The Organization which it is the purport of this work to describe is that of Armies in War. The vast subject of Organization in Peace opens out too wide a field. It is necessarily different in every country, being based on national idiosyncrasies, complicated by political, economic, and topographical conditions. These factors, however dominating in peace, have less influence on organization for war. The general features of War Organization are identical in all modern armies, as they represent the consensus of expert opinion, based on the practice of great leaders, and on the lessons learnt from success and failure in recent wars.

There are, of course, many differences in detail, due to the varying historical development of each army. These really indicate the degree to which the conservative sentiments retarding improvement have been bent to the changes necessitated by progress. The strength of tradition and inertia in armies is enormous. No human institutions—not the Law, not even the Church—so cherish ceremonial and reverence tradition and custom, or remain so long blind to changed conditions. In military arrangements the very object of their existence often seems obscured by a haze of unessential conventions. Military methods, once suitable, soon pass into mere forms, which it is considered sacrilegious to modify, however useless or even harmful they have become.

Among scores of examples of the extraordinary conservatism of military organization we may remember that England had no transport organized in the army she landed in the Crimea. We find in Germany Army Corps of two Divisions, Divisions of two Brigades, and Brigades of two Regiments, although two is the worst possible number of parts in a unit, according to Clausewitz and common sense. The twentieth century saw Cuirassiers in France, Rifles in most armies, and the “parade step” in Germany. The protean follies of uniform are only now partially disappearing.

The historical portion of this work shows the curious way in which a new form of organization, designed for a definite end, often loses sight of its purpose and reverts to a mere variety of the old type, which then has to put out a new development for the original end. This is the history of the numerous attempts to provide for Light Infantry duties at the front.

The above considerations account for a number of odd survivals in modern armies, and explain many differences in their organization. These, however, are always tending to diminish under the pressure of the hard facts of war, which have little respect for national prejudices and traditions.

A study of the present British war organization, described in some detail in Part II., will show that it embodies a large number of the changes suggested by recent wars, and demanded by the trend of modern military thought. The British Army is the latest to be reorganized, and the opportunity has been taken, with no less courage than wisdom, to adopt in every Branch all changes tending to fit it better for the fighting of the immediate future, as far as this can be forecast. When the reorganization is completed it is not too sanguine to believe that the British will be the best organized army of the day.