F.R.G.S. John Foreman

The Spaniards have occupied the towns of Cavite Province because we found it convenient to evacuate them. We must change our tactics as circumstances dictate.

We have proved it to be a bad policy to be fortified in one place awaiting the enemy's attack. We must take the offensive when we get the chance, adopting the Cuban plan of ambush and guerilla warfare. In this way we can, for an indefinite period, defy Spain, exhaust her resources, and oblige her to surrender from poverty, for it must be remembered that the very Spanish newspapers admit that each soldier costs a dollar a day, and adding to this his passage money, clothing and equipment, the total amounts to a considerable sum. Considering that Spanish credit abroad is exhausted, that her young men, to avoid conscription, are emigrating to France and elsewhere in large numbers, Spain must of necessity yield in the end. You already know that Polavieja resigned because the Government were unable to send him the further 20,000 men demanded. The Cubans, with their guerilla system, avoiding encounters unfavourable to themselves, have succeeded in wearying the Spaniards, who are dying of fever in large numbers. Following this system, it would be quite feasible to extend the action of the Katipunan to Ilocos, PangasinÁn, CagayÁn, and other provinces, because our brothers in these places, sorely tyrannized by the Spaniards, are prepared to unite with us.

The Provinces of Zambales, TÁrlac, Tayabas, etc., are already under the Katipunan Government, and to complete our success, the revolutionary movement should become general, for the ends which we all so ardently desire, namely:

(1) Expulsion of the friars and restitution to the townships of the lands which the friars have appropriated, dividing the incumbencies held by them, as well as the episcopal sees equally between Peninsular and Insular secular priests.

(2) Spain must concede to us, as she has to Cuba, Parliamentary representation, freedom of the Press, toleration of all religious sects, laws common with hers, and administrative and economic autonomy.

(3) Equality in treatment and pay between Peninsular and Insular civil servants.

(4) Restitution of all lands appropriated by the friars to the townships, or to the original owners, or in default of finding such owners, the State is to put them up to public auction in small lots of a value within the reach of all and payable within four years, the same as the present State lands.

(5) Abolition of the Government authorities' power to banish citizens, as well as all unjust measures against Filipinos; legal equality for all persons, whether Peninsular or Insular, under the Civil as well as the Penal Code.

The war must be prolonged to give the greatest signs of vitality possible, so that Spain may be compelled to grant our demands, otherwise she will consider us an effete race and curtail, rather than extend, our rights.

Malabar.

Shortly after this Emilio Aguinaldo, the recognized leader of the rebels, issued a Manifiesto in somewhat ambiguous terms which might imply a demand for independence. In this document he says:—

Every month brought to light fresh public exhortations, edicts, and proclamations from one side or the other, of which I have numerous printed copies before me now. About this time the famous Philippine painter, Juan Luna (vide p. 195), was released after six months' imprisonment as a suspect. He left Manila en route for Madrid in the Spanish mail-steamer Covadonga in the first week of July and returned to Manila the next year (November 1898).

In the field there were no great victories to record, for the rebels confined themselves exclusively to harassing the Spanish forces and then retreating to the mountains. To all appearances trade in Manila and throughout the Islands was little affected by the war, and as a matter of fact, the total exports showed a fair average when compared with previous years. The sugar production was, however, slightly less than in 1896, owing to a scarcity of hands, because, in the ploughing season, the young labourers in Negros were drafted off to military service. Total imports somewhat increased, notwithstanding the imposition of a special 6 per cent. ad valorem tax.

But the probability of an early pacification of the Islands was remote. By the unscrupulous abuse of their functions the volunteers were obliging the well-intentioned natives to forsake their allegiance, and General Primo de Rivera was constrained to issue a decree, dated August 6, forbidding all persons in military service to plunder, or intimidate, or commit acts of violence on persons, or in their houses, or ravish women, under penalty of death. In the same month the General commissioned a Filipino, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, to negotiate terms of capitulation with the rebels. By dint of bribes and liberal expenditure of money (vide Paterno's own letter at p. 410) Paterno induced the minor chiefs in arms to accept, in principle, the proposal of peace on the basis of reforms and money. Paterno was appointed by the Gov.-General sole mediator in the discussion of the terms to be made with Emilio Aguinaldo, and the General's private secretary, Don Niceto Mayoral, was granted special powers to arrange with Paterno the details of the proposed treaty. From Paterno's lips I have the following account of the negotiations:—

On August 4, 1897, he started on a series of difficult journeys into the rebel camps to negotiate severally with the chiefs, who, one after the other, stoutly refused to capitulate. On August 9 he interviewed Aguinaldo at Biac-na-batÓ, situated in the mountains, about a mile north of San Miguel de Mayumo (Bulacan). Aguinaldo withheld his decision until Paterno could report to him the definite opinions of his generals. Thereupon Paterno returned to the rebel chiefs, some of whom still tenaciously held out, whilst others were willing to capitulate, subject to Aguinaldo's approval. Paterno's mission was daily becoming more perilous, for the irreconcilable leaders regarded him as an evil genius sent to sow discord in the camp. After many delays the principal warriors assembled at Biac-na-batÓ on October 31 and held a great meeting, which Paterno, who is a fluent speaker, attended and harangued his audience in eloquent phrases, but to no purpose. His position was now a somewhat critical one. Several of the chiefs assumed such a defiant attitude that but for the clement nature of Aguinaldo, Paterno might never have returned to tell the tale. They clamorously insisted on their resolution to fight. Then Paterno adroitly brought matters to a crisis in a bold peroration which changed the whole scene. “Capitulate,” he exclaimed, “or get hence and vanquish the enemy! Is victory to be gained in this hiding-place?” Piqued by this fearless challenge, General Natividad immediately sallied forth with his troops and encountered the Spaniards for the last time. His dead body was brought into the camp, and, in the shades of night, with sombre lights flickering around them, in the presence of Natividad's bleeding corpse, again Paterno exhorted them to reflect on the prospects in the field and the offer of capitulation. Impressed by the lugubrious scene, Aguinaldo yielded, and the next day peace negotiations were opened. But other difficulties intervened. Aguinaldo having heard that a subordinate chief was conspiring to force his hand to capitulate, abruptly cast aside the papers, declaring that he would never brook coercion. The deadlock lasted a whole day, but at length Aguinaldo signed conditions, which Paterno conveyed to General Primo de Rivera at San Fernando (Pampanga). The willingness to capitulate was by no means unanimous. Paterno was forewarned that on his route a party of 500 Irreconcilables were waiting to intercept and murder him, so to evade them he had to hide in a wood. Fifteen minutes' delay would have cost him his life. Even a Spanish colonel for some occult reason sought to frustrate the peace negotiations by falsely reporting to General Primo de Rivera that Paterno was inciting the rebels to warfare. But the General believed in Paterno's good faith, although he declared the terms proposed unacceptable, and in like manner three other amended proposals were rejected, until finally the fifth document was accepted as tantamount to a Protocol of Peace to serve as a basis for the treaty. Here ends Paterno's verbal declaration.

The Protocol was signed in duplicate by Emilio Aguinaldo of the one part, and Pedro A. Paterno, as Peacemaker, of the other part. One copy was archived in the office of the Gobierno General in Manila,12 and the other was remitted to the Home Government with a despatch from the Gov.-General.

After many consultations and much deliberation it was decided at a Cabinet meeting to approve unreservedly of the negotiations, and to that effect a cablegram was sent to General Primo de Rivera fully empowering him to conclude a treaty of peace on the basis of the Protocol. Meanwhile, it soon became evident that there were three distinct interests at stake, namely, those of Spain and the Spanish people, those of the friars, and the claims of the rebels. Consequently the traditional feud between the Archbishop of Manila and the Captain-General was revived.

General Primo de Rivera in his despatch urged the Madrid Government to grant certain reforms, in any case, which could not fail to affect the hitherto independent position of the friars in governmental affairs. He also drew the attention of the Government to the defenceless condition of the capital in the event of a foreign attack (vide Senate speeches reported in the Diario de las Sesiones, Madrid, 1899 and 1900). The friars were exceedingly wroth, and combined to defeat the General's efforts to come to an understanding with the rebels. They secretly paid natives to simulate the Katipunan in the provinces, and the plot only came to light when these unfortunate dupes fell into the hands of the military authorities and confessed what had happened. Nevertheless, the General pursued the negotiations with Paterno as intermediary. Aguinaldo's original demand was for a total indemnity of ?3,000,000, but, in the course of the negotiations alluded to, it was finally reduced to ?1,700,000, inclusive of ?800,000 to be paid to Aguinaldo on his retirement from the Colony.

The terms of the Protocol of Peace having been mutually agreed upon, a treaty, known as the Pacto de Biac-na-batÓ,13 is alleged to have been signed at Biac-na-batÓ on December 14, 1897, between Emilio Aguinaldo and others of the one part, and Pedro A. Paterno, as attorney for the Captain-General, acting in the name of the Spanish Government, of the other part. Under this treaty the rebels undertook to deliver up their arms and ammunition of all kinds to the Spaniards; to evacuate the places held by them; to conclude an armistice for three years for the application and development of the reforms to be introduced by the other part, and not to conspire against Spanish sovereignty in the Islands, nor aid or abet any movement calculated to counteract those reforms. Emilio Aguinaldo and 34 other leaders undertook to quit the Philippine Islands and not return thereto until so authorized by the Spanish Government, in consideration whereof the above-mentioned ?800,000 was to be paid as follows:--?400,000 in a draft on Hong-Kong to be delivered to Aguinaldo on his leaving Biac-na-batÓ [This draft was, in fact, delivered to him]; ?200,000 payable to Aguinaldo as soon as he should send a telegram to the revolutionary general in command at Biac-na-batÓ, ordering him to hand over the rebels' arms to the Captain-General's appointed commissioner [This telegram was sent], and the final ?200,000 immediately after the singing of the Te Deum which would signify an official recognition of peace.

It was further alleged that on behalf of the Spanish Government many radical reforms and conditions were agreed to (outside the Treaty of Biac-na-batÓ), almost amounting to a total compliance with the demands of the rebels. But no evidence whatever has been adduced to confirm this allegation. Indeed it is a remarkable fact that neither in the Madrid parliamentary papers (to copies of which I have referred), nor in the numerous rebel proclamations and edicts, nor in the published correspondence of Pedro A. Paterno, is even the full text of the treaty given. It is singular that the rebels should have abstained from publishing to the world those precise terms which they say were accepted and not fulfilled by the Spanish Government, which denies their existence.

Whatever reforms might have been promised would have been purely governmental matters which required no mediator for their execution; but as to the money payments to be made, Paterno was to receive them from the Government and distribute them. An Agreement to this effect was, therefore, signed by General Primo de Rivera and Pedro A. Paterno in the following terms, viz.:—

In the peace proposals presented by the sole mediator, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, in the name and on behalf of the rebels in arms, and in the Peace Protocol which was agreed to and submitted to His Majesty's Government, which approved of the same, there exists a principal clause relating to the sums of money which were to be handed over to the rebels and their families as indemnity for the loss of their goods consequent on the war, which sums amounted to a total of ?1,700,000, which the mediator, SeÑor Paterno, was to distribute absolutely at his discretion, but the payment of the said sum will have to be subject to the conditions proposed by the representative of the Government, H.E. the General-in-Chief of this Army. These conditions were agreed to be as follows, viz.:—

(1) For the rebels in arms a draft for the sum of ?400,000 will be handed to SeÑor Paterno, payable in Hong-Kong, as well as two cheques for ?200,000 each, payable only on the condition of the Agreement being fulfilled on the other part. (2) For the families of those who were not rebels in arms, or engaged in rebellion, but who have likewise suffered the evils of war, the balance of the sum offered shall be paid in three equal instalments, the last to be paid six months after the date on which the Te Deum shall be sung, assuming the peace to become an accomplished fact. Peace shall be held to be effectively concluded if, during the interval of these instalment periods, no party of armed rebels, with recognized leader, shall exist, and if no secret society shall have been discovered as existing here or abroad with the proved object of conspiracy by those who benefit by these payments. The representative of the rebels, Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno, and the representative of the Government, the Captain-General Don Fernando Primo de Rivera, agree to the above conditions, in witness whereof each representative now signs four copies of the same tenour and effect, one being for the Government, another for the archives of the Captain-Generalcy, and one copy each for the said representatives. 14Done in Manila on the 15th of December, 1897.

Fernando Primo de Rivera,
The General-in-Chief.
Pedro A. Paterno,
The Mediator.

In the course of a few days a military deputation was sent by the Gov.-General, under the leadership of Lieut.-Colonel Primo de Rivera, to meet Aguinaldo and his 34 companions-in-arms at a place agreed upon in the Province of PangasinÁn. They had a repast together, and Aguinaldo called for cheers for Spain, in which all heartily joined. Thence they proceeded in vehicles to Sual to await the arrival of the s.s. Uranus, in which they embarked for Hong-Kong on Monday, December 27, 1897. Armed rebel troops were stationed at several places all along the route to Sual, ready to avenge any act of treachery, whilst two Spanish generals were held as hostages at the rebel camp at Biac-na-batÓ until Aguinaldo cabled his safe arrival in Hong-Kong.

Aguinaldo had very rightly stipulated that a Spanish officer of high rank should accompany him and his followers to Hong-Kong as a guarantee against foul play. The Gov.-General, therefore, sent with them his two nephews, Lieut.-Colonel Primo de Rivera and Captain Celestino Espinosa, and Major Antonio Pezzi. Aguinaldo and eight other chiefs, namely, Gregorio H. del Pilar, Wenceslao Vinegra, Vito Belarmino, Mariano Llaneras, Antonio Montenegro, Luis Viola, Manuel Fino, and EscolÁstico Viola, stayed at the Hong-Kong Hotel, whilst the remainder took up their abode elsewhere in the city. Aguinaldo cashed his draft for ?400,000, but as to the other two instalments of the ?800,000, the Spanish Government defaulted.

There was great rejoicing in Manila, in Madrid, and in several Spanish cities, and fÊtes were organized to celebrate the conclusion of peace. In Manila particularly, amidst the pealing of bells and strains of music, unfeigned enthusiasm and joy were everywhere evident. It was a tremendous relief after sixteen months of persecution, butchery, torture, and pecuniary losses. General Primo de Rivera received the thanks of the Government, whilst the Queen-Regent bestowed on him the Grand Cross of San Fernando, with the pension of 10,000 pesetas (nominal value £400). But no one in Spain and few in Manila as yet could foresee how the fulfilment of the Agreement would be bungled. According to a letter of Pedro A. Paterno, dated March 7, 1898, published in El Liberal of Madrid on June 17, 1898, it would appear that (up to the former date) the Spanish Government had failed to make any payment to Paterno on account of the ?900,000, balance of indemnity, for distribution according to Clause (2) of the Agreement set forth on the preceding page. The letter says:—

Whatever were the means employed, the rebellion was disorganized for a while, but the Spanish authorities had not the tact to follow up this coup by temperate and conciliatory measures towards their wavering quondam foes. Persons who had been implicated in the rebellion were re-arrested on trivial trumped-up charges and imprisoned, whilst others were openly treated as seditious suspects. The priests started a furious campaign of persecution, and sought, by all manner of intrigue, to destroy the compact, which they feared would operate against themselves. More executions took place. Instead of the expected general amnesty, only a few special pardons were granted.

There had been over two months of nominal peace; the rebels had delivered up their arms, and there was nothing to indicate an intention to violate their undertakings. Primo de Rivera, who believed the rebellion to be fast on the wane, shipped back to Spain 7,000 troops. The Madrid Government at once appointed to vacant bishoprics two friars of the Orders obnoxious to the people, and it is inconceivable that such a step would have been so speedily taken if there were any truth in the rebels' pretension that the expulsion of the friars had been promised to them. Rafael Comenge, the President of the Military Club, was rewarded with the Grand Cross of Military Merit for the famous speech which he had delivered at the Club. It was generally lauded by Spaniards, whilst it filled all classes of natives with indignation. Here are some extracts from this oration:—

Thirty thousand pesos were subscribed at the Military Club for the benefit of General Primo de Rivera. Admiral Patricio Montojo, who had co-operated against the rebels by firing a few shots at them when they occupied the coast towns of Cavite Province and transporting troops to and from Manila, was the recipient of a sword of honour on March 17, 1898. It was presented to him, on behalf of the Military Club, by SeÑor Comenge (who escaped from Manila as soon as the Americans entered the port) as a “perpetual remembrance of the triumph of our ships off the coast of Cavite,” although no deed of glory on the part of the fleet, during the period of the rebellion, had come to the knowledge of the general public.

The reforms alluded to in the treaty made with the rebel chiefs were a subject of daily conversation; but when the Diario de Manila published an article on March 17, demanding autonomy for the Islands and urging the immediate application of those reforms, General Primo de Rivera suspended the publication of the newspaper. Some were inquisitive enough to ask, Has a treaty been signed or a trick been played upon the rebels? The treatment of the people was far from being in harmony with the spirit of a treaty of peace.

The expatriated ex-rebels became alarmed by the non-receipt of the indemnity instalment and the news from their homes. A committee of Filipinos, styled La Junta PatriÓtica, was formed in Hong-Kong. They were in frequent communication with their friends in the Islands. The seed of discontent was again germinating under the duplicity of the Spanish lay and clerical authorities. Thousands were ready to take the field again, but their chiefs were absent, their arms surrendered, and the rebellion disorganized. Here and there roving parties appeared, but having no recognized leaders, their existence did not invalidate the treaty. The Spaniards, indeed, feigned to regard them only as a remnant of the rebels who had joined the pre-existing brigand bands. The volunteers were committing outrages which might have driven the people again into open revolt, and General Primo de Rivera had, at least, the sagacity to recognize the evil which was apparent to everybody. The volunteers and guerilla battalions were consequently disbanded, not a day too soon for the tranquillity of the city. On March 25, the tragedy of the Calle de Camba took place. This street lies just off the Calle de San Fernando in Binondo, a few hundred yards from the river. In a house frequented by seafaring men a large number of Visayan sailors had assembled and were, naturally, discussing the topics of the day with the warmth of expression and phraseology peculiar to their race, when a passer-by, who overheard the talk, informed the police. The civil guard at once raided the premises, accused these sailors of conspiracy, and, without waiting for proof or refutation, shot down all who could not escape. The victims of this outrage numbered over 70. The news dismayed the native population. The fact could no longer be doubted that a reign of terrorism and revenge had been initiated with impunity, under the assumption that the rebellion was broken for many a year to come. How the particulars of this crime were related by the survivors to their fellow-islanders we cannot know, but it is a coincidental fact that only now the flame of rebellion spread to the southern Island of CebÚ. For over a generation the CebuÁnos around Talisay, Minglanilla, and Talambau had sustained a dispute with the friars respecting land-tenure. From time to time procurators of the Law Court secretly took up the CebuÁnos' cause, and one of them, Florencio Gonzalez, was cast into prison and slowly done to death. This event, which happened almost coincidentally with the Calle de Camba tragedy, excited the CebuÁnos to the utmost degree. Nine days after that unfortunate episode, on April 3, 1898, a party of about 5,000 disaffected natives made a raid on the city of CebÚ. The leaders were armed with rifles, but the rank-and-file carried only bowie-knives. About 4 p.m. all the forces which could be mustered in the city went out against the rebels, who overwhelmed the loyalists, cutting some to pieces, whilst the remainder hastened back to the city in great disorder. But, instead of following up their victory, the half-resolute rioters camped near Guadalupe for the night. At 5 a.m. on April 4 they marched upon the city. Peaceful inhabitants fled before the motley, yelling crowd of men, women and children who swarmed into the streets, armed with bowie-knives and sticks, demanding food and other trifles. The terrified Spanish volunteers, after their defeat, took refuge in the Cotta de San Pedro (the Fort), where the Governor, General Montero, joined them, and ordered all foreigners to do the same. Later on the foreigners were permitted to return to their residences. Amidst the confusion which prevailed, the flight of peaceful citizens, the street-fighting, and the moans of the dying, the rebels helped themselves freely to all they wanted. The mob of both sexes told the townspeople that they (the rioters) had nothing to fear, as anting-anting wafers (q.v.) had been served out to them. The rebels had cut the CebÚ-Tuburan telegraph-wires (vide p. 267), but in the meantime three small coasting steamers had been despatched to Yloilo, YlÍgan, and another port to demand reinforcements. The next day, at sunrise, the rebels attempted to reach the Fort, but were fired upon from the Governor's house, which is situated in front of it, compelling them to withdraw along the shore road, where the gunboat Maria Cristina opened fire on them. The rebels then retreated to the Chinese quarter of Lutao, around the Cathedral and the Santo Nino Church. The Spaniards remained under cover whilst the mob held possession of the whole city except the Fort, Government House, the College, the churches, and the foreigners houses. During the whole day there was an incessant fusillade, the rebels' chief stronghold being the Recoleto Convent. Groups of them were all over the place, plundering the shops and Spanish houses and offices. On April 5 a small force of Spanish regulars, volunteers, and sailors made a sortie and fired on the insurgents in Lutao from long range. They soon retired, however, as the Fort was in danger of being attacked from another side. The same afternoon the steamer sent to YlÍgan for troops returned with 240 on board. During the night the Spanish troops ventured into the open and shots were exchanged. On April 6 the Venus arrived with 50 soldiers from Yloilo and was at once sent on to Bojol Island in search of rice and cattle, which were difficult to procure as that island was also in revolt. Native women were not interfered with by either party, nor were the foreigners, many of whom took refuge at the British Consulate. The rebels wished to advance from Lutao, but were kept back by the fire from the gunboat Maria Cristina. The Spanish troops did not care to venture past a block of buildings in which were the offices and stores of a British firm. On April 7 the merchant steamer Churruca arrived with troops, and in a couple of hours was followed by the cruiser Don Juan de Austria, also bringing reinforcements under the command of General Tejeiro (a former Governor of CebÚ Is.). The total fresh troops amounted to about 500 men of the 73rd Native Regiment and Spanish cazadores. Whilst these troops were landing, many of the rebels hastened out of the city towards San NicolÁs. General Montero and the Spanish refugees then emerged from the cotta. After General Tejeiro had strategically deployed his troops, a squad of them, crossing the General LoÑo Square (now called Plaza de Rizal) drove the rebels before them and dislodged them from the vicinity of the Recoleto Convent. At the same time the rebels were attacked at the mestizo quarter called the Parian and at Tiniago, whence they had to retreat, with severe loss, towards San NicolÁs, which practically adjoins CebÚ and is only separated therefrom by a narrow river. Simultaneously, the Don Juan de Austria threw a shell into the corner house of the (chiefly Chinese) shopping-quarter, Lutao, which killed several Chinese and set fire to the house. The flames, however, did not catch the adjoining property, so the troops burst open the doors, poured petroleum on the goods found therein, and caused the fire to extend until the whole quarter was, as I saw it, a mass of charred ruins with only the stone walls remaining. To complete the destruction of Lutao, once a busy bazaar, situated in that part of the city immediately facing the sea, another bomb was thrown into the centre. The troops then marched to San NicolÁs, and a third shell fired at the retreating enemy entered and completely destroyed a large private residence. An attempt was made to procure supplies from the little Island of Magtan, which lies only half a mile off the coast of CebÚ, but the expedition had to return without having been able to effect a landing at the capital town of Opon, which had risen in rebellion. On April 8 the loyal troops continued their pursuit of the rebels, who suffered severe losses at San NicolÁs and Pili, on the road south of CebÚ city. The corpses collected in the suburbs were carted into the city, where, together with those lying about the streets, they were piled into heaps, partly covered with petroleum-bathed logs, and ignited. The stench was very offensive for some hours, especially from a huge burning pile topped with a dead white horse in the General LoÑo Square. Practically the whole of the east coast of the island had risen against the Spaniards, but the rebels were careful not to interfere with foreigners when they could distinguish them as such. A large force of insurgents made another stand at Labangan, where they were almost annihilated; it is estimated they left quite a thousand dead on the field. The loyal troops followed up the insurgents towards the mountain region, whilst the Don Juan de Austria cruised down the coast with the intention of bombarding any town which might be in rebel hands. The material losses in CebÚ amounted to about ?1,725,000 in Lutao, represented by house property of Chinese and half-castes and their cash and stock-in-trade. The “CompaÑia General de Tabacos” lost about ?30,000 in cash in addition to the damage done to their offices and property. Rich natives and Chinese lost large sums of money, the total of which cannot be ascertained. From the Recoleto Convent ?19,000 in cash were stolen, and there, as well as in many of the Spanish residences, everything valuable and easily removable was carried off; but whether all this pillage was committed by the rebels alone must ever remain a mystery. The only foreigner who lost his life was my late Italian friend Signor Stancampiano, who is supposed to have died of shock, for when I last saw him he was hopelessly ill. As usual, a considerable number of well-known residents of the city were arrested and charged with being the prime movers in these doleful events.

Upon the hills on the west coast of CebÚ, near Toledo town, some American friends of mine experienced a series of thrilling adventures. Mr. and Mrs. Wilson, mother and son, to whom I am indebted for their generous hospitality, resided on a large sugar-estate at Calumampao, of which Mr. Wilson was part owner. They were, naturally, in ignorance of what had taken place in CebÚ City. The rebellion spread to their district, and many of the natives on and about the estate were eager to join in the movement. Mr. Wilson did his utmost to point out to them the futility of the attempt, but they indulged in all sorts of superstitions about the invulnerability of their chief, Claudio, and the charm attached to a red flag he carried, and they were determined to take their chance with him. On April 19 an insurgent force came on to the plantation, compelled the labourers to join their standard, and coolly quartered themselves in the out-buildings and warehouses. They did no harm to the Wilsons, but they kidnapped a Spanish gentleman who lived close by, and shot him, in spite of Mr. Wilson's entreaties to spare his life. The insurgents moved off, taking with them the estate hands, and in a couple of days a company of Spanish soldiers, under the command of Captain Suarez, arrived at the estate-house. The officer was very affable, and Mr. and Mrs. Wilson treated him as hospitably as they did all their friends and European passers-by. Naturally the conversation fell on the all-absorbing topic of the day and the object of his mission. After he and his men had been well refreshed they started down the hill to meet some cavalry reinforcements, and, as the Wilsons watched their departure, to their astonishment they saw Claudio, at the head of 200 rebels, rushing down the hill with the red flag floating in the air. Simultaneously a body of Spanish horse approached through the valley; Claudio and his followers, caught between the Spanish cavalry and infantry, retreated to a storehouse in the valley. The result was that some 40 rebels were killed, others taken prisoners, and the remainder escaped into the planted fields. Every leader was killed, and every peaceful native whom the Spaniards met on their way was unmercifully treated. Mr. Wilson was then asked to go on board a Spanish vessel, and when he complied he was charged with being in league with the rebels. He was allowed to return to shore to fetch his mother—a highly-educated, genial old lady—and when they both went on board they found there two Englishmen as prisoners. Their guest of a few days previous treated them most shamefully. When they were well on the voyage to CebÚ the prisoners were allowed to be on the upper deck, and Mrs. Wilson was permitted to use an armchair. The soldiers insulted them, and, leaning their backs against Mrs. Wilson's chair, some sang ribald songs, whilst others debated whether their captives would be shot on the beach or at the Cotta in CebÚ. Sometimes they would draw their swords and look viciously towards them. At last, after a series of intimidations, they reached CebÚ, where, after being detained on board several hours, they were all taken before the Governor and the Chief Justice, and were only saved from further miseries through the intercession of the American Vice-Consul, who, by the way, was an Englishman. War had just been declared between America and Spain (April 23, 1898), and the estate had to be left to the mercy of the rebels, whilst my friends took passage to Singapore on the Gulf of Martaban.

All immediate danger having now been dispelled, the Spaniards solaced themselves with the sweets of revenge. A Spanish functionary (who with his wife and brother's family were well known to me for several years) caused the soldiers to raid private houses, and bring out native families by force into the public square, or conduct them to the cemetery on the Guadalupe road, where they were shot in batches without inquiry and cremated. The heartrending scenes and wailing of the people failed to turn their persecutor from his purpose, save in one case—that of a colleague, who, wearing his chain of office, stepped forward and successfully begged for his life. A low estimate of this official's victims is 200. The motive for his awful crime was greed, for he formally confiscated his victims' goods and shipped them off daily in schooners to Yloilo. His ill-gotten gains would have been greater but for the action of the Governor, who, fearing that retribution might fall on his own head as the highest authority, ordered his guilty subordinate to appear before him, and in the presence of Filipinos he reprimanded him, boxed his ears, and commanded him to quit the island within a given period under pain of death. The Governor's indignation was evidently feigned, for he very shortly availed himself of an altogether novel means of terrorism. Sedition was smouldering throughout the island, but after the events of April the Spaniards seemed too daunted to take the field against the CebuÁnos. The Christian Governor, therefore, took into his service a Mindanao Mahometan, Rajahmudah Datto Mandi, and his band of about 100 SÁmal Moros to overrun the island and punish the natives. This chief, with his warriors, had been called from Zamboanga (Mindanao Is.) to Yloilo by General Rios, who immediately commissioned him to CebÚ in the month of July, 1898. On his arrival there he at once started his campaign under the auspices of the Governor, who granted him full liberty to dispose of the lives and property of the CebuÁnos to his heart's content, and as proof of the accomplishment of his gory mission he brought in and presented to his patron the ears which he had cut off the CebuÁnos. North of CebÚ City he and his retainers made a fresh start, slaying the people, burning villages, and devastating the standing crops. Having accomplished his task within three months Datto Mandi withdrew with all his men, except two who wished to settle at Pardo. He could not persuade them to leave, and after his departure they were cut to pieces by the CebuÁnos. Pending positive corroboration I was very sceptical about this strange narrative; but, being in Mindanao Island six years afterwards, I went to visit Datto Mandi, who most readily confirmed all the above particulars, and presented me with his portrait. Prior to the American advent, Datto Mandi, protÉgÉ as well as protector of the Spaniards, exercised a sort of feudal dominion over the services and the sundry cherished belongings of his people. Speaking of him as I myself found him, he was extremely affable and hospitable. The invitation to Datto Mandi was perhaps the most singular event of this period, and goes to show with what desperate fear the Spaniards retained their hold on the island up to the evacuation, which took place on December 26, 1898.

In the provinces north of Manila the rebellion was again in full vigour, and, all trust in Spanish good faith was irrevocably lost. The Spanish quarters at Subig (Zambales) and Apalit (Pampanga) were attacked and looted in the first week of March. The new movement bore a more serious aspect than that under Aguinaldo and his colleagues, who, at least, were men of certain intelligence, inspired by a wish to secure reforms, whereas their successors in revolt were of far less mental capacity, seeking, apparently, only retaliation for the cruelties inflicted on the people. It is possible, too, that the premium of ?800,000 per 35 rebel chiefs inflamed the imaginations of the new leaders, who were too ignorant to appreciate the promised reforms linked with the same bargain. During the month of February the permanent-way of the Manila-DagÚpan Railway had been three times torn up to prevent the transport of loyal troops. At the same time the villages around were looted and burnt. Early in March the rebels, under the chief leadership of Yocson, of Malolos, attacked and killed the garrisons and the priests in the north of PangasinÁn and Zambales, excepting six soldiers who managed to escape.15 Some of the garrison troops were murdered after surrender. The telegraph-line between Lingayen (PangasinÁn) and a place a few miles from Bolinao (Zambales) was cut down and removed. A lineman was sent out to repair it under escort of civil guards, who were forced by the rebels to retire. On March 7, about 2 a.m., the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company's cable-station at Bolinao was besieged by rebels. The village was held by about 400 armed natives, who had killed one native and two European soldiers on the way. The lighthouse-keeper and the Inspector of Forests safely reached Santa Cruz, 40 miles south, in a boat. The other civilian Spaniards and priests escaped in another boat, but were pursued and captured by the insurgents, who killed two of the civilians and brought the European women and friars into the village as prisoners at 4.30 the same afternoon. Eight soldiers had taken refuge in the cable-station, and at 6 a.m. a message was sent to the British staff requiring them to turn out the soldiers or quit the premises themselves. They refused to take either course, and declared their neutrality. A similar message was sent several times, with the same result. By 4 p.m. the soldiers had fortified the station as well as they could, and the rebels attacked, but were repulsed with a few shots. Nothing happened during the night, but the next day (March 8) another message was sent to the British staff urging them to withdraw as the rebels would renew the assault at 10 a.m. The staff again refused to comply. Then it appears that the rebels delayed their attack until the arrival of their chief, hourly expected. An ultimatum was at length received at the station, to the effect that if all arms were given up they would spare the soldiers' lives. They also demanded the surrender of the two rebels held prisoners by these soldiers. At this stage one of the company's staff, who were allowed to go and come as they pleased, volunteered to interview the rebels; but matters could not be arranged, as the Spanish corporal (a plucky youth of twenty years of age) in the station refused to surrender anything at any price. Still parleying was continued, and on March 11 one of the company's staff again visited the rebel camp to state that if the regular bi-monthly steamer failed to arrive on the morrow the corporal would surrender arms. Then the rebel chief proposed that the corporal should meet him half-way between the company's office and the rebel camp, the rebel pledging his word of honour that no harm should befall the corporal. The corporal, however, could not do this, as it would have been contrary to the Spanish military code to capitulate on his own authority, but he confirmed his willingness to surrender arms if no steamer arrived the next day, and the company's employee returned to the camp to notify this resolution. But in a few minutes he observed a commotion among the insurgents; some one had descried a warship approaching, and the native canoes were very busy making ready for escape or attack. The British delegate, therefore, hastened back to the station, and at 3 p.m. a Spanish gunboat arrived, to their immense relief, and landed 107 marines. Heavy firing continued all that afternoon, inflicting great loss on the rebels, whilst the Spaniards lost one soldier. On March 12 a Spanish cruiser anchored off the Bay of Bolinao; also a merchant steamer put into port bringing the Company's Manila Superintendent with apparatus for communicating with Hong-Kong in case the station were demolished. The next day H.M.S. Edgar entered, and Bolinao was again perfectly safe.

In consequence of this threatened attack on the cable-station the cable was detached from Bolinao and carried on to Manila in the following month (vide p. 267).

As soon as the news reached Manila that Bolinao was menaced, General Monet proceeded north with 1,000 men, whilst 3,000 more followed by railway as far as they could reach. On the way the General had five engagements with the enemy, between Lingayen (PangasinÁn) and Bolinao, where he arrived on the night of March 14, having routed the insurgents everywhere with great loss to them. On the Spanish side one lieutenant and one soldier were killed. After leaving a garrison of 300 men in Bolinao, General Monet returned to Manila in the Spanish cruiser the next day.

On March 31 Father MoÏses Santos, who had caused all the members of the Town Council of Malolos to be banished in 1895, was assassinated. He had been appointed Vicar of the Augustine Order and was returning to Malolos station, en route for Manila, in a buggy which stuck fast in a mud-pool (the same in which I have found myself several times), where he was stabbed to death. His body was recovered and taken by special train to Manila, where it was interred with great pomp in the Church of St. Augustine. He was 44 years of age, and had been 19 years in the Colony (vide p. 364).

In April, 1898, the Home Government recalled General Primo de Rivera, appointing in his stead General Basilio Augusti, who had never before held chief command in the Islands. Primo de Rivera was no doubt anxious to be relieved of a position which he could not well continue to hold, with dignity to himself, after the Madrid Government had shelved his recommendations for reforms. His subsequent speeches in the Senate incline one to draw this conclusion. The Colonial Minister, Segismundo Moret (who became Prime Minister in 1905), warmly supported the proposed reforms, but monastic influences were brought to bear which PrÁxedes Sagasta had not the moral courage to resist.

Don Pedro A. Paterno, the peacemaker, was sorely disappointed, too, that the Government had failed to remunerate him for his services. His position will be best understood from the subjoined translation of the letter which he addressed to a high authority on the subject. The original document was read in public session of Congress in Madrid on June 16, 1898, by the Deputy SeÑor Muro.

Some biographical notes of Don Pedro A. Paterno, with most of which he furnished me himself, may be interesting at this stage.

His Excellency Don Pedro Alejandro Paterno belongs to the class of Filipinos—the Chinese half-caste—remarkable in this Colony for that comparative intellectual activity of which Don Pedro himself is one of the brightest living examples. In the early decades of last century a Chinaman, called Molo, carried on a prosperous trade in the Calle del Rosario, in the Manila district of Binondo. His Philippine wife, whose family name was Yamson, carried in her veins the “blue blood,” as we should say in Europe, of Luzonia. She was the direct descendant of the Great MaguinoÓ, or Prince of Luzon, a title hereditary, according to tradition. Three sons were the issue of this marriage, one of whom, Maximino Molo, was the father of Pedro. Averse to indolent pleasure during his father's lifetime, Maximino, with his own scant but independent resources, started active life with a canoe and a barge, conveying goods out as far as Corregidor Island to secure the first dealings with the ships entering the port. In this traffic he made money so fast that he opened an office, and subsequently a store of his own, in the Escolta. His transactions attained large proportions, and by the time this kind of trade in the bay became obsolete, he was already one of the most respected middlemen operating between the foreign houses and provincial producers. His Christian name was abbreviated to MÁximo; and so proverbial were his placidity and solicitude for others that his friends affectionately nicknamed him Paterno (paternal), which henceforth became the adopted cognomen of the family. His unbounded generosity won for him the admiration of all his race, who graciously recognized him as their MaguinoÓ. Sympathetic in the ambitions and in the distress of his own people, he was, nevertheless, always loyal to Spanish authority; but whether his fortune awakened Spanish cupidity, or his influence with the masses excited the friars' jealousy, the fact is that in 1872 he was banished to the Ladrone Islands, accused of having taken part in the rising of Cavite. Ten years afterwards he was again in Manila, where I had the pleasure of his acquaintance, and on his decease, which took place July 26, 1900, he left considerable wealth.

Born in 1857, Pedro A. Paterno, at the early age of 14 years, was sent for his education to Spain, where he resided 11 years. The preparatory period over, he entered the University of Salamanca, and later on that of Madrid, where, under the protection and tutelage of the Marquis de Heredia, he was introduced into aristocratic circles, in which he became a great favourite. Amongst his college companions was the Marquis de Mina. At one time it was proposed that he should wed the daughter of the Marchioness de Montolibar, a suggestion which he disregarded because his heart already inclined towards the Filipina who is now his wife.

His assistance to the Home Government was of no mean importance. In 1882 he supported the abolition of the Government Tobacco Monopoly. In 1893 he again rendered valuable service to the State, in consideration of which he was awarded the Grand Cross of Isabella the Catholic, with the distinction of “Excellency.” In 1895 the oft-discussed question of the title of nobility he was to receive was revived. After the Peace of Biac-na-batÓ he fully expected that the usual Spanish custom would have been followed of conceding a title to the Peacemaker. The precedents for such an act, in modern times, are the titles given to Manuel Godoy (1795) and to General Espartero16 (1840), who became respectively Prince of Peace and Prince of Vergara for similar services rendered to the Crown. A dukedom, Paterno believes, would have been his reward if the revolution had definitely terminated with the retirement of Emilio Aguinaldo from the Islands in 1897.

A man of versatile gifts, Pedro A. Paterno has made his mark in literature with works too numerous to mention; he is a fluent orator, a talented musician, and the composer of the argument of an opera, Sangdugong Panaguinip (“The Dreamed Alliance”). As a brilliant conversationalist and well-versed political economist he has few rivals in his country. A lover of the picturesque and of a nature inclined to revel in scenes of aesthetic splendour, his dream of one day wearing a coronet was nurtured by no vulgar veneration for aristocracy, but by a desire for a recognized social position enabling him, by his prestige, to draw his fellow-men from the sordid pleasure of mere wealth-accumulation towards the sentimental, imaginative ideals of true nobility. In 1904 Pedro A. Paterno was the editor and proprietor of the newspaper La Patria, the mission of which was (1) to support the American dominion as a fait accompli, (2) to urge the fulfilment of the promise of eventual Philippine home rule, (3) to sustain a feeling of gratitude towards Spain, whence the Filipinos derived their civilization, and (4) to support Roman Catholic unity, on the ground that unity is strength.

In the second week of April, 1898, General Primo de Rivera left Manila for Spain, on the arrival of his successor in the Captain-Generalcy, General Basilio Augusti, in the s.s. Isla de Mindanao.17 Some days before General Primo de Rivera's departure the American Consul at Manila had received despatches from his Government to prepare to quit the Islands, as war was imminent between Spain and the United States. He was further instructed to hand over his consulate archives to the British Consul, who would take charge of American interests. But without the concurrence of the Spanish authorities no official transfer could be made from one consulate to the other, and the General professed ignorance of the existing relations between his country and America. He cabled to Madrid for information, but managed to delay matters until his successor assumed office, when the transfer was duly made. Consul Oscar F. Williams was in no way molested. He passed to and fro in the city without the least insult being offered him by any Spaniard. The Gov.-General courteously proposed to send a large bodyguard to his consulate, but it was not necessary. Yet, as soon as Consul Williams closed his office and went on board the s.s. Esmeralda, the American Consulate escutcheon was painted out, and the notice boards outside the doors were kicked about the streets.

General Primo de Rivera was so well aware of the strained relations between Spain and America, that the s.s. Leon XIII., in which he travelled from Manila to Barcelona, was armed as a cruiser, with two 4-inch Hontoria guns mounted aft of the funnel and two Nordenfeldts in the bows. This steamer, crowded with refugee Spanish families, some of whom slept on the saloon floors, made its first stoppage at Singapore on April 17. At the next port of call General Primo de Rivera learnt that the United States of America had presented an ultimatum to his Government. Before he reached Barcelona, in the third week of May, war between the two countries had already broken out (April 23, 1898). There were riots in Madrid; martial law was proclaimed; the Parliamentary Session was suspended; a strict censorship of the press was established; the great disaster to Spanish arms in Philippine waters had taken place; the Prime Minister Sagasta had intimated his willingness to resign, and Primo de Rivera entered Madrid when it was too late to save the Philippine Islands for Spain, even had the rebel version of the implied reforms under the alleged Treaty of Biac-na-batÓ been fulfilled to the letter.

The leaders of the principal political parties were hastily summoned to the palace to consult separately with the Queen-Regent on the situation, and they were unanimously of opinion that the Prime Minister who had accepted war should carry them through the crisis. Spain was apparently more concerned about the salvation of the Antilles than of her Far Eastern Colony.

The friars, fully alive to their moral responsibility towards the nation for the loss of the Philippines, were, nevertheless, desirous of finding a champion of their cause in the political arena, and Deputy Uria was willing to accept this onerous task. The Bishop-elect of Porto Rico (an Austin friar) was a fellow-passenger with General Primo de Rivera. According to El Liberal of June 3, 1898, when he arrived in Madrid he went with the Procurator of his Order to interview the Colonial Minister, SeÑor Romero GirÓn, on the prospects of Deputy Uria's proposed debate when Congress should meet again. The Minister pointed out to them the attendant difficulties, and referred them to the Prime Minister. They immediately went to SeÑor Sagasta's residence, where they were promptly given to understand that if any one could be found to defend them, there might well be others who would oppose them, so their champion withdrew.

When, months later, Parliament was re-opened, the Minister of War denied in Congress that the Treaty of Biac-na-batÓ had ever existed,18 and in support of his contention he cited a cablegram which the Gov.-General Primo de Rivera is alleged to have sent to the Prime Minister Sagasta. It was published in the Gaceta de Madrid of December 16, 1897, and reads as follows:—

(Translation)

Manila, 12th of December, 1897

To the President of the Council of Ministers, from the Governor-General

At the expiration of the time allowed and announced in the Gazette of November 28, after which rigorous and active war measures would be taken against the rebels, a deputation from the enemy came to me on behalf of the brothers Aguinaldo, Llaneras, and the so-called Republican Government, offering to surrender themselves, their followers, and their arms, on the sole conditions of their lives being spared and that they should receive means with which to emigrate. It appears to me, and to the general officers of this army, that this surrender is the result of the successive combats by which we have held the positions taken in MÓrong, Paray, Minuyan, and Arayat, and the enthusiasm displayed by the resolute volunteers in the provinces outside TagÁlog sphere. I feel sure of being able to take Biac-na-batÓ, as well as all the other points occupied by the rebels, but I am not so certain of being able to secure the persons of the chiefs of the rebellion with their followers. The war would then be carried on by roving parties who, from their hiding-places in the forests and mountains, might appear from time to time, and although of little importance, they would sustain the rebellion.

The generals agree with me that the peace will save the honour of Spain and the army, but in view of the importance of the event I consider it necessary to solicit the approval of the Government.

If the Government should accept the proposals, I will bring them to an issue at once, but I so far distrust them that I cannot be sure of anything until I have the men and the arms in my possession. In any case, it is now the unanimous opinion that the situation is saved.

Primo de Rivera. (Translation of reply)

Madrid, 13th of December, 1897

President of the Council of Ministers to the Governor-General,

Manila

Colonial Ministry Code. H.M. the Queen has perused with great satisfaction your Excellency's telegram, and commands me to congratulate you in the name of the nation. In view of the opinion of your Excellency and the generals under your orders that the honour of the army is saved, the Government fully authorizes your Excellency to accept the surrender of the rebel chiefs and their Government on the terms specified in your telegram. Please advise the surrender as soon as possible in order to give due and solemn publicity to the event. Receive my sincere congratulations and those of the Government.

Sagasta.

At the period of the above despatches the Peninsular and the Insular authorities were living in a fool's paradise with respect to Philippine affairs. Had it been officially admitted that those reforms which the clerical party so persistently opposed, but which the home legislators were willing to concede, had been granted to the rebels as a condition of peace, “the honour of the army” would have suffered in Spanish public opinion. Hence, the Spaniards' conception of national dignity imposed on the Government the necessity of representing the rebel chiefs as repentant, begging for their lives, and craving the means of existence in exile as the result of Spanish military valour.

But abroad, where the ministerial denial, mentioned on p. 414, was published by the foreign press, Aguinaldo was universally spoken of as having been “bought off.”

A wiser government would have learnt a lesson from a sixteen-months' rebellion and have afterwards removed its causes, if only to ensure the mother country's sovereignty. The probability of the Filipinos being able to subvert Spanish rule by their own unaided efforts was indeed remote, but a review of Spanish colonial history ought to have suggested to the legislators that that extraneous assistance to sedition which promoted emancipation in the former Spanish-American territories might one day be extended to the Filipinos.

The publication of the above documents, however, did little to calm the anger of the Madrid politicians who maintained that Spanish dominion in the Philippines could only be peacefully assured by a certain measure of reform in consonance with the natives' aspirations.

Months afterwards, when Spanish sovereignty in the Archipelago was drawing to a close, the Conde de las Almenas opened a furious debate in the Senate, charging all the Colonial Govs.-General with incompetency, but its only immediate effect was to widen the breach between political parties.