While Sir Frederick Roberts had been fighting hard in North-Eastern Afghanistan, Sir Donald Stewart had been experiencing comparative tranquillity in his Candahar command. As soon as the news reached him of the destruction of Cavagnari's mission he had promptly concentrated his troops, and so early as the third week of September (1879) he was in a position to carry out his orders to create a diversion in aid of Roberts' advance on Cabul by making a demonstration in the direction of Ghuznee and placing a garrison in Khelat-i-Ghilzai. No subsequent movements of importance were undertaken in Southern Afghanistan during the winter, and the province enjoyed almost unbroken quietude. In Herat, however, disturbance was rife. Ayoub Khan, the brother of Yakoub Khan, had returned from exile and made good his footing in Herat, of which formerly he had been conjoint governor with Yakoub. In December he began a hostile advance on Candahar, but a conflict broke out between the Cabul and Herat troops under his command, and he abandoned for the time his projected expedition.

[Illustration: ACTION AT AHMED KHEL. 20 Miles from GHUZNEE. 19th. April 1880.]

In the end of March Sir Donald Stewart began the march toward Cabul which orders from India had prescribed. He left behind him in Candahar the Bombay division of his force under the command of Major-General Primrose, whose line of communication with the Indus valley was to be kept open by Phayre's brigade, and took with him on the northward march the Bengal division, consisting of two infantry brigades and a cavalry brigade. The first infantry brigade was commanded by Brigadier-General Barter, the second by Brigadier-General Hughes, and the cavalry brigade, which divisional headquarters accompanied, by Brigadier-General Palliser. Khelat-i-Ghilzai was reached on 6th April; the Bengal portion of its garrison joined the division and the advance was resumed on the following day. Until Shahjui, the limit of the Candahar province, the march was uneventful; but beyond that place extreme difficulties were experienced in procuring supplies, for the villages were found deserted and the inhabitants had carried off, destroyed, or hidden their stores of grain. The force was embarrassed by a horde of Hazaras, who swarmed in wild irregularity on its flanks, plundering and burning with great vindictiveness, eager to wreak vengeance on their Afghan foes. And it had another although more distant companionship, in the shape of several thousand hostile tribesmen and ghazees, whose fanaticism their moullas had been assiduously inciting, and who marched day by day parallel with the British right flank along the foothills at a distance of about eight miles. Their attitude was threatening but it was not thought wise to meddle with them, since their retreat over the hills could not well be cut off, and since the policy of non-interference would tend to encourage them to venture on a battle. The soundness of this reasoning was soon to be made manifest.

On the night of April 18th the division was encamped at Mushaki, about thirty miles south of Ghuznee. The spies that evening brought in the information that the enemy had resolved on fighting on the following morning, and that the position they intended to take up was the summit of a low spur of the Gul Koh mountain ridge, bounding on the west the valley followed by the road. This spur was said to project in a north-easterly direction toward the Ghuznee river, gradually sinking into the plain. During a great part of its length it flanked and overhung the road, but near where it merged into the plain the road passed over it by a low saddle at a point about six miles beyond Mushaki. At dawn of the 19th the column moved off, Palliser leading the advance, which Sir Donald Stewart accompanied, Hughes commanding the centre, Barter bringing up the rear and protecting the baggage. An hour later the enemy were visible in great strength about three miles in advance, presenting the aspect of a vast body formed up on the spur and on the saddle crossed by the road, and thus threatening Stewart at once in front and on both flanks. The British general at once made his dispositions. His guns were on the road in column of route. The three infantry regiments of Hughes' brigade came up to the left of and in line with the leading battery, the cavalry took ground on the plain on its right, and a reserve was formed consisting of an infantry regiment, two companies sappers and miners, and the General's escort of a troop and two companies. Orders were sent back to Barter to send forward without delay half the infantry of his brigade. In the formation described the force resumed its advance until within striking distance. Then the two batteries came into action on either side of the road; the horse-battery on the right, the flat ground to its right being covered by the 2d Punjaub Cavalry; the field-battery on the left. Sir Donald Stewart's proper front thus consisted of the field and horse-batteries with their supports, but since it was apparent that the greatest strength of the enemy was on the higher ground flanking his left, it behoved him to show a front in that direction also, and for this purpose he utilised Hughes' three infantry regiments, of which the 59th was on the right, the 2d Sikhs in the centre, and the 3d Goorkhas on the left. Part of the reserve infantry was sent to make good the interval between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry.

The guns had no sooner come into action than the enemy in great masses showed themselves on spur and saddle and plain, bent seemingly on an attempt to envelop the position held by the British. 'Suddenly,' writes Hensmen, 'a commotion was observed in the most advanced lines of the opposing army; the moullas could be seen haranguing the irregular host with frantic energy, the beating of the tom-toms was redoubled, and then as if by magic waves on waves of men—ghazees of the most desperate type—poured down upon the plain, and rushed upon General Stewart's force. The main body of the Afghan army remained upon the hill to watch the ghazees in their reckless onslaught, and take advantage of any success they might gain. The fanaticism of the 3000 or 4000 men who made this desperate charge has perhaps never been equalled; they had 500 or 600 yards to cover before they could come to close quarters, and yet they made nothing of the distance. Nearly all were well armed with tulwars, knives, and pistols. Some carried rifles and matchlocks, while a few—and those must have been resolute fanatics indeed—had simply pikes made of bayonets, or pieces of sharpened iron fastened on long shafts. Their attack broke with greatest violence on our flanks. On our left flank the 19th Bengal Lancers were still moving into position when the ghazees rushed in among them. In an instant they were hidden in the cloud of dust and smoke, and then they galloped toward the right rear, and struck into the reserve in rear of the Lieutenant-General and his staff. All was confusion for a moment; the ammunition mules were stampeded, and with the riderless horses of the lancers killed or wounded in the mÊlÉe, dashed into the headquarter staff. The ghazees had continued their onward rush, and were engaged in hand-to-hand fighting with our infantry. Some of them penetrated to within twenty yards of the knoll on which the staff were watching the action, and so critical was the moment that Sir Donald Stewart and every man of his staff drew their swords and prepared for self-defence.' The hurried retirement of the lancers had left the left flank bare. It was turned by the fierce rush of the fanatics, who were actually in rear of the leftward infantry regiment and in the heart of the British position. The Goorkhas had been thrown into momentary confusion, but their colonel promptly formed them into rallying squares, whose fire mowed down the ghazees and arrested the headlong vehemence of their turning movement. But it was not the British left only which was temporarily compromised by the furious onslaught of the fanatics. Their enveloping charge broke down the defence of the weakly-manned interval between the left of the artillery and the right of the infantry. The detachments holding that interval were forced back, righting hand-to-hand as the sheer weight of the assault compelled them to give ground; the 59th, in its effort to throw back its right to cover the interval and protect the guns, was thrown into confusion and gave ground; and the guns, their case shot exhausted and the Afghans within a few yards of their muzzles, had to be retired. The onslaught on the right front of the horse-battery was delivered with great determination, but was held at bay and finally crushed by the repeated charges of the 2d Punjaub cavalry.

Every man of the reserves was hurried into the fighting line; the soldiers were steadied by the energetic efforts of their officers and settled down to a steady and continuous fire from their breechloaders; the guns poured their shells into the hostile masses; and the fire of the forty-pounders on the left effectually arrested the attempt of the Afghan horse to move round that flank. The hard-fought combat lasted for an hour; at ten o'clock the 'cease fire' sounded, and the British victory was signal. The enemy was dispersing in full flight, and the cavalry was chasing the fugitives across the plain on the right. How reckless had been the whirlwind charges of the ghazees was evidenced by the extraordinary number of their dead whose corpses strewed the battlefield. In no previous conflict between our troops and the Afghans had the latter suffered nearly so heavily. More than 1000 dead were counted on the field, and many bodies were carried away; on a moderate computation their total loss must have been between 2000 and 3000, and that in an estimated strength of from 12,000 to 15,000. The casualties of the British force were seventeen killed and 124 wounded, of whom four died of their wounds. The injuries consisted almost wholly of sword slashes and knife stabs received in hand-to-hand encounters. The pursuit was soon recalled, but the Hazaras took up the chase with ardour and in the rancour of vengeance slew and spared not.

Sir Donald Stewart tarried on the field only long enough to bury his dead and have his wounded attended to; and soon after noon his force resumed its march. Ghuznee was reached on the 21st, where there was a halt of three days. It had been reported that the indomitable Mushk-i-Alum was raising the tribesmen of Zurmut and Shilgur to avenge the defeat of Ahmed Khel, and a cavalry reconnaissance made on the 22d had found a gathering of 2000 or 3000 men about the villages of Urzoo and Shalez, six miles south-east of Ghuznee. On the morning of the 23d a strong column commanded by Brigadier-General Palliser moved on the villages, which were found occupied in considerable force. They were too solidly built to be much injured by artillery fire, and the Afghans lay close in the shelter they afforded. Palliser hesitated to commit his infantry to an attack. Sir Donald Stewart having arrived, ordered the infantry to carry the villages without delay, and the affair was soon over, the tribesmen suffering severely from the rifle fire as they evacuated the villages, and later in the pursuit made by the cavalry and horse-artillery. On the following day the march toward Cabul was resumed.

On the 16th April Major-General Ross had been despatched from Cabul by Sir Frederick Roberts on the mission of joining hands with Stewart's division. On the 20th Ross opened heliographic communication with Sir Donald, and was informed of the latter's victory at Ahmed Khel. But the junction of the two forces was not accomplished until the 27th; and in the interval the force commanded by General Ross had received considerable annoyance at the hands of tribal levies gathered by local chiefs. The tribesmen interfered with the roadmaking operations of his sappers in the vicinity of Sheikabad, and some fighting occurred in very rugged country on the 23d. Trivial loss was experienced by his command, but the demonstrations of the tribesmen evinced with what inveterate determination, notwithstanding so many severe lessons, the Afghans persisted in their refusal to admit themselves conquered. Driven away with severe loss on the 25th, those indomitable hillmen and villagers were back again on the following morning on the overhanging ridges; nor were they dispersed by the 'resources of civilised warfare' until more of them had paid with their lives the penalty of their obstinate hostility. On the 28th, at Sheikabad, Sir Donald Stewart took leave of the division which he had led from Candahar, and proceeded to Cabul with General Ross' force to assume the chief command in North-Eastern Afghanistan. His division turned aside into the Logur valley, where it remained at until the final concentration about Cabul in anticipation of the evacuation. By the reinforcement brought by Stewart the Cabul field force was increased to a strength of about 18,000 men.