2 Abbe Mable.

3 A division of the legislature has been adopted in the new constitution of every state except Pennsylvania and Georgia.

4 I cannot help remarking the singular jealousy of the constitution of Pennsylvania, which requires that a bill shall be published for the consideration of the people, before it is enacted into a law, except in extraordinary cases. This annihilates the legislature, and reduces it to an advisory body. It almost wholly supersedes the uses of representation, the most excellent improvement in modern governments. Besides the absurdity of constituting a legislature, without supreme power, such a system will keep the state perpetually embroiled. It carries the spirit of discussion into all quarters, without the means of reconciling the opinions of men, who are not assembled to hear each others’ arguments. They debate with themselves—form their own opinions, without the reasons which influence others, and without the means of information. Thus the warmth of different opinions, which, in other states, dies in the legislature, is diffused through the state of Pennsylvania, and becomes personal and permanent. The seeds of dissension are sown in the constitution, and no state, except Rhode Island, is so distracted by factions.

5 In the decline of the republic, bribery or military force obtained this office for persons who had not attained this age—Augustus was chosen at the age of twenty; or rather obtained it with his sword.

6 [“Query.”]

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8 I say the senate was elective—but this must be understood with some exceptions; or rather qualifications. The constitution of the Roman senate has been a subject of enquiry, with the first men in modern ages. Lord Chesterfield requested the opinion of the learned Vertot, upon the manner of chusing senators in Rome; and it was a subject of discussion between Lord Harvey and Dr. Middleton. The most probable account of the manner of forming the senate, and filling up vacancies, which I have collected from the best writers on this subject, is here abridged for the consideration of the reader.

Romulus chose one hundred persons, from the principal families in Rome, to form a council or senate; and reserved to himself the right of nominating their successors; that is of filling vacancies. “Mais comme Romulus avoit lui mÊme choisi les premiers senateurs il se reserva le droit de nommer a son grÉ, leurs successeurs.”—Mably, sur les Romains. Other well informed historians intimate that Romulus retained the right of nominating the president only. After the union of the Sabines with the Romans, Romulus added another hundred members to the senate, but by consent of the people. Tarquin, the ancient, added another hundred; but historians are silent as to the manner.

On the destruction of Alba by Hostilius, some of the principal Alban families were added to the senate, by consent of the senate and people.

After the demolition of the monarchy, Appius Claudius was admitted into the senate by order of the people.

Cicero testifies that, from the extinction of the monarchy, all the members of the senate were admitted by command of the people.

It is observable that the first creation of the senators was the act of the monarch; and the first patrician families claimed the sole right of admission into the senate. “Les familles qui descendoient des deux cent senateurs que “Romulus avoit crÉÉs,—se crurent seules en droit d’entrer dans le sÉnat.”—Mably

This right however was not granted in its utmost extent; for many of the senators in the Roman commonwealth, were taken from plebian families. For sixty years before the institution of the censorship, which was A. U. C. 311, we are not informed how vacancies in the senate were supplied. The most probable method was this; to enrol, in the list of senators, the different magistrates; viz., the consuls, prÆtors, the two quÆtors of patrician families, the five tribunes (afterwards ten) and the two Ædiles of plebian families: The office of quÆstor gave an immediate admission into the senate. The tribunes were admitted two years after their creation. This enrollment seems to have been a matter of course; and likewise their confirmation by the people in their comitia or assemblies.

On extraordinary occasions, when the vacancies of the senate were numerous, the consuls used to nominate some of the most respectable of the equestrian order, to be chosen by the people.

On the institution of the censorship, the censors were invested with full powers to inspect the manners of the citizens,—enrol them in their proper ranks according to their property,—make out lists of the senators and leave out the names of such as had rendered themselves unworthy of their dignity by any scandalous vices. This power they several times exercised; but the disgraced senators had an appeal to the people.

After the senate had lost half its members in the war with Hannibal, the dictator, M. Fabius Buteo, filled up the number with the magistrates, with those who had been honored with a civic crown, or others who were respectable for age and character. One hundred and seventy new members were added at once, with the approbation of the people. The vacancies occasioned by Sylla’s proscriptions amounted to three hundred, which were supplied by persons nominated by Sylla and chosen by the people.

Before the time of the Gracchi, the number of senators did not exceed three hundred. But in Sylla’s time, so far as we can collect from direct testimonies, it amounted to about five hundred. The age necessary to qualify for a seat in the senate is not exactly ascertained; but several circumstances prove it to have been about thirty years.

See Vertot, Mably, and Middleton on this subject.

In the last ages of Roman splendor, the property requisite to qualify a person for a senator, was settled by Augustus at eight hundred sestertia—more than six thousand pounds sterling.

9 [“Between states, and excluding negroes,” added in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

10 It is a capital defect of most of the state-constitutions, that the senators, like the representatives, are chosen in particular districts. They are thus inspired with local views, and however wrong it may be to entertain them, yet such is the constitution of human nature, that men are almost involuntarily attached to the interest of the district which has reposed confidence in their abilities and integrity. Some partiality therefore for constituents is always expectable. To destroy it as much as possible, a political constitution should remove the grounds of local attachment. Connecticut and Maryland have wisely destroyed this attachment in their senates, by ordaining that the members shall be chosen in the state at large. The senators hold their seats by the suffrages of the state, not of a district; hence they have no particular number of men to fear or to oblige.—They represent the state; hence that union and firmness which the senates of those states have manifested on the most trying occasions, and by which they have prevented the most rash and iniquitous measures.

It may be objected, that when the election of senators is vested in the people, they must choose men in their own neighborhood, or else those with whom they are unacquainted. With respect to representatives, this objection does not lie; for they are chosen in small districts; and as to senators, there is, in every state, a small number of men, whose reputation for abilities, integrity and good conduct will lead the people to a very just choice. Old experienced statesmen should compose the senate; and people are generally, in this free country, acquainted with their characters. Were it possible, as it is in small states, it would be an improvement in the doctrine of representation, to give every freeman the right of voting for every member of the legislature, and the privilege of choosing the men in any part of the state. This would totally exclude bribery and undue influence; for no man can bribe a state; and it would almost annihilate partial views in legislation. But in large states it may be impracticable.

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12 It is said by some, that no property should be required as a qualification for an elector. I shall not enter into a discussion of the subject; but remark that in most free governments, some property has been thought requisite, to prevent corruption and secure government from the influence of an unprincipled multitude.

In ancient Rome none but the free citizens had the right of a suffrage in the comitia or legislative assemblies. But in Sylla’s time the Italian cities demanded the rights of the Roman citizens; alledging that they furnished two-thirds of the armies, in all their wars, and yet were despised as foreigners. Vell Paterc. lib. 2. cap. 15. This produced the Marsic or social war, which lasted two years, and caried off 300,000 men. Ibm. It was conducted and concluded by Pompey, father of Pompey the Great, with his lieutenants Sylla and Marius. But most of the cities eventually obtained the freedom of Rome; and were of course entitled to the rights of suffrage in the comitia. “Paulatim deinde recipiendo in civitatem, qui arma aut non ceperant aut deposuerant maturiÙs, vires refectÆ sunt.” Vell. Paterc. 2. 16.

But Rome had cause to deplore this event, for however reasonable it might appear to admit the allies to a participation of the rights of citizens, yet the concession destroyed all freedom of election. It enabled an ambitious demagogue to engage and bring into the assemblies, whole towns of people, slaves and foreigners;—and everything was decided by faction and violence. This Montesquieu numbers among the causes of the decline of the Roman greatness. De la grandeur des Romains, c. 9.

Representation would have, in some measure, prevented the consequences; but the admission of every man to a suffrage will ever open the door to corruption. In such a state as Connecticut, where there is no conflux of foreigners, no introduction of seamen, servants, &c., and scarcely an hundred persons in the state who are not natives, and very few whose education and connexions do not attach them to the government; at the same time few men have property to furnish the means of corruption, very little danger could spring from admitting every man of age and discretion to the privilege of voting for rulers. But in the large towns of America there is more danger. A master of a vessel may put votes in the hands of his crew, for the purpose of carrying an election for a party. Such things have actually taken place in America. Besides, the middle states are receiving emigrations of poor people, who are not at once judges of the characters of men, and who cannot be safely trusted with the choice of legislators.

13 [These two paragraphs struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

14 [Last two sentences struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

15 The clause may at first appear ambiguous. It may be uncertain whether we should read and understand it thus—“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises in order to pay the debts,” &c. or whether the meaning is—“The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, and shall have power to pay the debts,” &c. On considering the construction of the clause, and comparing it with the preamble, the last sense seems to be improbable and absurd. But it is not very material; for no powers are vested in Congress but what are included under the general expressions, of providing for the common defence and general welfare of the United States. Any powers not promotive of these purposes, will be unconstitutional;—consequently any appropriations of money to any other purpose will expose the Congress to the resentment of the states, and the members to impeachment and loss of their seats.

16 [“O” changed to “good” in author’s copy P. L. F.]

17 “Quod nemo plebeius auspicia haberet, ideoque decemviros connubium diremisse, ne incerta prole auspicia turbarentur.” Tit. Liv. lib. 4. cap. 6.

18 Auguriis certe sacerdotisque augurum tantus honos accessit, ut nihil belli domique postea, nisi auspicato, gereretur: concilia populi, exercitus vocati, summa rerum, ubi aves non admisissent, dirimerentur. Liv. lib. 1. cap. 37.

19 [“The” and “of” struck out—“without” substituted in author’s copy—P. L. F.]

20 [Last two sentences struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

21 Essay on the Roman government.

22 Livy, 2.33.

23 Livy, 3.54.

24 Livy, 3.33.

25 Livy, 4.6.

26 Livy, 6. 35. 42. “Ne quis plus quingenta jugera agri possideret.”

27 Montesquieu supposed virtue to be the principle of a republic. He derived his notions of this form of government, from the astonishing firmness, courage and patriotism which distinguished the republics of Greece and Rome. But this virtue consisted in pride, contempt of strangers and a martial enthusiasm which sometimes displayed itself in defence of their country. These principles are never permanent—they decay with refinement, intercourse with other nations and increase of wealth. No wonder then that these republics declined, for they were not founded on fixed principles; and hence authors imagine that republics cannot be durable. None of the celebrated writers on government seems to have laid sufficient stress on a general possession of real property in fee-simple. Even the authors of the Political Sketches, in the Museum for the month of September, seems to have passed it over in silence; although he combats Montesquieu’s system, and to prove it false, enumerates some of the principles which distinguish our governments from others, and which he supposes constitutes the support of republics.

The English writers on law and government consider Magna Charta, trial by juries, the Habeas Corpus act, and the liberty of the press, as the bulwarks of freedom. All this is well. But in no government of consequence in Europe, is freedom established on its true and immoveable foundation. The property is too much accumulated, and the accumulations too well guarded, to admit the true principle of republics. But few centuries have elapsed, since the body of the people were vassals. To such men, the smallest extension of popular privileges, was deemed an invaluable blessing. Hence the encomiums upon trial by juries, and the articles just mentioned. But these people have never been able to mount to the source of liberty, estates in fee, or at least but partially; they are yet obliged to drink at the streams. Hence the English jealousy of certain rights, which are guaranteed by acts of parliament. But in America, and here alone, we have gone at once to the fountain of liberty, and raised the people to their true dignity. Let the lands be possessed by the people in fee-simple, let the fountain be kept pure, and the streams will be pure of course. Our jealousy of trial by jury, the liberty of the press, &c., is totally groundless. Such rights are inseparably connected with the power and dignity of the people, which rest on their property. They cannot be abridged. All other [free] nations have wrested property and freedom from barons and tyrants; we begin our empire with full possession of property and all its attending rights.

28 [Last three sentences struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

29 [Revise to “The constitution is generally good.—P. L. F.]

30 [“utterly” struck out.—P. L. F.]

31 The state debt of Connecticut is about 3,500,000 dollars, its proportion of the federal debt about the same sum. The annual interest of the whole 420,000 dollars.

32 [Last three sentences, the following paragraph and foot note struck out in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

33 [“The convention was composed of,” added after “that,” by author.—P. L. F.]

34 [“This proves how little dependence can be placed on theory. Twelve years experience, or four elections demonstrates the contrary.”—Note in author’s copy.—P. L. F.]

35 This is the case with that British Borough.

36 Trials between a state and its own Citizens, and between Citizens of the same state, involving questions concerning state laws that infringe this constitution, may be carried by appeal, it is presumed, into a foederal court.

37 There is one grand operation of the new foederal constitution, favorable to general liberty, which I do not remember to have heard from any of its friends. It is well known, that in most of the states the members of their Houses of Representatives are chosen in equal numbers from each county, and in the eastern states, in equal numbers from each town, without any regard to the number of taxable inhabitants, or the number of souls. Hence it is very frequent for a county, with ten thousand souls, to send only the same number of members to the state house of representatives, as a county with two thousand souls, by which each person in the least populous county has five times as great a voice in electing representatives, as his fellow citizen of the most populous county. This is clearly a departure from the principles of equal liberty, and ought to be altered in the several states. I speak the more plainly because our state constitution is free from that fault in the formation of our house of Assembly. Now the new constitution expressly declares, that the foederal Representatives shall be in the proportion of one to every thirty thousand, which accords with reason and the true principles of liberty. This house, therefore, so far as national matters go, will remedy the evil spoken of in the several states, and is one more great step towards the perfection of equal liberty and genuine republicanism in America. It must strongly recommend the foederal constitution to the serious reflecting patriot, even though he may formerly have had doubts, and it will suggest to the several states the propriety of reconsidering that point in their respective constitutions. Pennsylvania, though right in the principles on which her legislative elections are and will be held, is less safe from the existence of this fault in the adjoining sister states of Virginia, Maryland, Jersey, Delaware and New York, and in others more remote.

38 The candid Reader will suppose Mr. Wilson here means, that it is the best form of foederal government, which has ever been offered to the world—and it is surely true that the foederal constitution, considered in due connexion with the state constitutions, is the best form of government that has ever been communicated to mankind.

39 See some late publications.

40 See late publications.

41 “The error of those who reason by precedent, drawn from antiquity, respecting the rights of man, is, that they do not go far enough into antiquity. They do not go the whole way. They stop in some of the intermediate stages of an hundred or a thousand years, and produce what was then done, as a rule for the present day. This is no authority at all. If we travel still further into antiquity, we shall find a direct contrary opinion and practice prevailing; and if antiquity is to be authority, a thousand such authorities may be produced, successively contradicting each other: but if we proceed on, at last we shall come out right: We shall then come to the time when man came from the hand of his Maker. What was he then? Man. Man was his high and only title, and a higher cannot be given him——We are now got at the origin of man, and at the origin of his rights.——Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account, whether from the lettered or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in establishing one point, the unity of man; by which I mean that man is all of one degree, and consequently that all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights. By considering man in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only where he forgets his origin, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes dissolute.

“Hitherto we have spoken only (and that but in part) of the natural rights of man. We have now to consider the civil rights of man, and to shew how the one originates out of the other.—Man did not enter into society, to become worse than he was before, nor to have less rights than he had before, but to have those rights better secured. His natural rights are the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this distinction with more precision, it will be necessary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights.

“A few words will explain this. Natural rights are those which appertain to man in the right of his existence—civil rights are those which appertain to man in right of his being a member of society. Every civil right has for its foundation some natural right pre-existing in the individual, but to unite his individual power is not, in all cases, sufficiently competent. Of this kind are all those which relate to security and protection.

“From this short review it will be easy to distinguish between that class of natural rights which man retains after entering into society, and those which he throws into common stock as a member of society. The natural rights which he retains, are all those in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual as the right itself.—The natural rights which are not retained, are all those in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective: they answer not his purpose—those he deposits in the common stock of society, and takes the arm of society, of which he is a part, in preference and in addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in society, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.”—“Rights of Man,” 1791, page 30, 31.

42 “We have now traced Man from a natural individual to a member of society——Civil power, properly considered as such is made up of the aggregate of that class of the natural rights, which become defective in the individual in point of power, and answers not his purpose; but when collected into a focus, becomes competent to the purpose of every one.——Let us now apply those principles to government.——

“Individuals themselves, each in his own personal and sovereign right, entered into a compact with each other, to produce a government; and this is the only mode in which governments have a right to arise, and the only principle on which they have a right to exist.

“A constitution is not a thing in name only, but in fact.—It has not an ideal but a real existence, and wherever it cannot be produced in a visible form, there is none. A constitution is a thing antecedent to a government; and a government is only the creature of a constitution.—A constitution of a country is not the act of its government, but of the people constituting a government. It is the body of elements to which you can refer, and quote article by article; and which contains the principles on which the government shall be established, the manner in which it shall be organized, the powers it shall have, the mode of election, the duration of parliaments, or by what other name such bodies may be called, the powers which the executive part of the government shall have; and, in fine, every thing that relates to the complete organization of a civil government, and the principles on which it shall act, and by which it shall be bound.”—“Rights of Man,” page 35, 36.

“What is a constitution? it is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles or fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it.—What are legislatures? creatures of the constitution, they owe their existence to the constitution—they derive their powers from the constitution.—It is their commission, and therefore all their acts must be conformable to it, or else void. The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves, in their original, sovereign, and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature in their derivative capacity.”

Judge Patterson’s charge to the Jury in the Wioming case of Vanhorne’s lessee against Dorrance; tried at the circuit-court for the United States, held at Philadelphia, April term, 1795.

43 Constitutional properties are only, as has been observed at the beginning of this letter, parts in the organization of the contributed rights. As long as those parts preserve the orders assigned to them respectively by the constitution, they may so far be said to be balanced: but, when one part, without being sufficiently checked by the rest, abuses its power to the manifest danger of public happiness, or when the several parts abuse their respective powers so as to involve the commonwealth in the like peril, the people must restore things to that order, from which their functionaries have departed. If the people suffer this living principle of watchfulness and controul to be extinguished among them, they will assuredly not long afterwards experience that of their “temple,” “there shall not be left one stone upon another, that shall not be thrown down.”

44 When the controuling power is in a constitution, it has the nation for its support, and the natural and the political controuling powers are together. The laws which are enacted by the governments, controul men only as individuals, but the nation, thro’ its constitution controuls the whole government, and has a natural ability to do so. The final controuling power, therefore, and the original constituting power, are one and the same power.—“Rights of Man,” 1792. part 2d, b. 4, page 42.

45 See late publications against the Federal Constitution.

46 Blackstone, III. 279

47 Idem, IV. 350.

48 Idem, III. 381.

49 Instead of referring to musty records and mouldy parchments to prove that the rights of the living are lost, “renounced, and abdicated for ever,” by those who are now no more.—M. de la Fayette, in his address to the national assembly, applies to the living world, and says—“Call to mind the sentiments which nature has engraved in the heart of every citizen, and which take a new face when they are solemnly recognized by all. For a nation to love liberty, it is sufficient that she knows it; and to be free, it is sufficient that she wills it,”—“Rights of Man,” page 11.

50 See an enumeration of defects in trials by jury. Blackstone, III. 381.

51 Idem, IV. 350.

52 He who reverses the constitution, liberties and laws of his country.——

53 The great Bacon, in enumerating the art by which CÆsar enslaved his country, says—“His first artifice was to break the strength of the senate, for while that remained safe, there was no opening for any person to immoderate or extraordinary power.——‘Nam initio sibi erani frangendÆ senatus opes et autoritas qua salva nemini ad, immodica et extra ordinaria imperia aditus erat.’ Bossuet, bishop of Meaux, takes notice in his universal history, that the infamous Herod, to engross authority, attacked the Sanhedrim, which was in a manner the senate, where the supreme jurisdiction was exercised.”

54 “If we consider what the principles are that first condense man into society, and what the motive is that regulates their mutual intercourse afterwards, we shall find, by the time we arrive at what is called government, that nearly the whole of the business is performed by the natural operation of the parts upon each other.”—Rights of Man.

55 When Xerxes invaded Greece with the largest host and the greatest fleet that ever were collected, events occurred, which being preserved in history, convey to us a very affecting and instructive information.

While the danger was at some distance, the states of Greece looked to remote friends for assistance. Disappointed in these speculations, tho’ the vast armaments of their enemies were constantly rolling towards them, still there was no firmness in their union, no vigor in their resolutions.

The Persian army passed the Hellespont, and directed its march westward. It was then decided, that Thessaly was the frontier to be first attacked.

The Thessalians, than whom no people had been more forward in the common cause, hastened a remonstrance to Corinth, urging that unless they were immediately and powerfully supported, necessity would oblige them to make terms with the invaders.

This reasonable remonstrance roused the sluggish and hesitating councils of the confederacy. A body of foot was dispatched who soon occupied the valley of Tempe, the only pass from Lower Macedonia, into Thessaly.

In a few days, these troops being informed that there was another pass from Upper Macedonia, returned to the Corinthian Isthmus.

The Thessalians thus deserted made their submission.

“This retreat from Tempe appears to have been a precipate measure, rendered necessary by nothing so much as by the want of some powers of government extending over the several states which composed the confederacy.”—Mitford’s History of Greece.

With diminished forces, the defence of the confederates was now to be contracted. But in the conduct even of this business daily becoming more urgent, we find them laboring under the defects of their confederation.

“Destitute of any sufficient power extending over the whole, no part could confide in the protection of the whole, while the naval superiority of their enemy put it in his choice, where, when, and how to make his attacks; and therefore each republic seems to have been anxious to reserve its own strength for future contingencies.

Their generous hearts all beat at the call of freedom; but their efforts were embarrassed and enfeebled by the vices of their political constitution, to their prodigious detriment, and almost to their total destruction. For these vices, the ardor of heroism united with love of country could not compensate. These very vices therefore, may truly be said to have wasted the blood of patriots, and to have betrayed their country into the severest calamities.

If we shall hereafter by experience discover any vices in our constitution, let us hasten with prudence and a fraternal affection for each other, to correct them. We are all embarked in the same vessel, and equally concerned in repairing any defects.

56 See objections against the Federal constitution, very similar to those made in Scotland.

57 Justice Blackstone argues in like manner, after admitting the “expediency” of titles of nobility. “It is also expedient that their owners should form an independent and separate branch of the legislature”—otherwise “their privileges would soon be borne down and overwhelmed.”—Comment. 2. 157.

58 No member of parliament ought to be elected by fewer than the majority of 800, upon the most moderate calculation, according to Doctor Price.

59 By the constitution proposed to us, a majority of the house of representatives, and of the senate, makes a quorum to do business: but, if the writer is not mistaken, about a fourteenth part of the members of the house of commons, makes a quorum for that purpose.

60 If to the union of England and Scotland, a just connection with Ireland be added, ecclesiastical establishments duly amended; additions to the peerage regulated, and representation of the commons properly improved, it is to be expected, that the tranquility, strength, reputation, and prosperity of the empire will be greatly promoted, the monarchy will probably change into a republic, if representation in the house of commons is not encreased by additions from the counties and great trading cities and towns, without this precaution, an increase of the peerage seems likely to accelerate an alteration. These two measures should have, it is apprehended, in such a government and in such a progress of human affairs, a well-tempered co-operation. The power of the crown might thereby become more dignified, moderated, and secured.

The discussion of this subject would embrace a very great number of considerations; but the conclusion seems to approach as near to demonstration, as an investigation of this kind can do.

61 Against what is called equality in representation, the great Montesquieu seems to have declared by the strongest implication. In his Spirit of Laws, b. ch. 2, he says, that the confederate republic of Lycia contained twenty-three associated towns: that, in the common council, the larger towns had three votes, the middling towns two, and the lesser only one; that they contributed to the common expence according to the proportion of suffrages; and, that were he to give the model of an excellent confederate republic, it should be that of Lycia. Could the immortal spirit of Montesquieu revisit the earth, and behold the model now offered to America, how quickly would his favorite republic sink in his estimation. In a new quarter of the globe scarcely heard of by the greater part of Europeans in his day, and since the commencement of the present century, he would see men who have attained a perfection in the science most conducive to human happiness, in that study which was the principal occupation of his life, in which his predecessors had acquired only a few glimmering lights, and of which it was reserved for him to develope most of the true first principles.

62 Whether the state of Maryland shall be divided into six districts, for each to choose one man, or the people at large give their suffrage for the whole six, is hereafter to be settled by the assembly. The latter mode, on a variety of occasions, would be preferable.

63 The importance of having the western territory determined a common stock, needs only to be mentioned, to excite attention.

As the articles of confederation contain no provision, for adjusting the dispute between the United States, and particular states, Maryland, for a long time, refused her ratification. An adequate provision is made by the proposed plan. That the United States will assuredly institute actions against two of the states, setting up claims equally wild and extensive, may appear from the following statement.

New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland, have been always interested in making good the common claim; as they never laid any particular claim to the territory in question.

Massachusetts, if the province of Maine be separate, is likewise become interested in the common claim.

Connecticut, and New York, have both made cessions, which congress has accepted. These two are therefore become interested.

Pennsylvania, although very extensive, has her limits ascertained. She likewise is interested.

Virginia, having made a cession to congress, has since relinquished a part of the reserved lands, or at least offered independence, to Kentucky.

North Carolina, having once made a cession, thought proper, in the omnipotence of her destined sovereignty, to repeal the act. Will not the cession be determined valid, and the repeal void?

South Carolina also, it is said, has ceded part of that territory, which lately she disputed with Georgia. In this case the United States have their claim fortified.

But Georgia, the weakest of all, lays claim to an immense tract of country. In this territory there are warlike and independent tribes of the aborigines, now carrying terror and desolation towards the heart of the country occupied by the whites. It is expected, that this circumstance, with a consciousness of the weak foundation of her claims, will dispose Georgia to give up without a suit, and consent to be circumscribed within narrower limits, so soon as a proper tribunal shall have power to enter upon a rational investigation.

N. B.—For the above statement I am principally indebted to a member of the late continental convention, and who for a considerable time, was a member of congress, a gentleman of established honour and accuracy.