LESSON I.

“The Elements of Moral Science: By Francis Wayland, D.D., President of Brown University, and Professor of Moral Philosophy. Fortieth Thousand. Boston, 1849.” Pp. 396.

This author informs us that he has been many years preparing the work, with a view to furnish his pupils with a text-book free from the errors of Paley. Like Paley, whom he evidently wishes to supersede, he has devoted a portion of his strength to the abolition of slavery. We propose to look into the book with an eye to that subject alone. President Wayland says:

P. 24. “Moral Law is a form of expression denoting an order of sequence established between the moral quality of actions and their results.”

Pp. 25, 26. “An order of sequence established, supposes, of necessity, an Establisher. Hence Moral Philosophy, as well as every other science, proceeds upon the supposition of the existence of a Universal Cause, the Creator of all things, who has made every thing as it is, and who has subjected all things to the relations which they sustain. And hence, as all relations, whether moral or physical, are the result of his enactment, an order of sequence once discovered in morals, is just as inviolable as an order of sequence in physics.

“Such being the fact, it is evident that the moral laws of God can never be varied by the institutions of man, any more than the physical laws. The results which God has connected with actions will inevitably occur, all the created power in the universe to the contrary notwithstanding.

“Yet men have always flattered themselves with the hope that they could violate the moral law and escape the consequences which God has established. The reason is obvious. In physics, the consequent follows the antecedent, often immediately, and most commonly after a stated and well-known interval. In morals, the result is frequently long delayed; the time of its occurrence is always uncertain:—Hence, ‘because the sentence against an evil work is not speedily executed, therefore the hearts of the sons of men are fully set in them to do evil.’ But time, whether long or short, has neither power nor tendency to change the order of an established sequence. The time required for vegetation, in different orders of plants, may vary; but, yet, wheat will always produce wheat, and an acorn will always produce an oak. That such is the case in morals, a heathen poet has taught us. ‘Raro, antecedentum scelestum deseruit pede poena claudo.’ Hor. lib. iii. car. 2.

“A higher authority has admonished us, ‘Be not deceived; God is not mocked; whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he reap.’ It is also to be remembered, that, in morals as well as in physics, the harvest is always more abundant than the seed from which it springs.”

To this doctrine we yield the highest approval.

The first obvious deduction from the lesson here advanced is, that the laws of God, as once revealed to man, never lose their high moral qualities nor their divine character, at any subsequent age of the world. The law, which God delivered to Moses from Mount Sinai, authorizing his chosen people to buy slaves, and hold them as an inheritance for their children after them, is, therefore, the law of God now. The action of the law may be suspended at a particular time or place, from a change of contingencies,—yet the law stands unaffected.

We hope no one doubts the accuracy of the doctrine thus fairly stated in these “Elements.” But we shall see how fatal it is to some portions of the author’s positions concerning slavery. And we propose to show how this doctrine, as connected with slavery, has been, and is elucidated in scripture. The twenty-eighth chapter of Deuteronomy shows that the fruits of wickedness are all manner of curses, finally terminating in slavery or death.

Here, slavery, as a threatened punishment, distinctly looks back to a course of wickedness for its antecedent. The same idea is spread through the whole Scriptures: “Whosoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin.” John viii. 34. “I am carnal, sold under sin.” Rom. vii. 14. “Behold, for your iniquities have ye sold yourselves.” Isa. 1. 1. See, also, Jer. xiii. 22.

The biblical scholar will recollect a multitude of instances where this doctrine is clearly advanced, recognising sin as the antecedent of slavery.

Abraham was obedient to the voice of God. His conduct was the antecedent and the consequent was, God heaped upon him many blessings and among them, riches in various things,—“male and female slaves,” some of whom were “born in his house,” and some “bought with his money;” and God made a covenant with him, granting him, and his seed after him, the land of Canaan for an everlasting possession.

But this gift, as is the continuance of all other blessings, was accompanied with a condition, which is well explained in Genesis, xviii. 19: “For I know him, that he will command his children and his household after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to do justice and judgment; that the Lord may bring upon Abraham that which he hath spoken of him.”

Scholars will concede the fact that “his household” is a term by which his slaves are particularly included, over whom his government was extended; and, without its proper maintenance, the covenant so far on his part would be broken.

From the wording of the covenant it is evident that Abraham had slaves before the covenant was made, since it embraced regulations concerning slaves, but, in no instance, hints that the existence of slavery was adverse to the law of God, or that the holding of slaves, as slaves, was contrary to his will. The deduction is, that slavery exists in the world by Divine appointment; and that the act of owning slaves is in conformity with the moral law.

The doctrine, that sin is the antecedent of slavery, is further elucidated and made still more manifest by the recognition of the institution by the biblical writers, where they place sin and slavery in opposition to holiness and freedom:—thus, figuratively, making righteousness the antecedent of freedom. “Stand fast, therefore, in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, and be not entangled again with the yoke of bondage.” Gal. v. 1. “And ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.” John iii. 32.

The abuse of slavery, like the abuse of any thing else, is doubtless a great sin. Of the blessings God bestows on man, there is perhaps no one he does not abuse; and while we examine the laws of God, as presenting to the mind the vast field of cause and effect,—of antecedent and consequent,—we may be led to a reflection on the necessity of a conformity thereto, lest a long continuance of such abuses shall become the antecedent to future calamities and woes, either to ourselves or posterity; woes and calamities prefigured by those nations and tribes already under the infliction of slavery, as a just punishment of sin.

Thus far, we thank the Rev. Dr. Wayland for this fair exposÉ of his views of the moral law of God; and if he will apply them now to the institution of slavery,—if he will unfetter his intellect from the manacles imposed on it by a defective education on that subject, and cut himself loose from the prejudices that his associations have gathered around him, we may yet have occasion to rejoice over him as one once an estray from the fold of truth, but now returned, “sitting in his right mind and clothed.” And will not Mr. Fuller and Professor Taylor rejoice with us!

LESSON II.

In those “Elements of Moral Science,” we find the following, p. 29:

“From what has been said, it may be seen that there exists, in the actions of men, an element which does not exist in the actions of brutes * * * * * * We can operate upon brutes only by fear of punishment, and hope of reward. We can operate upon man, not only in this manner, but also by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong; and by such means as may improve his moral nature. Hence, all modes of punishment, which treat men as we treat brutes, are as unphilosophical as they are thoughtless, cruel, and vindictive. Such are those systems of criminal jurisprudence which have in view nothing more than the infliction of pain upon the offender.”

It was unnecessary to inform us that man possesses higher mental endowments than the brute. But the main object of the author in the foregoing paragraph is his deduction; that, because we can operate on man by an appeal to his consciousness of right and wrong, therefore any other mode of governing him is wrong. This consequent we fail to perceive. We also fail in the perception that his postulate is universally true: which we think should have been proved before he can claim assent to the deduction. If this our view be correct, we beg the reverend author to reflect how far he may have made himself obnoxious to the charge of sophistry!

If President Wayland intends, by the clause,—“and by such means as may improve his moral nature,”—to include corporeal punishment, then his mind was unprepared to grapple with the subject; for, in that case, the whole paragraph is obscure, without object, and senseless. We most readily agree that to govern man by appeals to his consciousness of right and wrong is highly proper where the mind is so well cultivated that no other government is required.

But, however unhappy may be the reflection, too large a proportion of the human family will not fall within that class. How often do we see among men, otherwise having some claim to be classed with the intelligent, those of acknowledged bad habits; habits which directly force the sufferer downward to poverty, disgrace, disease, imbecility, and death,—on whom argument addressed to their “consciousness of right and wrong,” “is water spilled on the ground.”

Children, whose ancestors have, for ages, ranked among the highly cultivated of the earth,—each generation surpassing its predecessor in knowledge, in science, and religion,—have been found to degenerate, oftener than otherwise, when trained solely by arguments addressed to their reason, and unaccompanied by physical compulsion.

What then are we to expect from man in a savage state, whose ancestors have been degenerating from generation to generation, through untold ages,—him, who has scarcely a feeling in common with civilized man, except such as is common to the mere animal,—him, whom deteriorating causes have reduced to the lowest grade above the brute?

Domberger spent twelve years in passing through the central parts of Africa, from north to south. He found the negroes, in a large district of country, in a state of total brutality. Their habits were those only of the wild brutes. They had no fixed residences. They lay down wherever they might be when disposed to sleep. They were not more gregarious than the wild goats. So far as he could discover, they had not a language even, by which to hold intercourse with each other. They possessed no power by which they were enabled to exhibit moral degradation, any more than the wild beasts.

Hanno, the Carthaginian navigator, in his Periplus, eight hundred years before the birth of Christ, gives a similar account of a race he calls GÆtuli.

It is possible that man, in these extreme cases, where there is very little to unlearn, might sooner be regenerated, elevated to civilization, physical and mental power, than in other cases where there may be far more proof of mental capacity, but where the worst of intellectual and physical habits have stained soul and body with, perhaps, a more indelible degradation.

It would be a curious experiment, and add much to our knowledge of the races of man, to ascertain how many generations, under the most favourable treatment, it would require to produce an equal to Moses, or a David, a Newton, or the learned Dr. Wayland himself, (if such be possible,) from these specimens of man presented before us! And we now inquire, what course of treatment will you propose, as the most practical, to elevate such a race to civilization?

It appears to us God has decided that slavery is the most effectual.

“Therefore my people are gone into captivity, because they have no knowledge.” Isa. v. 13. “And they forsook the Lord, and served Baal and Ashteroth. And the anger of the Lord was hot against Israel, and he delivered them into the hands of the spoilers that spoiled them, and he sold them into the hands of their enemies round about.” Judg. ii. 13, 14. See also, iii. 6–8. “If his children forsake my law and walk not in my judgments: if they break my statutes, and keep not my commandments: then will I visit their transgressions with the rod and their iniquity with stripes.” Ps. lxxxviii. 30–32. “He that troubleth his own house shall inherit the wind: and the fool shall be the servant (??????ebed ebed, slave) to the wise of heart.” Prov. ii. 29. “And her daughters shall go into captivity. Thus will I execute judgments in Egypt: and they shall know that I am the Lord.” Ezek. xxx. 18. See also the preceding part of the chapter.

It is highly probable that among savage tribes, punishment and the infliction of pain are often applied with no higher view than to torture the object of displeasure. But to us it seems remarkably unfortunate, in a student of moral and civil jurisprudence, to suggest that legal punishment, among civilized men, is ever awarded or ordered with any such feeling. If our education has given us a correct view of the subject, the man who inflicts pain even on the brute, solely on the account of such a feeling, instantly, so far as it is known, sinks to the grade of a savage; and much more explicitly when the object of revenge is his fellow man. On the contrary, when “the offender” has given unquestionable evidence of a depravity too deeply seated for any hope of regeneration, and the law orders his death, it selects that mode of execution which inflicts the least suffering, and which shall have also the greatest probable influence to deter others who may be downward bound in the road of moral deterioration. There never has been a code of laws among civilized nations, where the object of punishment was to inflict pain on the implicated; only so far as was thought necessary to influence a change of action for the better. The object of punishment invariably has been the improvement of society.

If the Rev. Dr. Wayland had been teaching legislation to savages, or, perhaps, their immediate descendants, his remarks, to which we allude, might have been in place. But may we inquire to what cause are we indebted for them?

Permit us to inquire of the Doctor, where now are to be found the “systems of criminal jurisprudence” to which he alludes? Does he imagine that such system has some likeness to the government of the civilized man over his slave? Or, in their government, does he propose to abolish corporeal punishment, because he may think that will destroy the institution itself? For “a servant (???????abed abed, a slave) though he understand, he will not answer.” Prov. xxix. 19.

We cannot pass over the paragraph we have quoted, without expressing the most bitter regret to learn from Dr. Wayland’s own words, that he recognises the fact, without giving it reproval, that “we” punish “brutes” with no other view than to inflict pain. To us, such an idea is most repugnant and awful! And we hope—we pray Him who alone hath power to drag up from the deep darkness of degradation, that the minds of such men may be placed under the controlling influence of a rule that will compel to a higher sense of what is proper, and to a more clear perception of what is truth!

The learned Doctor says:

P. 49. “By conscience, or moral sense, is meant that faculty by which we discern the moral quality of actions, and by which we are capable of certain affections in respect to this quality.

“By faculty is meant any particular part of our constitution, by which we become affected by the various qualities and relations of beings around us?” * * * “Now, that we do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men, must, I think, be admitted. Every human being is conscious, that, from childhood, he has observed it.” * * * * *

P. 50. “The question would then seem reduced to this: Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or by a combination of faculties? I think it must be evident from what has been already stated, that this is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.

“Now, if this be the case, it seems self-evident that we must have a distinct and separate faculty, to make us acquainted with the existence of this distinct and separate quality.”

And for proof, he adds: “This is the case in respect to all other distinct qualities: it is, surely, reasonable to suppose, that it would be the case in this.”

What! have we a distinct faculty by which we determine one thing to be red, and another distinct faculty by which we discover a thing to be black; another distinct faculty by which we judge a thing to be a cube, and another distinct faculty by which we determine it to be a triangle? Have we one distinct faculty by which we find a melon, and another by which we find a gourd? What! one distinct faculty by which we determine a professor of moral philosophy to be a correct teacher, and another by which we discover him to be a visionary?

This faculty of moral sense puts us in mind of Dr. Testy’s description of the peculiar and distinct particles upon the tongue, which render a man a liar, a lunatic, or a linguist; a treacher, a tattler, or a teacher, and so on. His theory is that every mental and moral quality of a man has its distinct particle, or little pimple, upon the tongue, whereby the quality is developed; or, by the aid of which the man is enabled to make the quality manifest. Long practice in examining the tongues of sick people enabled him, he says, to make the discovery. We should like to know what acuminated elevation of the cuticle of the tongue represented “conscience or moral sense,” as a separate and distinct faculty!

Why does he not at once borrow support from the extravagancies of phrenology, and assert, according to the notions of its teachers, that, since the brain is divided into distinct organs for the exercise of each distinct faculty, therefore there must be a distinct faculty for the conception of each idea? There is surely an evident relation between this theory of the author and the doctrines of Gall; nor will the world fail to associate it with the phantasies of Mesmer.

But we ask the author and his pupils to apply to this theory the truism of Professor Dodd: “It is, at all times, a sufficient refutation of what purports to be a statement of facts, to show that the only kind of evidence by which the facts could possibly be sustained, does not exist.”

The theory by which the Doctor arrives at the conclusion that we possess a separate and distinct faculty for the perception of each separate and distinct quality, assimilates to that of a certain quack, who asserted that the human stomach was mapped off, like Gall’s cranium, into distinct organs of digestion; one solely for beef-steak, one for mutton-chops, and another for plum-pudding!

It is a great point with certain of the higher class of abolition writers to establish the doctrine that man possesses a distinct mental power, which they call conscience, or moral sense, by which he is enabled to discover, of himself, and without the aid of study, teaching, or even inspiration, what is right and what is wrong.

The practice is, the child is taught by them that slavery is very wicked; that no slaveholder can be a good man; and much of such matter. Books are put into the hands of the schoolboy and the youth, inculcating similar lessons, fraught with lamentation and sympathy for the imaginary woes of the slave, and hatred and disgust towards the master; and when maturer years are his, he is asked if he does not feel that slavery is very wicked; and the professors of moral philosophy then inform him that he feels so because he possesses “a distinct mental faculty”—distinct from the judgment—which teaches those who cultivate it, infallibly, all that is right and wrong; that this conscience, or moral sense, is more to be relied on than the Bible—than the ancient inspirations of God!

Hence, Channing says:

“That same inward principle, which teaches a man what he is bound to do to others, teaches equally, and at the same instant, what others are bound to do to him.” * * * “His conscience, in revealing the moral law, does not reveal a law for himself only, but speaks as a universal legislator.” * * * “There is no deeper principle in human nature than the consciousness of right.” Vol. ii. p. 33.

And Barnes, on Slavery, says:

P. 381. “If the Bible could be shown to defend and countenance slavery as a good institution, it would make thousands of infidels; for there are multitudes of minds that will see more clearly that slavery is against all the laws which God has written on the human soul, than they would see, that a book, sanctioning such a system, had evidence of Divine origin.”

And this same author makes Dr. Wayland say:

P. 310. “Well may we ask, in the words of Dr. Wayland, (pp. 83, 84,) whether there was ever such a moral superstructure raised on such a foundation? The doctrine of purgatory from a verse of Maccabees; the doctrine of papacy from the saying of Christ to Peter; the establishment of the Inquisition from the obligation to extend the knowledge of religious truth, all seem nothing to it. If the religion of Christ allows such a license from such precepts as these, the New Testament would be the greatest curse that ever was inflicted on our race.”

This book, as quoted by Barnes, we have not seen.

Such is the doctrine of these theologians, growing out of the possession, as they imagine, of this distinct moral faculty, infallibly teaching them the truth touching the moral quality of the actions of men. And what is its effect upon their scarcely more wicked pupils? One of them, in a late speech in Congress, says:

“Sir, I must express the most energetic dissent from those who would justify modern slavery from the Levitical law. My reason and conscience revolt from those interpretations which

The ignorant fanaticism, so proudly buoyant even in repose upon its ill-digested reason,—here so flippantly uttered,—to us bespeaks a dangerous man, (as far as he may have capacity,) in whatever station he may be found. The most hateful idolatry has never presented to the world a stronger proof of a distorted imagination giving vent to the rankest falsehood. It is to be deeply regretted that such intellects are ever permitted to have any influence upon the minds of the young. We deem it would be a fearful inquiry, to examine how far the strange assassinations, lately so common at the North, have been the direct result of that mental training of which we here see an example. We fear too little is thought of the quick transition from this erroneous theology to the darkened paths of man when enlightened alone by his own depraved heart.

The saying is true, however awful: He who rejects or dispels the plain meaning of the Bible, rejects our God, and is an idolater; and God alone can give bound to his wicked conceptions.

The foregoing extracts show us a specimen of the arguments and conclusions emanating from the doctrine that the conscience is a distinct mental power, and that it infallibly teaches what is right before God. We deem it quite objectionable—quite erroneous!

We present the proposition: The judgment is as singly employed in the decision of what is right and wrong, as it is in the conclusion that all the parts of a thing constitute the whole of it. True, the judgment, when in the exercise of determining what is right and wrong in regard to our own acts, has been named conscience. But it remains for that class of philosophers, who argue that man possesses a faculty of clairvoyance, to establish that man has also a sister faculty, which they call conscience, or moral sense; and that it exists as an independent mental power, distinct from judgment.

Most men live without reflection. They think of nothing but the objects of sense, of pressing want, and the means of relief. The wonderful works of nature create no wonder. A mine of sea-shells on the Andes excites no surprise. Of the analogies or dissimilarities between things, or their essential relations, the mind takes no notice. Even their intellectual powers exist almost without their cognisance. Their mental faculties are little improved or cultivated; and, as they are forced to the Gazetteer for the description of some distant locality, so they would be to their logic, before they could speak of their own mental functions.

The teaching of this doctrine, untrue as it is, may, therefore, be very harmful; as ill-informed individuals often form a very erroneous judgment about right and wrong, and, under the influence of its teachings, may come to think and believe that their conclusion concerning right and wrong is the product of their infallible guide, the conscience, or moral sense, and therefore past all doubt and beyond question; that their minds are under the influence and control of a new and spiritually higher law than the law of the land, or even the moral law as laid down in the Bible, when not in unison with their feelings. And we venture to prophesy, in case this doctrine shall gain general credence, that such will be the rocks on which multitudes will founder; for simple and ill-informed people may thus be led, and doubtless are, to do very wicked and mischievous acts, under the influence of this belief—a belief of their possessing this power, which no one ever did possess, unless inspired.

“There is a way that seemeth right unto a man, but the end thereof are the ways of death.” Prov. xvi. 25.

Thus we see there is a class of theologians, who, in hot pursuit of abolitionism, seem ready to sacrifice their Bible and its religion to the establishment of such principles as they deem wholly contradictory to, and incompatible with, the existence of slavery; and it is hence that they attempt to teach that man possesses an intuitive sense of its wrong. But shall we not be forced, with regret, to acknowledge, that there are quacks in divinity as well as in physic?

LESSON IV.

We do not charge Dr. Wayland with being the author of this new doctrine that man possesses an independent and distinct power, faculty, or sense, by the exercise of which he perceives right and wrong, or, in other words, the moral quality of the actions of men, and upon which perception he may rest with safety, as to its accuracy and truthfulness; for the same doctrine has been suggested by greater men than Dr. Wayland, long ago. Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutchinson, and Dr. Reid have laid the foundation; the latter of whom says, (p. 242,) “The testimony of our moral faculty, like that of the external senses, is the testimony of nature, and we have the same reason to rely upon it.“ Again: “As we rely upon the clear and distinct testimony of our eyes, concerning the figures and colours of bodies about us, we have the same reason, with security, to rely upon the clear and unbiassed testimony of our conscience with regard to what we ought or ought not to do.”

Such sentiments may seem to some to be deducible from an indistinct and indefinite reference to our judgment after the understanding has been improved by moral culture, when such judgment, by a mere looseness of language, is sometimes described as if the writers confounded it with the state of mind and moral perfectibility produced by the reception of the Holy Ghost. Thus, Archbishop Secker, in his Fourth Lecture on the Catechism, says:

“How shall all persons know what they are taught to believe is really true?

“Answer. The greater part of it, when it is once duly proposed to them, they may perceive to be so by the light of their own reason and conscience.”

Now it is evident that the bishop’s answer is predicated upon the supposition that the understanding has been cultivated in conformity to the principles of moral truth.

But, from such hasty, perhaps thoughtless, snatches of speculation, occasionally found in some few of the older metaphysical writers, our author and his co-associates in this belief have drawn their materials, remodelled the parts, and reared, even as to heaven, a lofty structure upon a doubtful, tottering base, bringing untold social and political evils upon society, and spiritual death, in its fall, to all who shelter under it. But for the good of the world, in opposition to such a doctrine, truth has erected her column of solid masonry, against which the fanaticism and sophistry of these builders can only, like successive drops of water, carry down the walls some useless portions of the cement.

We repeat, how tottering must be the argument founded upon analogy where there is no relation! We all agree that the senses make truthful representations: all see, smell, and taste alike; vinegar will be sour to the savage, as well as the savant. But is their judgment the same about the moral qualities of actions? What says this moral sense, this conscience, in the savage, who is taught to steal from his friend and torture his enemy? Does the reverend doctor think his moral sense will dictate the same conclusion? What right has he, then, to say, it is the voice of nature—of God? Does he fail to perceive that the moral quality of actions is distinguished by man in conformity to his experience, his training, his education?

We see that men often differ about the moral quality of an action. It might be that no two men would have the same idea about the moral quality of a particular action. Would the conscience, this moral sense, or faculty, in such case, be right in each one? If not, who is to determine which is right and which is wrong? And further, of what use to man can be this distinct, independent, and unchangeably truthful power, which, nevertheless, brings him no certainty? But has the mind of man ever found out that God has overdone, or unnecessarily done, any thing? Will these theorists reflect, that, in case God had seen fit to bestow such a sense on man, inspiration would have been useless, and the Bible not wanted? And the condition of man upon the earth would be wholly stationary instead of progressive. And permit us to inquire, whether this notion of theirs is the reason why some of these theorists speak so rashly, we might say blasphemously, of that sacred volume, upon the condition which they dictate?

The truth is, we have no such infallible guide. The idea of right and wrong, either theologically or physically considered, is always fixed through an exertion of the powers of the understanding. We have no instinctive power reaching the case. Our judgment, our feelings are often unstable, irregular, and sometimes antagonistic. In abstruse cases, very often we cannot even satisfy ourselves what is right and will it be said that we do not often fail to see the object, design, and law of God touching a case?

On every decision on a question of right or wrong, a train of mental action is called into operation, comparing the ideas already in the mind with the facts of the case under review, and noting the similarity of these facts to our idea of right, or whether the facts conform to our idea of wrong. This decision we call judgment: but when the decision reaches to the question of right or wrong, touching our own conduct only, logicians have agreed to call it conscience; not a distinct action from judgment—much less a distinct faculty; and by no means carrying with it more proof of accuracy and correctness than is our judgment about any other matter, where the ideas and facts are equally manifest and accurately presented.

There is another consideration which to us gives proof that the conscience or moral sense is not an independent faculty of the mind, nor to be relied on at all as infallible. Many of us have noticed the changes that imperceptibly come over our moral feelings, and judgment of right and wrong, conscience or moral sense, through the influences of association and habit. Our affluent neighbour, who manifests to others many virtues and some follies, our mind, by association and habit, regards as a perfect model of human greatness and perfection. Thus a corrupt government soon surveys a corrupt people; and a somewhat licentious, but talented and accomplished clergyman, soon finds his hearers in fashion. Nor is it unfrequent, that which should stigmatize a father is beheld with admiration by the son. Thus wealth, to most, is desirable, but its desirability has been created by association; we recollect the objects it enables us to command, often the objects of our principal pursuit. The quality the mind associates with these gratifications, it eventually associates with that which procures them. Thus, we perceive, the mind is able to form a moral estimate upon considerations wholly artificial, which could never happen in case the moral sense was independent, and a distinct faculty teaching us infallible truth.

But how are we to account for the fact that some of the finest intellects, as well as the most learned men, have fallen into this most dangerous error? It should be a subject of deep thought!

We discover, in some men of the highest order of intellects, the power of arriving, as it were instantaneously, at a conclusion, giving it the appearance of being intuitive, rather than the result of what would be, when analyzed, a long chain of reasoning. Thus, the instant and happy thought often springing to the mind when in some sudden or unforeseen difficulty. The nice and instant perception, often displayed by medical men, of the condition of the patient, is an example; and hence the astonishing accuracy of judgment, sometimes noticed in the military commander, from a mere glance of the eye.

In such cases the mind is often not conscious of any mental action; and others, who observe these facts, are led, sometimes, to confound what, in such cases, is a deductive judgment, with intuitiveness. The judgment, thus formed without any perceptible succession of thought, is merely the result of acquirement from long experience and habits of active ratiocination. Some few instances of this unconscious and rapid thought have been exemplified by mathematicians, when the calculator could give no account how he arrived at the conclusion. Will any one claim that they abstract their answers from the most abstruse propositions intuitively, or by instinct, or by any new and distinct faculty of the mind? This habit of mind is as applicable to morals as to any thing else. But in mathematics the data are everywhere the same; whereas in morals the data are as different among men as are their conditions of life; because our ideas of right and wrong, existing in the mind before the judgment is formed on the case to be considered, were introduced by the aid of the senses, through the medium of experience and education; and it is, therefore, quite obvious that the idea of right in one man may be quite like the idea of wrong in another.

But it remains to show the fallacy of the argument by which Dr. Wayland arrives at his conclusion. Let us examine the paragraph quoted, and sift from verbiage the naked points of the argument:

“We do actually observe a moral quality in the actions of men.”

“Do we perceive this quality of actions by a single faculty, or a combination of faculties? This notion” (the perception of the moral quality of an action) “is, in its nature, simple and ultimate, and distinct from every other notion.”

“We have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities.” “Therefore, it is self-evident that this is a separate and distinct faculty.”

The syllogism is defective because the idea of right or wrong is not simple nor ultimate, but complex, and ever subject to change from the influence of any new light presented to the mind. Nor is it true that we possess a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with each distinct quality; for, if so, the mind would be merely a very large bundle of faculties; and we should neither possess nor stand in need of any reasoning powers whatever, because the naked truth about every thing would always stand revealed before us by these faculties; which, we think, is not the fact.

In syllogistic argument, the first principles must be something that cannot be otherwise—unalterable—an eternal truth; “because these qualities cannot belong to the conclusion unless they belong to the premises, which are its causes.”

The syllogism will then stand thus:

It is not true our notion, or idea, of the moral quality of an action “is simple and ultimate, and distinct from any other idea or notion:”

It is not true that we have a distinct faculty to make us acquainted with the existence of all other distinct qualities:

Therefore, it is not true, nor self-evident, that we perceive the moral qualities of an action, or that we have the idea or notion of it, by the aid of a single distinct and separate faculty.

The “notion” advanced by Dr. Wayland, on this subject, appears to us so strange, that it would be difficult to conceive it to have been issued or promulgated by a schoolman, did we not know how often men, led by passion, some by prejudice, argue from false premises to which they take no heed, or, from a want of information, honestly mistake for truths.

LESSON V.

P. 206. “It” (slavery) “supposes that the Creator intended one human being to govern the physical, intellectual, and moral actions of as many other human beings as, by purchase, he can bring within his physical power, and that one human being may thus acquire a right to sacrifice the happiness of any number of other human beings, for the purpose of promoting his own.”

This proposition is almost a total error. Slavery supposes the Creator intended that the interest of the master in the slave who, by becoming his slave, becomes his property, should secure to the slave that protection and government which the slave is too degenerate to supply to himself; and that such protection and government are necessary to the happiness and well-being of the slave, without which he either remains stationary or degenerates in his moral, mental, and physical condition.

P. 207. “It” (slavery) “renders the eternal happiness of the one party subservient to the temporal happiness of the other.”

This is equally untrue. Slavery subjects one party to the command of another who is expected to feel it a duty to so “command his household” that “they shall keep the way of the Lord, to do justice and judgment.”

This is the voice of God on the subject, as heretofore quoted. The learned Dr. Wayland is evidently wholly unacquainted with the spirit and intention, and, we may add, origin of the institution of slavery; yet he has, doubtless, been studying some of its abuses.

But suppose a man to study nothing of Christianity but its abuses, and from these alone undertake to describe what he conceives to be its results, its character, and suppositions; he doubtless would make what Dr. Wayland would very justly call a distorted representation; and perhaps, he might safely use a harsher phrase. But would such a representation be productive of any good in the world? It might do much mischief by spreading, broadcast, its errors and misrepresentations; a most delicious food for the morbid appetite of the ignorant and fanatic infidel! Yes, infidelity has its fanatics as well as abolitionism!

“Obey them that have rule over you, and submit yourselves: for they watch for your souls as they that must give account, that they may do it with joy and not with grief: for that is unprofitable for you.” Heb. xiii. 17.

P. 207. “If argument were necessary to show that such a system as this must be at variance with the ordinance of God, it might easily be drawn from the effects which it produces, both upon morals and national wealth.”

The author, in this instance, as he has in many others, designs to produce an effect on the mind of his reader from what he does not say, as well as from what he does say. We acknowledge this mode to be quite noncommittal, while, on the minds of some, it may be very skilfully used to produce an impression. But we confess ourselves ignorant of any logical rule by which it is entitled to produce any on us. The mode of speech used is intended to produce the impression that the proposition is someway self-evident, and therefore stands in no need of proof or argument. But how the proposition, that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God” is self-evident, and needs no proof nor argument, we have not the “moral sense” or “faculty” to discover. But as Dr. Wayland proposes, nevertheless, to prove its truth by its effects on morals and wealth, let us listen to the evidence.

Idem. “Its effects must be disastrous upon the morals of both parties. By presenting objects on whom passion may be satiated without resistance and without redress, it tends to cultivate in the master, pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness. By accustoming the slave to subject his moral principles to the will of another, it tends to abolish in him all moral distinctions; and thus fosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to the appetites of his master.”

This is his proof that slavery is “at variance with the ordinances of God,” as he has drawn it from its effect on morals;—in which we think him singularly unfortunate. He asks us to receive, as proof of the truth of the proposition, a combination of propositions all requiring proof of their truth, but of the truth of which he offers no proof.

This view of the state of the argument, we imagine, would be sufficient to condemn it in all well-schooled minds; but, nevertheless, we propose to show that which he offers as proof is not true; and even if true, is no proof of the truth of the proposition he endeavours to sustain.

In regard to the master, the effect complained of may or may not exist, as may be the fact whether the master is or is not capable of administering the charge and government of slaves wisely for himself and them. But these abuses, when found to exist, are no proof of the moral impropriety of the institution; for, if so, the abuses of a thing are proof that the thing itself is evil. There are many abuses of government: is government, therefore, at variance with the ordinances of God? The same of matrimony; and is it, therefore, to be set aside? Some men make an abusive use of their education, and, in consequence, would have been more valuable members of society in a state of comparative ignorance: are our universities, therefore, to be abolished? Money has been said to be “the root of all evil;” it, to some extent, is the representative of wealth and power; the possession of either of which may, in some individuals, sometimes apparently enable the possessor “to cultivate pride, anger, cruelty, selfishness, and licentiousness.” The same may be said of power of any kind. But has not Dr. Wayland learned that there are cases where the effect would be and is entirely the reverse?—where power, wealth, or even the possession of slaves, produces in the possessor a greater degree of humility, placidity or mildness, sympathy or charity for others, and orderly conduct in himself? Does the reverend moral philosopher make so low an estimate of the value of civilization—of the influence of Christianity—as not to admit the capability of enjoying a blessing without abusing it?

If Dr. Wayland’s argument be founded on truth, it will be easy to show that any system of things must be at variance with the ordinances of God which permit the possession of either power or wealth: consequently, in such case, we must and should all go back to the savage state. We ask this learned standard author to read the history of Abraham and Isaac, and inform us whether slavery produced the effect on them which he supposes to be an entailment of the institution; for the effect must be proved to be an unchangeable, a universal and unavoidable consequence, before it can receive the character of evidence in the case to which he applies it.

But Dr. Wayland thinks that slavery “tends to abolish all moral distinctions in the slave”—“fosters in him lying, deceit, hypocrisy, dishonesty, and a willingness to yield himself up to minister to the appetites of his master;” and, therefore, “is at variance with the ordinances of God.”

If the doctor had seen the native African and slave in the wild, frantic joy of his savage worship, tendered to his chief idol-god, the imbodiment of concupiscence; if he had seen all the power of the Christian master centered to effect the eradication of this heathen belief, and the habits it engendered; had he witnessed the anxiety of the master for the substitution of the precepts of Christianity; if he had seen the untiring efforts of the masters, sometimes for several generations, before this great object could be accomplished, and the absolute necessity of its accomplishment before the labour of the slave could ordinarily become to him an article of full and desirable profit,—he would probably never have written the paragraph we have quoted!

But since, in the honest, we may perhaps say the amiable, simplicity of his mind, he has composed this lesson for his pupil, which, like the early dew in imperceptible showers on the tender blade, becomes the daily nutriment of his juvenile mind and the habitual aliment of its maturity, we deem it necessary to make one further brief remark in proof of its entire inadequacy to the task assigned it in his argument, as a particular and special, and of its total untruthfulness as a general and comprehensive, maxim in morals.

Our experience is, that the crimes here named, when detected in the slave, are punished, and, if necessary, with severity, if for no other reason, because they render the slave less valuable to his master. The master wishes to find in his slave one on whom he can rely with certainty; in whom there is no dissonance of interest from his own, and whose honesty and obedience are past doubt. The qualities which are the exact opposite of the crimes imputed are, therefore, sedulously cultivated in the slave,—and truly, very often, with small success. But we are surprised at the doctrine which proclaims a system of government that ever punishes and looks with displeasure on “lying, deceit, hypocrisy, and dishonesty,” to be the very thing to foster and nourish those vices! When such is proved to be the fact, we shall regard it as a new discovery in morals.

As to the last clause of what he has adduced as proof of his proposition, we say that any one who is in the employ, or even the company, of another, either as a friend, wife, child, or hireling, as well as slave, may manifest a growing willingness to minister to the appetites of such person; and such inclination, or willingness, will operate to the benefit or injury of those so influenced, in proportion as such appetite is good or bad, or tends to good or evil: but this influence, whether tending to benefit or injury, is not an exclusive incident of slavery, and, therefore, cannot with any propriety, be quoted either for or against it: for, everywhere, “evil communications corrupt good manners.”

LESSON VI.

Dr. Wayland informs us that slavery is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it diminishes the amount of national wealth. If the diminishing of national wealth be proof of the variance from the ordinances of God, then it will follow that whatever will increase such wealth must be in conformity to such ordinances,—a position which we think no one will attempt to maintain. But let us notice the evidence he adduces to prove that slavery diminishes national wealth. His first proof is, that slavery does not “impose on all the necessity of labour;” but that it “restricts the number of labourers—that is, of producers—by rendering labour disgraceful.”

Now this is surely a proposition which requires to be proved itself before it can be received as a proof of an antecedent proposition; and President Wayland seems to have perceived that, under the general term, “labourers,” it would be incapable of proof; and, therefore, he informs us that by labourers he means producers. The logicians will agree that there is a disjointedness in this proposition (very common in this author) to which exception might be taken; but we suppose Dr. Wayland means that slavery decreases the number of those whose labour is employed in the production of the articles or products of agriculture; for we do not presume he means that the labours of the law, physic, divinity, the mechanic arts, commerce, politics or war, are rendered disgraceful by slavery, but agriculture alone; and that, therefore, it is at variance with the ordinances of God, because it thus diminishes the amount of national wealth. If this is not his meaning, we confess ourselves unable to find any meaning in it.

We know of no surer method to test its truth or falsehood than for the Slave States to compare their number of agricultural producers with those of the Free States, having relation to the entire population. The result will be found wholly adverse to the reverend moralist’s position. In fact, so great is the disproportion between the numbers of agricultural labourers in the Slave States, compared to those in the Free, that the articles of their produce often fall down to prices ruinous to the agriculturist, which very seldom, or never, happens in the Free States. Let Dr. Wayland study the statistics touching this point, and he will find himself in error.

But the proposition of President Wayland includes this minor proposition: That the increase of agricultural products, to the greatest possible extent, increases national wealth. We are very far from discovering the truth of this; because the increase of a production, beyond utility and demand, can add nothing to the value of the production, since value depends upon utility and demand. If this position be true, which we think very few at this day will dispute, it is quite obvious that President Wayland, and even Adam Smith, (from whom we suppose the former has received this notion,) are quite mistaken when they predicate the amount of labour to be the sole measure, or, in fact, the amount of wealth; since that position must render the amount of labour and the amount of wealth terms of convertible significance, which, in fact, is seldom the case. Such, then, being the state of the argument, Dr. Wayland’s proposition is, in effect: That the production of the articles of agriculture, to an extent beyond any demand or value, is in conformity to the ordinances of God; and, therefore, their production, to any less extent, is at variance with those ordinances, because the first increases and the latter decreases national wealth. We shall leave these contradictions for the consideration of the professor of moral philosophy and his pupils.

The second witness Dr. Wayland introduces to prove the truth of his proposition, that slavery lessens the amount of national wealth, is that slavery takes from the labourer the natural stimulus to labour,—the desire of individual benefit,—and substitutes the fear of punishment: And for the third and last, that slavery removes from both parties the disposition and motive to frugality; by which means national wealth is diminished.

If national wealth be the desideratum, in order not to be at variance with the ordinances of God, it matters not whether the contributors to it did so contribute through the selfish view of personal aggrandizement and a desire of elevation above their fellows, or whether they did so to relieve themselves from some stigma or personal infliction that a refusal might be expected to fasten upon them. The motive in both cases is the same—a desire to benefit themselves. Thus Dr. Wayland, therefore, makes a distinction where, in reality, there is no difference.

But again, if the amount of labour be the criterion of the amount of national wealth, as he seems to suppose, it can make no difference, in a national point of view, whether A and B squander the result of their labours into the possession of C and D, or retain it themselves because the change of possession in no way destroys the thing possessed. It might be gathered, from this part of Dr. Wayland’s argument, that the greatest misers would be the most efficient builders of national wealth, and, therefore, most in accordance with the ordinances of God.

We are somewhat at loss to perceive the precise idea the author affixes to the term “national wealth.” Whether this be his or our fault, we leave for others to decide.

Has it ever occurred to the reverend author to estimate the wealth of a nation by the moral, physical, and individual welfare of the population?

But we cannot attempt, or undertake, to expose, nor explain, all the false reasoning, distorted views, and prejudiced conclusions found heaped up, in heterogeneous confusion, by the abolition writers. The dissection of mental putridity is as unwelcome a task as that of the animal carcass in a state of decomposition.

If we cast our eyes over the surface of human life, we notice that wealth and power usually travel hand in hand but that wealth is distributed unequally, varied from the lofty possessions of royal power down to the most scanty pittance of poverty and want;—yet leaving a vast majority in possession of nothing save life, and their right to the use of the elements of nature. It is with these lower classes we have the most to do. The wants of these, most generally, are physical: indeed, we sometimes find them only on a level with the brute. Thus, the African mountaineer is prone and content to feed on the decaying remains of what he may find, and wanders, like the hyena, upon the trail of what he hopes to find his prey; while the savage islanders of the distant seas are satisfied with what the ocean heaves on shore. We notice that these wants are increased by climate; hence, the native of the extreme north, content with his flitch of blubber, yet robs the bear of his hide for a blanket. These wants we also find enlarged by the least contact with civilization. Hence we see the African, on the western coast of his continent, garnished out with the gewgaws of Europe, and the Indian of our own clime with the trinkets of trade. And thus we may notice that, as civilization and capital increase in any country, new objects of desire, new individual wants increase in proportion. Hence, the farm-house now exhibits its carpet, whereas Queen Elizabeth was content with straw!

All these wants require some action, on the part of those who desire their gratification, to continue their supply, or it must cease; because, as a general rule, the product of individual labour must bound the supply of individual wants, in all cases where the individual possesses no capital which yields an additional revenue.

But a large portion of those in savage life produce nothing; so, also, a portion from civilized society seem ever disposed to break through the rules of civilization, to retrograde as to morals, and subsist by trick or some dishonesty. They produce nothing, and are, therefore, a total drawback on the welfare of others. We find, also, another portion, the product of whose labour is inadequate to the supply of their individual wants, and who are without capital to supply the deficiency. Such must die, or resort to charity; or retrograde, and live by their wits. Good men, in all ages, have striven to obviate these evils. The Levitical law did so by permitting the unfortunate man to sell himself, as a slave, for six years, or for life, as he might choose, under the state of the case; or, in case he did not so choose to sell himself, but became indebted beyond his means, the law forced his sale, and also that of his whole family. Although, to some, this law may look harsh, yet its spirit, intention, and effect were in favour of the general good, of morals, and of life. Yet it was slavery; and we take liberty here to say, although some may not be prepared to receive it, that such ever was, is now, and ever will be the spirit, intention, and effect of slavery, when not disfigured by its abuse.

We have in vain looked through these “Elements” for some proposal of the author to meet such cases as those of savages, and of those degenerating and deteriorating poor, in all countries, known to be so from the fact that they ever strive to live by their wits. And here we may remark that it is evident the system of alms-giving must terminate when the capitalists shall find the amount of alms beyond their surplus revenue; and no one will deny that the whole system has a direct tendency towards a general bankruptcy. We therefore ask Dr. Wayland to make a proposal that shall be a permanent and effectual remedy in the cases under consideration.

Now, very few will say, but that if society can find out some humane plan by which beggars and thieves can be forced, if force be necessary, to yield a product of labour equal to the supply of their necessary wants, the ordinances of God will not sanction the act.

From imperfection, perhaps, in the organization of society, we not only see individuals branching off, and taking a downward road, but also, in all old countries, from the very stimulus of nature, a constant tendency to such an increase of population as lessens the value of labour by overstocking the demand, whereby its product becomes less than is required for the supply of individual wants. The consequences resulting from these facts, so ruinous to individual morals and happiness, often become national evils and the causes of national deterioration. But, under the Levitical law, and in all countries with similar provisions, the effect has been, and ever will be, a division of such population into a separate caste,—not national deterioration.

With a view to remedy the evils to which we have invited the attention of the Rev. Dr. Wayland, Sismondi, book vii. chap. 9, has proposed, that inasmuch, as he says, the low wages of the labouring poor redound wholly to the pecuniary benefit of the capitalists who employ them, those capitalists shall be charged by law with their support, when wages become too low to supply the necessary wants of the labourer; at the same time bestowing power on the capitalists to prevent all marriages when the labourer can give no evidence of a prospect of increased means of subsistence, satisfactory to the capitalist, that he will not be burdened with the support of the offspring. We are, by no means, the advocates of Sismondi’s proposed arrangement. But if the labourers, since in some sense they may be considered freemen, give their consent to it, we do not perceive that it would be “at variance with the ordinances of God.”

The author of these “Elements” and Sismondi, we believe, differed little, if any, on the subject of the abolition of slavery touching the negro race. Will he say, the proposal of that philosopher to benefit the condition of the labouring poor, if carried into effect as suggested, would be “at variance with the ordinances of God?” Yet, all the world perceive that it is a mere modification of slavery, containing conditions more obnoxious to human nature than appertains to any condition of slavery now known beyond the African shores.

Man has ever been found to advance in moral improvement civilization, and a stable and healthy increase of population, only in proportion as they have been taught to supply their necessary wants by the products of individual labour. This is what first distinguishes civilized from savage life. The savage relies wholly upon the elements, the casualties that bring him advantage, and the spontaneous productions of nature. The idea of supplying his wants through the products of labour never enters the mind. And will it be denied that, even in civilized countries, they who solely rely upon begging, trick, and dishonesty, for their support, are always found to be deteriorating, both in morals and in their physical ability, rapidly receding from all the characteristics of civilization, in the direction towards savage life. Indeed, a tendency to move in the same direction is often perceptible among those who only partially supply the wants of civilized support by the product of individual labour, and rely upon their wits for the remainder, thus, to some extent, becoming the plunderers of society. We would have been happy to have found the causes why these things are so, as well as to have found the remedy, in “The Elements of Moral Science.”

But let us contemplate, for a moment, a certain class of freemen, the lazaroni of Italy, who exist, merely, upon one small dish of macaroni, daily issued to them from the Hospital of St. Lazarus. We are all familiar with the condition of these people. Let us compare theirs with what would be the condition of the beggars and thieves of some other countries, were they placed under the control of some salutary power, whereby their necessary wants would be supplied by the product of their individual labour. We need not ask which condition is most “at variance with the ordinances of God!”

Dr. Wayland has retained, for his last witness, the old trite charge that slavery impoverishes the soil; that, therefore, it constantly “migrates from the old to new regions,” “where alone the accumulated manure of centuries” can “sustain a system at variance with the laws of nature.” “Hence,” he says, “slavery in this country is acknowledged to have impoverished many of our most valuable districts.”

We are not aware how far Dr. Wayland has founded this statement upon facts drawn from his own observation. Has he done so at all; or has he, carelessly and without reflection, adopted it from the assertions of others notoriously destitute of ability to form an opinion with accuracy, or else too deeply prejudiced to give their opinion any value? Does he wish us to infer that the plough and the hoe, in the hands of a slave, communicate some peculiar poison to the soil; and by reason of which “the ground shall not henceforth yield her strength?” Will he please explain how the effect of which he complains is produced? If he finds it merely in the mode of cultivation, we then inquire whether the same mode would not produce the same effect, even if the plough and hoe were held by freemen? If so, then it is evident that “the impoverishment of many of our most valuable districts” is not the result of slavery, but of a bad mode of cultivation. Or, will the doctor contend that if those valuable districts had been cultivated by free hired men, the evils from negligence in the labourer would be remedied? “He that is a hireling fleeth, because he is a hireling, and careth not for the sheep.” John x. 13.

Dr. Wayland will not deny that the “heathen round about,” of whom the Jews were permitted to buy slaves, were a slave-holding people; but we have no account that their country was impoverished thereby. The Canaanites, whom the Israelites drove out from Palestine, were slaveholders; yet the country was represented as very fertile, even to “overflowing with milk and honey.” The Danites found “Laish very good,” Judg. xviii. 9. And the children of Judah “found fat pasture and good” about Gedar. 1 Chron. iv. 40. “For they of Ham had dwelt there of old!”

For many centuries, slavery extended over every part of Europe, yet history gives us no account of the ruin of the soil. In Greece and Rome, the numbers of slaves were extended to millions beyond any number these States possess; but their historians failed to discover their destructive influence on the fertility of those countries.

Before the impoverishment of the soil can, with any force, be adduced as proof against slavery, it must be proved to be a necessary consequence; which, we apprehend, will be a difficult labour, since the sluggishness and the idleness of the Canaanites, and of the nations round about, left their country overflowing with milk and honey, abounding in fat pastures and good, notwithstanding their population were, to a large extent, slaves,—since, also, the servile cultivation of the soil in Greece and Rome did not impoverish it; and since slavery, which everywhere abounded in Europe, never produced that effect.

If Dr. Wayland will discover the legitimate cause of this impoverishment of the soil in the Slave States, and teach the planters a better mode of cultivation, we doubt not he will receive their thanks, and deserve well of his country, as a public benefactor.

Dr. Wayland says:

P. 209. “The moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery.”

P. 210. “The moral principles of the gospel are directly subversive of the principles of slavery.” * * * “If the gospel be diametrically opposed to the principles of slavery, it must be opposed to the practice of slavery; and, therefore, were the principles of the gospel fully adopted, slavery could not exist.”

Dr. Wayland having conceived himself to possess a distinct faculty, which reveals to him, with unerring truthfulness, whatever is right and all that is wrong, may be expected to consider himself fully able to decide, in his own way, what instruction God intended to convey to us, on the subject of slavery, through the books of Divine revelation; yet, we cannot but imagine that St. Paul would be somewhat astonished, if presented with the doctor’s decision for his approval, and that he would cry out:

“Who art thou that judgest another man’s servant? To his own master, he standeth, or falleth: yea, he will be holden up; for God is able to make him stand.”

But although we cannot boast of possessing this unerring moral guide, which, of late years, seems to be so common a possession among that class who ardently desire us to believe that they have monopolized all the knowledge of God’s will on the subject of slavery, yet we may venture a remark on the logical accuracy of Dr. Wayland’s argument.

It seems to be a postulate in his mind that the gospel is diametrically opposed to, and subversive of, the principles of slavery. We do not complain of this syllogistic mode; but we do complain, as we have done before, that his postulate is not an axiom, a self-evident truth, or made equal thereto by the open and clear declarations of Christ or his apostles. This defect cannot be remedied by ever so many suppositions, nor by deductions therefrom. Nor will those of a different faith from Dr. Wayland, on the subject of “conscience,” or “moral sense,” be satisfied to receive the declarations of this his “distinct faculty” as the fixed decrees of eternal truth. His assertions and arguments may be very convincing to those who think they possess this distinct faculty, especially if their education and prejudices tend to the same conclusion.

But if what President Wayland says about slavery be true, then to hold slaves is a most heinous sin; and he who does so, and never repents, can never visit Paul in heaven. He necessarily is placed on a parallel with the thief and robber; and Dr. Channing has been bold enough to say so.

But has Paul ever hinted to us any such thing as that the holding of slaves is a sin? Yet he gives us instruction on the subject and relations of slavery. What excuse had St. Paul for not telling us what the Rev. Dr. Wayland now tells us, if what he has told us be true? And if it be true, what are we to think of Paul’s verity, when he asserts that he has “not shunned to declare all the counsel of God?”

Did Jesus Christ ever hint such an idea as Dr. Wayland’s? What are we to understand, when he addresses God, the Father, and says, “I have given unto them the words thou gavest me, and they have received them?” What are we to deduce from his remark on a slaveholder, and who notified him of that fact, when he says to his disciples, “Verily I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel?” What impression was this remark calculated to produce on the minds of the disciples? Does Dr. Wayland found his assertion on Luke xvii. 7–10? or does he agree with Paley that Christ privately condemned slavery to the apostles, and that they kept such condemnation secret to themselves, to prevent opposition to the introduction of Christianity, and left the most wicked sin of slave-holding to be found out by a mere innuendo? Or does Dr. Wayland claim, through the aid of his distinct moral faculty infallibly teaching him the truth, to have received some new light on the subject of slavery, which the FATHER deemed not prudent to be intrusted to the SON, and, therefore, now more lucid and authoritative than what was revealed to the apostles?

The Archbishop Secker has made a remark which appears to us conclusive, and also exactly to fit the case. In his Fifth Lecture on the Catechism, he says:—

“Supposing the Scripture a true revelation, so far as it goes; how shall we know, if it be a full and complete one too, in all things necessary? I answer: Since our Saviour had the Spirit without measure, and the writers of Scripture had as large a measure of it as their commission to instruct the world required, it is impossible that, in so many discourses concerning the terms of salvation as the New Testament contains, they should all have omitted any one thing necessary to the great end which they had in view. And what was not necessary when the Scripture was completed, cannot have become so since. For the faith was, once for all, ‘delivered to the saints,’ Jude 3; and ‘other foundation can no man lay,’ 1 Cor. iii. 11, than what was laid then. The sacred penmen themselves could teach no other doctrine than Christ appointed them; and he hath appointed no one since to make addition to it.”

But it may be proper to take some further notice how the author of these “Elements” attempts to prove the truth of the proposition that “the moral precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery.” He says, “God can make known to us his will, either directly or indirectly.”

He may, in express terms, command or forbid a thing; this will be directly;—or he may command certain duties, or impose certain obligations, with which some certain course of conduct is inconsistent; in which case the inconsistent course of conduct will be indirectly forbidden.

We have not followed Dr. Wayland’s exact words, because we found them somewhat confused, and rather ambiguous. We prefer to have the case clearly stated, and we then accept the terms, and repeat the question, “Has God imposed obligations on man which are inconsistent with the existence of domestic slavery?”

In proof that he has, Dr. Wayland presents the Christian duty “to preach the gospel to all nations and men, without respect to circumstances or condition.” We agree that such is our duty, so far as we may have the power; and it appears to us strange how that duty can interfere with the existence of slavery, because the practical fact is, slavery brings hundreds of thousands of negroes into a condition whereby the duty may be performed, and many thereby do come to some knowledge of the gospel, who would, otherwise, have none.

Every Christian slaveholder feels it to be his duty. Is it denied that this duty is ever performed?

But if it is incompatible with the institution of slavery for the slave to be taught Christianity, then Christianity and slavery can never co-exist in the same person. Therefore, Dr. Wayland must prove that no slave can be a Christian, before this argument can have weight.

The man who owns a slave has a trust; he who has a child has one also. In both cases the trustee may do as he did who “dug in the earth and hid his lord’s money.” We cheerfully deliver them up to the lash of Dr. Wayland.

The author of the “Elements of Moral Science” next presents the marriage contract, and seems desirous to have us suppose that its obligations are incompatible with slavery. His words are—

“He has taught us that the conjugal relation is established by himself; that husband and wife are joined together by God; and that man may not put them asunder. The marriage contract is a contract for life, and is dissoluble only for one cause, that of conjugal infidelity. Any system that interferes with this contract, and claims to make it any thing else than what God has made it, is in violation of his law.”

This proposition is bad; it is too verbose to be either definite or correct. There are many things that will interfere with the provisions of this proposition, and yet not be in violation of the laws of God. Suppose one of President Wayland’s pupils has married a wife, and yet commits a crime. He is arrested, and the president is his judge. When about to pronounce sentence of imprisonment for life, the pupil reads to his judge the foregoing paragraph, and argues that he cannot receive such sentence, because it will interfere with the marriage contract, and, therefore, be in violation of the laws of God.

We trust some will deem this a sufficient refutation of the proposition.

But if we take the proposition as its author has left it, we have yet to learn that any slaveholder will object to it; although it may be he will differ with them on the subject of what constitutes Christian marriage, among pagan negroes or their pagan descendants.

Will the reverend moralist determine that a promiscuous intercourse is the conjugal relation established by God himself; that such is the marriage contract which no man may put asunder? Will he decide that an attempt to regulate the conduct of men, bond or free, who manifest such a state of morals, is in violation of the laws of God? Who are his pupils, when he shall say that an attempt to enforce the laws of God, in practice among men, is a violation of them?

So far as our experience goes, masters universally manifest a desire to have their negroes marry, and to live with their wives and children, in conformity to Christian rules. And one reason, if no other, is very obvious. The master wishes to secure the peace and tranquillity of his household. And we take this occasion to inform Dr. Wayland and his coadjutors, that a very large proportion of the punishments that are awarded slaves are for violations of what, perhaps, he may call the marriage contract, so anxious is the master to inculcate the obligations of marriage among them.

It is true, some slaves of a higher order of physical and moral improvement, influenced by the habits and customs of their masters, habituate themselves to a cohabitation with one companion for life; and, in all such cases, the master invariably gives countenance to their wishes; indeed, in some instances, masters have deemed them worthy of having their wishes sanctioned and solemnized by the ceremonies of the church ritual. And in all such cases, superior consideration and advantages are always bestowed, not only in reward of their merit, but as an encouragement for others.

The African negro has no idea of marriage as a sacred ordinance of God. Many of the tribes worship aFetish, which is a personification of their gross notions of procreation; but it inculcates no idea like that of marriage; and we have known the posterity of that people, four or five generations removed from the African native, as firmly attached to those strange habits as if they had been constitutional. Negroes, who have only arrived to such a state of mental and moral development, would find it somewhat difficult to comprehend what the Christian church implied by the marriage covenant! Therefore, where there was no reason to believe that its duties were understood, or that their habits and conduct would be influenced by it any longer than until they should take some new notion, a ceremony of any high order has been thought to do injury. A rule, often broken, ceases to be venerated. And we feel quite sure that some Christians would deem it quite improper to permit those to join in any sacred ceremony which neither their physical nor mental development would permit them to comprehend or obey, whether freemen or slaves.

In the articles drawn up at Ratisbon by Melancthon, we find, Article 16, De Sacram. Matrimo.:

“The sacrament of matrimony belongs only to Christians. It is a holy and constant union of one single man with one single woman, confirmed by the blessing and consecration of Jesus Christ.”

And St. Paul says, Eph. v. 32, of matrimony: “This is a great mystery: but I speak concerning Christ and the Church.”

We know not whether the author of the “Elements” believes, with Melancthon, that matrimony is a Christian sacrament or not. We believe the majority of modern Protestants do not so consider it, although Luther says, De Matrimonio:

“Matrimony is called a sacrament, because it is the type of a very noble and very holy thing. Hence the married ought to consider and respect the dignity of this sacrament.”

Question:—Would Melancthon, or Luther, or the author of these “Elements,” consent to perform the marriage ceremony, joining, in the holy bonds of matrimony, two negroes, who neither understood the Christian duties it imposed, and of whom it was well known that they would not regard the contract as binding any longer than their fancy or passions might dictate. A Christian sacrament is not only a sign of Christian grace, but the seal of its insurance to us, and the instrument of the Holy Ghost, whereby faith is conferred, as a Divine gift, upon the soul. We feel it a Christian duty to “not give that which is holy to dogs,” nor “cast pearls before swine.” Is Dr. Wayland of the same opinion?

It may be well to advise our author of some facts in proof of what state of connubial feelings exist among African negroes. We quote from Lander, vol. i. p. 312:

“The manners of the Africans are hostile to the interests and advancement of women.”

P. 328. “A man is at liberty to return his wife to her parents, at any time, without adducing any reason for his dislike.” * * * “The children, if any, the mother is by no means permitted to take along with her; but they are left behind with the father, who delivers them over to the care of other women.”

P. 158. “A man thinks as little of taking a wife as of cutting an ear of corn; affection is altogether out of the question.”

Vol. ii. p. 208. “Africans, generally speaking, betray the most perfect indifference on losing their liberty, or in being deprived of their relations; while love of country is, seemingly, as great a stranger to their breasts as social tenderness and domestic affection.”

We quote from the Christian Observer, vol. xix. p. 890: “Mr. Johnson was appointed to the care of Regent’s Town, June, 1816. * * * Natives of twenty-two different nations were there collected together: * * * none of them had learned to live in a state of marriage.”

Proofs of this trait in the African character may be accumulated; and a very determined disposition to live in a state of promiscuous intercourse is often noticeable, in their descendants, for many generations, notwithstanding the master endeavours to restrain it by corporeal punishment. But yet, under this state of facts, our laws forbid the separation of children from mothers, under ages stipulated by law.

It is the interest of the master to have his slaves orderly—to possess them of some interest which will have a tendency to that result. Their quiet settlement in families has been thought to be among the most probable and influential inducements to insure the desired effect, and to produce a moral influence on them. Besides this interest of the master, his education on the subject of marriage must be allowed to have a strong influence on his mind to favour and foster in his slaves a connection which his own judgment teaches him must be important to their happiness and his own tranquillity, to say nothing of his duty as a Christian. Indeed, we never heard of a master who did not feel a strong desire, a pride, to see his slaves in good condition, contented and happy; and we venture to assert, that no man, who entertained a proper regard for his own character, would consent to sell a family of slaves, separately, to different individuals, when the slaves themselves manifested good conduct, and a habit, or desire, to live together in conformity to the rules of civilized life. Even a casual cohabitation is often caught at by the master, and sanctioned, as permanent, if he can do so in accordance with the conduct and feelings of the negroes themselves.

That the owners of slaves have sometimes abused the power they possessed, and outraged the feelings of humanity in this behalf, is doubtless a fact. Nor do we wish to excuse such conduct, by saying that proud and wealthy parents sometimes outrage the feelings of common sense and of their own children in a somewhat similar way. These are abuses that can be, and should be corrected; and we are happy to inform Dr. Wayland that we have lived to see many abuses corrected, and hope that many more corrections may follow in their train. But we assure him that the wholesale denunciations of men who, in fact, know but little about the subjects of their distress, may produce great injury to the objects of their sympathies, but no possible benefit. And let us now, with the best feeling, inform Dr. Wayland, and his co-agitators, of one result of his and their actions in this matter. We assert what we know.

Thirty years ago, we occasionally had schools for negro children; nor was it uncommon for masters to send their favourite young slaves to these schools; nor did such acts excite attention or alarm; and, at the same time, any missionary had free access to that class of our population. But when we found, with astonishment, that our country was flooded with abolition prints, deeply laden with the most abusive falsehoods, with the obvious design to excite rebellion among the slaves, and to spread assassination and bloodshed through the land;—when we found these transient missionaries, mentally too insignificant to foresee the result of their conduct, or wholly careless of the consequences, preaching the same doctrines;—these little schools and the mouths of these missionaries were closed. And great was the cry. Dr. Wayland knows whereabout lies the wickedness of these our acts! Let him and his coadjutors well understand that these results, whether for the benefit or injury of the slave, have been brought about by the work of their hands.

If these transient missionaries were the only persons who had power to teach the gospel to the slave, who has deprived the slaves of the gospel?

If these suggestions are true, will not Dr. Wayland look back upon his labours with dissatisfaction? Does he behold their effects with joy? Has he thrown one ray of light into the mental darkness of benighted Africa? Has he removed one pain from the moral disease of her benighted children? If so perfectly adverse have been his toils, will he expect us to countenance his school, sanction his morality, or venerate his theology? A very small portion of poison makes the feast fatal!

Does he complain because some freemen lower themselves down to this promiscuous intercourse with the negro? We are dumb; we deliver them up to his lash! Or does he complain because we do not marry them ourselves? We surely have yet to learn, because we decline such marriages, and a deteriorated posterity, that, therefore, we interfere with the institution of marriage, or make it something which God did not. We had thought that the laws of God all looked towards a state of physical, intellectual, and moral improvement and that such an amalgamation as would necessarily leave a more deteriorated race in our stead, would be sin, and would be punished, if in no other way, yet still by the very fact of such degradation. Or does Dr. Wayland deny that the negro is an inferior race of man to the white? If the slave and master were of the same race, as they once were in all parts of Europe, intermarriage between them would blot out the institution, as it has done there. In such case, his argument might have some force.

Under the Spanish law, a master might marry his female slave, or he might suffer any freeman to marry her; but the marriage, in either case, was emancipation to her. The wife was no longer a slave; and so by the Levitical law. See Deut. xxi. 14.

The laws of the Slave States of our Union forbid amalgamation with the negro race; consequently such a marriage would be a nullity, and the offspring take the condition of the mother.

The object of this law is to prevent the deterioration of the white race.

Thus we have seen that all the practical facts relating to the influence of the slavery of the Africans among us, touching the subject of marriage, as to them, are in opposition to what Dr. Wayland seems to suppose. In short, the slavery of the negroes in these States has a constantly continued tendency to change—to enforce an improvement of the morals of the African—to an approximation of the habits of Christian life.

It is conceded by Dr. Wayland, that the Scriptures do not directly forbid or condemn slavery. In search of a path over this morass of difficulty, he says that the Scripture goes upon the “fair ground of teaching moral principles” “directly subversive of the principles of slavery;” and quotes the golden rule in proof; and thus comes to the conclusion that, “if the gospel be diametrically opposed to the principle of slavery, it must be opposed to the practice of slavery.” In excuse for this mode being pursued by the Author of our religion, he says—

P. 212. “In this manner alone could its object, a universal moral revolution, have been accomplished. For, if it had forbidden the evil, instead of subverting the principle,—if it had proclaimed the unlawfulness of slavery and taught slaves to resist the oppression of their masters,—it would instantly have arrayed the two parties in deadly hostility, through the civilized world; its announcement would have been the signal of servile war; and the very name of the Christian religion would have been forgotten amidst the agitations of universal bloodshed.”

We have heretofore attempted to show that this doctrine is extremely gross error;—its very assertion goes to the extinction, the denial of the divinity of Jesus Christ and his religion. And we deeply lament that this was not one of the errors of Paley which Dr. Wayland has seen fit to expunge from his book. (See his Preface.)

Paley says, third book, part ii. chap. 3—“Slavery was a part of the civil constitution of most countries, when Christianity first appeared; yet no passage is to be found in the Christian Scriptures by which it is condemned or prohibited. This is true, for Christianity, soliciting admission into all nations of the world, abstained, as behooved it, from intermeddling with the civil institutions of any. But does it follow, from the silence of Scripture concerning them, that all the civil institutions which then prevailed were right? Or that the bad should not be exchanged for better?”

“Besides this, the discharging the slaves from all obligation to obey their masters, which is the consequence of pronouncing slavery to be unlawful, would have had no better effect than to let loose one half of mankind upon the other. Slaves would have been tempted to embrace a religion which asserted their right to freedom; masters would hardly have been persuaded to consent to claims founded on such authority; the most calamitous of all contests, a bellum servile, might probably have ensued, to the reproach, if not the extinction, of the Christian name.”

In these thoughtless remarks of Paley, abolition writers seem to have found a mine of argument, from which they have dug until they deemed themselves wealthy.

Channing, vol. ii. p. 101, says—

“Slavery, in the age of the apostle, had so penetrated society, was so intimately interwoven with it, and the materials of servile war were so abundant, that a religion preaching freedom to the slave would have shaken the social fabric to its foundation, and would have armed against itself the whole power of the state. Paul did not then assail the institution. He satisfied himself with spreading principles, which, however slowly, could not but work its dissolution.”

This author, thus having satisfied himself with a display which the greater portion of his readers deem original, commences, p. 103, and quotes from “The Elements of Moral Science,” p. 212:

“This very course, which the gospel takes on this subject, seems to have been the only one that could have been taken in order to effect the universal abolition of slavery. The gospel was designed, not for one race or for one time, but for all races and for all times. It looked, not at the abolition of this form of evil for that age alone, but for its universal abolition. Hence, the important object of its author was to gain it a lodgment in every part of the known world:” and concludes with our quotation from the author.

Dr. Barnes “fights more shy;” he sees “the trap.” The Biblical Repertory has unveiled to his view the awful abyss to which this doctrine necessarily leaps. Yet the abyss must be passed; the facts, the doctrine of Paley, and the gulf, must be got over, in some way, or abolition doctrines must be given up. For thirty pages, like a candle-fly, he coquets around the light of this doctrine, until he gathers courage, and finally falls into it under the plea of “expediency.” He quotes Wayland’s Letters to Fuller, p. 73, which says—

“This form of expediency—the inculcating of a fundamental truth, rather than of the duty which springs immediately out of it, seems to me innocent. I go further: in some cases, it may be really demanded,” &c.

“And a certain ruler asked him, saying, Good Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life.” Luke xviii. 18.

This man was rich—probably had slaves. Was it inexpedient for the Son of God to have plainly told him of its wickedness? Was not the occasion quite appropriate, if such had been the Saviour’s view?

When the keeper of the prison said to Paul and Silas, “Sirs, what shall I do to be saved?” was it inexpedient in them to have mentioned this sin?

When the subject of slavery was mentioned in Corinthians, Ephesians, Colossians, in Timothy, Titus, and Peter, was it still inexpedient? And in the case of Philemon, “the dearly beloved and fellow-labourer,” when Paul was pleading for the runaway slave, in what did the inexpediency consist? When the centurion applied to the Son of God, and boasted that he owned slaves, can we bring forward this paltry excuse?

This doctrine of Paley has been so commonly quoted, let us be excused for presenting a remark from the “Essays,” reprinted from the Princeton Review, second series, p. 283:

“It is not by argument that the abolitionists have produced the present unhappy excitement. Argument has not been the character of their publications. Denunciations of slave-holding as man-stealing, robbery, piracy, and worse than murder; consequently vituperation of slaveholders as knowingly guilty of the worst of crimes; passionate appeals to the feelings of the inhabitants of the Northern States; gross exaggerations of the moral and physical condition of the slaves, have formed the staple of their addresses to the public.”

P. 286. “Unmixed good or evil, however, in such a world as ours, is a rare thing. Though the course pursued by the abolitionists has produced a great preponderance of mischief, it may incidentally occasion no little good. It has rendered it incumbent on every man to endeavour to obtain, and, as far as he can, to communicate, definite opinions and correct principles on the whole subject. * * * The subject of slavery is no longer one on which men are allowed to be of no mind at all. * * * The public mind is effectually aroused from a state of indifference and it is the duty of all to seek the truth, and to speak in kindness, but with decision. * * * We recognise no authoritative rule of truth and duty but the word of God. * * * Men are too nearly upon a par as to their powers of reasoning, and ability to discover truth, to make the conclusions of one mind an authoritative rule for others.” * * *

The subject for consideration is: If the abolitionists are right in insisting that slave-holding is one of the greatest of all sins,—that it should be immediately and universally abandoned, as a condition of church communion, or of admission into heaven,—how comes it that Christ and his apostles did not pursue this sin in plain and determined opposition? How comes it that the teachings of the abolitionists, on the subject of slavery, are so extremely different from those of Jesus Christ and his apostles? The mind is forced to the conclusion that, if the abolitionists are right, Jesus Christ and his apostles are wrong! We agree that, if slave-holding is a sin, it should at once be abandoned. The whole subject is resolved to one single question: Is slave-holding, in itself, a crime before God?

The abolitionists say that it is; we assert that it is not; and we look to the conduct of Christ and his apostles to justify our position. Did they shut their eyes to the enormities of a great offence against God and man? Did they temporize with a heinous evil, because it was common and popular? Did they abstain from even exhorting masters to emancipate their slaves, though an imperative duty, from fear of consequences? Was slavery more deeply rooted than idolatry? or more deeply interwoven with the civil institutions? more thoroughly penetrated through every thing human—their prejudices, literature, hopes, and happiness? Was its denunciation, if a sin, attended with consequences more to be dreaded than death by torture, wild beasts, the crucifix, the fagot, and the flame? Did the apostles admit drunkards, liars, fornicators, adulterers, thieves, robbers, murderers, and idolaters to the Christian communion, and call them “dearly beloved and fellow-labourers?” Did the Son of God ever intimate of any such unrepentant man, that he had “not found so great faith, no, not in Israel?”

What are we then to think of the intellect of that man who shall affirm that Jesus Christ and his apostles classed the slave-holder with the worst of these characters? Yea, what can such a man think of himself? Did the apostles counsel thieves and robbers how they should advisedly conduct themselves in the practice of these crimes? Were those who had been robbed carefully gathered up and sent back to some known robber, to be robbed again? And, on such occasion, did any of the apostles address such robber in the language of affection, saying, “I thank my God, making mention of thee always in my prayers, hearing of thy love and faith, which thou hast towards the Lord Jesus and toward all saints?”

No one in his senses will deny that the Scriptures condemn injustice, cruelty, oppression, and violence, whether exhibited in the conduct of the master towards his slave or any other person:—crime being the same, whether committed in the relation of master and slave, husband and wife, or the monarch and his subjects. It may so happen that great crimes are committed by persons in these relations. But what is the argument worth which asserts it is very wicked to be a schoolmaster, because some schoolmaster whipped his pupil too much, or another not enough, or a third, in an angry, wicked state of mind, has put one to death?

Who has ever asserted that marriage was not a Divine institution, because some in that state live very unhappily together, and others have conspired against the happiness or life of those whom the institution made it their duty to protect?

Dr. Wayland’s proposition, when analyzed and freed from verbiage, is this: the teaching of moral principles, subversive of the abuse of a thing, is proof that the teacher is opposed to the thing itself! and, if true, we say, is as applicable to every other institution among men, as to slavery.

LESSON IX.

Dr. Wayland says, p. 213—

“It is important to remember that two grounds of moral obligation are distinctly recognised in the gospel. The first is our duty to man as man, that is, on the ground of the relation which men sustain to each other; the second is our duty to man as a creature of God, that is, on the ground of the relation which we all sustain to God. On this latter ground, many things become our duty which would not be so on the former. It is on this ground that we are commanded to return good for evil, to pray for them that despitefully use us, and, when we are smitten on one cheek, to turn also the other. To act thus is our duty, not because our fellow-man has a right to claim this course of conduct from us, but because such conduct in us will be well-pleasing to God. And when God prescribes the course of conduct which will be well-pleasing to him, he by no means acknowledges the right of abuse in the injurious person, but expressly declares, ‘Vengeance is mine and I will repay it, saith the Lord!’ Now, it is to be observed, that it is precisely upon this latter ground that the slave is commanded to obey his master. It is never urged, like the duty of obedience to parents, because it is right; but because the cultivation of meekness and forbearance under injury will be well-pleasing unto God. Thus servants are commanded to be obedient to their own masters, ‘in singleness of heart, as unto Christ; doing the will of God from the heart, with good-will doing service, as to the Lord, and not to man.’ Eph. v. 5–7.

“Servants are commanded to count their masters worthy of all honour, that the name of God and his doctrine be not blasphemed. 1 Tim. vi.1. That they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things. Titus iii. 9.

“The manner in which the duty of servants or slaves is inculcated, therefore, affords no ground for the assertion that the gospel authorizes one man to hold another in bondage, any more than the command to honour the king, when that king was Nero, authorized the tyranny of the emperor; or the command to turn the other cheek when one was smitten, justifies the infliction of violence by an injurious man.”

Added to the foregoing, we find the following note:

“I have retained the above paragraph, though I confess that the remarks of Professor Taylor, of the Union Theological Seminary of Virginia, have led me seriously to doubt whether the distinction, to which it alludes, is sustained by the New Testament.”

Why then did he retain it?

In his preface to the fourth edition, which is inserted in the present, after expressing his acknowledgments for the criticisms with which gentlemen have favoured him, he says—

“Where I have been convinced of error, I have altered the text. Where I have only doubted, I have suffered it to remain; as it seemed profitless merely to exchange one doubtful opinion for another.”

We beg to know what doubtful opinion would have been introduced by the deletion of this, which he acknowledges to be doubtful? Why did he not go to the Bible, and inquire of Jesus Christ and the apostles for advice in such a case? “And immediately Jesus stretched forth his hand, and caught him, and said unto him, O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?” Matt. xiv. 31.

In Matt. xxi. 21, we find that the doubting mind is destitute of Christian power; and the same in Mark xi. 23. Jesus, speaking to his disciples, says to them, Luke xii. 29, “Neither be ye of a doubtful mind.” Does any one imagine that Luke would have left any thing in his book that he thought doubtful? But we find in Rom. xiv. 1, “Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations.” This surely needs no comment. The poison of doubt is rejected in 1 Tim. ii. 8; and the apostle in Rom. xiv. 23, says, “And he that doubteth is damned if he eat, because he eateth not of faith, for whatsoever is not of faith is sin.” How awful is the condition of him who shall attempt to preach a doctrine, and that an important one too, as the doctrine of the Bible, of which he doubts! A doctrine in which he can have no faith! Who shall say it would not be a palpable attempt to change the meaning and alter the sense of the Scripture from its true interpretation?

“Ye shall not add unto the word which I command you, neither shall ye diminish aught from it, that ye may keep the commandments of the Lord your God, which I command you.” Deut. iv. 2.

“But there be some that trouble you, and pervert the gospel of Christ. But though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed. As we said before, so say we now again, if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed.” Gal. 1. 7–9.

“I Jesus have sent mine angel to testify unto you these things in the churches. * * * For I testify unto every man that heareth the words of the prophecy of this book, if any man shall add unto those things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book; and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out or the book of life.” Rev. xxii. 16–19.

“Every word of God is pure. * * * Add not unto his words, lest he reprove thee, and thou be found a liar.” Prov. xxx. 5–6.

We have not seen the remarks of Professor Taylor; but we can easily imagine that a professor of theology, free from the delirium of abolitionism, would not have found it a difficult labour to prove that the main point of the author’s argument was contradicted by Scripture, and that even he himself attempted to sustain it only by assumption. We regret that President Wayland has not given us Professor Taylor’s remarks that made him “doubt.” We, however, will venture our “remark” that the author’s assertion, “the inculcation of the duty of slaves affords no evidence that the Scriptures countenance slavery, more than the command to honour the king authorized the tyranny of Nero,” is a comparison where there is no parallel. Dr. Wayland must first make it appear that all kings, or chief magistrates, are, necessarily, wicked tyrants, like Nero; and that the wicked tyranny is a part and parcel of the thing to be honoured, before his parallel between slavery and monarchy can be drawn; and since, then, the deduction will be useless, we suppose he will not make the attempt.

The parallel that might have been sustained is this: The inculcation of the duty of slaves to obey their masters does not authorize masters to abuse their power over their slaves, any more than the command to honour the king authorized the tyranny of Nero;—from which the deductions are, that masters have a right to command their slaves as things in their peculiar relation, and not as things having a different relation. The master has no right to command a slave, as if the slave stood in the relation of a horse; nor even a horse, as if the horse stood in the relation of a piece of timber: so the king has no right to govern his subjects as if they were idiots or brutes, but as enlightened free-men, if such be their condition.

The object of the government is the happiness no more of the governor than of the governed. This principle, so profusely illustrated in Scripture, it would seem the abolitionists run to shipwreck, in every approach they make towards it.

There are a class of abolition writers who never fail to compare St. Paul’s instruction, to live in obedience to the civil authority, (making no exception even when the worst of monarchs are in power,) with his instruction to slaves to obey their masters; and then say that no argument is to be drawn from the latter in favour of slavery, any more than there is from the former in favour of the wickedness of the Emperor Nero. To some, this position may look quite imposing; while others will associate it with the false position of a wicked, unprincipled lawyer, who is ambitious only to gain his case, and cares not by what falsehood, or by what means. But it is truly mortifying to see such an argument presented, and attempted to be sustained, by any one who pretends to be an honest man, and a disciple of the Lord Jesus Christ. And we cannot but reflect that such an one must be in one of three predicaments; either in that of the lawyer, or his understanding must be so obtuse he cannot reason, or so crazed by fanaticism as to be equally stultified in intellect. Yet these men present this argument, or position, with an air which displays the utmost confidence of their having obtained a victory, and of their having established for themselves a lofty intellectual character.

Jesus Christ and his apostles everywhere reprimanded and condemned crime, outrage, and oppression, whether to superiors, equals, or inferiors. Yet these qualities of action must take their character from the facts of the case. The parent will feel it his duty to compel, by force, his froward child to do right; yet the same action directed to his neighbour, or equal, may be manifestly wrong, or even sinful. The crimes of monarchs and the crimes of masters are everywhere condemned, as well as the crimes of all other men. Yet to be a monarch or a master is nowhere condemned, per se, as a sinful condition of itself.

All history agrees that Nero was a wicked, bad prince; he was wicked and bad because his acts were wicked and bad; not because he was a prince or an emperor. Slaves are ordered to be obedient to their masters. Is there any one so crazy as therefore to suppose that the master has a right to overwork, starve, murder, or otherwise misuse his slave? We are all commanded to be obedient to the civil power. Does this give the chief ruler the right to practise the wickedness of Nero?

Is there any proof that Philemon murdered, or was recklessly cruel to his slaves? What justice is there in comparing his character as only on an equality with that of Nero? Was Nero, with all his sins, admitted into the church of Christ? Where is the parallel between him and the “beloved” of the apostle?

We feel authorized to affirm that St. Paul would have rejected from the church a slaveholder, who murdered, starved, or otherwise maltreated his slaves, because these crimes would have been proof of his want of the Christian character. The same evidence of wicked conduct would have excluded any other man, even the emperor, from the church; yet, since slaveholders, who had not been guilty of such enormities, were admitted to the church, and distinguished as “beloved,” this fact becomes proof that slaveholding is no evidence of a sinful character. So monarchs and emperors, who gave proof of the possession of the Christian character, were always admissible to the Christian church. This fact also becomes demonstration, that being a monarch or an emperor gave no proofs of a sinful character.

Will Dr. Wayland undertake to prove that the admission of Constantine to the Christian church gave any license to the wicked murders and hateful hypocrisy of the Emperor Phocas? Or will he venture to extend his argument, and say that the command of marital and filial obedience proves nothing in their favour; since we are commanded to yield a like obedience to the king, although that king be the wicked Phocas? The fact is, the mere character of chief-magistrate, of husband, of parent or slaveholder, is quite distinct from the character which their acts may severally heap upon them. It is, therefore, quite possible for us to reverence and obey the king, yet hold in contempt the person who fills the throne.

Civil government, the relations of parent and child, husband and wife, and slavery itself, are all ordinances of Divine wisdom, instituted for the benefit of man, under the condition of his fallen state. But because these relations are in accordance with the ordinances of God, it by no means follows that the abuses of them are so.

Suppose those who wish to abolish the institution of marriage should present the same argument in their behalf which Dr. Wayland has in this case, it will surely be just as legitimate in the one as the other. But will not Dr. Wayland readily say that there is no parallel between the particular relations compared? We doubt not, he would consider it too stupid to even require refutation.

LESSON X.

Our author says, as before quoted—

P. 209. “That the precepts of the Bible are diametrically opposed to slavery.”

In proof, he offers one precept:

“Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself, and All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them.”

Upon which he says, for argument—

“1. The application of these precepts is universal. Our neighbour is every one whom we may benefit. The obligation respects all things whatsoever. The precept, then, manifestly extends to men as men, or men in every condition; and if to all things whatsoever, certainly to a thing so important as the right of personal liberty.

“2. Again, by this precept it is made our duty to cherish a tender and delicate respect for the right the meanest individual possesses over the means of happiness bestowed on him by God, as we cherish for our own right over our own means of happiness, or as we desire any other individual to cherish for it. Now, were this precept obeyed, it is manifest that slavery could not in fact exist for a single instant. The principle of the precept is absolutely subversive of the principle of slavery. That of the one is the entire equality of right; that of the other, the entire absorption of the rights of one in the rights of the other.”

We propose to make no comment upon these arguments. We cannot do battle against phantoms. But we shall take this golden rule, which we most devoutly reverence, and show that it inculcates slavery, upon a statement of facts.

The 28th chapter of Deuteronomy contains the revelations of blessings and curses promised the Jews, and, we may add, all mankind, for obedience to the laws of God, and for disobedience to the same. At the 68th verse, they were told that they should again be sent to Egypt; or that they should be exposed for sale; or that they should expose themselves for sale, as the passage may be read, and that no man should buy them; or that there should not be buyers enough to give them the benefit even of being slaves, whereby they could be assured of protection and sustenance. This was most signally verified at the time Jerusalem was sacked by Titus; and not only in Egypt, but in many other places, thousands of the Hebrew captives were exposed for sale as slaves. But thousands of them, thus exposed, died of starvation, because purchasers could not be found for them. The Romans, considered them too stubborn, too degraded, to be worthy of being slaves to them, refused to buy them. Their numbers, compared to the numbers of their purchasers, were so great that the price became merely nominal; and thousands were suffered to die, because purchasers could not be had at any price. Their death was the consequence.

Now let us apply the truly golden rule or precept, relied upon by Dr. Wayland in support of abolitionism. Would it teach to buy these slaves, or not?

The same incident happened once again to all the Jews, who were freemen in Spain, during the reign of Ferdinand and Isabella, when 800,000 Jews were driven from that kingdom in one day; vast multitudes of whom famished to death because, although anxious to do so, they could not find for themselves even a master! Let us ask, what would the precept teach in this case?

Nor has such a peculiar relation of facts been confined to the Jews alone. In 1376, the Florentines, then a travelling, trading, or commercial people, but in many instances quite forgetful of the rules of Christian honesty, became exceedingly obnoxious to their neighbours, especially to the subjects of the church of Rome. To many of them, murder and robbery became a mere pastime. From individuals the moral poison was communicated to their government. The church was despoiled of her patrimony, her subjects of their homes. The church remonstrated until patience was exhausted, when Gregory XI. issued his papal bull, delivering each individual of that nation, in all parts of the earth, who did not instantly make reparation, up to pillage, slavery, or death.

Let us notice how Walsingham witnessed this matter in England, where a large portion of the traders were of that people, all liable, if freemen, to be put to death by any one who might choose to inflict the punishment; and their effects were legally escheated to whomsoever might seize them. Slavery was their only remedy. The Anglo-Saxon Normans, the natives of the realm, had not yet, as a people, sufficiently emerged from the poverty and darkness of the times to give them protection. This, to us so strange a relation between the church and civil government, in regard to the Florentines, produced an action on the part of the king by which he became their personal master. Thus they became slaves, not of the crown, but of the individual who sat upon the throne. Did he act in conformity to this precept or not?

John and Richard Lander were sent by the “London African Association” to explore some parts of Africa. On the 24th of March, 1830, they were only one half day’s travel from the seacoast, at which point they say, vol. i. p. 58:

“Meantime the rainy season is fast approaching, as is sufficiently announced by repeated showers and occasional tornadoes; and, what makes us still more desirous to leave this abominable place, is the fact, as we have been told, that a sacrifice of no less than three hundred human beings, of both sexes and all ages, is about to take place. We often hear the cries of these poor creatures; and the heart sickens with horror at the bare contemplation of such a scene as awaits us, should we remain here much longer.”

It is to be regretted that since the abolition of the slave-trade in Africa, slaves have become of little value in that country. That the Africans in many places have returned to sacrifice and cannibalism, is also true, and a cause of deep sorrow to the philanthropist; but, considering the state and condition of these savages, there is no alternative;—the slave there, if he cannot be sold, is at all times liable to be put to death.

Suppose you buy, and then turn them loose there; they will again and instantly be the subjects of slavery; and even there, slavery is some protection, for, so long as the savage master chooses or is able to keep his slave alive, he is more sure of the usual means of living. But, let us present this state of facts to the Christian, and ask him to apply the golden rule; and, in case the slave-trade with Africa had not now been abolished, what would he deem it his duty to do for the practical and lasting benefit of these poor victims, whom the sympathy of the world has thus consigned to sacrifice and death?

The people of the Slave States have determined not to countenance amalgamation with the slave race; they have determined not to set the slaves free, because they have previously resolved that they will not, cannot live under the government of the negro. In full view of these evils, they have resolved that they will not suffer the presence of that race in their community, on terms of political or social equality. They have, therefore, further resolved, in furtherance of its prevention, to oppose it while life shall last.

Now, Dr. Wayland says—

P. 215. “The slaves were brought here without their own consent; they have been continued in their present state of degradation without their own consent, and they are not responsible for the consequences. If a man have done injustice to his neighbour, and have also placed impediments in the way of remedying that injustice, he is as much under obligations to remove the impediments in the way of justice as he is to do justice.”

The ancestors of our slaves were brought from beyond sea by the people of Old England, and by the people of New England, and particularly by the people of Rhode Island, among the descendants of whom the reverend doctor resides. The ancestors of these slaves were sold to our ancestors for money, and guaranteed, by them, to be slaves for life, and their descendants after them, as they said, both by the laws of God and man. Whether this was false, whether they were stolen and cruelly torn from their homes, the reverend doctor has better means of determining than we. We may sell, we will not free them.

Under this statement of facts, let the reverend doctor apply the golden rule and his own argument to himself. Let him then buy, and set them free in Rhode Island; or send them to Africa, if their ancestors “were unlawfully torn from thence.”

“Wo unto you, scribes and pharisees, hypocrites! because ye build the tombs of the prophets, and garnish the sepulchres of the righteous, and say, If we had been in the days of our fathers, we should not have been partakers with them in the blood of the prophets. Wherefore, ye be witness unto yourselves, that ye are the children of them that killed the prophets.” Matt. xxiii. 29, 30, 31.

“For they bind heavy burdens, and grievous to be borne, and lay them on men’s shoulders; but they themselves will not move them with one of their fingers.” Idem. 4.

Within the last year, our sympathies have been excited by an account now published to the world, of an African chieftain and slaveholder, who, during the year previous, finding himself cut off from a market on the Western coast, in consequence of the abolition of the slave-trade with Europe and America,—the trade with Arabia, Egypt, and the Barbary States not being sufficient to drain off the surplus number,—put to death three thousand!

The blood of these massacred negroes now cries from the ground unto Dr. Wayland and his disciples—

“Apply, oh, apply to bleeding Africa the doctrine of the golden rule, and relieve us, poor African slaves, from starvation, massacre, and death. Come, oh, come; buy us, that we may be your slaves, and have some chance to learn that religion under which you prosper. Then ‘we shall build up the old wastes’—‘raise up the former desolations,’ and ‘repair the waste cities, the desolations of many generations.’ ‘And strangers shall stand and feed your flocks, and the sons of the alien shall be your ploughmen, and your vine-dressers.’ ‘Then ye shall be named the priests of the Lord; men shall call you the ministers of our God.'” Isa. lxi. 4, 5, 6.

We shall here close our remarks on the Rev. Dr. Wayland’s book; and however feeble they may be, yet we can conscientiously say, we have no “doubt” about the truth of our doctrine.

“Forever, O Lord, thy word is settled in heaven. Thy faithfulness is unto all generations; thou hast established the earth, and it abideth. They continue, this day, according to thine ordinances; for all are thy servants,” (??????????l?abadeka ebedeka, slaves.) cxix. 89, 90, 91.

LESSON XI.

Among those who have advocated views adverse to those of our present study, we are compelled to notice Dr. Paley, as one of the most influential, the most dignified, and the most learned. He defines slavery to be “an obligation to labour for the benefit of the master, without the contract or consent of the servant.” He says “that this obligation may arise, consistently with the laws of nature, from three causes: 1st, from crimes; 2d, from captivity; and 3d, from debt.” He says that, “in the first case, the continuance of the slavery, as of any other punishment, ought to be proportionate to the crime. In the second and third cases, it ought to cease as soon as the demand of the injured nation or private creditor is satisfied.” He was among the first to oppose the African slave-trade. He says, “Because, when the slaves were brought to the African slave-market, no questions were asked as to the origin of the vendors’ titles: Because the natives were incited to war for the sake of supplying the market with slaves: Because the slaves were torn away from their parents, wives, children, and friends, homes, companions, country, fields, and flocks, and their accommodation on shipboard not better than that provided for brutes: Because the system of laws by which they are governed is merciless and cruel, and is exercised, especially by their English masters, with rigour and brutality.”

But he thinks the American Revolution, which had just then happened, will have a tendency to accelerate the fall of this most abominable tyranny, and indulges in the reflection whether, in the providence of God, the British legislature, which had so long assisted and supported it, was fit to have rule over so extensive an empire as the North American colonies.

Dr. Paley says that slavery was a part of the civil constitution of most countries when Christianity appeared; and that no passage is found in the Christian Scriptures by which it is condemned or prohibited. But he thinks the reason to be, because “Christianity, soliciting admission into all nations of the world, abstained, as behooved it, from intermeddling with the civil institutions of any; but,” says he, “does it follow from the silence of Scripture concerning them, that all the civil institutions that then prevailed were right? or, that the bad should not be exchanged for better? Besides,” he says, “the discharging the slaves from all obligations to their masters would have had no better effect than to let loose one half of mankind upon the other. Besides,” he thinks “it would have produced a servile war, which would have ended in the reproach and extinction of the Christian name.”

Dr. Paley thinks that the emancipation of slaves should be carried on very gradually, by provision of law, under the protection of government; and that Christianity should operate as an alterative, in which way, he thinks, it has extinguished the Greek and Roman slavery, and also the feudal tyranny; and he trusts, “as Christianity advances in the world, it will banish what remains of this odious institution.”

In some of his other writings, Dr. Paley suggests that Great Britain, by way of atoning for the wrongs she has done Africa, ought to transport from America free negroes, the descendants of slaves, and give them location in various parts of Africa, to serve as models for the civilization of that country.

Dr. Paley’s Treatise on Moral and Political Philosophy, from which the foregoing synopsis is taken, was published to the world in 1785; but it had been delivered in lectures, almost verbatim, before the University of Cambridge, several years previous; and it is now a class-book in almost every high literary institution where the English language is spoken. It is, therefore, a work of high authority and great influence.

But we think his definition of the term slavery is not correct. Let us repeat it: “An obligation to labour for the benefit of the master, without the contract or consent of the servant.”

Many, who purchase slaves to be retained in their own families, first examine and consult with the slave, and tell him—“My business is thus; I feed and clothe thus; are you willing that I should buy you? For I will buy no slave who is not willing.”

To this, it is usual for the slave to say, “Yes, master! and I hope you will buy me. I will be a good slave. You shall have no fault to find with me, or my work.”

By all the claims of morality, here is a contract and consent, and the statute might make it legal. But who will say that the condition of slavery is altered thereby? But, says one, this supposition does not reach the case, because all the obligations and conditions of slavery previously existed; and, therefore, the “contract” and “consent” here only amounted to a contract and consent to change masters.

Suppose then, from poverty or misfortune, or some peculiar affection of the mind, a freeman should solicit to place himself in the condition of slavery to one in whom he had sufficient confidence, (and we have known such a case,)—a freeman anxiously applying to his more fortunate friend to enter into such an engagement for life; suppose the law had sanctioned such voluntary slavery, and, when entered into, made it obligatory, binding, and final for ever. There would be nothing in such law contrary to the general powers of legislation, however impolitic it might be; and such a law did once exist among the Jews.

“And if a sojourner or a stranger wax rich by thee, and thy brother that dwelleth by him wax poor, and sell himself unto the stranger or sojourner by thee, or to the stock of the stranger’s family; after that he is sold, he may be redeemed again; and one of his brethren may redeem him. Either his uncle or his uncle’s son may redeem him, or any that is nigh of kin unto his family may redeem him; or, if he be able, he may redeem himself: * * * and if he be not redeemed in one of these years,—then he shall go out in the year of Jubilee, both he and his children with him.” Lev. xxv. 47–54. “Now these are the judgments which ye shall set before them. If ye buy an Hebrew servant, six years shall he serve, and in the seventh he shall go out free for nothing. If he came in by himself, he shall go out by himself; if he were married, then his wife shall go out with him. If his master have given him a wife, and she have borne him sons or daughters, the wife and her children shall be her master’s, and he shall go out by himself; and if the servant shall plainly say, ‘I love my master, my wife, and my children; I will not go out free,’—then his master shall bring him unto the judges; he shall bring him unto the door, or unto the door-post, and his master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him for ever.” Ex. xxi. 1–6.

It is clear, then, that “to contract and consent,” or the reverse, is no part of the qualities of slavery. Erase, then, that portion of Dr. Paley’s definition as surplusage; it will then read, “an obligation to labour for the benefit of the master.”

Now, there can be no obligation to do a thing where there is no possible power to do it; and more especially, if there is no contract. But it does not unfrequently occur, that a slave, from its infancy, old age, idiocy, delirium, disease, or other infirmity, has no power to labour for the benefit of the master; and the want of such ability may be obviously as permanent as life, so as to exclude the idea of any prospective benefit. Yet the law compels the master to supply food, clothes, medicine, pay taxes on, and every way suitably protect such slave, greatly to the disadvantage of the master. Or, a case might be, for it is presumable, that the master, from some obliqueness of understanding, might not wish some slave, even in good health, to labour at all, but would prefer, at great expense, to maintain such slave in luxury and idleness, clothed in purple and fine linen, and faring sumptuously every day: surely, such slave, would be under no obligation to labour for the benefit of the master, when, to do so, would be acting contrary to his will and command. Yet none of these circumstances make the slave a freeman, or alter at all the essentials of slavery.

The slave, then, may or may not be under obligation to labour for the benefit of the master. Therefore, the “obligation to labour for the benefit of the master” is surplusage also, and may be erased. So the entire definition is erased—not a word left!

The fact is, Dr. Paley took some of the most common incidents accompanying the thing for the thing itself; and he would have been just as logically correct had he said, that “slavery was to be a hearty feeder on fat pork,” because slaves feed heartily on that article. In his definition Dr. Paley has embraced none of the essentials of slavery.

We propose to notice the passage—“This obligation may arise, consistently with the laws of nature, from three causes: 1st, from crime; 2d, from captivity; 3d, from debt.”

The first consideration is, what he means by “obligation.” In its usual acceptation, the term means something that has grown out of a previous condition, as the obligations of marriage did not, nor could they exist until the marriage was had. If he only means that the “obligations” of slavery arise, &c., then he has told us nothing of the arising of slavery itself. But as he has used the word in the singular number, and given it three progenitors, we may suppose, that, by some figure of rhetoric, not usual in works of this kind, he has used the consequent for the cause. In that case, the sentence should read, “Slavery may arise, consistently with the laws of nature, from three causes,” &c.; which is what we suppose the doctor really meant.

The next inquiry is, what did Dr. Paley mean by “the laws of nature?” Permit us to suffer him to answer this inquiry himself.

In the twenty-fourth chapter of his “Natural Theology,” a work of great merit, he says—

“The wisdom of the Deity, as testified in the works of creation, surpasses all idea we have of wisdom drawn from the highest intellectual operations of the highest class of intelligent beings with whom we are acquainted. * * * The degree of knowledge and power requisite for the formation of created nature cannot, with respect to us, be distinguished from infinite. The Divine omnipresence stands in natural theology upon this foundation. In every part and place of the universe, with which we are acquainted, we perceive the exertion of a power which we believe mediately or immediately to proceed from the Deity. For instance, in what part or point of space, that has ever been explored, do we not discover attraction? In what regions do we not discover light? In what accessible portion of our globe do we not meet with gravitation, magnetism, electricity? together with the properties, also, and powers of organized substances, of vegetable or animated, nature? Nay, further we may ask, what kingdom is there of nature, what corner of space, in which there is any thing that can be examined by us, where we do not fall upon contrivance and design? The only reflection, perhaps, which arises in our minds from this view of the world around us, is that the laws of nature everywhere prevail; that they are uniform and universal. But what do we mean by the laws of nature? or by any law? Effects are produced by power, not by law; a law cannot execute itself; a law refers to an agent.”

By the “laws of nature,” then, Dr. Paley clearly means the laws of God.

Now be pleased to look at the close of Dr. Paley’s remarks on slavery, where he trusts that, “as Christianity advances in the world, it will banish what remains of that odious institution.” How happens it that an institution which arises consistently with the laws of God should be odious to him, unless the laws of God and Dr. Paley are at variance on this subject?

It will be recollected, that Dr. Paley has presented a number of facts, displaying acts of oppression and cruelty, as arguments against the African slave-trade. These facts are arranged and used in place as arguments against the institution of slavery itself; and the verbose opponents of this institution have always so understood it, and so used this class of facts. It is this circumstance that calls for our present view of these facts, rather than any necessity the facts themselves impose of proving their exaggeration or imaginary existence; and doubtless, in many cases, most heartless enormities were committed. But what do they all prove? Truly, that some men engaged in the traffic were exceedingly wicked men.

Such men would fashion the traffic to suit themselves, and would, doubtless, make their business an exceedingly wicked one. But none of the enormities named, or that could be named, constituted a necessary part of the institution of slavery, or necessarily emanated from it. What enormities have wicked men sometimes committed in the transportation of emigrants from Germany and Ireland? Wicked men, intrusted with power, have, at least sometimes, been found to abuse it. Is it any argument against the institution of marriage, because some women have made their husbands support and educate children not their own? Or, because some men murder, treat with cruelty, or make their wives totally miserable and wretched? None of these things were any part of the institution of marriage, but the reverse of it. Apply this view also to the institution of Christianity, for nothing has been more abused. Already, under its very banners, as it were, have been committed more enormities than would probably attend that of slavery through all time. Yet the institution of Christianity has not been even soiled thereby; but its character and usefulness have become brighter and more visible. In proportion to the importance of a thing is its liability to abuse. A worthless thing is not worth a counterfeit.

We have before us the testimony of travellers in regard to the indifference felt by the Africans on being sold as slaves; of their palpable want of love and affection for their country, their relatives, and even for their wives and children. Nor should we forget that a large portion of this race are born slaves to the chieftains, whose wars with each other are mere excursions of robbery and theft.

Lander, vol. i. p. 107, speaking of Jenna, says—

“It must not be imagined that because the people of this country are almost perpetually engaged in conflicts with their neighbours, the slaughter of human beings is therefore very great. They pursue war, as it is called, partly as an amusement, or to keep their hands in it; and partly to benefit themselves by the capture of slaves.”

One decrepit old woman was the victim of a hundred engagements, at Cape La Hoo, during a three years’ war. Lander describes those who claim to be free, as the war men of the path, who are robbers. He says, p. 145, “they subsist solely by pillage and rapine.”

Such is the condition of the poor free negro in Africa. The chieftain often, it is true, has goats, sheep, fields of corn and rice; but we mistake when we suppose that the slaves, the surplus of whom were formerly sent to market, were the proprietors of such property. At Katunqua, p. 179, Lander describes the food to be “such as lizards, rats, locusts, and caterpillars, which the natives roast, grill, bake, and boil.” No people feed on such vermin who possess fields and flocks.

We can form some notion of their companionship, from p. 110: “It is the custom here, when the governor dies, for two of his favourite wives to quit the world on the same day;” but in this case they ran and hid themselves. Also, p. 182: “This morning a young man visited us, with a countenance so rueful, and spoke in a tone so low and melancholy, that we were desirous to learn what evil had befallen him. The cause of it was soon explained by his informing us that he would be doomed to die, with two companions, as soon as the governor’s dissolution should take place.”

There is little or no discrepancy among travellers in their descriptions of the Africans. Their state of society must have been well known to Paley; yet Paley gives us a picture of their state of society from imagination, founded upon that state of society with which his pupils were conversant: “Because the slaves were torn away from their parents, wives, children, and friends, homes, companions, country, fields, and flocks.”

If the picture drawn by Paley were the lone consideration addressed to our commiseration in the argument against slavery as a Divine institution of mercy, we should, perhaps, be at some loss to determine what amount was due from us to the African slave, who had thus been torn from the danger of being put to death!—thus torn from his fields of lizards and locusts, and flocks of caterpillars!

But what shall we think of an argument, founded on relations in England, but applied to Africa, where no such relations exist?

It is a rule to hesitate as to the truthfulness of all that is stated, when the witness is discovered to be under the influence of a prejudice so deeply seated as to mislead the mind, and especially when we discover a portion of the stated facts to be either not true or misapplied.

The reasons assigned by Dr. Paley why the Christian Scriptures did not prohibit and condemn slavery, we deem also quite erroneous:—“For Christianity, soliciting admission into all nations of the world, abstained, as behooved it, from intermeddling with the civil institutions of any;” and then asks, with an air of triumph, “But does it follow from the silence of Scripture concerning them, that all the civil institutions that prevailed were right? or that the bad should not be exchanged for better?”

We wish to call particular attention to this passage, for, even after having examined the books of the Greek philosophers, we are constrained to say we have never seen a more beautiful sophism.

Is it a fact, then, that Jesus Christ and his apostles did compromise and compound with sin, as Dr. Paley thinks it behooved them, and with the design to avoid opposition to the introduction of Christianity?

Say, thou humble follower of the lowly Jesus, art thou ready to lay down thy life for Him who could truckle to sin—to a gross, an abominable sin, which alone would destroy the purity of his character and the divinity of his doctrine? In all love, we pray Him who holds your very breath in his hand, to cause you to tremble, before you shall say that Jesus Christ was a liar, and his apostles perjured!

“I am the true vine; and my Father is the husbandman * * * as the Father hath loved me, so have I loved you; continue ye in my love. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends if ye do whatsoever I command you. Henceforth I call you not servants, for the servant knoweth not what his Lord doeth; but I have called you friends; for ALL THINGS that I have heard of my Father, I have made known unto you.” John xv. 1, 9, 13, 15.

“And when they were come to him, he said unto them; ye know, from the first day that I came into Asia, after what manner I have been with you, at all seasons, serving the Lord with all humility of mind, and with many tears and temptations, which befell me by the lying in wait of the Jews. And how I kept back nothing that was profitable unto you; but have showed you, and have taught you publicly and from house to house. Wherefore, I take you to record this day, that I am pure from the blood of all men. For I have not shunned to declare unto you all the counsel of God.” Acts xx.

Had St. Paul foreseen the attack upon his character, made by Dr. Paley, seventeen hundred and eighty-five years after, and that upon his Master and their religion, he need not have altered his language to have repelled the slander.

“Simon Peter, a servant and apostle of Jesus Christ, to them that have obtained like precious faith with us, through the righteousness of God and of our Saviour Jesus Christ: grace and peace be multiplied unto you, through the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ our Lord, according as his divine power hath given unto us ALL THINGS THAT PERTAIN UNTO LIFE AND GODLINESS, through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue.” 2 Pet. i. 1, 2, 3.

And what says this holy man,—what says this same Peter, touching the subject of Dr. Paley’s remarks?

“Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear; not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward, * * * for hereunto were ye called.” 1 Pet. ii. 18–21.

Permit us to inquire whether the language of Jesus Christ himself, of St. Paul and St. Peter, does not, in a strong degree, contradict the supposition of Dr. Paley? And let us inquire whether it is probable that a class of men, devoted to the promulgation of a doctrine which ran so counter to many of the civil institutions, customs, habits, and religions then in the world, as to have subjected them to death, would have secretly kept back a part of their creed, when, to have made it known, could not have increased their danger; and, especially, as by the creed itself, such keeping back would have insured to them the eternal punishment hereafter?

“Now we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the spirit which is of God: that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God; which things we also speak, not in the words which man’s wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth.” 1 Cor. ii. 12, 13. “And Jesus came and spake unto them, saying all power is given unto me in heaven and in earth. Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, teaching them to observe ALL THINGS whatsoever I have commanded you; and lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world.” Matt. xxviii. 18–20. “And now, O Father, glorify thou me, with thine own self, with the glory which I had with thee before the world was. I have manifested thy name unto the men which thou gavest me out of the world. Now they have known ALL THINGS whatsoever thou hast given me of thee: for I have given unto them the WORDS which thou gavest me, and they have received them, and have known surely that I came out from thee.” John xvii. 5–8.

It is not possible that we could have had greater evidence that the whole counsel of God, illustrating the Christian duty, was delivered to the apostles, and through them, to the world. Besides, the very presumption of the incompleteness of the instruction undermines the divinity of the doctrine.

There is, perhaps, no one who does not feel pain, sometimes almost unspeakable, when we see a great man leaning upon the staff of error, especially when such error is palpable, gross, and calamitous in its tendency and effects.

But, cheering as the early ray of hope, and welcome as the rest-giving witness of a covenant, will be the proof that human weakness still had power to wade from out the miry labyrinth of error—to stand upon the rock from whence even human eyes might behold some few glimpses of the rising effulgence of truth.

We have some evidence that Dr. Paley did, at a later period of his life, adopt a more consistent view of the Christian Scriptures, touching the subject of this inquiry. In his “HorÆ PaulinÆ,” a work of exceeding great merit, on the subject of Paul’s letter to the Corinthian church, he enumerates and classifies the subjects of Paul’s instruction, among which slavery is conspicuously mentioned, and then says—“That though they” (the subjects) “be exactly agreeable to the circumstances of the persons to whom the letter was written, nothing, I believe, but the existence and reality of the circumstances” (subjects) “could have suggested them to the writer’s thought.”

In all Christian love and charity, we are constrained to believe that he had discovered his error; and that, had his life been spared longer, he, with diligence and anxiety, would have expunged from his works charges so reflecting on himself, and contrary to the character of the God of our hope.

LESSON XIII.

Slavery existed in Britain when history commenced the records of that island. It was there found in a state and condition predicated upon the same causes by which its existence is now continued and perpetuated in Africa. But as early as the year 692–3 A.D., the Witna-Gemot, convoked by Ina, began to manifest a more elevated condition of the Britons. Without abolishing slavery, they regulated its government, ameliorated the old practice of death or slavery being the universal award of conquest; by submission and baptism the captive was acknowledged to merit some consideration; life, and, in some cases, property were protected against the rapacity of the conqueror; the child was secured against the mere avarice of the savage parent, and heavy punishment was announced against him who should sell his countryman, whether malefactor, slave, or not, to any foreign master.

He who has the curiosity to notice the steps by which the Britons emerged from savage life, in connection with their condition of slavery, may do well to examine the works of William of Malmsbury, Simeon of Durham, Bede, Alcuin, Wilkins, Huntingdon, Hoveden, Lingard, and Wilton. But he will not find the statutes of the monarchies succeeding Ina free from these enactments until he shall come down near the fourteenth century. Thus, generations passed away before these statutes came to be regarded with general respect. National regeneration has ever been thus slow. Thus, savage life has ever put to death the captive; while we find that slavery, among such tribes, has ever been introduced as a merciful provision in its stead, and is surely a proof of one step towards a more elevated state of moral improvement. But in the case of Britain and the whole of Europe, the slave was of the same original stock with the master; he, therefore, presented no physical impediment to amalgamation, by which has been brought about whatever of equality now exists among their descendants.

But in the close of this study, we propose to take some notice of the arguments of another most distinguished writer in favour of the abolition of slavery, as it now affects the African race.

In 1777, the celebrated Dr. Samuel Johnson wrote his argument in favour of the freedom of the negro slave who accompanied his master from Jamaica to Scotland, and who there brought suit in the Court of Sessions for his freedom. This argument has been deemed by so many to be unanswerable, and ever since that time so generally used as a seed argument in the propagation of abolition doctrines, that we feel it worthy of notice and examination.

Johnson was a bitter opponent of negro slavery; yet, strange, he ever advocated the justice of reducing the American colonies and the West India Islands to the most abject condition of political slavery to the British crown. This system is fully advocated, and garnished by his sarcasm and ridicule, in his famous work, entitled “Taxation no Tyranny.” “How is it,” says he, “that we hear the loudest yelps for liberty among the drivers of negroes.”

Not long after he wrote this argument, on the occasion of a dinner-party at Dilly’s, he said, “I am willing to love all mankind, except an American;” whereupon, adds his biographer, “he breathed out threatenings and slaughter, calling them rascals, robbers, pirates, and exclaiming, he’d burn and destroy them.”

Some knowledge of a man’s peculiar notions relevant to a subject will often aid the mind in a proper estimate of the value of his opinion and judgment concerning correlative matters. His biographer says—

“I record Dr. Johnson’s argument fairly upon this particular case;” * * * “but I beg leave to enter my most solemn protest against his general doctrine with respect to the slave-trade; for I will most resolutely say that his unfavourable notion of it was owing to prejudice, and imperfect or false information. The wild and dangerous attempt, which has for some time been persisted in, to obtain an act of the legislature to abolish so very important and necessary a branch of commercial interest, must have been crushed at once, had not the insignificance of the zealots who vainly took the lead in it, made the vast body of the planters, merchants, and others, whose immense properties are involved in the trade, reasonably enough suppose that there would be no danger. The encouragement which the attempt has received excites my wonder and indignation; and though some men of superior abilities have supported it, whether from a love of temporary popularity when prosperous, or a love of general mischief when desperate, my opinion is unshaken. To abolish a status, which in all ages God has sanctioned and man has continued, would not only be robbery to an innumerable class of fellow-subjects, but it would be extreme cruelty to African savages, a portion of whom it saves from massacre or intolerable bondage in their own country, and introduces into a much happier state of life.” Boswell’s Life of Johnson, vol. ii. pp. 132, 133.

On the same page, the biographer adds—

“His violent prejudices against our West-Indian and American settlers, appeared whenever there was an opportunity.” * * * “Upon an occasion, when in company with several very grave men at Oxford, his toast was: ‘Here’s to the next insurrection of the negroes in the West Indies!’ I, with all due deference, thought that he discovered a zeal without knowledge.”

This was surely bold in Boswell!

Since the culmination of the great British lexicographer, it has been unusual to hear a whisper in question of his high moral accuracy, of his singularly nice mental training, or the perspicuous and lofty display of these qualities in all his works. Even at this day, such a whisper may be proof of temerity. But truth is of higher import than the fear of individual rebuke, or of our literary faith that any one hero in the walks of erudition heretofore went down to the tomb without one mental or classical imperfection.

Argument in favour of a negro claiming his liberty, referred to in Boswell’s Life of Johnson, p. 132.

“It must be agreed that in most ages many countries have had part of their inhabitants in a state of slavery; yet it may be doubted whether slavery can ever be supposed the natural condition of man. It is impossible not to conceive that men in their original state were equal; and very difficult to imagine how one would be subjected to another but by violent compulsion. An individual may, indeed, forfeit his liberty by a crime; but he cannot by that crime forfeit the liberty of his children. What is true of a criminal seems true likewise of a captive. A man may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of perpetual servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can entail that servitude on his descendants; for no man can stipulate without commission for another. The condition which he himself accepts, his son or grandson would have rejected. If we should admit, what perhaps may with more reason be denied, that there are certain relations between man and man which may make slavery necessary and just, yet it can never be proved that he who is now suing for his freedom ever stood in any of those relations. He is certainly subject by no law, but that of violence, to his present master, who pretends no claim to his obedience but that he bought him from a merchant of slaves, whose right to sell him never was examined. It is said that according to the constitutions of Jamaica he was legally enslaved; these constitutions are merely positive, and apparently injurious to the rights of mankind, because whoever is exposed to sale is condemned to slavery without appeal, by whatever fraud or violence he might have originally been brought into the merchant’s power. In our own time, princes have been sold, by wretches to whose care they were intrusted, that they might have an European education; but when once they were brought to a market in the plantations, little would avail either their dignity or their wrongs. The laws of Jamaica afford a negro no redress. His colour is considered as a sufficient testimony against him. It is to be lamented that moral right should ever give way to political convenience. But if temptations of interest are sometimes too strong for human virtue, let us at least retain a virtue where there is no temptation to quit it. In the present case there is apparent right on one side, and no convenience on the other. Inhabitants of this island can neither gain riches nor power by taking away the liberty of any part of the human species. The sum of the argument is this: No man is by nature the property of another. The defendant is, therefore, by nature, free. The rights of nature must be some way forfeited before they can be justly taken away. That the defendant has, by any act, forfeited the rights of nature, we require to be proved; and if no proof of such forfeiture can be given, we doubt not but the justice of the court will declare him free.”

The author of this production has artfully surrounded his subject with such a plausibility of concessive proposals, doubtful suggestions, indefinite words and propositions, as will require a sifting of his ideas into a more distinct view. And we fear some will find his argument thus vague and indeterminate; the mind will pass it by, as one of those learned masterpieces of logic, so distant from the eye of our common judgment, that they will sooner yield their assent than endure the labour of examination.

The first suggestion we would offer on the subject of this production is its total inapplicability to the case. The negro was held a slave in Jamaica. The inquiry was not, whether he was so held in obedience to the British law regulating the institution of slavery in Jamaica. The only question was, whether a slave in Jamaica, or elsewhere, who had by any means found his way into Scotland, was or was not free by operation of law. Not a word is directed to that point. And the court of session must have regarded its introduction before them as an argument in the case, as idle and as useless as would have been a page from his Rasselas. The British government established negro slavery by law in all her colonies, but made no provision by which the slave, when once found on the shores of England, could be taken thence again into slavery.

The object, no doubt, was wholly to prevent their introduction there, in favour to her own labouring poor. The British monarchy retained the whole subject of slavery under its own control. The colonies had no voice in the matter. They had no political right to say that the slave, thus imposed on them, should, after he had found his way into any part of the British Isles, be reclaimed, and their right of property in him restored. Their political condition differed widely from the condition of these United States at the formation of this republic.

They, as colonial dependants, had no power to dictate protection to their own rights, or to insist on a compromise of conflicting interests to be established by law.

Dr. Johnson’s argument is exclusively directed against the political and moral propriety of the institution of slavery as a state or condition of man anywhere, instead of the true question at issue. The argument, taken as a whole, is, therefore, a sophism, of the order which dialecticians call “ignoratio elenchi;” a dodging of the question; a substitution of something for the question which is not; a practice common among the pert pleaders of the day—sometimes, doubtless, without their own perception of the fact. In regard to him who uses this sophism to effect the issue, the conclusion is inevitable,—he is either dishonest or he is ignorant of his subject. And when we come to examine this celebrated production as an argument against the moral propriety of the existence of the institution of slavery in the world, we shall find every pillar presented for its foundation a mere sophism, now quite distinctly, and again more feebly enunciated, as if with a more timid tongue, and left to inquiry, adorned by festoons of doubt and supposition.

We shall requote some portions, with a view to their more particular consideration. And, first, “Yet it may be doubted whether slavery can ever be supposed the natural condition of man.” This clause, when put in the crucible, reads, “Yet slavery can never exist in conformity to the law of God.” Whoever doubts this to be the sense, we ask him to suppose what the sense is! The author did not choose these few words to express the proposition, because the law of God could readily be produced in contradiction: “Whosoever committeth sin is the servant (d?????, doulos, SLAVE) of sin.” Besides, then, he loses the benefit of the sophism,—the substitution of the condition of man in his fallen state, through the ambiguity of the word “natural,” for the condition of the first man, fresh from the hand of the Creator. This sophism is one of great art and covertness; so much so, that it takes its character rather from its effect on the mind than from its language; and we therefore desire him who reads, to notice the whole chain of thought passing in the author’s mind,—lest he forget how our present state is the subject of contemplation offered as data, when, on the word “natural,” as if it were a potter’s wheel, our original condition is turned to the front, a postulate, from which we are left to compare and conclude.

The doctrine of the Bible is, that slavery is the consequence of sin. If “natural” be taken to mean the quality of a state of perfect holiness and purity, then slavery cannot be the natural condition of man; no doubts are required in the case. But if “natural” is used to express the quality of our condition under sin, sinking us under the curse of the law, then the propriety of its use will not be “doubtful,” when applied to slavery, because it is a consequent of the quality of the condition. “Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them.” The proposition, as thus explained, we think of no value in the argument; but, as left by the author, obscure, its real meaning and intent not obviously perceived nor easily detected, and he may have thought it logical and sound.

“It is impossible not to conceive that men, in their original state, were equal.”

Here is another sophism, which the learned call petitio principii, introduced without the least disguise,—the assumption of a proposition without proof, which, upon examination, is not true. If the author mean, by “original state,” the state of man in paradise, we have no method of examining facts, except by a comparison of Adam with Eve, who was placed in subjection. And if we may be permitted to examine the state of holy beings more elevated than was man,—“For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels,”—then, by analogy, we shall find it possible to conceive that men, in the original state, were not equal, since even the angels, who do the commands of God, are described as those “that excel in strength.”

But if Dr. Johnson mean the state of man after the fall, then Cain was told by God himself, that, if he did well, he should have rule over Abel.

“And very difficult to imagine how one would be subjected to another, but by violent compulsion.” The object of this singular remark is to enforce the proposition, That slavery is incompatible with the law of God, which is not true.

“And if the servant shall plainly say, ‘I love my master * * * I will not go out free:’ then his master shall bring him * * * and he shall serve (be a slave to) him for ever.”

But if it shall be said the value of the passage quoted resides in the term “violent compulsion;” that “violent compulsion,” sufficient to make a man a slave, is incompatible with the law of God, then it will have no weight in the argument, because the “violent compulsion” used may be in conformity to the law of God. “And I will cause thee to serve (be a slave) to thine enemies in the land which thou knowest not.”

“An individual may indeed forfeit his liberty by crime, but he cannot forfeit the liberty of his children.”

This, as a proposition, presents a sophism of the order non causa pro causa, in reverse. We all agree a man may forfeit his liberty by crime; but how are we to deduce from this fact that the liberty of the child cannot be affected by the same crime? The truth is, the crime that deprives a parent of liberty, may, or may not, deprive the child. The framework of this sophism is quite subtle; it implies the sophism, “a dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter,” to have full effect on the mind. Because, in truth, the crime that deprives the parent of liberty does not invariably involve the liberty of the child, we are, therefore, asked to assent to the proposition that it never does. But, perhaps, an analysis of the proposition before us may be more plain to some, when we remark, what is true in all such compound sophisms, that the proposition containing it is divisible into two distinct propositions.

In this case, the first one is true,—the second not. If, by crime, a man forfeits his life, he forfeits his liberty. If he is put to death previous to a condition of paternity, its prospect is cut off with him. Those beings who, otherwise, might have been his descendants, will never exist. Hence rude nations, from such analogy, in case of very high crimes, destroyed, with the parent, all his existing descendants. Ancient history is full of such examples. The principle is the same as the more modern attaint, and is founded, if in no higher law, in the common sense of mankind; for, when the statute establishing attaints is repealed, the public mind and the descendant both feel that the attaint essentially exists, even without law to enforce it. Who does not perceive that the descendants of certain traitors are effectually attainted at the present day, even among the most enlightened nations. He who denies that the crime of the parent can affect the liberty of the child, must also deny that the character of the parent can affect him; a fact that almost universally exists, and which every one knows.

“Let his children be continually vagabonds and beg; * * * let his posterity be cut off; * * * let the iniquities of his fathers be remembered with the Lord.”

This doctrine was recognised and practised by the church, even in England, in the more early ages. Let one instance suffice. About the year 560, Mauricus, a Christian king of Wales, committed perjury and murdered Cynetus,—whereupon, Odouceus, Bishop of Llandaff, in full synod, pronounced excommunication, and cursed, for ever, him and all his offspring. See Milton’s ?????????S??S, cap. 28.

This principle actively exists in the physical world. The parent contracts some loathsome disease—the offspring are physically deteriorated thereby. He whose moral and physical degradation are such that slavery to him is a blessing, with few exceptions, will find his descendants fit only for that condition. The children of parents whose conduct in life fostered some mental peculiarity, are quite likely, with greater or less intensity, to exhibit traces of the same. “The parents have eaten sour grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” The law is not repealed by the mantle of love, which, in mercy, the Saviour has spread over the world, any more than forgiveness blots out the fact of a crime. The hope of happiness hereafter alleviates present suffering, but, in no sense, annihilates a cause which has previously existed.

“A man may accept life from a conquering enemy on condition of perpetual servitude; but it is very doubtful whether he can entail that servitude on his descendants; for no man can stipulate, without commission, for another.”

All that is presented as argument here, is founded upon the proposition, that no man can stipulate for his descendants, whether unborn or not.

If what we have before said be true, little need be said on the subject of this paragraph. For we have already seen that the conduct of the ancestor, to an indefinite extent, both physically influences and morally binds the condition of the offspring. It is comparatively but a few ages since, over the entire world, the parent had full power, by law, to put his children to death for crime, or to sell them into slavery for causes of which he was the judge. And it may be remarked, that such is the present law among, perhaps, all the tribes who furnish from their own race slaves for the rest of the world. It is not necessary here to show why a people, who find such laws necessary to their welfare, also find slavery a blessing to them.

Civilization has ameliorated these, to us, harsh features of parental authority; yet, to-day, the world can scarcely produce a case where the condition of the child has not been greatly affected by the stipulations, the conduct, the influences of the parent, wholly beyond its control. The relation of parent has ever been found a sufficient commission to bind these results to the condition of the offspring.

“But our fathers dealt proudly, and hardened their necks, and hearkened not to thy commandments, and refused to obey; * * * and in their rebellion appointed a captain to return to their bondage.”

“The condition which he (the captive) accepts, his son or grandson would have rejected.”

This, at most, is supposititious, and, as an argument, we think, extremely weak; because it implies, either that the acceptance of the parent was not the result of necessity, and the wisest choice between evils, or that the rejection, by the son, was the fruit of extravagant pretension.

“He that is extravagant will quickly become poor, and poverty will enforce dependence and invite corruption.” * * * “I have avoided that empyrical morality that cures one vice by the means of another.” Johnson’s Rambler.

“If we should admit, what perhaps with more reason may be denied, that there are certain relations between man and man, which may make slavery necessary and just, yet it can never be proved, that he, who is suing for his freedom, ever stood in any of these relations.”

We cannot pretend to know what were the particular facts in relation to the slavery of the individual then in Scotland. It is not, however, pretended that the facts in relation to this slave were not the facts in relation to all others. No suggestion of any illegality as to his slavery in Jamaica is made, other than the broad ground of the illegality of slavery itself. This is quite evident from what follows:

“He is certainly subject, by no law but that of violence, to his present master, who pretends no claim to his obedience, but that he bought him from a merchant of slaves, whose right to sell him was never examined.”

In the passage under consideration, we are confined wholly to negro slavery; and had Dr. Johnson been serious in admitting that slavery, under “certain relations,” was “necessary and just,” he would have yielded his case; because, then, the slave in hand would have been placed in the category of proving that he did not exist under these relations. Johnson well knew that slavery existed in Jamaica by the sanction of the British Parliament, and he manifests his contempt for it, by the assertion that the slave was held only by the law of force. He was, therefore, not reaching for the freedom of that particular slave, but for the subversion of slavery as a condition of man.

The author has heretofore signified a willingness to admit the lawfulness of slavery, when induced by “crime or captivity;” but now denies the validity of such admission, because the relations of “crime and captivity” can never be proved. The apparent object of his admission was merely to rally us, by his liberality, to the admission that these relations could never be proved; and we admit they never can be in the way he provides; and he therefore announces the demonstration of the proposition, that slavery can never be just, because “these relations,” which alone make it so, can never be established. But what are the reasons? They are the very causes which render the Africans obnoxious to the condition of slavery—the degraded, deteriorated, and savage state of that people. The negro slave, in his transit from the interior of Africa, is often sold many times, by one master and chieftain to another, before he reaches the western coast, whence he was transferred by the slave factors to the English colonies. No memory of these facts, or of the slave’s origin, is preserved or attempted. Under these circumstances, though each individual of these slaves induced the condition by “crime or captivity,” such fact could never be established in the English colony. To attempt proof there of any fact touching the case, would be as idle and futile as to attempt such proof in regard to the biography of a baboon. Besides, the truth is, a very large portion of these slaves were born slaves in Africa, inheriting their condition from a slave ancestry of unknown ages, and recognised to be slaves by the laws and customs of the various tribes there, and sent to market as a surplus commodity, in accordance to the laws and usages among them, enforced from time immemorial.

So far as we have knowledge of the various families of man, we believe it to have ever been the practice for one nation to receive the national acts of another as facts fixed, and not subject to further investigation or alteration by a foreign people, especially when none but the people making the decision were affected by it. Johnson surely must have agreed to such a practice, because an opposite course, so far as carried into action, would have involved every nation in universal war and endless bloodshed. Besides, the right to usurp such control would involve the right to enslave, and can only exist when the degeneracy of a nation has become too great a nuisance to be longer tolerated with safety by the people annoyed: self-protection will then warrant the right.

If England makes it lawful for her subjects to buy slaves in Africa and hold them in Jamaica, then her subjects may lawfully hold there such as are decided by the laws of Africa to be slaves. But the author of the argument, with all this before him, having dictated what alone shall make a man a slave, would propose to set up a new tribunal contrary to all international law—contrary to the peace of the world—and, finally, as to the object to which it is to be applied, forever abortive: wherefore his argument in effect is, because “these relations,” which he admits would justly make a man a slave, cannot be proved, therefore what he admits to be true is not true; and puts us in mind of the sophism: “If, when a man speaks truth, he says he lies, he lies; but he lies when he speaks the truth; therefore, by speaking the truth, he lies!” which we think about as relevant to the question.

In his conclusion, Dr. Johnson frankly acknowledges the position we have assigned him:—

“The sum of the argument is this: No man is, by nature, the property of another. The defendant, therefore, is free by nature. The rights of nature must be someway forfeited before they can be justly taken away.”

There are, in our language, but few words of which we make such loose and indefinite use as we do of the word “nature,” and its variously modified forms. It would elucidate what we wish to bring to mind concerning the use of this word, to select some verbose author, of a fanatical habit of thought, or enough so to favour a negligence as to the clearness of the ideas expressed by the terms at his command, and compare the varied meanings which his application of the word will most clearly indicate. We do not accuse Dr. Johnson of any want of astute learning, but we wish to present an excuse for explaining that, by his use of the phrases, “men by nature”—“by nature free”—“the rights of nature,” he means, the rights established by the laws of God. He uses those phrases as synonyms of the Creator, of his providence influencing the condition of man, or the adaptations bestowed on him. The laws of nature are the laws of God. And we are bold to say, no discreet writer uses the words differently. As a sample of its legitimate use, we quote “Milton to Hortlib on Education:”—

“Not to mention the learned correspondence which you hold in foreign parts, and the extraordinary pains and diligence which you have used in this matter, both here and beyond the seas; either by the definite will of God so ruling, or the peculiar sway of nature, which also is God’s working,” &c.

We all agree that God has made the world, and all things therein, and that he established laws for its government, and also for the government of every thing in it. Now we must all agree that it was an act of great condescension, love, and mercy, if God did come down from his throne in heaven, and, from his own mouth instruct a few of the lost men then in the world, his chosen people, what were some of his laws, such as were necessary for them to know and to be governed by, that they might, to the greatest possible extent, live happily in this world, and enjoy eternal life hereafter. Do you believe he did so? You either believe he did, or you believe the Bible is a fable. If you believe he did, then we refer you to Ex. xx. and xxi., and to Lev. xxv., for what he did then reveal, as his law, on the subject of slavery; not that other important revelations were not made concerning this subject, which we shall have occasion to notice in the course of these studies.

If we believe the Bible to be a true book, then we must believe that God did make these revelations to Moses. Among them, one law permitted the Israelites to buy, and inherit, and to hold slaves. And Dr. Wayland, the author of “The Elements of Moral Science,” agrees that what was the law of God must ever remain to be so.

It will follow then, if the laws of God authorize slavery, that a man by nature may be the property of another, because, whatever you may think the laws of nature to be, yet they can have no validity in opposition to the laws of God. If it shall be said that Jesus Christ repealed the law as delivered to Moses, then we answer: He says he came not to destroy, but to fulfil the law and that he fully completed his mission. He had no commission to repeal the law: therefore he had no power to do so.

This portion of Dr. Johnson’s argument is consonant with the notions of the advocates of the “higher law” doctrine, who persist that slavery is a sin, because they think it is.

But if the law permitted slavery, then to hold, cannot be a sin, because God “frameth not mischief by a law.” See Ps. xciv. 20. “Wo unto them that decree unrighteous decrees.” Isa. x. 1. If the law authorizing the Jews to hold slaves was unrighteous, then God pronounces the wo upon himself, which is gross contradiction.

But the law is “pure, holy, and just;” therefore a law permitting sin must be against itself—which cannot be; for, in such case, the law recoils against itself, and destroys its own end and character.

But again: “The end of the commandment is charity out of a pure heart, and of a good conscience, and faith unfeigned.” 1 Tim. i. 5. Now it is not charity to permit that which cannot be done with a pure heart, because then conscience and faith are both deceived.

Again: The law “beareth not the sword in vain, but to be a terror to evil works, for he (the instrument executing the law) is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.”

If slavery, or to hold slaves, be sin, then also the law granting the license to do so destroys the very object which it was enacted to sustain. But again: If the law allows sin, then it is in covenant with sin and the law itself, therefore, must be sin.

In short, the doctrine is pure infidelity. It is destructive to the object of law, and blasphemous to God. What are we to think of him who holds that God descended in the majesty of his power upon Sinai, and there, from the bottomless treasures of his wisdom and purity, commanding man to wash his garment of every pollution, opened to him—what? Why, an unclean system of morals, stained by a most unholy impurity; but which he is nevertheless to practise to the damning of his soul! Atheism, thou art indeed a maniac!

In the course of these studies, we shall attempt to show that man is not free in the unlimited sense with which the word is here used. Absolute freedom is incompatible with a state of accountability. Say, if you choose, Adam was free in paradise to eat the apple, to commit sin, yet we find his freedom was bounded by an accountability beyond his power to give satisfactory answer: hence the consequent, a change of state, a circumscribing of what you may call his freedom. This, in common parlance, we call punishment; yet our idea of punishment is inadequate to express the full idea; because God cannot be supposed to delight in punishment, or to be satisfied with punishment, in accordance with our narrow views. Such would be inconsistent with the combination of his attributes—a Being so constituted of all power, that each power is predominant, even love and mercy. Thus the law of God clothes the effect in mercy and positive good, inversely to the virulence of the cause, or in direct proportion to its propriety. Thus, righteousness, as a cause, exalteth a nation; but sin is a reproach to any people. Thus the law of God places the sinner under the government of shame, infamy, contempt, as schoolmasters to lead him back to virtue; and it may be observed that the schoolmaster is more forcing in his government in proportion to the virulence of vice, down to the various grades of subjection and slavery, and until the poison becomes so great that even death is a blessing.

But if the mind cannot perceive that the chastenings of the Lord are blessings, let it regard them as lessons. The parent, from the waywardness of the child, perceives that it will fall from a precipice, and binds it with a cord to circumscribe its walk. True, such are poor figures to outline a higher Providence!

The Being who created, surely had power to appoint the government. Can the thing created remain in the condition in which it is placed, except by obedience to the law established for its government? Disobedience must change the condition of the thing and bring it under new restraints—a lessening of the boundaries of freedom. The whole providence of God to man is upon this plan, and is abundantly illustrated, in the holy books, by precept and example. These restraints follow quick on the footsteps of disobedience, until the law—the Spirit shall no longer strive for reformation, but say, “Cut it down; why cumbereth it the ground?”

Is this a too melancholy view? Let us, then, look at obedience and its consequents, and turn the eye from this downward path of mental and physical degradation, pain, misery, want, slavery, and death, to the bright prospect of a more elevated state of progressive improvement, secured to us as a consequent, a reward of obedience; the physical powers improving, the mental elevating, and all our faculties becoming instruments of greater truthfulness, until our condition shall be so elevated that the Creator shall say, “Come ye and sit at my right hand!”

The assertion, that “no man is by nature the property of another,” flatters our vanity and tumefies our pride, but is, nevertheless, untrue. We are all absolutely the property of Him who made, and who sustains his right to dispose of us; and does so in conformity to his law. Thus, qualifiedly, we are the property of the great family of man, and are under obligations of duty to all; more pressingly to the national community of which we compose a part, and so on down to the distinct family of which we are a member. It is upon this principle that Fleta says, (book i, chap. 17,) “He that has a companion has a master.” See also the same in Bracton, book i. chap. 16.

If, by the laws of God, other men could have no property in us, the laws of civil government could have no right to control us. But if the civil government, by the laws of God, has the right to govern and control us, so far as is for the benefit of ourselves and the community, then it will follow, that when our benefit will be enhanced, and that of the community, by our subjection to slavery, either temporary or perpetual, the laws of God, in mercy, will authorize such subjection. Or, if the state of our degradation be such that our continuance upon the earth be an evil past all remedy, then the laws of God will authorize the civil law to decree our exit.

The providence of God to man is practical. He never deals in the silly abstractions of foolish philosophers. He spends no time in experimenting by eristic syllogisms. He deals alone in his own power, which nowhere ever ceases to act, although wholly beyond our comprehension. Man may long for a full view of the Almighty, yet we are destined here to perceive but the “hinder parts” of his presence—the effect of his power, not Him! Let us worship; and, for our guidance, be content with the pillar of cloud by day and of fire by night!

In conclusion: Should the author of “The Elements of Moral Science” examine this argument of the great dialectician of the past century, with his acknowledged logical acumen, free from the prejudices of his locality, now so abundantly displayed in that portion of his work to which we object, we would suggest the propriety of his applying the discoveries he may make to emendations in his succeeding thousands.