Extreme interest was naturally taken by all Europeans in the miserable fate of the thousands of Spanish soldiers and civilians who had fallen into the rebels hands up to the capitulation of Manila.1 Held captive in groups at different places in the Island of Luzon, many of them passed a wretched existence, with bad food, scant clothing, and deprived of every pleasure in life beyond the hope of one day seeing their native land. Many of them died, either from natural causes or the effect of their privations (some of starvation in Tayabas), or as a result of brutal treatment. A minority of them received as good treatment as possible under the circumstances. The fate of the majority depended chiefly upon the temperament of the native commander of the district. There were semi-savage native chiefs, and there were others, like Aguinaldo himself, with humane instincts. Amongst the former, for instance, there was Major Francisco Braganza, who, on February 28, 1900, in Camarines Sur, ordered one hundred and three Spanish soldiers to be tied up to trees and cut and stabbed to death with bowie-knifes and their bodies stripped and left without burial. He was tried by court-martial and sentenced to be hanged, September 26, 1901, and the sentence was carried out at Nueva CÁceres (Camarines Sur) on November 15 following. Many prisoners managed to escape, no doubt with the aid or connivance of natives, until Aguinaldo issued a decree, dated Malolos, November 5, 1898, imposing a penalty of twenty years' imprisonment on whomsoever should give such aid. Aguinaldo told me he was personally inclined to liberate these prisoners, or, at least, those civilians accustomed to an easy office life who, if they went free, would have had no inclination whatever to fight, but would have done their best to embark for Spain. The few who might have broken their parole would have been easily caught again “for the last time in their lives,” and the women and children were an obstacle to military operations. Indeed, from time to time, Aguinaldo did liberate small groups of civilians, amongst whom were some of my old friends whom I afterwards met in Spain. Aguinaldo's Prime Minister, Apolinario Mabini (vide p. 546), was, however, strongly in favour of retaining the Spaniards as hostages until the Spanish Government should officially recognize the Philippine Republic. It will be clearly seen from the negotiations entered into between the respective parties that this recognition was the condition which the rebels most pertinaciously insisted upon, whilst the Spaniards' offers of millions of dollars were always met by much larger demands, which practically implied a refusal to treat on a money basis. The facts in the negotiations certainly support Aguinaldo's statement to me that the rebels never sought money, but political advantage, by the retention of the prisoners.

The intense excitement in Spain over the prisoners' doom called into existence meetings, liberation societies, frequent discussions in and out of Parliament, and continual protests against the apparent Ministerial lethargy. In reality, the Spanish Government, fearful of a rupture with America, could take no official action in the matter, further than appeal, indirectly, to the generosity of the captors, and remind America of her undertaking under Article 6 of the treaty. In January, 1899, the Colonial Minister cabled to several people in Manila, begging them to use their influence—but they themselves were already in the rebel camp. No form of compensation in money or armament for the captives' liberty could be officially made without involving Spain in a casus belli with America. Recognition of a Philippine Republic would have been in direct opposition to the spirit of the treaty of peace. In September, 1898, the Superiors of the regular clergy in Manila appealed to Rome; the Vatican communicated with President McKinley, and the President sent an inquiry to Maj.-General E.S. Otis concerning the captive friars. General Otis, after investigation, reported that these prisoners were fairly well treated. In the following month, whilst the Treaty of Paris was under discussion, the Spanish Government appealed to the United States Government to aid them in the rescue of the prisoners, and orders to do so were transmitted to General Otis. The Filipinos and the Americans were ostensibly on good terms at that period, and General Otis suggested to Aguinaldo that the friars and civilian Spaniards should be set free. On the subject of this request, Aguinaldo replied to General Otis by letter dated Malolos, November 3, 1898, as follows, viz:—“The Philippine people wish to retain the Spanish civil functionaries in order to obtain the liberty of the Filipinos who are banished and under arrest, and the friars in order to obtain from the Vatican a recognition of the rights of the Philippine secular clergy.... It is not hatred or vengeance which inspires the Filipinos to retain the Spanish civil and religious functionaries, but political expediency, and the tranquillity of the Philippine people demands this measure.”

At this date there were hundreds of Philippine prisoners held by the Spanish Government in different places, some of them under worse conditions than the Spanish prisoners. For instance, 218 were deported to the fever-stricken colony of Fernando Po, and only 94 of them came out alive. The treaty of peace was still being discussed, and on its conclusion, Article 6 stipulated a release of “all persons detained or imprisoned for political offences in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines,” and that the United States would “undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents”; but there was no proviso that the release of the Philippine prisoners should depend on that of the Spanish prisoners, and after the treaty was signed, Spain showed no particular haste immediately to carry out her undertaking to return the Philippine prisoners to their islands.

When General Diego de los Rios evacuated the Visayas Islands and brought his Spanish troops to Manila, en route for Spain, January, 1899, he himself remained in Manila as a Spanish Government Agent to obtain the release of the prisoners. For the special purpose, by courtesy of the American authorities, he held a kind of semi-official position; but he did not care to risk his person within the rebel lines. A Spanish merchant, Don Antonio Fuset, president of the Spanish Club, undertook the negotiations, and succeeded in inducing Apolinario Mabini to issue a decree signed by Aguinaldo and himself, dated January 22, 1899, giving liberty to all invalid civilians and soldiers. Simultaneously the Spanish Press in Manila was abusing Aguinaldo and his officers, calling them monkeys and using epithets which brought down their vengeance on the captives themselves.

The outbreak of the War of Independence (February 4, 1899) precluded direct American intervention in favour of the Spanish prisoners. General Rios, whose importance was being overshadowed by SeÑor Fuset's productive activity, cabled to Madrid that he would attend to the matter himself. But the didactic tone of his letters to Aguinaldo was not conducive to a happy result, and having frankly confessed his failure, the general made an appeal to the consuls and foreign merchants to exercise conjointly their influence. A letter of appeal from them was therefore drawn up and confided for delivery in the insurgent camp to my late friend Baron Du Marais.2 This chivalrous gentleman, well known as the personification of integrity and honour, had resided many years in the Islands and spoke TagÁlog fluently. On reaching the insurgent camp he was imprisoned on the charge of being a spy, but was shortly afterwards released, and on his way back to the capital he was waylaid by the natives, who foully murdered him. SeÑor Fuset then resumed his labours, and, as a result of his appeal to the generosity of his countrymen, he was able to set out for Boac and Batangas in the little steamer Castellano to carry supplies to the prisoners detained in those localities. On his journey he distributed to them 500 cotton suits, 290 pairs of shoes, 100 pairs of alpargatas (a sort of hempen shoe or sandal made in Spain), 14,375 packets of cigarettes, and ?1,287. Several subsequent expeditions carried supplies to the prisoners, the total amount of material aid furnished to them, in goods and money, being estimated at ?60,000.

After five months of fruitless effort General Diego de los Rios left Manila for Spain on June 3, 1899, and was succeeded by General NicolÁs Jaramillo as the negotiator representing Spain. Moreover, it was desirable to recall General Rios, whose cablegrams commenting on the Americans' military operations were making him a persona non grata in official circles.

With the requisite passes procured from Aguinaldo, two Spanish envoys, SeÑores Toral and Rio, and the Filipino Enrique Marcaida set out for the insurgent seat of government, which was then at TÁrlac. On their arrival there (June 23) Aguinaldo appointed three commissioners to meet them. At the first meeting the Filipinos agreed to liberate all except the friars, because these might raise trouble. At the next meeting they offered liberty to all on the following terms, impossible of acceptance by the Spanish commissioners, viz.:—

(1) Spain is to recognize the Independence of the Philippines and repudiate the cession of the Islands to America.

(2) After the recognition and repudiation stipulated in Clause 1, the Philippine Republic will liberate all the prisoners, without exception, and will pay their expenses back to Spain. If Spain cannot possibly accede to the conditions of Clause 1, the Philippine Republic will accept, in lieu thereof, arms, munitions and provisions, or their money equivalent.

(3) The Spanish Government is to exchange the receipts given for money subscribed to the Philippine loan for the certificates of that loan.3

The Filipinos declined to say what sum they would consider an equivalent, as per Clause 2, and invited the Spaniards to make an offer. The Spaniards then proposed ?1,000,000.

On June 29, at the third conference, the Filipinos refused to accept less than ?6,000,000. This demand stupefied the Spaniards, who said they would return to consult General Jaramillo; but they were reluctant to leave the matter unsettled, and a last conference was held the next day, when the Spaniards raised their offer to ?2,000,000. The Filipinos then reduced their demand to ?3,000,000, which the Spaniards objected to; but they were successful in obtaining the liberty of the Baler garrison and 22 invalids, with all of whom they returned to Manila (vide Baler garrison, p. 494).

On July 5 a decree was issued from TÁrlac, signed by Emilio Aguinaldo and countersigned by his minister, Pedro A. Paterno, to the effect that all invalid prisoners would be at liberty to embark at certain ports designated, if vessels were sent for them flying only the Spanish flag and a white one bearing the Red Cross. Difficulties, however, arose with the American authorities which impeded the execution of this plan. General Jaramillo was preparing to send his commissioners again to TÁrlac when he received a cablegram from Madrid telling him to suspend further overtures to the insurgents because international complications were threatened. It appears that America objected to the proposal to pay to the insurgents a large sum of money.

On August 9 General Jaramillo wished to send the Spanish warship General Alava, or a Spanish merchant vessel with the Red Cross flag, to San Fernando de la Union with provisions for the prisoners, but General E.S. Otis objected to the proposed proceeding on the ground that it would compromise the dignity of America. But General Jaramillo still persisted in his project, and after a lapse of three days he again addressed a note on the subject to General E. S. Otis, from whom he received another negative reply. On September 5 General Jaramillo informed General Otis that the prisoners were concentrated in the ports named in the insurgents' decree, and solicited permission to send a vessel flying the Red Cross flag to receive them. Three days afterwards General Otis replied that a recognition of Aguinaldo's pretension to designate certain ports for the Spaniards' embarkation would be not only humiliating but ridiculous. Furthermore, he was expecting reinforcements shortly, with which peace would be assured and all the ports re-opened, and then America would co-operate for the liberty of the prisoners. General Jaramillo replied to this communication by addressing to General Otis a lengthy philosophical epistle on the principles involved in the question, but as General Otis did not care to continue the correspondence, General Jaramillo sought to bring pressure on him by notifying him that the s.s. P. de SatrÚstegui would be detained 48 hours in order to learn his decision as to whether that vessel could call for the prisoners. As General Otis did not reply within the prescribed period General Jaramillo went to see him personally and ineffectually opened his heart to him in very energetic terms, which General Otis complacently tolerated but persisted in his negative resolution, and the interview ended with the suggestion that General Jaramillo should obtain Aguinaldo's consent for a vessel carrying the American flag to enter the ports and bring away the prisoners.

About this time an incident occurred which, but for the graciousness of General Otis, might have operated very adversely to the interests of those concerned. In September, 1899, a Spanish lady arrived in Manila saying that she was the representative of a Society of Barcelona Ladies formed to negotiate the liberation of the prisoners. She brought with her a petition addressed to Aguinaldo, said to bear about 3,000 signatures. But unfortunately the document contained so many offensive allusions to the Americans that General Jaramillo declined to be associated with it in any way. No obstacle was placed in the way of the lady if she wished to present her petition privately to Aguinaldo; but, apparently out of spite, she had a large number of copies printed and published broadcast in Manila. General Jaramillo felt it his duty to apologize to General Otis and repudiate all connexion with this offensive proceeding, which General Otis very affably excused as an eccentricity not worthy of serious notice.

On September 29 the Spanish commissioners, Toral and Rio, again started for the insurgent capital, TÁrlac. The proposal for vessels to enter the ports under the American flag was rejected by Aguinaldo's advisers, Pedro A. Paterno and Felipe Buencamino, and negotiations were resumed on the money indemnity basis. The Aguinaldo party had already had sore experience of the worth of an agreement made with Spanish officials, and during the discussion they raised the question of the validity of their powers and the guarantee for their proposed undertakings. The real difficulty was that America might object to Spain officially making any compact whatsoever which must necessarily involve a recognition of the Philippine Republic; and even as it was, the renewed suggestion of a payment of millions of dollars was a secret negotiation. The Spanish commissioners started by proposing that Aguinaldo should give up 80 per cent. of the prisoners on certain conditions to be agreed upon thereafter, and retain the 20 per cent. as guarantee for the fulfilment of these hypothetical terms; moreover, even the 20 per cent. were to be concentrated at a place to be mutually agreed upon, etc. The artfulness of the commissioners' scheme was too apparent for Paterno and Buencamino to accept it. The commissioners then presented the Insurgent Government with a voluminous philosophical dissertation on the subject, whilst the Filipinos sought brief facts and tangible conditions. The Filipinos then offered to address a note to the Spanish Consul in Manila to the effect that the prisoners who were infirm would be delivered at certain ports as already stated, and that he could send ships for them on certain terms. Still the commissioners lingered in TÁrlac, and on October 23 the Filipinos made the following proposals, which were practically an intimation to close the debate.

1. Recognition of the Philippine Republic as soon as the difficulties with America should be overcome.

2. The payment of seven millions of pesos.

These conditions having been rejected by the commissioners, Aguinaldo's advisers drew up a document stating the reasons why the negotiations had fallen through, with special reference to the insufficiency of the commissioners' powers and the inadmissibility of their attitude in desiring to treat with Aguinaldo individually instead of with his Government, for which reasons the Philippine Republic formally declared its resolution definitely to cease all negotiations with the Spanish commissioners, preferring to deal directly with the Spanish Government. Not satisfied with this formal intimation the commissioners asked that the conditions of the liberation already granted since January to the invalid prisoners should be modified, and that they should be handed over to them—the very persons already declared to be insufficiently authorized. In response to this importunity the requisite passports were immediately sent to the commissioners to enable them to quit the Philippine Republic's seat of government and territory forthwith.

Apart from the moral aspect of the case, and regarded only in the light of a business transaction, it does not appear that the Filipinos were ever offered a solid guarantee for the fulfilment of any of the proposed conditions. But the insuperable difficulty was Spain's inability to comply with the Filipinos' essential condition of recognition of the Philippine Republic.

Finally, in the prosecution of the War of Independence, the American troops drove the insurgents so hard, capturing town after town, that they were constrained to abandon the custody of the Spanish survivors, who flocked in groups to the American posts, and eventually embarked for their native land. On May 20, 1900, the Spanish Commission received a letter from the insurgent General Trias stating that orders had been issued to liberate all the prisoners.

In due course the Spanish warships sunk at the Battle of Cavite were raised by the Americans, and the dead bodies of Spain's defenders on that memorable day were handed over to a Spanish Commission. The same organization also took charge of the bodies recovered from Baler (east coast of Luzon), and after a Requiem mass was said at the Cathedral these mortal remains were conducted with appropriate solemnity on board the s.s. Isla de Panay, which left Manila for Barcelona on February 14, 1904.