The Massachusetts Gazette, (Number 391)

Friday, December 14, 1787.

For the Massachusetts Gazette.

To the Inhabitants of this State:

In some former publications, I have confined myself chiefly to pointing out the views of the opposers to the plan of federal government; the reason why I did not enter particularly into the merits of the new constitution is, that I conceived if it was candidly read, and properly attended to, that alone would be sufficient to recommend it to the acceptance of every rational and thinking mind that was interested in the happiness of the United States of America. Some babblers of the opposition junto have, however, complained that nothing has been said, except in general terms, in favour of the federal constitution; in consequence of this, incompetent as I am to the undertaking, I have been induced to lay the following remarks before the publick.

Sect. first, of the new constitution, says,

“All legislative powers Herein Granted shall be vested in a congress of the United States.”

I beg the reader to pay particular attention to the words herein granted, as perhaps there may be occasion for me to recur to them more than once in the course of my observations.

The second section of the federal constitution says, that the members of the house of representatives shall be chosen every [pg 028] second year, and the electors shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature. Some have made objections to the time for which the representatives are to be chosen; but it is to be considered, that the convention, in this particular, meant to accommodate the time for which the representatives should stand elected, to the constitutions of the different states. If it had been provided, that the time should have been of shorter duration, would not a citizen of Maryland or South-Carolina had reason to murmur?

The weakness the anti-federalists discover in insinuating that the federal government will have it in their power to establish a despotick government, must be obvious to every one; for the time for which they are elected is so short, as almost to preclude the possibility of their effecting plans for enslaving so vast an empire as the United States of America, even if they were so base as to hope for anything of the kind. The representatives of the people would also be conscious, that their good conduct alone, would be the only thing which could influence a free people to continue to bestow on them their suffrages: the representatives of the people would not, moreover, dare to act contrary to the instructions of their constituents; and if any one can suppose that they would, I would ask them, why such clamour is made about a bill of rights, for securing the liberties of the subject? for if the delegates dared to act contrary to their instructions, would they be afraid to encroach upon a bill of rights? If they determined among themselves to use their efforts to effect the establishment of an aristocratical or despotick government, would a bill of rights be any obstacle to their proceedings? If they were guilty of a breach of trust in one instance, they would be so in another.

The second section also says, no person shall be elected a representative who shall not have been seven years an inhabitant of the United States. This clause effectually confounds all the assertions of the anti-federalists, respecting the representatives not being sufficiently acquainted with the different local interests of their constituents; for a representative, qualified as the constitution directs, must be a greater numbskull than a Vox Populi or [pg 029] an Agrippa,12 not to have a knowledge of the different concerns of the Confederation.

The objection that the representation will not be sufficient, is weak in the highest degree. It is supposed, that there are sufficient inhabitants in the state of Massachusetts to warrant the sending of six delegates, at least, to the new Congress—To suppose that three gentlemen, of the first characters and abilities, were inadequate to represent the concerns of this state in a just manner, would be absurd in the highest degree, and contradictory to reason and common sense. The weakness of the anti-federalists, in regard to the point just mentioned, sufficiently shews their delinquency with respect to rational argument. They have done nothing more than barely to assert, that the representation would not be sufficient: it is a true saying, that assertions are often the very reverse of facts.

Sect. third, of the new constitution, says, each state shall choose two senators, &c. The liberalty of this clause is sufficient, any reasonable person would suppose, to damp all opposition.

Can any thing be more consistent with the strictest principles of republicanism?

Each state is here upon an equal footing; for the house of representatives can of themselves do nothing without the concurrence of the senate.

The third section further provides, that the senate shall choose their own officers. This is so congenial with the constitution of our own state, that I need not advance any argument to induce the free citizens of Massachusetts to approbate it. And those who oppose this part of the federal plan, act in direct opposition to what the anti-federalists often profess, for the excellency of our constitution has been their favourite theme.

The third section also provides, that the senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. This clause seems to be peculiarly obnoxious to anti-federal sycophants.

They have declared it to be arbitrary and tyrannical in the highest degree. But, fellow-citizens, your own good sense will [pg 030] lead you to see the folly and weakness contained in such assertions. You have experienced the tyranny of such a government; that under which you now live is an exact model of it. In Massachusetts, the house of representatives impeach, and the senate try, the offender.

That part of the proposed form of government, which is to be styled the senate, will not have it in their power to try any person, without the consent of two-thirds of the members.

In this respect, therefore, the new constitution is not more arbitrary than the constitution of this state. This clause does not, therefore, savour in the least of any thing more arbitrary than what has already been experienced: so that the horrours the anti-federal junto pretend to anticipate on that head, must sink into nothing. Besides, when the house of representatives have impeached, and the senate tried any one, and found him guilty of the offence for which he is impeached, they can only disqualify him from holding any office of power and trust in the United States: and after that he comes within the jurisdiction of the law of the land.

How such a proceeding can be called arbitrary, or thought improper, I cannot conceive. I leave it to the gentlemen in opposition to point out the tyranny of such conduct, and explain the horrid tendency it will have, for the government of the United States to determine whether any one or more of their own body are worthy to continue in the station to which they were elected.

Another clause, which the anti-federal junto labour to prove to be arbitrary and tyrannical, is contained in the fourth section, which provides, that the time and place for electing senators and representatives shall be appointed by the different state legislatures, except Congress shall at any time make a law to alter such regulation in regard to the place of choosing representatives. The former part of this clause, gives not the least opportunity for a display of anti-federal scandal, and the latter, only by misrepresentation, and false construction, is by them made a handle of. What is intended, by saying that Congress shall have power to appoint the place for electing representatives, is, only to have a [pg 031] check upon the legislature of any state, if they should happen to be composed of villains and knaves, as is the case in a sister state;13 and should take upon themselves to appoint a place for choosing delegates to send to Congress; which place might be the most inconvenient in the whole state; and for that reason be appointed by the legislature, in order to create a disgust in the minds of the people against the federal government, if they themselves should dislike it. The weakness of their arguments on this head, must therefore be obvious to every attentive mind.

There is one thing, however, which I might mention, as a reason why the opposition junto dread the clause aforementioned—they may suppose, that Congress, when the people are assembled for the choice of their rulers, in the place they have appointed, will send their terrible standing army (which I shall speak of in its place) and, Cesar Borgia like, massacre the whole, in order to render themselves absolute. This is so similar to many of the apprehensions they have expressed, that I could not pass it by unnoticed. Indeed the chief of their productions abound with improbabilities and absurdities of the like kind; for having nothing reasonable to alledge against a government founded on the principles of staunch republicanism, and which, if well supported, will establish the glory and happiness of our country. They resort to things the most strange and fallacious, in order to blind the eyes of the unsuspecting and misinformed.

Cassius.

(To be continued.)