petersburg, and, as there were two trains ready to leave, I determined to ride up and ascertain why he wished to see me, and try and get a third brigade. I sent Feribee's regiment down to the Isle of Wight to find out where the enemy was. I left Zuni at 2 P.M., and reached Petersburg at 3:50 P.M. I called on Longstreet as directed. I could not induce him to leave me the third brigade.... I then asked of him permission to remain in Petersburg until the morning, which he granted. Soon after a communication was handed me in which the general commanding "expressed surprise that I was in the city, and asked me to explain what induced me to abandon my command." I had a locomotive waiting to take me back to Zuni, or Franklin, as occasioned required; but considering the General told me I could remain, and by reason of this artful note, I determined not to leave anyhow under such an imputation. He may have lost his temper at Lee's victory at Chancellorsville without him. 6th. Wrote this morning to the President and asked for a court of inquiry. Now, while on this subject, I will state that the request was I will explain, although it is a trifling matter, why I went to Petersburg. First, Longstreet wrote me to call and see him as soon as my command crossed the Blackwater, but he left before I passed over. Next, when I got to Zuni I had posted my troops all in their old positions on the line of the Blackwater as they were before Longstreet moved them to Suffolk; no Longstreet was at Zuni. Secondly, Petersburg was my headquarters, and from there I could communicate with Zuni and Franklin, on the Blackwater, by telegraph and railroad, and be in either place in a short time. Thirdly, Longstreet left Franklin without turning the command of his two divisions over to me, and I presumed he was pressing forward with his command to the aid of Gen. Lee at Chancellorsville, who had called him to his assistance on the 27th of April, and so often afterwards. Continuing, my diary says: Busy the balance of the day in my office with official business. I did not leave the city until 9 P.M., when I took the cars for Franklin. I arrived there after 11 P.M. Found all quiet. Whilst I was in Petersburg Gen. Hood was impressing horses for cavalry service. Carriages, wagons, carts, etc., from which the horses were unhitched, were left in the streets. 8th. Changed headquarters to-day to Ivor.... 9th. Arrived at Ivor at 10 A.M. Gen. J. R. Davis left to-day on leave. 13th. Went to Petersburg and remained there all day following. 15th. Started for Richmond. Saw Gens. Lee, Elzy, Cooper, Ransom, Ewell, and others. Dined with the Hon. Judge James Perkins. In the evening I went to the President's. I found him ill and suffering with a cough. I took tea with them.... 16th. Saw the Secretary of War this morning. Spoke to him about leave of absence. Said it could not be granted.... 23d. Went to the Blackwater bridge, where Jenkins's Brigade was. For exercise to the troops crossed over the river to feel the enemy, in force, on the other side. I took about three thousand men and four batteries of artillery. Col. Green, with two Mississippi regiments, advanced and drove in their pickets, and captured some property. Could not draw them out to attack us. After dark withdrew. Wednesday, 27th. Went to Petersburg, intending to go to Fort Powhatan. Found there a dispatch informing me that I would be ordered on the day following to report to Gen. J. E. Johnston in Mississippi. 29th. No orders having been received, I went to Richmond to see about taking staff officers with me. Gen. Cooper could allow me only my aids. Finally the Secretary of War gave me permission to take my adjutant general, assistant adjutant general, quartermaster, and orderly. The Secretary of War told me that Gen. Joseph E. Johnston had applied for an officer of the rank of major general, and as they knew I was acquainted with the country, he had ordered me, etc. As I had once been called on to submit a plan for the defense of the Mississippi river, and complied with the request, it might have had some influence on the action of the Secretary. Besides, I had once declined duty at Vicksburg. (See letters from the President to Gen. Lee, War Records, page 716, Vol. LI., No. 108 Serial, suggesting that I be sent to Mississippi.) Before I take leave of the arduous duties I had been performing, of defending a line three hundred miles in length, of exchange of prisoners, examining correspondence, obtaining supplies, etc., I will refer to some matters again relating to the siege of Suffolk, about which I made no report. I have alluded to Gen. Longstreet taking my troops without consulting me, and his movements on to Suffolk, and his attempts to have Gen. Jenkins keep the command of them. I am quite sure it was Hood's chief of artillery who asked my artillery officer for guns to place in the works on the Nansemond river, and to which I gave my consent. It was not Gen. Law, because he protested when ordered to garrison the fort. But this matters not. The garrison and the guns formed a part of Hood's command, and yet (I am told) both Pollard and a clerk in the Rebel War Office state in their books that I lost "Stribbling's battery;" and yet, most erroneous of all, Longstreet in his book states "that a battery was put on a neck of land and captured by the enemy." He fails to state that the fort and garrison therein were captured, which of course includes the arms and the guns. The great events of war often hinge on some small matter not obvious to an ordinary commander, but which, at a glance, would be visible to the eye of the great captain, and provided for in his plans for a victory. The commander of a remote supporting corps is presumed, when alone, to be able to consider carefully everything that might occur to prevent an immediate compliance Now from Suffolk to Zuni messages were passed rapidly by the best of signal men. Thence by telegraph to Petersburg, Richmond, and on to Gen. Lee. On the 21st of April Gen. Lee reported the enemy was at Kelly's Ford; that Hooker was putting his army in motion; the 28th they crossed the Rappahannock; the 29th they crossed the Rapidan, and skirmishing commenced near Chancellorsville. On the 30th the armies were face to face. Robert E. Lee. From this it will be seen that Gen. Lee sounded the notes of warning to Longstreet as early as the 21st of April, and Norris on the 21st (as chief signal officer) informed him Hooker was moving with one hundred and fifty thousand men, nine days before he crossed the Rappahannock near Chancellorsville and was confronted by Lee. As soon as the plans or intentions of the enemy were further divined, Lee took measures to concentrate his forces. To Gen. Longstreet, with his army corps at Suffolk, he sent urgent dispatches, ten of which I copy from the War Department Records (Vol. 25, Part 2) as follows: No. 1. Page 763. GEN. COOPER TO GEN. LEE. Richmond, May 1, 1863. Gen. R. E. Lee, Fredericksburg, Va. Orders were sent on Wednesday (the 29th of April) to Gen. Longstreet to move forward his command to reËnforce you. He replied he would do so immediately, but expected to be a little delayed in gathering up his transportation train to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy, then in sight. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. No. 2. Page 752. R. E. LEE TO THE PRESIDENT. Headquarters, Army of Northern Virginia, April 27, 1863. His Excellency, Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederate States. Mr. President: I have written to Gen. Longstreet to expedite, as much as possible, his operations in North Carolina, as I may be obliged to call him back at any moment.... R. E. Lee, General. No. 3. Page 757. GEN. S. COOPER TO GEN. D. H. HILL. Richmond, Va., April 29, 1863. Maj. Gen. D. H. Hill, Commanding, Goldsboro, N. C. General: The following telegram has just been received from Gen. Lee: The enemy is crossing below Deep Run, about the same place as before.... Where his main efforts will be made I cannot say. Troops not wanted south of James river had better be moved in this direction, and all other necessary preparations made. This renders it important that such forces as you deem judicious should be concentrated at Richmond, to be in supporting distance. Gen. Lee may telegraph you.... A like dispatch has been sent to Lieut. Gen. Longstreet. I am, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant, S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. No. 4. Page 757. GEN. COOPER TO GEN. LONGSTREET. Gen. Longstreet. The following dispatch has just been received from Gen. Lee; Fredericksburg, Va., April 29, 1863. The enemy is in large force on the north bank of the Rappahannock opposite the railroad at Hamilton's crossing. He is crossing troops below the point at which he crossed in December.... I hear of no other point at which he is crossing except below Kelly's Ford, where Gen. Howard has crossed with his division, said to be fourteen thousand, six pieces of artillery, and some cavalry.... All available troops had better be sent forward as rapidly as possible. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. No. 5. Page 758. GEN. COOPER TO GEN. LONGSTREET. Adjutant and Inspector General's Office,} Lieut. Gen Longstreet. The following telegram just received since the one already communicated to you: If any troops can be sent by rail to Gordonsville, under a good officer, I recommend it. Longstreet's Division, if available, had better come to me; and the troops for Gordonsville and the protection of the railroad, from Richmond and North Carolina if practicable. Gen. Howard, of the enemy's forces making toward Gordonsville.... The Secretary, in view of the above, directs the return of your command, or at least such portions of it as can be spared without serious risk; also any surplus force that can be spared from D. H. Hill.... These movements are required to be made with the utmost dispatch. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. No. 6. Page 758. SECRETARY SEDDON TO GEN. COOPER. War Department, C. S. A., April 29, 1863. Gen. Cooper. Dear General: Gen. Lee telegraphs that all available force at our command J. A. Seddon, Secretary of War. No. 7. Page 758. SECRETARY OF WAR TO GEN. COOPER. War Office, Richmond, April 29, 1863. Gen. Cooper. Gen. Lee, by another telegram just sent the President, says: "... Longstreet's Division, if available, had better come to me...." J. A. Seddon, Secretary. No. 8. Page 760. GEN. COOPER TO GEN. LONGSTREET. Richmond, Va., April 30, 1863. Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, Suffolk, Va. Move without delay your command to this place, to effect a junction with Gen. Lee. S. Cooper, Adjutant and Inspector General. No. 9. Page 761. GEN. LEE. TO PRESIDENT DAVIS. Fredericksburg, April 30, 1863. His Excellency, President Davis. ... Enemy was still crossing the Rappahannock at 5 P.M. yesterday.... Object evidently to turn my left.... If I had Longstreet's Division, I would feel safe. R. E. Lee, General. No. 10. Page 765. GEN. LONGSTREET TO GEN. COOPER. Suffolk, Va., May 2, 1863. Gen. Cooper. I cannot move unless the entire force is moved; and it would then take several days to reach Fredericksburg. I will endeavor to move as soon as possible. James Longstreet, Lieutenant General Commanding. "Responsibility cannot exist without a name," or an object. Perhaps Longstreet delayed to execute these orders for the reason he states (page 329), that there was a "plan of battle projected"—that is, "to stand behind our intrenched lines and await the return of my troops from Suffolk." "And my impression is that Gen. Lee, standing under his trenches, would have been stronger against Hooker than he was in December against Burnside, and he would have grown stronger every Longstreet's first dispatch disclosed his intentions to Lee, and Lee wisely decided not to wait ten or twelve days for Longstreet to join him. Moreover, it is not probable that Lee thought Hooker would be so knightly as to await the arrival of the Suffolk troops before giving battle. Longstreet does not deal even in the conjectural, for it is not based on any evidence; he merely guesses. But it is better to deal with the possible. Two brigades could have been withdrawn from before Suffolk on the night of the 27th of April and sent to join Gen. Lee, then the main force on the night of the 28th. There is no doubt about this. In this event the enemy could have passed the 29th in discovering our intentions. Rather than crossing the Nansemond river and giving us battle, they would have awaited orders, and probably been sent to Fredericksburg to aid Hooker; but this is not important. On the 28th he could have ordered Gen. D. H. Hill, then at Goldsboro, to have protected the train, called on Whiting at Wilmington for aid, while I had a division at Franklin on the Blackwater, and forces elsewhere which would no doubt have saved the train from the enemy. His first dispatch is very misleading, and does not convey the idea that he would sit down and wait six days for the wagons before he withdrew. While this was going on at Suffolk, the heroic "Stonewall" Jackson was marching to the right and rear of Hooker's army, and when it was announced to him that the enemy was capturing his wagon train, without checking the walk of his horse he said: "Do not let them capture any ammunition wagons." What value were his baggage wagons compared to the loss of even a few minutes in accomplishing the great object of his movement, on which victory depended. To his master mind before him was the enemy, the impending battle, the victory, and the reward due to genius of battle, with all the spoils of war strewn in the conqueror's path. And it was so. And thus it was that Longstreet, by not effecting a junction with Lee, "put the cause Mark Antony, in his speech over the dead CÆsar, said: "Power in most men has brought their faults to light. Power in CÆsar brought into prominence his excellencies." So power given Lee made known to the world the nobility of his character and greatness as a commander; while in others it disclosed a spirit of envy and a desire for detraction; and in all some peculiarities. Lee was not conscious of his strength, because his greatness of soul was derived from his goodness of heart, and it rested upon him with the ease and grace of a garment. His generosity induced him to overlook the frailty incident to humanity, and to forgive even disobedience in his lieutenants. He remembered what Job said about a book, and wrote none. He envied no one. He left no writings extant naming an enemy, and his harshest remark in reference to an officer of high rank was, in effect, that he was "slow to move." The official reports show that Hooker had 161,491 men and 400 guns. Lee's forces numbered 58,100 men, with 170 guns. This was known to Lee's lieutenants. The publication of the Official Record by Congress discloses the fact that Mr. Seddon induced Gen. Lee to send Gen. Longstreet with Hood's and Pickett's Divisions to cover Richmond, which he thought menaced from Fortress Monroe and Suffolk. Lee thought Pickett's Division sufficient. (Official Record, Vol. 22, p. 623.) I had the name and reported strength of every regiment in both Suffolk and Norfolk, obtained from blockade runners and verified by prisoners. Suffolk had no strategic value to the enemy of any import, and none to us. In 1862 I designed the taking of Suffolk, and on an appointed day assembled some eight or nine thousand troops at Franklin, on the Blackwater. The only officers who had any knowledge of this were Gens. G. W. Smith, in Richmond, and J. J. Pettigrew. It was stopped, the morning the troops assembled, by Gen. G. W. Smith on strategic grounds and it not being a depot of supplies; and he was right. And when Secretary Seddon, against Lee's advice, joined with Longstreet in moving on Suffolk so late in the spring, he or Longstreet committed an error, the consequence of which was Lee had to fight Hooker with the force just stated, without the Hooker would never have embarked his great army on the Potomac at Aquia, and carried them back where they had once been under Gen. McClellan, and Richmond was not in danger, and Longstreet's expedition to Suffolk not in accordance with grand strategy; and but for Lee's audacity, and Stonewall Jackson's swift movements and vigorous blows at Chancellorsville, the Confederacy would have been there shattered into fragments, and all by one false movement to Suffolk. "Fortune loves a daring suitor." Lee threw down the iron glove, and the daring suitor won! It was the most remarkable victory of the war, but by the absence of those divisions, and the death of Stonewall Jackson, the large fruits of the victory were lost. |
|
