  In the eyes of many in the North, Grant’s Army had floundered in the swamps for months with nothing to show for it except a steadily mounting death list from disease. Criticism of the Union commander mounted. “I don’t know what to make of Grant, he’s such a quiet little fellow,” said Lincoln, thinking of the more flamboyant leaders who had led his Eastern armies, “The only way I know he’s around is by the way he makes things git.” Lincoln had grown increasingly fond of Grant, whose army, while ineffective, had never been inactive. Now he declared to Grant’s critics, “I think we’ll try him a little longer.” Although Grant had made every effort to navigate the bayous and reach Vicksburg, he was later to record that little hope had been entertained that success would greet these ventures. While waiting for the dry season which would permit land operations, however, he had determined to exhaust every possibility and to retain the fighting edge of his army by keeping it constantly on the move. As April arrived and the roads began to emerge from the slowly receding waters, Grant prepared to execute the movement which he had believed from the first to be the logical approach against Vicksburg—marching down the west bank of the Mississippi through Louisiana, crossing the river south of the city, and laying siege to it from the rear. PORTER RUNS THE VICKSBURG BATTERIES.Grant’s Vicksburg campaign officially began on March 29, 1863, when he ordered McClernand’s Corps to open a road for the army from Milliken’s Bend to the river below the city. Considerable work had been done previously when it was contemplated that a canal from Duckport to the river below Vicksburg might offer passage to the fleet. Falling waters had finally defeated this plan and, during April, McClernand’s engineers labored to bridge streams, corduroy roads, and build flatboats to cross areas still covered by flood waters. During that month also, elements of the Army of the Tennessee accomplished the 70-mile march and assembled at a small hamlet appropriately named, Hard Times, in view of Grant’s unpleasant bayou experiences. Here they were across the river from the Confederate stronghold of Grand Gulf, 25 miles below Vicksburg. Adm. David Dixon Porter, commanding the Union naval operations on the inland waters. Courtesy National Archives. Porter’s gunboats running the Vicksburg batteries on the night of April 16, 1863. From a wartime sketch. This remarkable wartime photograph, taken by a Confederate Secret Service agent, shows Grierson’s cavalrymen near the end of their 600-mile raid behind the Confederate lines. From Photographic History of the Civil War. To ferry the Union Army across the Mississippi, it was necessary for Porter’s fleet, in anchorage north of Vicksburg, to run the batteries and rendezvous with Grant below. While naval craft singly and in groups had, on occasion, passed these batteries successfully before, it was still a formidable undertaking for which careful preparation was required. As protection against shellfire, each vessel had its port side, which would face the Vicksburg guns in passage, piled high with bales of cotton, hay, and grain. Coal barges were lashed alongside as an additional defense. Shortly before midnight, April 16, Confederate pickets in skiffs at the bend of the river above Vicksburg saw the muffled fleet bearing down upon them and quickly gave the alarm. Tar barrels along the bank were ignited and buildings in the small village of De Soto across the river were set afire. The blinding light of a great flare helped illuminate the river and outline the fleet for the Confederate gunners. Tier upon tier of the river batteries thundered down on the Union vessels. In return, these boats delivered their broadsides into the city as they passed so close that the clatter of bricks from falling buildings could be heard on board. Through this “magnificent, but terrible” spectacle—one of the most fearful pageants of the war—steamed the fleet in single file. “Their heavy shot walked right through us,” related Porter. Every one of the 12 boats was hit repeatedly. Many went out of control and revolved slowly with the current. Despite the furious bombardment, only one craft was sunk; within a few days damages were repaired and the fleet joined the army at the village of Hard Times. Because of the difficulty of supplying the army by wagon train over the wretched road from Milliken’s Bend, 6 transports and 12 barges loaded with supplies ran the batteries a few nights later with the loss of 1 transport and 6 barges. THE RIVER CROSSING.Grant’s plan was to make an assault landing at Grand Gulf, a fortified road junction on the bluffs at the mouth of the Big Black River. On April 29, the Union gunboats pounded the Grand Gulf fortifications for 6 hours, seeking to neutralize the defenses and clear the landing for 10,000 Federal infantry aboard transports just beyond range of the Confederate cannon. The naval attack failed to reduce the Confederate works, and that night Grant marched southward along the Louisiana shore to a landing opposite Bruinsburg. There he was met by the fleet which then slipped downstream under cover of darkness. By noon of the following day, April 30, Grant was across the Mississippi, experiencing
Grant’s landing was unopposed, partly because of two diversionary movements and partly because of Pemberton’s decision to hold his army close to Vicksburg and fight a defensive campaign. Both diversions were completely successful. On April 17, the day after Porter’s running of the batteries had indicated Grant’s strategy of striking from the south, Col. B. H. Grierson with 1,000 cavalrymen moved out from southwestern Tennessee on one of the celebrated cavalry raids of the war. They rode entirely through the State of Mississippi behind Pemberton’s army to a junction with Union forces at Baton Rouge, La. In 16 days Grierson covered 600 miles, interfering with Confederate telegraph and railroad communications and forcing Pemberton to detach a division of infantry to protect his supply and communication lines. Sherman, whose corps had not yet made the march from Milliken’s Bend, made an elaborate feint above Vicksburg. Loading his men aboard every available gunboat, transport, and tug, he landed at The events immediately following Grant’s landing revealed a basic difference in tactical concepts between Pemberton, commanding the Army of Vicksburg, and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, his superior, who was in charge of Confederate operations in the West. Johnston believed that to defeat Grant it would be necessary for Pemberton to unite his whole force in order to smash the Union Army, preferably before Grant could consolidate his position on the east bank. Accordingly, he wired Pemberton on May 2 “If Grant’s army crosses, unite all your troops to beat him; success will give you back what was abandoned to win it.” It was Pemberton’s concept that holding Vicksburg was vital to the Confederacy and that he must primarily protect the city and its approaches. To have marched his army to meet Grant “would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defenses of their garrisons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy.” This inability of Pemberton and Johnston to reach agreement upon the tactics that might thwart Grant’s invasion seriously affected subsequent Confederate operations and prevented effective cooperation between the two commanders in the Vicksburg campaign. Maj. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding the Union XV Corps. Courtesy National Archives. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, commanding Confederate military operations in the West. Courtesy National Archives. THE BATTLE OF PORT GIBSON.McClernand’s Corps, immediately upon debarking on April 30, headed for the bluffs 3 miles inland. By nightfall the Federal soldiers had reached the high ground and pushed on toward Port Gibson, 30 miles south of Vicksburg. From this point, roads led to Grand Gulf, Vicksburg, and Jackson. Maj. Gen. John S. Bowen moved his Grand Gulf command toward Port Gibson to intercept the threat, and, at daylight on May 1, leading elements of the Union advance clashed with Bowen’s troops, barring the two roads which led to Port Gibson. The battle of Port Gibson was a series of furious day-long engagements over thickly wooded ridges cut by deep, precipitous gullies and covered with dense undergrowth. While greatly outnumbering Bowen, McClernand was prevented by the rugged terrain from bringing his whole force into action. Slowly forced backward, Bowen conducted an orderly retreat through the town, which he evacuated. The holding action had cost Bowen 800 casualties from his command of 8,000; Union losses were about the same from a force at hand of about 23,000. Pemberton determined not to contest Grand Gulf lest he risk being cut off from Vicksburg and withdrew across the Big Black River. Thus he permitted Grant to occupy Grand Gulf and gave him a strong foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi. THE STRATEGY OF THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN.Grant’s overall strategy, up to the capture of Grand Gulf, had been first to secure a base on the river below Vicksburg and then to cooperate with Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks in capturing Port Hudson. After this he planned to move the combined force against Vicksburg. Port Hudson, a strong point on the Mississippi near Baton Rouge, was garrisoned by Confederate troops after Farragut’s withdrawal the previous summer. At Grand Gulf, Grant learned that Bank’s investment of Port Hudson would be delayed for some time. To follow his original plan would force postponement of the Vicksburg campaign for at least a month, giving Pemberton invaluable time to organize his defense and receive reinforcements. From this delay the Union Army could expect the addition of no more than 12,000 men. Grant now came to one of the most remarkable decisions of his military career. Information had been received that a new Confederate force was being raised at Jackson, 45 miles east of Vicksburg. Against the advice of his senior officers, and contrary to orders from Washington, Grant resolved to cut himself off from his base of supply on the river, march quickly in between the two Confederate forces, and defeat each separately before they could join against him. Meanwhile, he would subsist his army from the land through which he marched. The plan was well conceived, for in marching to the northeast toward Edwards Station, on the railroad midway between Jackson and Vicksburg, But this calculated risk was accompanied by grave dangers, of which Grant’s lieutenants were acutely aware. It meant placing the Union Army deep in alien country behind the Confederate Army where the line of retreat could be broken and where the alternative to victory would not only be defeat but complete destruction. The situation was summed up in Sherman’s protest, recorded by Grant, “that I was putting myself in a position voluntarily which an enemy would be glad to maneuver a year—or a long time—to get me.” The action into which Pemberton was drawn by the Union threat indicated the keenness of Grant’s planning. The Confederate general believed that the farther Grant campaigned from the river the weaker his position would become and the more exposed his rear and flanks. Accordingly, Pemberton elected to remain on the defensive, keeping his army as a protective shield between Vicksburg and the Union Army and awaiting an opportunity to strike a decisive blow—a policy which permitted Grant to march inland unopposed. With the arrival of Sherman’s Corps from Milliken’s Bend, Grant’s preparations were complete and, on May 7, the Union Army marched out from Grand Gulf to the northeast. His widely separated columns moved out on a broad front concealing their objective. When assembled, Grant’s Army numbered about 45,000 during the campaign. To oppose him, Pemberton had available about 50,000 troops, but these were scattered widely to protect important points. On the day of Grant’s departure from Grand Gulf, Pemberton’s defensive position was further complicated by orders from President Jefferson Davis that both Vicksburg and Port Hudson must be held at all cost. The Union Army, however, was already between Vicksburg and Port Hudson and would soon be between Vicksburg and Jackson. In comparison with campaigns in the more thickly populated Eastern Theater, where a more extensive system of roads and railroads was utilized to provide the tremendous quantities of food and supplies necessary to sustain an army, the campaign of Grant’s Western veterans (“reg’lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves,” said a charitable “Johnny Reb”) was a new type of warfare. The Union supply train largely consisted of a curious collection of stylish carriages, buggies, and lumbering farm wagons stacked high with ammunition boxes and drawn by whatever mules or horses could be found. (Grant Troops on the march, going into bivouac at night. From a wartime sketch. A noted historian described this campaign: “The campaign was based on speed—speed, and light rations foraged off the country, and no baggage, nothing at the front but men and guns and ammunition, and no rear; no slackening of effort, no respite for the enemy until Vicksburg itself was invested and fell.” THE BATTLES OF RAYMOND AND JACKSON.When it became likely that Grant might strike the railroad in the vicinity of Edwards Station, Pemberton moved from Vicksburg toward that point with his main force, leaving a strong reserve in this city. At the same time he ordered the units collecting at Jackson to hit Grant’s flank and rear if the opportunity presented itself. Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s Division, in advance of McPherson’s Union Corps, reached the vicinity of Raymond, a crossroads village 15 miles from Jackson on May 12, and was there engaged by a Confederate brigade under Brig. Gen. John Gregg. A sharp clash lasting several hours followed, Gregg’s outmanned infantry being driven back toward Jackson. Each side lost about 500 men during the engagement. Confederate resistance at Raymond indicated to Grant that Jackson might be held more strongly than had been anticipated, and rumors reached the Union Commander that strong reinforcements under Johnston were expected there. Grant then determined to make sure of Jackson and, on May 13, wheeled his entire army toward the east. THE VICKSBURG CAMPAIGN Johnston arrived by rail in Jackson, on the night of the Raymond engagement, in order to take field command of all troops defending Vicksburg, and was notified that Grant’s Army was between Pemberton’s forces and those in Jackson. About 12,000 troops were at Jackson, against which the entire Union Army was reported to be moving. Johnston telegraphed Richmond, “I am too late.” Photograph of Vicksburg taken from across the Mississippi River by a Union surgeon during a bombardment. From Photographic History of the Civil War. In a pouring rain, Sherman and McPherson approached Jackson on the morning of May 14. Johnston posted the brigades of General Gregg and Brig. Gen. W. H. T. Walker on the approaches to the city with instructions to hold just long enough for valuable stores to be removed from Jackson northward to Canton where he hoped to combine forces with Pemberton. Delaying their attack until the rain A Union assault during the battle of Champion’s Hill. From a wartime sketch. THE BATTLE OF CHAMPION’S HILL.Events preceding the battle of Champion’s Hill emphasized the opposing tactical views held by the two Confederate commanders. Pemberton believed the retention of Vicksburg so imperative that no move which might endanger the city should be considered. It was Johnston’s view that Admiral Porter’s successful passage of the batteries and Grant’s approach from the rear had already doomed the city, and that it was consequently valuable only for the military supplies and troops which it contained. Johnston believed that the South’s only chance to prevent loss of the Mississippi was for Pemberton and himself to join forces and fight the great battle which might smash and destroy Grant’s Army. On the morning of May 14, Pemberton, at Edwards Station, received the dispatch from Johnston (a copy of which Grant had already intercepted) informing him of the position of Union troops at Clinton, between the two Confederate forces, and ordering him “if practicable, come up on his [Grant’s] rear at once.” Pemberton considered the order “suicidal.” Convinced that Johnston’s recent arrival on the field and separation from the main body did not give him sufficient information to survey the situation accurately, Pemberton called a council of war and placed the order before his commanders. Although a majority of his council favored obedience to Johnston’s order, Pemberton was unwilling to endorse a movement which might endanger Vicksburg. It was decided to move instead against Grant’s supposed communications which were believed essential to the Union Army’s existence away from the river. On May 15, Pemberton marched to the southeast with 17,000 men, his route further separating him from Johnston to the north. Grant, meanwhile, prepared to head westward, his line of march threatening to pierce the gap between Johnston and Pemberton and beat both of them in the race for Vicksburg. On the morning of the 16th, a second order was received from Johnston ordering Pemberton to move to the north and join Johnston. This order was obeyed, but as Pemberton’s troops were countermarching they were struck by Union troops. The battle of Champion’s Hill centered around a crescent-shaped ridge of about 75 feet elevation near the Champion plantation home and involved three parallel roads leading from Edwards Station to Raymond. Each of Pemberton’s three divisions—led by General Bowen, General Loring, and Maj. Gen. Carter L. Stevenson—covered one of these roads. The battle opened shortly before noon on the 16th when Brig. Gen. A. P. Hovey’s Union Division, supported by Logan’s Division, attacked along the north road which passed over the slope of Champion’s Hill. From the crest of the hill, Stevenson’s Confederate Division opened a heavy fire on the advancing Union lines which steadily mounted the ridge, driving the Confederates back and capturing 11 guns. To meet this threat to the Confederate left flank, Bowen’s Division was shifted to the north to prevent a breakthrough. Re-forming his lines, Bowen counterattacked the ridge position. He dislodged the Federal infantry, driving them from the slope, and recaptured all but two of the lost guns. Grant, in turn, was now compelled to reinforce his hard-pressed right, and at 3:30 p. m. massed Union batteries concentrated fire on the ridge. The Federal infantry followed with heavy and repeated attacks along the entire line, and for the third time the hill changed hands. Pemberton was unable to rally his troops against these attacks, and the divisions of Bowen and Stevenson began to retreat toward Baker’s Creek. Loring was detailed to hold the road open for the withdrawal of the Confederate Army. Before Loring could rejoin the main body, after its crossing of the stream, the Union Army secured the crossings. Loring was thus cut off, and he was only able to join Johnston after a long 3-day march around the Union Army. Pemberton retreated toward Vicksburg and that night took position at Big Black River, 12 miles east of the city. VICKSBURG
Wartime photograph of a Union supply station on the Big Black River in rear of Vicksburg. Courtesy Library of Congress. The battle of Champion’s Hill (or Baker’s Creek) was the bloodiest action of the Vicksburg campaign. The numbers actually engaged were relatively equal, although a large Union reserve was close at hand. Pemberton lost nearly 4,000 men, not counting the entire division of Loring which was lost to his army. Grant listed casualties of 2,500, with Hovey losing one-third of his entire division killed and wounded. THE BATTLE OF BIG BLACK RIVER.Not knowing that Loring’s Division had been cut off, Pemberton made a stand at the Big Black River in order to hold the bridges open for Loring to join the main force. The Confederate entrenchments spanned the river at a readily defensible location where the stream made a horseshoe bend. Across the mile-wide neck of the river the Confederates constructed a line of works, and behind the earthworks, with their backs to the river, were placed 4,000 infantry of Bowen’s Division supported by artillery. Before dawn on the 17th the Union Army pushed on toward Vicksburg. Grant, still hoping to win the race for Vicksburg, had dispatched Sherman’s Corps to the north to pass the retreating Confederate Army as Grant engaged it from the front. At an early hour the Federal troops came in sight of the Confederate line, whereupon they opened an artillery barrage and deployed to assault. Before the deployment was complete, Brig. Gen. Eugene A. Carr’s Division charged “with a shout” from the woods fronting the Confederate position. Realizing the danger of their position, where they might be cut off from the crossing to their rear, the Confederate troops broke and headed for the bridges in disorder. After the withdrawal, the bridges were burned, effectively halting Union pursuit. In the confusion, Grant captured over 1,000 prisoners along with 18 artillery pieces. While Pemberton’s Army retreated into the defenses of Vicksburg, Grant’s engineers immediately began construction of bridges across the Big Black River, using trees, cotton bales, and lumber from nearby buildings as bridging materials. Sherman’s Corps, which had struck the river 11 miles to the north attempting to outflank Pemberton and prevent his retreat to Vicksburg, threw a pontoon bridge across the river at that point. By light of pitch torches, the bridges were completed during the night. On the following morning, May 18, troops crossed en route to Vicksburg. A regiment drawn up in line of battle. From a wartime sketch. THE CAMPAIGN ENDED.The Union Army, now within a few miles of its long-sought objective, had, in the 18 days since it crossed the Mississippi, completed one of the most noteworthy campaigns of the war. Marching deep into enemy territory, the Army of the Tennessee had successfully lived off the country while fighting and winning five engagements and inflicting critical losses in men and equipment, had prevented Johnston and Pemberton from joining forces, and had driven the Army of Vicksburg into the defenses of the city. “Whistling Dick.” This Confederate cannon which guarded Vicksburg gained widespread fame among Union soldiers and sailors because of the peculiar whistle of its projectiles. From Photographic History of the Civil War. The terrain of the siege of Vicksburg—looking from the Confederate line to the Union position on the far ridge. By noon of May 18, with Grant’s advance expected momentarily, Pemberton believed the defenses of Vicksburg strong enough to stand off the Union Army until Johnston received sufficient reinforcements to raise the expected siege and prevent loss of the Mississippi River. There, while inspecting his defenses, Pemberton received a dispatch from Johnston advising the evacuation of Vicksburg which, Johnston felt, was already doomed. Military necessity demanded that “instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies and march to the northeast.” Unwilling to yield the city without a fight, Pemberton placed the order before his senior officers. They were of unanimous opinion that it would be “impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale as to be of further service to the Confederacy.” As the council of war reached its decision to remain and fight, Union guns opened on the works. The siege of Vicksburg had begun. |
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