Morality is a metaphysical quality by the help of which our practical actions are justified, and which in most cases constitutes restraint. Morality is a science, say some; morality is an art, say others; for many idealists it remains a revanche of reason, and M. Rodrigues sees in it the will which binds itself and which we bind. “Individual liberty,” he says, “if it exists, only plays a part on the second plane; in practice it signifies little when humanity in its entirety is considered. Bound to an organism, and still more to society, the psychological or moral consciousness, when it draws inspiration from within itself, finds there in effect what its milieu has placed there. It expresses a system of representations, to the forming of which it has in itself contributed but a small part.... Morality, too, has undergone an evolution parallel in all points to that of science.”

Yes, truly, morality, like everything which touches on conduct, social laws, rites, traditions, ancestral prejudices, the need of freedom, the right of the individual, undergoes continual evolution according to the conditions of a community. We are to-day far from the morality which, according to Kant, is legislation on the part of the reasonable being, enjoining upon all persons the same duties.

According to the morality of Epictetus, resting on the idea of liberty, “man may free himself of all dependence with regard to other men and to Nature, and raise himself to absolute freedom, distinguishing between the things which rest on him and those which do not, and despising the latter as immaterial”; according to the ethics of Epicurus, pleasure is the sovereign good of man, and all our efforts should tend towards its attainment, provided that pleasure consist as much of the satisfaction of the heart and mind as of the senses, but modern morality has become sectarian, and differs according to class.

The principle of bourgeois morality is to preserve the unity of the community without any consideration for the liberty of the individual; the bourgeois family being a sort of commercial association, it confines its morality to the idea of a duty which is, above all, the protection of the interests of the community. It is a morality which is quite beside the point, and which has no intrinsic value.

The principle of aristocratic morality is to preserve for the glory of its escutcheon all the splendour it deems requisite. It does not trouble itself as to the means by which that escutcheon gains in radiance, because it has made a virtue of its pride. The superadded adornments trouble it with no pangs of conscience, because for it duty consists in the integrity of appearances. This morality is not, in the main, more false in conception than that of the bourgeois; it is the guardian of appanage as the other is the guardian of selfish interests.

The morality of Courts consists in preserving tradition intact, and it does not hesitate to sacrifice individuals to the Cause which is one, unchangeable, and imperative. It is thus a morality extraordinary, having authority above right and outside duty.

But whatsoever constitutes the quality deemed essential, whether it be the commercial and industrial stability of the bourgeois, the true or false splendour of the nobleman’s escutcheon, or the more or less artificial halo of the Court, it is none the less true that class morality is daily obliged to yield to circumstances and bend to conditions.

Being one of the manifestations of human action, morality is necessarily subject to the law of living according to such and such an epoch. It has to adapt itself to change. For this reason personal interest, selfishness, pride of birth, and the idea of being above humanity must all, in spite of their rules, conform to new conceptions of altruism and idealism, for there is no moral finality.

To speak truly, every individual bears the moral sense within himself, but he has to remember that the sanction of moral judgment is one of the most important factors of civilisation and progress, and cannot be dissociated to-day from the scientific element.

Nothing leads men more astray than to let them believe that certain persons or certain things injurious to society are desirable.

The personal interest of the merchant is not adapted to the artisan’s life conditions; an escutcheon is not a thing to be coveted by the worker; and the right called “Divine” diminishes in no degree the right of a people. On the contrary, class morality is hostile to the new moral ideas answering to new social needs; this is the reason why its value has depreciated, because humanity is making a constant effort towards an ideal which it creates and changes according to the difficulties of the way, and because the straight road leads to righteousness.