From the days of Legaspi the supreme rule in these Islands was usually confided for indefinite periods to military men: but circumstances frequently placed naval officers, magistrates, the Supreme Court, and even ecclesiastics at the head of the local government. During the last half century of Spanish rule the common practice was to appoint a Lieut.-General as Governor, with the local rank of Captain-General pending his three-years' term of office. An exception to this rule in that period was made (1883–85) when Joaquin Jovellar, a Captain-General and ex-War Minster in Spain, was specially empowered to establish some notable reforms—the good policy of which was doubtful. Again, in 1897, Fernando Primo de Rivera, Marquis de Estella, also a Captain-General in Spain, held office in Manila under the exceptional circumstances of the TagÁlog Rebellion of 1896, in succession to Ramon Blanco, Marquis de PeÑa Plata. Considering that Primo de Rivera, during his previous Gov.-Generalship (1880–83), had won great popularity with the Filipinos, he was deemed, in Madrid, to be the man most capable of arresting the revolutionary movement. How far the confidence of the Home Government was misplaced will be seen in Chapter xxii.

Soon after the conquest the Colony was divided and sub-divided into provinces and military districts as they gradually yielded to the Spanish sway. Such districts, called Encomiendas,1 were then farmed out to Encomenderos, who exercised little scruple in their rigorous exactions from the natives. Some of the Encomenderos acquired wealth during the terms of their holdings, whilst others became victims to the revenge of their subjects. They must indeed have been bold, enterprising men who, in those days, would have taken charge of districts distant from the capital. It would appear that their tenure was, in a certain sense, feudal, for they were frequently called upon to aid the Central Government with vessels, men, and arms against the attacks of common enemies. Against Mahometan incursions necessity made them warriors,—if they were not so by taste,—civil engineers to open communications with their districts, administrators, judges, and all that represented social order. Encomiendas were sometimes given to Spaniards as rewards for high services rendered to the commonwealth,2 although favouritism or (in later years) purchase-money more commonly secured the vacancies, and the holders were quite expected to make fortunes in the manner they thought fit, with due regard for the Royal Treasury (vide p. 54).

The Encomenderos were, in the course of time, superseded by Judicial Governors, called Alcaldes, who received small salaries, from £60 per annum and upwards, but were allowed to trade. The right to trade—called “indulto de comercio”—was sold to the Alcalde-Governors, except those of Tondo,3 Zamboanga, Cavite, Nueva Ecija, Islas Batanes and Antique, whose trading right was included in the emoluments of office. The Government's object was economy.

In 1840 Eusebio Mazorca wrote thus4:—“The salary paid to the chiefs of provinces who enjoy the right of trade is more or less ?300 per annum, and after deducting the amount paid for the trading right, which in some provinces amounts to five-sixths of the whole—as in PangasinÁn; and in others to the whole of the salary—as in Caraga; and discounting again the taxes, it is not possible to conceive how the appointment can be so much sought after. There are candidates up to the grade of brigadier who relinquish a ?3,000 salary to pursue their hopes and projects in governorship.”

This system obtained for many years, and the abuses went on increasing. The Alcaldes practically monopolized the trade of their districts, unduly taking advantage of their governmental position to hinder the profitable traffic of the natives and bring it all into their own hands. They tolerated no competition; they arbitrarily fixed their own purchasing prices, and sold at current rates. Due to the scarcity of silver in the interior, the natives often paid their tribute to the Royal Treasury in produce,—chiefly rice,—which was received into the Royal Granaries at a ruinously low valuation, and accounted for to the State at its real value; the difference being the illicit profit made by the Alcalde. Many of these functionaries exercised their power most despotically in their own circuits, disposing of the natives' labour and chattels without remuneration, and not unfrequently, for their own ends, invoking the King's name, which imbued the native with a feeling of awe, as if His Majesty were some supernatural being.

In 1810 TomÁs de Comyn wrote as follows:—“In order to be a chief of a province in these Islands, no training or knowledge or special services are necessary; all persons are fit and admissible.... It is quite a common thing to see a barber or a Governor's lackey, a sailor or a deserter, suddenly transformed into an Alcalde, Administrator, and Captain of the forces of a populous province without any counsellor but his rude understanding, or any guide but his passions.”5

By Royal Decree of 1844 Government officials were thenceforth strictly prohibited to trade, under pain of removal from office.

In the year 1850 there were 34 Provinces, and two Political Military Commandancies. Until June, 1886, the offices of provincial Civil Governor and Chief Judge of that province were vested in the same person—the Alcalde Mayor. This created a strange anomaly, for an appeal against an edict of the Governor had to be made to himself as Judge. Then if it were taken to the central authority in Manila, it was sent back for “information” to the Judge-Governor, without independent inquiry being made in the first instance; hence protest against his acts was fruitless.

During the Regency of Queen Maria Christina, this curious arrangement was abolished by a Decree dated in Madrid, February 26, 1886, to take effect on June 1 following.

Eighteen Civil Governorships were created, and Alcaldes' functions were confined to their judgeships; moreover, the Civil Governor was assisted by a Secretary, so that two new official posts were created in each of these provinces.

The Archipelago, including Sulu, was divided into 19 Civil Provincial Governments, four Military General Divisions, 43 Military Provincial Districts, and four Provincial Governments under Naval Officers, forming a total of 70 Divisions and Sub-Divisions.

Cost of Spanish Administration

Civil Governments

Military General Governments

Military Provinces and Districts

Provincial Governments under Naval Officers, Officers in Charge of Naval Stations as ex-officio Governors

The Spanish Government intended, in due course, to establish Civil Government throughout the Islands. A Civil Governor was the representative of the Gov.-General, whose orders and decrees he had to publish and execute at his own discretion. He could not absent himself from his province without permission. He had to maintain order, veto petitions for arms' licences, hold under his orders and dispose of the Civil Guard, Carabineers, and local guards. He could suspend the pay for ten days of any subordinate official who failed to do his duty, or he could temporarily suspend him in his functions with justifiable cause, and propose to the Gov.-General his definite removal. He had to preside at all municipal elections; to bring delinquents to justice; to decree the detention on suspicion of any individual, and place him at the disposal of the chief judge within three days after his capture; to dictate orders for the government of the towns and villages; to explain to the petty-governors the true interpretation of the law and regulations affecting their districts.

The Governor was chief of police, and could impose fines up to ?50 without the intervention of judicial authority; and in the event of the mulcted person being unable to pay, he could order his imprisonment at the rate of one day's detention for each half-peso of the fine; it was provided, however, that the imprisonment could not exceed 30 days in any case. He had to preside at the ballot for military conscription, but he could delegate this duty to his Secretary, or, failing him, to the Administrator. Where no harbour-master had been appointed, the Civil Governor acted as such. He had the care of the primary instruction; and it was his duty specially to see that the native scholars were taught the Spanish language. Land concessions, improvements tending to increase the wealth of the province, permits for felling timber, and the collection of excise taxes were all under his care. He had also to furnish statistics relating to the labour poll-tax; draw up the provincial budget; render provincial and municipal accounts, etc., all of which had to be counter-signed under the word Intervine by the Secretary. He was provincial postmaster-general, chief of telegraph service, prisons, charities, board of health, public works, woods and forests, mines, agriculture and industry. Under no circumstances could he dispose of the public funds, which were in the care of the Administrator and Interventor, and he was not entitled to any percentages (as Alcalde-Governors formerly were), or any emoluments whatsoever further than his fixed salary.

A Governor had to be a Spaniard over 30 years of age. It is curious to note, from its political significance, that among the many classes of persons eligible for a Civil Governorship were those who had been Members of the Spanish Parliament or Senate during one complete session.

Upon the whole, a Provincial Governor passed life very comfortably if he did not go out of his way to oppress his subjects and create discord. His tranquillity, nevertheless, was always dependent upon his maintaining a good understanding with the priesthood of his district, and his conformity with the demands of the friars. If he had the misfortune to cross their path, it brought him a world of woe, and finally his downfall. There have been Provincial Governors who in reality held their posts by clerical influence, whilst others who exercised a more independent spirit—who set aside Church interests to serve those of the State, with which they were intrusted—fell victims to sacerdotal intrigue; for the subordinates of the hierarchy had power to overthrow as well as to support those who were appointed to their districts. Few improvements appear to have been made in the provinces by the initiative of the local Governors, nor did they seem to take any special interest in commercial and agricultural advancement. This lack of interest was somewhat excusable and comprehensible, however, seeing that after they were appointed, and even though they governed well within the strict limitations of their office, they were constantly expecting that a ministerial change or the fall of a single minister might remove them from their posts, or that the undermining influence of favouritism might succeed in accomplishing their withdrawal. It was natural, therefore, that they should have been indifferent about the fostering of new agricultural enterprises, of opening tracks for bringing down timber, of facilitating trade, or of in any way stimulating the development of the resources of a province when the probability existed that they would never have the personal satisfaction of seeing the result of their efforts.

Some Governors with whom I am personally acquainted have, in spite of all discouragement, studied the wants of their provinces, but to no purpose. Their estimates for road-making and mending, bridge-building, and public works generally were shelved in Manila, whilst the local funds (Fondos locales), which ought to have been expended in the localities where they were collected, were seized by the authorities in the capital and applied to other purposes.

An annual statement of one province will be sufficient, as an example, to illustrate the nature of this local tax:—

Local Funds7—Albay Province

Provincial Revenue

Municipal Revenue

In the same year this province contributed to the common funds of the Treasury a further sum of ?133,009.

There was in each town another local tax called Caja de Comunidad, contributed to by the townspeople to provide against any urgent necessity of the community, but it found its way to Manila and was misappropriated, like the Fondos locales.

There was not a peso at the disposal of the Provincial Governor for local improvements. If a bridge broke down so it remained for years, whilst thousands of travellers had to wade through the river unless a raft were put there at the expense of the very poorest people by order of the petty-governor of the nearest village. The “Tribunal,” which served the double purpose of Town Hall and DÂk Bungalow for wayfarers, was often a hut of bamboo and palm-leaves, whilst others, which had been decent buildings generations gone by, lapsed into a wretched state of dilapidation. In some villages there was no Tribunal at all, and the official business had to be transacted in the municipal Governor's house. I first visited Calamba (La Laguna) in 1880, and for 14 years, to my knowledge, the headmen had to meet in a sugar-store in lieu of a Tribunal. In San JosÉ de Buenavista, the capital town of Antique Province, the Town Hall was commenced in good style and left half finished during 15 years. Either some one for pity's sake, or the headmen for their own convenience, went to the expense of thatching over half the unfinished structure, which was therefore saved from entire ruin, whilst all but the stone walls of the other half rotted away. So it continued until 1887, when the Government authorized a partial restoration of this building.

As to the roads connecting the villages, quite 20 per cent. of them serve only for travellers on foot, on horse or on buffalo back at any time, and in the wet season certainly 60 per cent, of all the Philippine highways are in too bad a state for any kind of passenger conveyance to pass with safety. In the wet season, many times I have made a sea journey in a prahu, simply because the highroad near the coast had become a mud-track, for want of macadamized stone and drainage, and only serviceable for transport by buffalo. In the dry season the sun mended the roads, and the traffic over the baked clods reduced them more or less to dust, so that vehicles could pass. Private property-owners expended much time and money in the preservation of public roads, although a curious law existed prohibiting repairs to highways by non-official persons.

Every male adult inhabitant (with certain specified exceptions) had to give the State fifteen days' labour per annum, or redeem that labour by payment. Of course thousands of the most needy class preferred to give their fifteen days. This labour and the redemption-money were only theoretically employed in local improvements. This system was reformed in 1884 (vide p. 224).

The Budget for 1888 showed the trivial sum of ?120,000 to be used in road-making and mending in the whole Archipelago. It provided for a Chief Inspector of Public Works with a salary of ?6,500, aided by a staff composed of 48 technical and 82 non-technical subordinates. As a matter of fact, the Provincial and District Governors often received intimation not to encourage the employment of labour for local improvements, but to press the labouring-class to pay the redemption-tax to swell the central coffers, regardless of the corresponding misery, discomfort, and loss to trade in the interior. But labour at the Governor's disposal was not alone sufficient. There was no fund from which to defray the cost of materials; or, if these could be found without payment, some one must pay for the transport by buffaloes and carts and find the implements for the labourers' use. How could hands alone repair a bridge which had rotted away? To cut a log of wood for the public service would have necessitated communications with the Inspection of Woods and Forests and other centres and many months' delay.

The system of controlling the action of one public servant by appointing another under him to supervise his work has always found favour in Spain, and was adopted in this Colony. There were a great many Government employments of the kind which were merely sinecures. In many cases the pay was small, it is true, but the labour was often of proportionately smaller value than that pay. With very few exceptions, all the Government Offices in Manila were closed to the public during half the ordinary working-day,—the afternoon,—and many of the Civil Service officials made their appearance at their desks about ten o'clock in the morning, retiring shortly after mid-day, when they had smoked their habitual number of cigarettes.

The crowd of office-seekers were indifferent to the fact that the true source of national vigour is the spirit of individual self-dependence. Constant clamour for Government employment tends only to enfeeble individual effort, and destroys the stimulus, or what is of greater worth, the necessity of acting for one's self. The Spaniard (except the Basque and the Catalonian) looks to the Government for active and direct aid, as if the Public Treasury were a natural spring at the waters of which all temporal calamities could be washed away—all material wants supplied. He will tell you with pride rather than with abashment that he is an empleado—a State dependent.

National progress is but the aggregate of personal individual activity rightly directed, and a nation weakens as a whole as its component parts become dormant, or as the majority rely upon the efforts of the few. The spirit of CÆsarism—“all for the people and nothing by them”—must tend not only to political slavery, but to a reduction in commercial prosperity, national power, and international influence. The Spaniards have indeed proved this fact. The best laws were never intended to provide for the people, but to regulate the conditions on which they could provide for themselves. The consumers of public wealth in Spain are far too numerous in proportion to the producers; hence not only is the State constantly pressed for funds, but the busy bees who form the nucleus of the nation's vitality are heavily taxed to provide for the dependent office-seeking drones. It is the fatal delusion that liberty and national welfare depend solely upon good government, instead of good government depending upon united and co-operative individual exertion, that has brought the Spanish nation to its present state of deplorable impotence.

The Government itself is but the official counterpart of the governed. By the aid of servile speculators, a man in political circles struggles to come to the front—to hold a portfolio in the ministry—if it only be for a session, when his pension for life is assured on his retirement. Merit and ability have little weight, and the proteges of the outgoing minister must make room for those of the next lucky ministerial pension-seeker, and so on successively. This Colony therefore became a lucrative hunting-ground at the disposal of the Madrid Cabinet wherein to satisfy the craving demands of their numerous partisans and friends. They were sent out with a salary and to make what they could,—at their own risk, of course,—like the country lad who was sent up to London with the injunction from his father, “Make money, honestly if you can, but make it.”

From the Conquest up to 1844, when trading by officials was abolished, it was a matter of little public concern how Government servants made fortunes. Only when the jealousy of one urged him to denounce another was any inquiry instituted so long as the official was careful not to embezzle or commit a direct fraud on the Real Haber (the Treasury funds). When the Real Haber was once covered, then all that could be got out of the Colony was for the benefit of the officials, great and small. In 1840, Eusebio Mazorca wrote as follows:8—“Each chief of a province is a real sultan, and when he has terminated his administration, all that is talked of in the capital is the thousands of pesos clear gain which he made in his Government.”

Eusebio Mazorca further states:9—“The Governor receives payment of the tribute in rice-paddy, which he credits to the native at two reales in silver per caban. Then he pays this sum into the Royal Treasury in money, and sells the rice-paddy for private account at the current rate of six, eight or more reales in silver per caban, and this simple operation brings him 200 to 300 per cent. profit.”

The same writer adds:—“Now quite recently the Interventor of Zamboanga is accused by the Governor of that place of having made some ?15,000 to ?16,000 solely by using false measures ... The same Interventor to whom I refer, is said to have made a fortune of ?50,000 to ?60,000, whilst his salary as second official in the Audit Department10 is ?540 per annum.” According to ZÚÑiga, the salary of a professor of law with the rank of magistrate was ?800 per annum.

Up to June, 1886, the provincial taxes being in the custody of the Administrator, the Judicial Governor had a percentage assigned to him to induce him to control the Administrator's work. The Administrator himself had percentages, and the accounts of these two functionaries were checked by a third individual styled the “Interventor,” whose duties appeared to be to intervene in the casting-up of his superiors' figures. He was forbidden to reside with the Administrator. After the above date the payment of all these percentages ceased.

But for the peculations by Government officials from the highest circles downwards, the inhabitants of the Colony would doubtless have been a million or so richer per annum. One frequently heard of officials leaving for Spain with sums far exceeding the total emoluments they had received during their term of office. Some provincial employees acquired a pernicious habit of annexing what was not theirs by all manner of pretexts. To cite some instances: I knew a Governor of Negros Island who seldom saw a native pass the Government House with a good horse without begging it of him; thus, under fear of his avenging a refusal, his subjects furnished him little by little with a large stud, which he sold before he left, much to their disgust.

In another provincial capital there happened to be a native headman imprudently vain enough to carry a walking-stick with a chased gold-knob handle studded with brilliants. It took the fancy of the Spanish Governor, who repeatedly expressed his admiration of it, hoping that the headman would make him a present of it. At length, when the Governor was relieved of his post, he called together the headmen to take formal leave of them, and at the close of a flattering speech, he said he would willingly hand over his official-stick as a remembrance of his command. In the hubbub of applause which followed, he added, “and I will retain a souvenir of my loyal subordinates.” Suiting the action to the word, he snatched the coveted stick out of the hand of the owner and kept it. A Gov.-General in my time enriched himself by peculation to such an extent that he was at his wits' end to know how to remit his ill-gotten gains clandestinely. Finally, he resolved to send an army Captain over to Hong-Kong with ?35,000 to purchase a draft on Europe for him. The Captain went there, but he never returned.

There were about 725 towns and 23 missions in the Colony. Each town was locally governed by a native—in some cases a Spanish or Chinese half-caste—who was styled the petty-governor or Gobernadorcillo, whilst his popular title was that of Capitan. This service was compulsory. The elections of Gobernadorcillos and their subordinates took place every two years, the term of office counting from the July 1 following such elections. In the few towns where the Gobernadorcillos were able to make considerable sums, the appointment was eagerly sought for, but as a rule it was considered an onerous task, and I know several who have paid bribes to the officials to rid them of it, under the pretext of ill-health, legal incapacity, and so on. The Gobernadorcillo was supported by what was pompously termed a “ministry,” composed of two lieutenants of the town, lieutenants of the wards, the chiefs of police, of plantations, and of live-stock.

The Gobernadorcillo was nominally the delegate and practically the servant of his immediate chief, the Provincial Governor. He was the arbiter of local petty questions, and endeavoured to adjust them, but when they assumed a legal aspect, they were remitted to the local Justice of the Peace, who was directly subordinate to the Provincial Chief Judge. He was also responsible to the Administrator for the collection of taxes—to the Chief of the Civil Guard for the capture of criminals, and to the priest of his parish for the interests of the Church. His responsibility for the taxes to be collected sometimes brought him imprisonment, unless he succeeded in throwing the burden on the actual collectors—the Cabezas de Barangay.

The Gobernadorcillo was often put to considerable expense in the course of his two years, in entertaining and supplying the wants of officials passing through. To cover this outlay, the loss of his own time, the salaries of writers in the Town Hall, presents to his Spanish chiefs to secure their goodwill, and other calls upon his private income, he naturally had to exact funds from the townspeople. Legally, he could receive, if he chose (but few did), the munificent salary of ?2 per month, and an allowance for clerks equal to about one-fifth of what he had to pay them. Some of these Gobernadorcillos were well-to-do planters, and were anxious for the office, even if it cost them money, on account of the local prestige which the title of “Capitan” gave them, but others were often so poor that if they had not pilfered, this compulsory service would have ruined them. However, a smart Gobernadorcillo was rarely out of pocket by his service. One of the greatest hardships of his office was that he often had to abandon his plantation or other livelihood to go to the provincial capital at his own expense whenever he was cited there. Many of them who did not speak or understand Spanish had to pay and be at the mercy of a Secretary (Directorcillo), who was also a native.

When any question arose of general interest to the townspeople (such as a serious innovation in the existing law, or the annual feasts, or the anticipated arrival of a very big official, etc.) the headmen (principalia) were cited to the Town Hall. They were also expected to assemble there every Sunday and Great Feast Days (three-cross Saint days in the Calendar), to march thence in procession to the church to hear Mass, under certain penalties if they failed to attend. Each one carried his stick of authority; and the official dress was a short Eton jacket of black cloth over the shirt, the tail of which hung outside the trousers. Some Gobernadorcillos, imbued with a sense of the importance and solemnity of office, ordered a band to play lively dance music at the head of the cortÉge to and from the church. After Mass they repaired to the convent, and on bended knee kissed the priest's hand. Town affairs were then discussed. Some present were chided, others were commended by their spiritual dictator.

In nearly every town the people were, and still are, divided into parties holding divergent views on town affairs, each group being ready to give the other a “stab in the back” when the opportunity offers, and not unfrequently these differences seriously affect the social relations of the individual members.

For the direct collection of taxes each township was sub-divided into groups of forty or fifty families called Barangays: each group had to pay taxes to its respective head, styled Cabeza de Barangay, who was responsible to the petty-governor, who in turn made the payment to the Provincial Administrator for remission to the Treasury (Intendencia) in Manila. This Barangay chiefdom system took its origin from that established by the natives themselves prior to the Spanish conquest, and in some parts of the Colony the original title of datto was still applied to the chief. This position, hereditary among themselves, continued to be so for many years under Spanish rule, and was then considered an honourable distinction because it gave the heads of certain families a birthright importance in their class. Later on they were chosen, like all the other native local authorities, every two years, but if they had anything to lose, they were invariably re-elected. In order to be ranked among the headmen of the town (the principalia), a Barangay chief had to serve for ten years in that capacity unless he were, meanwhile, elected to a higher rank, such as lieutenant or gobernadorcillo. Everybody, therefore, shirked the repugnant obligations of a chiefdom, for the Government rarely recognized any bad debts in the collection of the taxes, until the chief had been made bankrupt and his goods and chattels sold to make good the sums which he could not collect from his group, whether it arose from their poverty, death, or from their having absconded. I have been present at auction sales of live-stock seized to supply taxes to the Government, which admitted no excuses or explanations. Many Barangay chiefs went to prison through their inability or refusal to pay others' debts. On the other hand, there were among them some profligate characters who misappropriated the collected taxes, but the Government had really little right to complain, for the labour of tax-gathering was a forced service without remuneration for expenses or loss of time incurred.

In many towns, villages, and hamlets there were posts of the Civil Guard established for the arrest of criminals and the maintenance of public order; moreover, there was in each town a body of guards called Cuadrilleros for the defence of the town and the apprehension of bandits and criminals within the jurisdiction of the town only. The town and the wards together furnished these local guards, whose social position was one of the humblest and least enviable. There were frequent cases of Cuadrilleros passing over to a band of brigands. Some years ago the whole muster belonging to the town of Mauban (Tayabas) suddenly took to the mountains; on the other hand, many often rendered valuable aid to society, but their doubtful reliability vastly diminished their public utility.

From the time Philippine administration was first organized up to the year 1884, all the subdued natives paid tribute. Latterly it was fixed at one peso and ten cents per annum, and those who did not choose to work for the Government during forty days in the year, paid also a poll-tax (fallas) of ?3 per annum. But, as a matter of fact, thousands were declared as workers who never did work, and whilst roads were in an abominable condition and public works abandoned, not much secret was made of the fact that a great portion of the poll-tax never reached the Treasury. These pilferings were known to the Spanish local authorities as caidas or droppings; and in a certain province I met at table a provincial chief judge, the nephew of a general, and other persons who openly discussed the value of the different Provincial Governments (before 1884) in Luzon Island, on the basis of so much for salary and so much for fees and caidas.

However, although the tribute and fallas system worked as well as any other would under the circumstances, for some reason, best known to the authorities, it was abolished. In lieu thereof a scheme was proposed, obliging every civilized inhabitant of the Philippines, excepting only public servants, the clergy, and a few others, to work for fifteen days per annum without the right of redeeming this obligation by payment. Indeed, the decree to that effect was actually received in Manila from the Home Government, but it was so palpably ludicrous that the Gov.-General did not give it effect. He had sufficient common sense to foresee in its application the extinction of all European prestige and moral influence over the natives if Spanish and foreign gentlemen of good family were seen sweeping the streets, lighting the lamps, road-mending, guiding buffalo-carts loaded with stones, and so on. This measure, therefore, regarded by some as a practical joke, by others as the conception of a lunatic theorist—was withdrawn, or at least allowed to lapse.

Nevertheless, those in power were bent on reform, and the Peninsular system of a document of identity (CÉdula personal), which works well amongst Europeans, was then adopted for all civilized classes and nationalities above the age of 18 years without exception, its possession being compulsory. The amount paid for this document, which was of nine classes,11 from ?25 value downwards, varied according to the income of the holder or the cost of his trading-licences. Any person holding this document of a value under ?3½ was subject to fifteen days' forced labour per annum, or to pay 50 cents for each day he failed to work. The holder of a document of ?3½ or over paid also ?1½ “Municipal Tax” in lieu of labour. The “CÉdula” thenceforth served as a passport for travelling within the Archipelago, to be exhibited at any time on demand by the proper authority. No legal document was valid unless the interested parties had produced their CÉdulas, the details of which were inscribed in the legal instrument. No petitions would be noticed, and very few transactions could be made in the Government offices without the presentation of this identification document. The decree relating to this reform, like most ambiguous Spanish edicts, set forth that any person was at liberty to take a higher-valued CÉdula than that corresponding to his position, without the right of any official to ask the reason why. This clause was prejudicial to the public welfare, because it enabled thousands of able-bodied natives to evade labour for public improvements of imperative necessity in the provinces. The public labour question was indeed altogether a farce, and simply afforded a pretext for levying a tax.

It would appear that whilst the total amount of taxation in Spanish times was not burdensome, the fiscal system was obviously defective.

The (American) Insular Government has continued the issue of the CÉdula on a reasonable plan which bears hard on no one. Forced labour is abolished; government work is paid for out of the taxes; and the uniform cost of the CÉdula is one peso for every male between the ages of 18 and 60 years.

In 1890 certain reforms were introduced into the townships, most of which were raised to the dignity of Municipalities. The titles of Gobernadorcillo and Directorcillo (the words themselves in Spanish bear a sound of contempt) were changed to Capitan Municipal and Secretario respectively (Municipal Captain and Secretary) with nominally extended powers. For instance, the Municipal Captains were empowered to disburse for public works, without appeal to Manila, a few hundred pesos in the year (to be drawn, in some cases, from empty public coffers, or private purses). The functions of the local Justices of the Peace were amplified and abused to such a degree that these officials became more the originators of strife than the guardians of peace. The old-established obligation to supply travellers, on payment therefor, with certain necessaries of life and means of transport was abolished.

Hitherto it had been the custom for a traveller on arriving at a town without knowing any one there, or without letters of introduction, to alight (by right) at the Tribunal, or Town Hall. Each such establishment had, or ought to have had, a tariff of necessary provisions and the means of travelling to the next town (such as ponies, gigs, hammocks, sedan-chairs, etc., according to the particular conditions of the locality). Each Barangay or Cabezeria furnished one Cuadrillero (vide pp. 223, 224) for the service of the Tribunal, so that the supply of baggage-carriers, bearers, etc., which one needed could not be refused on payment. The native official in charge of this service to travellers, and in control of the Cuadrilleros, was styled the Alguacil. Hence the Tribunal served the double purpose of Town Hall and casual ward for wayfarers. There were all sorts of Tribunales, from the well-built stone and wood house to the poverty-stricken bamboo shanty where one had to pass the night on the floor or on the table.

By decree of Gov.-General Weyler (1888–91) dated October 17, 1888, which came into force on January 1, 1889, the obligation of the Tribunal officials to supply provisions to travelling civilians had been already abolished, although, under both reforms, civilians could continue to take refuge at the Tribunal as theretofore. Notwithstanding the reform of 1890, until the American advent the European traveller found it no more difficult than before to procure en route the requisite means for provincial travelling.