  The writer, in these pages, has shown by what must be conceded on all sides, irrefragable evidence that school histories are in error in saying the Battle of New Orleans was fought after peace, and was therefore a needless battle. The writer has also shown by evidence he considers conclusive, that England held as invalid the title of the United States to Louisiana, acquired by sale from Bonaparte to the United States in 1803; that England deliberately planned the conquest of Louisiana (with the resultant development, if successful, of a great dominion to the west of the United States, like Canada on the North). That evidence is mainly furnished by the British themselves. First in the British note to the United States Peace Commissioners, criticizing the title of the United States to Louisiana; and, second, in the fitting out and dispatching of the expedition against New Orleans during the peace negotiations; in the complete Civil Government staff, for Louisiana, carried by the expedition; in the record of the peace negotiations, first in the insistence by the British upon the Uti Possidetis principle, and, second, when that failed, in the proposal of words to be inserted in the Mutual Restoration clause, which proposal finally resulted in the word, “Possessions” in that clause, under which England could hold that Louisiana, having been taken, was not subject to return, not being a possession of the United States; further in the letter of Prime Minister Liverpool to Lord Castlereagh, assuming British occupation of New Orleans, outlining purpose to “frighten Madison” into signing the Treaty (thus leaving England in possession of Louisiana). After close and careful study, the writer presents as a summary of his conclusion as to the value of the Battle of New Orleans: First, that it was a highly necessary battle on the part of the United States, rendered so by British aggression; Second, that the statement in school and other histories that it was fought after peace is entirely false, the Peace Treaty itself being evidence. (All historians, past, present, and to come, cannot change the text of that Treaty); Third, that it saved the Louisiana Purchase to the United States or averted another war with England; Fourth, that it settled forever the question of the title to Louisiana; Fifth, that it created a profound impression on the world. Speaking, as one orator has put it, in language all nations could understand, that the young American Republic had the will to be free and the power to enforce that will; Sixth, that it marked the last time that the foot of a foreign foe has been set on American soil, except when Mexico invaded Texas in 1846; Seventh, that it practically added to the Peace Treaty that impressment and orders in council would no longer be imposed by England, for these obnoxious policies were never sought to be revived; Eighth, that it saved this sorely harassed, nearly treason-torn country, at a critical time in its life, from threatened and possible disunion, and re-established national self-respect; Ninth, that it made Andrew Jackson a national hero, resulting in his election as President of the United States, and the establishment of what is known as the Jackson era; Tenth, that it resulted in mutual respect and friendship between the United States and England, which has endured to this day, and which it is hoped will perpetually endure. Could any battle have had a greater or more varied effect? School historians and other historians, in appraising the battle as a needless and useless one, do violence to truth and grossly impose upon Young America, as well as America in general. The underlying American sentiment of honor, truth and justice demands revision of these school histories, and that right speedily. In conclusion, the writer recommends, as revision, in those histories which desire to dispose of the Battle of New Orleans in a paragraph, the following: The Battle of New Orleans, fought January 8, 1815, was one of the most brilliant defensive victories in history. Many historians have classed it as a needless victory in that it was fought after peace. That is an error, for the Peace Treaty, signed by the Commissioners of the two countries, December 24, 1814, specifically provided that it should not be effective until ratified by both sides. It was not ratified by the United States until February 17, 1815, soon after its reception. The news of the victory came at a critical time in the history of the country, and was received with great enthusiasm everywhere. It settled forever all question as to the title of the United States to Louisiana. It saved Louisiana, or a least averted another war with England. It resulted in lasting, solid peace with England, which should permanently endure. As illustration of the character of that peace, it may be pointed out that the boundary line between the United States and Canada extending about three thousand miles, has not, on either side, a fort or fortification. God help the English-speaking people if one should ever be necessary! The End. |
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