FORT DONELSON.

The capture of Fort Henry was important, but it would be of restricted use unless Fort Donelson should also be taken. At this point the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers are only twelve miles apart. The little town of Dover stood upon a bluff on the left bank of the Cumberland. Immediately above it, two small brooks empty into the river, making a valley or bottom overflowed by every high water. Immediately below the town is Indian Creek. One branch of it, rising close by the head of the upper one of the two brooks, flowing outwardly from the river toward the west, then bending to the north and northeast, makes almost the circuit of the town, about half a mile from it, before emptying into the creek. Several small brooks, flowing from the north into Indian Creek, make deep ravines, which leave a series of ridges, very irregular in outline, but generally parallel to the river. About half a mile below the mouth of Indian Creek, Hickman Creek, flowing eastwardly, empties into the river at right angles with it. Small branches running into Hickman Creek almost interlock with those emptying into Indian Creek, whereby the series of ridges parallel to the river are made to extend continuously from the valley of one creek to the valley of the other.

Fort Donelson, a bastioned earthwork, was erected on the river-bluff, between the two creeks, its elevation being one hundred feet above the water. A bend in the river gives the fort command over it as far as its armament could carry. On the slope of the ridge facing down stream, two water-batteries were excavated. The lower battery and larger one, was so excavated as to leave traverses between the guns. A ten-inch columbiad and nine thirty-two pound guns constituted the armament of the lower battery; a rifled piece, carrying a conical ball of one hundred and twenty-eight pounds, with two thirty-two pound carronades, the armament of the upper. These water-batteries were, according to Colonel J.D. Webster, General Grant's chief of staff, thirty feet above the water-level at the time of the attack. Colonel Gilmer, the engineer who constructed them, reported them as being fifty feet above the water-level; but it does not appear at what stage of the water. As the narrow channel of the river allowed an attacking party to present only a narrow front, the batteries required but little horizontal range for their guns, and the embrasures were accordingly made quite narrow. Eight additional guns were in the fort.

Colonel Gilmer, going from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson, immediately began the tracing and construction of works for infantry defence. The river protected the east face of the position, and the valley of Hickman Creek, filled with back-water from the river, sufficiently guarded the north. The line traced was two miles and a half long, following the recessions and salients. The right of the line, occupying a ridge extending from creek to creek, was nearly parallel with the river, and distant from it fourteen hundred yards in an air-line. It was somewhat convex, projecting to the front about its centre, at the point where Porter's battery was afterward posted. The left, facing to the south and southwest, beginning just above Dover, on the point of a ridge extending nearly to the river between the two small brooks, continued out from the river along this ridge to its western extremity, and thence across the valley of the small curved stream described as encircling Dover and emptying into Indian Creek, to a V-shaped eminence in the fork between this small stream and Indian Creek. This salient termination was on the continuation of the line of the right or the west face of the infantry works. This point was assigned to Maney's battery and Heiman's brigade. The line of infantry defence was what came to be called, during the war, rifle-pit—a trench with the earth thrown up on the outer side. Batteries were constructed at nine points in the line, and armed with the guns of eight field batteries.

line

The Line from Columbus to Bowling Green.

The valley of Indian Creek made a break in the line; there was an interval at the creek between the portion occupied by Heiman's line and the work on the opposite slope, afterward the extreme left of General Buckner's command. The entire line on both faces, except the portion crossing the small valley or ravine to Heiman's left, followed the face of ridges from fifty to eighty feet high, faced by valleys or ravines filled with forest and underbrush. The trees were cut about breast-high, and the tops bent over outward, forming a rude abattis extremely difficult to pass through. The back-water filling the valley of Hickman Creek was an advantage to the defenders of Donelson, in so far as it served as a protection to one face of the position, and diminished the distance to be guarded and fortified. It was quite as great an advantage to the besiegers as it was to the besieged. They were by it relieved from a longer, being an exterior, line. Their transports and supplies could be landed and hauled out in security. Moreover, the back-water extending up Indian Creek also, within the defensive lines, cut the position in two, and made communication between the two parts inconvenient.

Immediately upon the capture of Fort Henry, work was begun on this line of infantry defence. The garrison, increased by the force from Fort Henry, numbered about six thousand effective men, under the command of Brigadier-General Bushrod R. Johnson. General Pillow, ordered by General A.S. Johnston, arrived on February 9th from Clarksville with 2,000 men. He was immediately followed by General Clarke, who had been stationed at Hopkinsville with 2,000 more; and Generals Floyd and Buckner, who were at Russellville with 8,000 more, followed. General Johnston began to set them all in motion by telegram from Bowling Green, before he received news of the surrender of Fort Henry. General Floyd was so averse to going to Donelson that he continued to remonstrate. General Buckner, whose division had arrived, proposed on the night of the 11th to take it back to General Floyd, his commanding officer at Clarksville; but Pillow, who was senior to Buckner, ordered him to remain, and repaired himself to Clarksville. Under the combined influence of Pillow's persuasion and General Johnston's orders, Floyd finally made up his mind to go, and arrived at Donelson with the last of his command in the night of the 12th. Meanwhile, Major-General Polk had sent 1,860 men from Columbus. On the night of February 12th, Donelson was defended by about 20,000 men. The heavy guns in the water batteries were manned mostly by details from light batteries and artillery drilled a short time before the national force appeared, by two artillery officers, under the supervision of Colonel Milton A. Haynes, Chief of the Tennessee Corps of Artillery.

General Grant, in reporting to General Halleck, on February 6th, the surrender of Fort Henry, added: "I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry." It was soon clear that he could not haul wagons over the road, and he proposed to go without wagons and double-team his artillery. The water continued rising. For two miles inland from Fort Henry the road was for the greater part under water. On the 8th he telegraphed: "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone, but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising water." The cavalry, however, fording the overflow, went to the front of Donelson on the 7th, skirmished with the pickets, and felt the outposts.

General Halleck went earnestly to work gathering and forwarding troops and supplies. Seasoned troops from Missouri, and regiments from the depots in Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio—so freshly formed that they had hardly changed their civil garb for soldier's uniform before they were hurried to the front to take their first military lessons in the school of bivouac and battle—were alike gathered up. General Halleck telegraphed Grant to use every effort to transform Fort Henry into a work strong on its landward side, and by all means to destroy the railroad bridge across the Cumberland at Clarksville, above Fort Donelson. Grant was urging Commodore Foote to send boats up the Cumberland to co-operate in an attack on Donelson.

On February 11th, Foote sailed from Cairo with his fleet. On the same day Grant sent six regiments, which had arrived at Fort Henry on transports, down the river on the boats from which they had not landed, to follow the fleet up the Cumberland. He also on the same day moved the greater part of his force out several miles from Fort Henry on to solid ground. On the morning of the 12th, leaving General L. Wallace and 2,500 men at Fort Henry, he moved by two roads, diverging at Fort Henry, but coming together again at Dover, with 15,000 men and eight field batteries. The force was organized in two divisions; the first commanded by General McClernand, the second by General C.F. Smith. McClernand had three brigades. The first, commanded by Colonel R.J. Oglesby, comprised the Eighth, Eighteenth, Twenty-ninth, Thirtieth, and Thirty-first Illinois, the batteries of Schwartz and Dresser, and four companies of cavalry. The second, commanded by Colonel W.H.L. Wallace, consisted of the Eleventh, Twentieth, Forty-fifth, and Forty-eighth Illinois, Colonel Dickey's Fourth Illinois Cavalry, and Taylor's and McAllister's batteries. The third, commanded by Colonel W.R. Morrison, comprised the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois. Smith's first brigade, commanded by Colonel John McArthur, was composed of the Ninth, Twelfth, and Forty-first Illinois. The second brigade was left at Fort Henry. The third, Colonel John Cook, contained the Fifty-second Indiana, Seventh and Fiftieth Illinois, Thirteenth Missouri, and Twelfth Iowa; and the fourth, Colonel John G. Lauman, contained the Twenty-fifth and Fifty-sixth Indiana, and the Second, Seventh, and Fourteenth Iowa. Major Cavender's battalion of Missouri artillery was attached to the division. Some of Major Cavender's guns were twenty-pounders. Three pieces in McAllister's battery were twenty-four pound howitzers.

McClernand's division, preceded by the Fourth Illinois cavalry, marched in advance on both roads. No opposition was encountered before reaching the pickets in front of Donelson. The advance came in sight of the fort about noon. McArthur's brigade, forming the rear of the column, halted about three miles from the fort at 6 P.M., and moved into position at half-past ten. It was observed by Colonel W.H. L. Wallace, whose brigade was at the head of the column on the telegraph or direct road between Forts Henry and Donelson, that the enemy's camps were on the other side of the creek, which, on examination, was found to be impassable. He moved up the creek and joined Colonel Oglesby, whose brigade was the advance on the Ridge road, in a wooded hollow, screened from view from the works by an intervening ridge.

The moment that deployment was begun, Oglesby's brigade, which was the farther to the right, was briskly attacked by cavalry, who, after a sharp skirmish, retired. McClernand's division was assigned to the right, C.F. Smith's to the left. The day was spent feeling through the thick woods and along deep ravines, and high, narrow winding ridges. At times a distant glimpse was caught, through some opening, of the gleam of tents crowning a height; at times, a regiment tearing its way through blinding undergrowth was startled and cut by the sudden discharge from a battery almost overhead, which it had come upon unawares. The advancing skirmish-line was in constant desultory conflict with the posted picket-line. Batteries, occasionally, where an opening through the timber permitted, took a temporary position and engaged the hostile batteries. The afternoon passed in thus developing the fire of the line of works, feeling towards a position and acquiring an idea of the formation of the ground. Smith's division, by night, was in line in front of Buckner, and McClernand's right had crossed Indian Creek and reached the Wynn's Creek road. The column had marched without transportation. The men had nothing but what they carried in knapsack and haversack. Shelter-tents had not yet come into use. The danger of drawing the enemy's fire prevented the lighting of camp-fires. The army bivouacked in line of battle. The besieged resumed at night their task, which had been interrupted by the afternoon skirmishing, of completing and strengthening their works.

Next morning, Thursday the 13th, arrived, and the fleet had not come. Fifteen thousand men, without supplies, confronted 20,000 well intrenched. A party was sent to destroy the railroad bridge over the Tennessee, above Fort Henry, the trestle approach to which had been partly destroyed by Lieutenant-Commander Phelps, to prevent effectually reinforcements reaching Donelson from Columbus. Order was sent to General Lewis Wallace, who had been left with a brigade in command at Fort Henry, to join the besieging force. The two divisions on the ground prosecuted the work of feeling for position and probing the enemy. Colonel Lauman's brigade, of C.F. Smith's division, bivouacked the night of the 12th, about a mile from the intrenchments. On the 13th he moved over the intervening ridges till he came in view of the portion of the works held by Colonel Hanson, constituting the right of General Buckner's line. A deep hollow filled with timber filled the space between Lauman and the works before him. On the farther slope, crowned by the works, the slashed timber made an extensive abattis. Colonel Veatch, with the Twenty-fifth Indiana, advanced across the ravine or hollow, and forced his way partly up the slope. He remained with his command two hours exposed to a fire to which, from their position, they could make no effectual reply, and were recalled. The Seventh and Fourteenth Iowa moved up to the left of the position reached by Colonel Veatch, and a detachment of sharpshooters was posted so as to reach with their fire the men in the trenches and divert their fire. At night Lauman withdrew his command to the place of the previous night's bivouac. Colonel Cook's brigade advanced, the morning of the 13th, on the right of Lauman's. The left of his line came also in front of Hanson's works. The valley was here filled with such an "immensity of abattis" that he did not feel justified in ordering an attempt to cross it, but kept up through the day a desultory fire of skirmishers and sharpshooters over it. The demonstration made by Lauman and Cook appeared so threatening that General Buckner sent the Eighteenth Tennessee to reinforce Hanson. The Seventh Illinois, which constituted the right of Cook's advance moving through the timber where a ridge leads to a battery at a salient in General Buckner's line, suddenly found itself under fire and retired. Colonel Cook formed his line with the other four regiments upon a ridge overlooking the enemy's intrenchments, about six hundred yards from them, separated from them by a valley dense with timber, mostly cut so as to form abattis, and remained in this position for the night.

McClernand continued pressing all day to his right, following the course of the ridge along which the Wynn's Ferry road passes. By night his right nearly or quite reached the point where the Wynn's Ferry road issued from the intrenchments. His artillery was very active; the companies acting at times separately, at times uniting and concentrating their fire on some well-served battery, they silenced temporarily several batteries, and in the afternoon shelled some camps. A determined assault was made on the position held by Maney's battery, supported by Colonel Heiman with the Tenth, Forty-eighth, and Fifty-third Tennessee, and the Twenty-seventh Alabama. This position was, at the same time, the most salient and the most elevated in the entire line of intrenchment. It was so traced that both faces were swept by artillery and infantry fire from portions of the works to the right and the left. Colonel Morrison was directed with his brigade, the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois, to assault this position. Colonel Haynie, of the Forty-eighth Illinois, senior to Morrison, was ordered to join him and take the command. Morrison, on the right, assaulted the left face of the work; the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth assaulted the right. Crossing the valley, they began the ascent, encountered the tangled abattis, and while striving to tear their way through it, under a plunging fire from the battery and the infantry above them, they were assailed by artillery and infantry from a long extent of line beyond. They recoiled from this toil and this double fire. The Forty-fifth Illinois was sent to reinforce Morrison. The four regiments started again, forced their way still farther up the abattis, and were again repelled. Undaunted, they rushed up the hill-side the third time. Part of the command pierced through the abattis and reached the rifle-pits. The summit of the rifle-pits was a blaze of musketry. Maney's guns hurled shrapnel into their faces. To Morrison's right and to Haynie's left, the long line of rifle-pits was a line of musketry, and from projecting points the batteries sent their fire. Morrison was wounded. His men could not climb over the intrenchment. The regiments recalled, fell back in order out of fire. The dead leaves on the hill-side were inflamed in some way, in this close contest, and when artillery and musketry had ceased, helpless wounded lying on the hill-side were burned to death. Colonel Heiman's men, leaping over their works, were able to save some. General Buckner reported his loss in the assault on Hanson's position as thirty-nine killed and wounded. Ten killed and thirty wounded were reported as Heiman's loss, most of them in Maney's battery. Nearly every regiment in the entire line of the intrenchments suffered some casualties from the National artillery. The national loss was more severe. The pertinacity of the attack through the day prevented the besieged from suspecting the inferiority in numbers of the attacking force.

The Carondelet, a thirteen-gun ironclad, arrived in the morning of the 13th, and fired at the water-batteries at long-range. One shot struck a thirty-two-pound gun, disabling it, and killed Captain Dixon, of the engineers, who had assisted Colonel Gilmer in the construction of both Henry and Donelson. A shot from the one hundred and twenty-eight-pound gun in the upper battery, entering a porthole, damaged the machinery of the Carondelet, and she drew out of range.

The fleet, together with transports bringing reinforcements and supplies, arrived toward evening. McClernand had moved so far around to the right as to leave a wide gap between his left and Smith's division. McArthur's brigade, of Smith's division, was moved to the right. Near midnight, upon the request of General McClernand, McArthur detached two regiments and moved them farther to the right, to within a quarter of a mile of McClernand's left. Severe wind set in with the night. Snow fell and the ground froze. Fires could not be lighted by either army. Some of McClernand's regiments, having thrown away their blankets on going into action, sat up all night.

General Lewis Wallace arrived from Fort Henry about noon, Friday, the 14th, and was placed in command of a division of troops just arrived on the transports, styled Third Division. The First Brigade, commanded by Colonel Charles Cruft, consisted of the Seventeenth and Twenty-fifth Kentucky, and the Thirty-first and Forty-fourth Indiana. The Third Brigade, commanded by Colonel John M. Thayer, comprised the Fifty-eighth and Seventy-sixth Ohio, and the First Nebraska. The Second Brigade was not organized; but in the course of Saturday, the Forty-sixth, Fifty-seventh, and Fifty-eighth Illinois and Twentieth Ohio, reported separately, and were assigned to duty. General Wallace moved into position on the right of General C.F. Smith, so as to hold the narrow ridge or spur which faced the right of Buckner's line, and was separated from McClernand by the valley of Indian Creek.

The day was quiet along the National lines, and was spent in defining and adjusting the commands in position. Skirmishers exchanged occasional shots, and artillerists from time to time tried the range of their guns. McClernand moved his right still nearer to the river, Oglesby's brigade reaching nearly to the extreme left of the Confederate works, and to the head of the back-water up the valley of the small brooks above Dover; the Eighth, Eighteenth, and Twenty-ninth Illinois were respectively posted across the three roads, which, leaving the main road along the ridge, called Wynn's Ferry road, crossed the hollow and through the enemy's intrenchments into Dover. The cavalry reconnoitered around the enemy's left, to the muddy and overflowed bottom extending back from the river immediately above Dover.

According to the report of General Buckner it was decided, in a council of general officers held that morning, to cut a way for the garrison out through the enclosing force at once, before delay would make it impracticable; that General Pillow was to lead, and Buckner to cover the retreat of the army if the sortie proved successful. Buckner made the necessary preparations, but early in the afternoon the order was countermanded by General Floyd, at the instance of General Pillow, who, after drawing out his troops for the attack, thought it too late for the attempt. Though this is not mentioned in the reports of General Floyd, General Pillow, or Colonel Gilmer, Colonel Baldwin in his report says that General Buckner formed his division in open ground to the left and rear of the intrenchments, for the purpose, apparently, of attacking the National right, Colonel Baldwin's command being the head of the column; that the column marched out by a road about two hundred yards from the left of the intrenchments, and approached the right of the National line by a course nearly perpendicular to it; but, after advancing a quarter of a mile, General Pillow said it was too late in the day to accomplish anything, and the troops returned to their quarters. Major Brown, commanding the Twentieth Mississippi, reports substantially the same, and adds they were under fire as soon as they began the advance, and one of his men was shot before they advanced one hundred yards.

About three o'clock in the afternoon Flag Officer Foote moved his fleet up the river to attack the fort. The flag-ship St. Louis and three other ironclads, the Carondelet, Louisville, and Pittsburg, each armed with thirteen guns, advanced, followed by the wooden gunboats Tyler and Conestoga. The water-battery attacked was a mere trench twenty feet wide, sunk in the hill-side. The excavated earth thrown up outside the ditch made a rampart twelve feet through at the summit. Carefully laid sand-bags added to the height of the rampart, and left narrow spaces for embrasures; narrow, but sufficient there, where the channel of the river, straight and narrow, required the fleet to advance in a straight line and with a narrow front. Such a work, at an elevation of thirty feet above the water, was almost unassailable.

The gunboats opened fire when a mile and a half from the fort, and continued advancing slowly and firing rapidly till the ironclads were within four hundred yards of the battery. The boats could use only their bow-guns, three on each boat. After a severe action of an hour and a half, a solid shot entering the pilot-house of the flag-ship, carried away the wheel, and the tiller-ropes of the Louisville were disabled by a shot. The relieving-tackles being no longer able to steer or control these boats in the rapid current, they became wholly unmanageable, and drifted down the river. The other two boats were also damaged, and the whole fleet withdrew. There were fifty-four, officers and men, killed and wounded on the fleet—Commodore Foote being one of the wounded. The flag-ship alone was struck fifty-nine times. One rifled gun on the Carondelet burst during the action. The terrible pounding by the heavy navy guns seems to have inflicted no injury upon the earthworks, their armament, or the men.

Transports arrived in the course of the day, bringing additional reinforcements. General McArthur was ordered at 5 P.M. to occupy ground on the extreme right of the National line, to act as a reserve to General Oglesby. He reached the assigned position in the dark, about 7 P.M., and "encamped for the night, without instructions and without adequate knowledge of the nature of the ground in front and on the right." The troops, without shelter and without fires, suffered another night of cold and wind and snow and sleet, after a day without food.

In the night, General Floyd, in council with General Pillow, General Buckner, and Colonel Gilmer, determined to make a sortie in the morning, and, if practicable, cut a way out, and retreat by the Wynn's Ferry road to Charlotte. Pillow was to begin with an attack on McClernand's right, assisted by the cavalry. When he should succeed in pushing back the right, Buckner was to issue from the works and strike the division near its centre. When the whole of the division should be rolled back onto Lewis Wallace, leaving a cleared way out into the country over the road, Pillow's division was to lead, and Buckner to hold the National forces back and afterward serve as rear-guard on the retreat to Charlotte. The brigade commanders were sent for and received instructions. No instructions were given to them, nor was anything said in the council, as to what supplies the troops should carry, and some regiments took neither knapsacks nor rations. Before dawn, Saturday, the 15th, Pillow's division began assembling, as on the previous day, on open ground in rear of the extreme left of the intrenchments. Colonel Baldwin, who was posted with two of his regiments, the Twenty-sixth Tennessee and Twenty-sixth Mississippi, in Pillow's portion of the intrenchments, while the rest of his brigade was west of Indian Creek, under Buckner, held the advance, the Twentieth Mississippi being added to his command, giving him a temporary brigade of three regiments. Colonel Heiman, with his brigade and Maney's battery, strengthened by the Forty-second Tennessee, were to remain in position and thence aid the attack while it was going on. The Thirtieth Tennessee was to occupy the trenches vacated by Buckner, while the Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Tennessee were to act as garrison to the main work—the fort.

Commodore Foote wrote to General Grant desiring an interview with him, and asking, as he was disabled by wounds, to be excused from going to see Grant, requested that the interview be held on the flag-ship. The Twentieth Ohio, which had arrived on transports the evening before and was ordered to report to General Lewis Wallace the day before, while marching after breakfast from the boats to the fort, met General Grant with some of his staff riding down the river road to where the boats lay. The sally had been made and the attack begun; but there was nothing in the sound that came through several miles of intervening forest to indicate anything more serious than McClernand's previous assaults.

Baldwin's brigade, leaving the intrenchments at 6 A.M., marched by the right flank out a narrow and obstructed byroad, crossed the valley in front of the works, and, while ascending the slope beyond, encountered what they supposed to be a line of pickets. But Oglesby's hungry men had slept little that cold night, and by simply rising to their feet were in line of battle. Baldwin's brigade, in attempting to deploy, was thrown into confusion, repeatedly rallied, and was thrown into disorder and pushed back before its line was established. Colonel Baldwin, in his report, says that deployment forward into line would have brought his men into such an exposed situation that he threw his regiment first into column of company, then deployed on the right into line, and admits that practising tactics with new troops under fire is a different thing from practice on the drill-ground. The movement that Colonel Baldwin attempted with his leading regiment, the Twenty-sixth Mississippi, is the same that General Sigel accomplished at Pea Ridge with such brilliant effect, where he had by artillery fire to drive back the enemy's line to gain room for each successive deployment.

The firing sufficiently notified General McArthur where he was, and, without waiting for orders, he formed his brigade into line on Oglesby's right. Pillow's division, continually filing out from the intrenchments, continually extended his line to his left. McArthur, to gain distance to his right, widened the intervals between his regiments, refused his right, and prolonged it by a skirmish line. Oglesby brought into action Schwartz's battery, then commanded by Lieutenant Gumbart, and the batteries in position in the besieged intrenchments joined in the combat. A tenacious fight, face to face, ensued—so stationary that its termination seemed to be a mere question of endurance and ammunition. General Pillow moved the Twentieth Mississippi by wheeling its left to the front. In this position the regiment suffered so severely that it withdrew and took shelter behind a rising ground. A depression was found by which General B.R. Johnson's brigade could find comparative protection while moving to their left and gaining distance to their front. General McArthur found his right flank turned and his ammunition nearly exhausted, and withdrew his brigade to a new position several hundred yards to his rear. Oglesby moved the Eighteenth Illinois to the right, to partially fill the vacated line, and brought up the Thirtieth Illinois from its position in reserve to take the place left by the Eighteenth. Colonel Lawler, of the Eighteenth, was wounded early in the engagement. Captain Brush, who had succeeded to the command, was wounded while carrying out this movement. The ammunition of the Eighteenth being now nearly gone, it retired in good order to replenish, leaving 44 of its number dead, and 170 wounded on the ground where it had stood.

McClernand, when he found his command heavily pressed, sent to Lewis Wallace, the adjoining division commander, for aid. Wallace sent to Grant's headquarters for instructions, but the General was away on the flag-ship, and his staff did not take the responsibility of acting in his place. Wallace, having been ordered to act on the defensive, declined to move without first receiving an order. When McArthur fell back, Oglesby's right became enveloped, McClernand repeated his request, and Wallace, seeing the affair was serious, took the responsibility, and ordered Cruft's brigade to advance. The Twenty-fifth Kentucky, on coming up, by some mistake fired into the Eighth and Twenty-ninth Illinois. These regiments and the Thirtieth Illinois broke and retired. The Eighth had lost 55 killed and 188 wounded; the Twenty-ninth, 25 killed and 60 wounded; the Thirtieth, 19 killed and 71 wounded. The wounded had been taken off to a building in the rear, which was turned into a hospital. Cruft maintained his position stoutly, receiving and making charges, and firing steadily from line. His men found the same difficulty that is mentioned in reports of other commanders, of distinguishing the enemy except when close at hand, or in motion. Their uniform, of the same color with the dead leaves of dense scrub-oak, uniforms and foliage at a short distance were undistinguishable. McArthur drew his brigade back out of the contest, halted, and obtained ammunition and rations. His men, who had fasted thirty-six hours, had one good meal before they moved toward night to the extreme left, in support of the troops there engaged. Cruft's brigade, being isolated, finally retired to the right and rear, and took position near the hospital.

When the rest of Oglesby's brigade retreated, the Thirty-first Illinois, Colonel John A. Logan, the left of the brigade and connecting with the right of Colonel W.H.L. Wallace's brigade, wheeled so as to have its line at right angles with the line of the enemy's intrenchments; for, as McArthur's and Oglesby's commands crumbled away, Pillow's division, rolling up McClernand's, were now advancing in a course parallel to the front of their intrenchments. The Thirty-first held its ground; but yielding was only a question of time. As Pillow's division in deploying continually increased its front, Colonel Baldwin's brigade was continually pressed to his right and came in front of W.H.L. Wallace's brigade. McCausland's brigade, consisting of the Thirty-sixth and Fiftieth Virginia, formed on Baldwin's right and in front of W.H.L. Wallace, Their assault was aided by the batteries in position in the intrenchments, and Wallace's batteries alternately replied to the artillery and played upon the line of infantry. Wallace held his line, and Pillow sent to Buckner to advance. Buckner held his command within the intrenchments massed, waiting for his opportunity. He sent three regiments, Third Tennessee, Eighteenth Tennessee, and Fourteenth Mississippi, across the intervening hollow. They attacked with spirit; but, confused by the missiles flying overhead, broken by pushing through the snow-covered boughs, and galled by the hot fire they encountered, they quickly fell back in disorder, and, according to General Buckner, communicated their depression to the rest of his command.

Toward noon, as McClernand's right was rolled up and began to crumble, Buckner, who had cheered his men, now led his division farther to his right, near to Heiman's position in the intrenchments; there he approached under cover till near Wallace's line. Three batteries supported his charge—Maney's, Porter's, and Graves', these three batteries concentrating their fire on Wallace's artillery. Forrest brought his cavalry forward. Wallace's brigade, with Taylor's and McAllister's batteries, and Logan's regiment, with boxes nearly empty, withstood the combined attack. McAllister fired his last round of ammunition. Taylor had fired seventeen hundred rounds of ammunition, an average of two hundred and eighty-three rounds to the piece. The infantry fired their last cartridge. The batteries of Maney, Graves, and Porter poured in their fire; the divisions of Pillow and Buckner aided—some regiments at a halt firing, but Buckner's advancing. Forrest's cavalry hovered on the outskirts. Wallace gave the command to fall back. McAllister had not horses left to haul off his three howitzers, and had to leave two. The order did not reach the Eleventh Illinois. The rest of the command fell back in regular order, and the Eleventh and Thirty-first continued fighting. Colonel Logan, of the Thirty-first, was wounded; the lieutenant-colonel was killed. Thirty others were killed. The ranks were thinned by the wounded who had fallen and been carried off the field. Ammunition was gone. Logan told Lieutenant-Colonel Ransom, of the Eleventh Illinois, who, having had his wound dressed, had returned to his regiment, that the Thirty-first must leave, and suggested that the Eleventh should take the position left by the Thirty-first. The Thirty-first marched steadily from the field, and the Eleventh, alone now, faced to the rear, wheeled to the left, and continued the fight. But, assailed on both flanks as well as in front, and finally charged by the cavalry, it was broken, and fell back in disorder. The brigade fell back half a mile.

Fugitives from the front passed by General Lewis Wallace, who was conversing with Captain Rawlins, General Grant's assistant adjutant-general. Among them a mounted officer galloped down the road, shouting, "We are cut to pieces." General Wallace at once ordered Colonel Thayer's brigade to the front. Marching by the flank, they soon met portions of Oglesby's and Colonel Wallace's brigades retiring from the field. They all stated they were out of ammunition. Thayer's brigade passed on at a double-quick. Position was taken; a battery, Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, commanded by Captain Wood, was posted across the road; to its right, the First Nebraska and Fifty-eighth Illinois; to the left, the Fifty-eighth Ohio and a company of the Thirty-second Illinois. The Seventy-sixth Ohio and Forty-sixth and Fifty-seventh Illinois were posted in reserve. As soon as this line was formed, interposed between the enemy and the retiring regiments, they halted and waited for ammunition. The line was scarcely formed before a force, coming up the road and through the forest, made a fierce attack. The assault was vigorous. The line remained steady, and, with fire deliberate and well aimed, quickly drove off the assailants. That closed the attack made by the sortie. Colonel Cruft's brigade, the position of which was not then known to General Wallace, was off at the right, near enough to see the repulsed force retire in the direction of the works. Cruft's brigade was brought into alignment with Thayer's, and Wallace held the ground with his division.

McClernand's division was swept from the ground which it had occupied. The desired road for retreat was open to the besieged. Buckner was in the position assigned to him, and halting, awaited his artillery and reserves from the intrenchments. General Pillow, who now found himself within the intrenchments at the salient, held by Colonel Heiman, directed the artillery to remain, and sent reiterated orders to Buckner to return and resume his position within the works. He was in the act of returning when he met General Floyd, who seemed surprised at the movement. After some conversation, in which both agreed that the original plan should be carried out, Floyd directed Buckner to remain till he could see Pillow. After consulting with Pillow, Floyd sent orders to Buckner to retire within the lines, and to repair as rapidly as possible to his former position on the extreme right, which was in danger of attack. By order of General B.R. Johnson, Colonel Drake's brigade and the Twentieth Mississippi remained on the field.

General Grant, at his interview on the flag-ship, was advised of the serious injury to the fleet, and informed that Commodore Foote, leaving his two ironclads least injured to protect the transports at the landing, would proceed to Cairo with the other two, repair them, hasten the completion of the Benton and mortar-boats, and return to the prosecution of the siege. General Grant, upon this, made up his mind to intrench, and with reinforcements complete the investment of the enemy's works. Reaching the lines about one o'clock on his return, he learned the state of affairs, ordered General C.F. Smith to prepare to storm the works in his front, repaired to the right, inspected the condition of the troops, and gave orders to be ready to attack when General Smith should make his assault.

The Fifty-second Indiana had been detached from Colonel Cook's brigade to watch a gap in the intrenchments, near the extreme right of the besieged line. At two o'clock General Smith ordered the assault by Lauman's brigade; the Fifty-second Indiana was temporarily attached to the brigade. The assaulting force was formed in column of battalions of five companies each. The Second Iowa was in advance, with General Smith in its centre, and followed in order by the Fifty-second Indiana, Twenty-fifth Indiana, Seventh Iowa, and Fourteenth Iowa. Birge's sharpshooters, deployed on each flank, opened a skirmishing fire. The column advanced silently, without firing, crushed down the abattis, covered the hill-side with battalions, heedless of the fire from the garrison, pressed on to the works, leaped over, formed in line, and drove the defending regiment to further shelter.

Just at this time General Buckner was gaining this, the extreme right of the line of intrenchments, with Hanson's regiment, which had left it in the morning for the sortie. Hanson pushed his men forward, but the works were occupied. The Thirtieth Tennessee, which had been holding that portion of the works during the day, fell back to another ridge or spur, between the captured work and the main fort. Lauman's brigade pushed on to assault that position. Hanson's regiment, the Third, Eighteenth, and Forty-first Tennessee and Fourteenth Mississippi, came to the aid of the Thirtieth; portions of Porter's and Graves' batteries were brought up. The Forty-ninth and Fiftieth Tennessee, the garrison of the fort, hastened out in support. General Smith sent for Cook's brigade and artillery. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson sent up two ten-pound Parrott guns. Buckner held the inner ridge, to which his men had retired, and intrenched it in the night. Smith held the works he had gained, an elevation as high as any within the line. His battery established there, enfiladed part of the line still held, and took in reverse nearly the whole of the intrenchments. In the charge, the column, including Birge's sharpshooters, but excluding the Fifty-second Indiana, lost 61 killed and 321 wounded; of these, the Second Iowa lost 41 killed and 157 wounded. General Smith, though sixty years old, spent the night without shelter, on the captured ridge.

General Grant, having set in motion C.F. Smith's attack, rode to the right and ordered the troops there to take the offensive and regain the ground that had been lost. General Lewis Wallace moved with a brigade commanded by Colonel Morgan L. Smith, and made of the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana, in advance. These two regiments belonged to Smith's division, and marched from Fort Henry to Donelson with Wallace. Colonel M.L. Smith, in his report, calls this command the Fifth Brigade, Third Division. The regimental commanders in their reports style it, Fifth Brigade, General C.F. Smith's division. Following was Cruft's brigade. General Wallace says, in his report: "As a support, two Ohio regiments, under Colonel Ross, were moved up and well advanced on the left flank of the assailing force, but held in reserve." Colonel Ross, of the Seventeenth Illinois, arriving at the front that morning and reporting for duty, was at once assigned to the command of the brigade composed of the Seventeenth and Forty-ninth Illinois, and, as ordered by General McClernand, moved with General Wallace in support and reserve, till recalled about dark by McClernand. An Ohio regiment, the Twentieth, Colonel Whittlesey, did go out in support and reserve, but it was not under Colonel Ross, and it remained close to the enemy's works all night.

The column approached the ridge held by Drake's brigade and the Twentieth Mississippi. M.L. Smith's brigade came in front, where the slope was bare; Cruft had to push up through bushes. General Wallace speaks with admiration of the advance by Smith. He advanced his line and ordered it to lie down, and to continue firing while lying down. As soon as the fire of the enemy on the summit slackened, the regiments rose, dashed up the hill, and lay down again before the fire from the hill-top could be made effective. In a short time, with rapid bounds, the summit was gained. Cruft's brigade pushed up through the bushes. Drake fell back within the intrenchments. Wallace stationed his picket-line close to the enemy's works. The retiring Confederate force took with them six captured pieces of artillery, several thousand small arms, and between two and three hundred prisoners; but returned to their trenches weary, disappointed, disheartened.

In the night General Floyd and General Buckner met with General Pillow and his staff, at General Pillow's headquarters, to consider the situation. After some recrimination between Pillow and Buckner whether the intention and plan had been to commence the retreat directly from the battlefield, or first to cut a way out and then return to the works, equip for a march and retreat by night, it was agreed to evacuate that night and march out by the ground which had been gained. Pillow ordered the chief quartermaster and the chief commissary to burn the stores at half-past five in the morning. Precaution was taken, however, before actually preparing for the movement, to send out scouts to see if the way were still clear. The scouts returned with report that the National forces had reoccupied the ground. This being doubted, other scouts were sent out, who brought the same report in more positive terms. Pillow proposed to cut a way out. Buckner said that was now impossible, and Floyd acquiesced. Pillow at last assented to this, but proposed to hold the fort at least one day longer and take the chances of getting out. Buckner said that was impossible; a lodgement had been made in the key of his position; assault would certainly follow as soon as it was light, and he could not withstand it. It was remarked that no alternative was left but to surrender. General Floyd said he would never surrender—he would die first. Pillow said substantially the same. Buckner said, if he were in command, he would surrender and share the fate of the garrison. Floyd inquired of Buckner, "If the command should devolve on you, would you permit me to take out my brigade?" To which Buckner replied, "Yes, if you leave before the terms of capitulation are agreed on." Forrest asked, "Gentlemen, have I leave to cut my way out?" Pillow answered, "Yes, sir, cut your way out," and asked, "Is there anything wrong in my leaving?" Floyd replied, "Every person must judge for himself of that?" Whereupon General Pillow said, "Then I shall leave this place." General Floyd turned to General Pillow and told him, "General Pillow, I turn the command over, sir." General Pillow said, "And I pass it." General Buckner said, "And I assume it," and countermanded the order for the destruction of the commissary and quartermaster stores, and ordered white flags to be prepared and a bugler to report to him.

At eleven o'clock that night Floyd telegraphed to General A.S. Johnston a glorious victory. Four hours later, at the close of the council or conference, he telegraphed: "We are completely invested by an army many times our numbers. I regret to say the unanimous opinion of the officers seems to be that we cannot maintain ourselves against these forces."

Colonel Forrest reported that upon examination he found that deep mud and water made an escape by land, between the investing force and the river, impracticable for infantry. Forrest marched out with all the cavalry but Gantt's Tennessee battalion and two companies of Helm's Kentucky cavalry, taking with him the horses of Porter's battery and about two hundred men of various commands. There was not a steamboat at the landing; General Floyd had sent all up the river with wounded and prisoners. Not a skiff or yawl could be found. A little flatboat or scow was got by some means from the other side of the river, and on this General Pillow crossed the river with his staff and Colonel Gilmer. Two steamboats returned at daybreak, one of them bringing "about four hundred raw troops." The four hundred raw troops were dumped on shore, and Floyd took possession of the boats. Floyd's brigade, consisting of four Virginia regiments and the Twentieth Mississippi, had been divided during the siege. The four Virginia regiments were organized into two brigades, and the Twentieth Mississippi attached to another command. Two Virginia regiments were ferried across the river, and the Twentieth Mississippi, understanding that they were to be taken on board with Floyd, stood on guard and kept off the growing crowd of clamorous soldiers while the other two Virginia regiments embarked. The rope was cut and Floyd steamed up the river, leaving the Twentieth Mississippi and his aide-de-camp, Lieutenant Breckenridge Drake, behind. It was said afterward that word was received from General Buckner that the boat must leave at once, or it would not be allowed to leave.

Soon after daybreak, Sunday the 16th, the men of Lauman's brigade heard the notes of a bugle advancing from the fort. It announced an officer, who bore to General Grant a letter from General Buckner, proposing the appointment of commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, and also proposing an armistice until noon. General Grant replied, acknowledging the receipt of the letter, and adding: "No terms except an unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Buckner replied: "The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose." White flags were displayed along the works; the National troops marched in, and General Grant at once made the following order: "All prisoners taken at the surrender of Fort Donelson will be collected as rapidly as practicable near the village of Dover, under their respective company and regimental commanders, or in such manner as may be deemed best by Brigadier-General S.B. Buckner, and will receive two days' rations preparatory to embarking for Cairo. Prisoners are to be allowed their clothing, blankets, and such private property as may be carried about the person, and commissioned officers will be allowed their side-arms."

There is disagreement as to the number of guns captured. There were thirteen in the water-batteries and eight in the fort. Besides, there were eight artillery companies, whose field-pieces were disposed in nine positions along the line of intrenchments. Six of these companies were those of Maney, Porter, Graves, Green, Guy, Jackson. The other two are called Ross and Murray in the account in the Nashville Patriot, and called Parker and French on the pen-sketch of the works showing the position of the light batteries, found among the Confederate records. The number of pieces in these batteries is not given. Badeau gives the number of guns surrendered at sixty-five, and no reason is seen why that is not correct.

There is no means of determining with any precision the number of the garrison. General Grant, on the day of the surrender, reported the number of prisoners taken as twelve to fifteen thousand. Badeau says the number captured was 14,623; and that rations were issued at Cairo to that number of prisoners taken at Fort Donelson. According to a report or estimate made by Major Johnson, of the first Mississippi, and found among his papers in Mississippi in 1864, the number "engaged" was 15,246, and the number surrendered 11,738. General Floyd gives no estimate. General Pillow, in his brief to the Secretary of War of the Confederacy, defending himself from charges, gives thirteen thousand as about the number engaged in the defence; while General Buckner, in a report made after he was exchanged, says the aggregate of the army within the works was never greater than twelve thousand. An estimate published in the Nashville Patriot soon after the surrender makes the number engaged 13,829.

Major Brown's estimate was evidently the most deliberate and careful, yet it is not free from error. It is not accurate in the number of casualties. The regimental reports made after the surrender are not numerous, but they present some means of testing Major Brown's estimate. According to that estimate, the Eighth Kentucky lost 19 killed and 41 wounded; according to the official report of Colonel Simonton, commanding the brigade, the loss of the Eighth Kentucky was 27 killed and 72 wounded. According to Major Brown's estimate, two of the Virginia regiments lost none killed or wounded, and the aggregate of the loss of the four regiments was 13 killed and 113 wounded; according to the brigade reports, every regiment lost both killed and wounded, the aggregate being 41 killed and 166 wounded. Major Brown's estimate omits the Kentucky cavalry battalion of three companies. It names also only seven artillery companies, while the Nashville Patriot's account and the memorandum on the manuscript plan of the intrenchments name eight. This estimate is also incomplete. It gives only the number engaged belonging to regiments and companies, and thereby excludes brigade and division commanders, and their staff and enlisted men at their headquarters; it also excludes the "four hundred raw troops" (the reports give them no other designation) who arrived too late to be engaged, but in time to be surrendered; and the estimate being only of those engaged, excludes sick, special duty men, and all except the muskets and sabres present for duty in the works. Such an estimate of "effective" or "engaged" is no basis for a statement of the number surrendered. The morning report of Colonel Bailey's regiment, the Forty-ninth Tennessee, for January 14th, was 680 effectives out of an aggregate of 777. His last morning report before the surrender was 393 effectives out of an aggregate of 773. Major Brown's estimate gives this regiment 372 engaged. Colonel Bailey's morning report of those present with him on the way from Donelson to Cairo, which included none from hospitals, was, officers and men, 490.

There is no report of trustworthy accuracy, giving either the aggregate or the effective strength. Ten thousand five hundred prisoners were put into the charge of Colonel Whittlesey, of the Twentieth Ohio; of which number he sent north, guarded by his own regiment, about six thousand three hundred; another, but much smaller body, was put into the hands of Colonel Sweeney. Besides these, were the wounded and sick in hospital, in camp, and some left on the field. Colonel Whittlesey, at the time, estimated the entire number taken charge of, including sick and wounded, at 13,000. General Floyd said that the boats which carried across and up the river his four Virginia regiments, took at the same time about as many other troops; and he says he took up the river with him 986, officers and men, of the four Virginia regiments. Pillow reported, on March 14th, that several thousand infantry had got out in one way or other, many of whom were at that time with him at Decatur, Ala., and the rest under orders to rendezvous there. They continued slipping out after the surrender. General B.R. Johnson, on the Tuesday after the surrender, not having reported or been enrolled as a prisoner, walked with a fellow-officer out of the intrenchments at mid-day, and, not being challenged, continued beyond the National camps and escaped. The accounts of the escape by boat with Floyd, on horse with Forrest, and by parties slipping out by day and by night through the forest and undergrowth and the devious ravines, fairly show that 5,000 must have escaped. There was scarcely a regiment or battery, if, indeed, there was a single regiment or battery, from which some did not escape. Eleven hundred and thirty-four wounded were sent up the river by boat the evening before the surrender, and General Pillow estimated the killed at over four hundred and fifty. This accounts for an aggregate of over nineteen thousand five hundred, sufficiently near the estimate of nineteen thousand six hundred—the number in the place during the siege, and the additional four hundred, who arrived only in time to be surrendered.

General Floyd surmised the killed and wounded to be fifteen hundred. Pillow estimated them at two thousand. The National loss was, in McClernand's division, 1,445 killed and wounded, and 74 missing; in C.F. Smith's division, 306 killed, 1,045 wounded, and 167 missing; and in Lewis Wallace's division, 39 killed, 248 wounded, and 5 missing—making an aggregate of 3,329 killed, wounded, and missing. General Grant sat down before the place Wednesday the 12th, at noon, with 15,000 men, and with that number closed in upon the works and made vigorous assaults next day. Reinforcements began to arrive at the landing Thursday evening, and when the place surrendered his army had grown by reinforcements to twenty-seven thousand. Grant had no artillery but the eight field-batteries which he brought over from Fort Henry to Donelson. These were not fixed in position and protected by earthworks, but were moved from place to place and used as batteries in the field.

The defensive line from Columbus to Bowling Green, broken by the capture of Fort Henry, was now shattered. General A.S. Johnston evacuated Bowling Green on February 14th, and on the 17th and 18th moved with the main body of his troops from Nashville to Murfreesboro. The rear-guard left Nashville on the night of the 23d, and the advance of Buell's army appeared next morning on the opposite bank of the river. Columbus was evacuated shortly after. The National authority was re-established over the whole of Kentucky, the State of Tennessee was opened to the advance of both army and fleet, and the Mississippi was cleared down to Island Number Ten.

General Halleck telegraphed on February 17th, the day after the surrender, to General McClellan: "Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers, and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Donelson and Henry." Next day, the 18th, he telegraphed to General Hunter, commanding the Department of Kansas, thanking him for his aid in sending troops; and to Grant, ordering him not to let the gunboats go up higher than Clarksville, whence they must return to Cairo immediately upon the destruction of the bridge and railroad. On the 19th he telegraphed to Washington: "Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You cannot get a better one. Honor him for this victory, and the whole country will applaud." On the 20th he telegraphed to McClellan, "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity." Upon the receipt in Washington of the news of the surrender of Fort Donelson, the President at once appointed Grant major-general, and the Senate immediately confirmed the appointment. Buell and Pope shortly after received the same promotion. Later, in March, C.F. Smith, McClernand, and Lewis Wallace were confirmed to the same rank. On March 11th, General Halleck was assigned to the command of the Department of the Mississippi, embracing all the troops west of a line drawn north and south indefinitely through Knoxville, Tenn., and east of the western boundary of Arkansas and Missouri. On February 15th, Grant had been assigned to the command of the Military District of Tennessee, the limits of which were not defined, and General W.T. Sherman succeeded to the command of the District of Cairo.