It is now possible, furthermore, to determine the common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings, to assign them a place in the total realm of our experience, and thus to define conceptually Anarchism and its species.

I. The common and special qualities of the Anarchistic teachings.

1. The Anarchistic teachings have in common only this, that they negate the State for our future. In the cases of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker, the negation means that they reject the State unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere; in the case of Tolstoi it means that he rejects the State, though not unconditionally, yet for our future; in the cases of Bakunin and Kropotkin it means that they foresee that in future the progress of evolution will do away with the State.

2. As to their basis, the Anarchistic teachings are classifiable as genetic, recognizing as the supreme law of human procedure merely a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin) and critical, regarding a norm as the supreme law of human procedure. The critical teachings, again, are classifiable as idealistic, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), and eudemonistic, whose supreme law is happiness. The eudemonistic teachings, finally, are on their part further classifiable as altruistic, for which the general happiness is supreme law (Godwin), and egoistic, for which the individual's happiness takes this rank (Stirner, Tucker).

As to what they affirm for our future in contrast to the State, the Anarchistic teachings are either federalistic—that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker)—or spontanistic—that is, they affirm for our future a social human life on the basis of a non-juridical controlling principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

As to their relation to law, a part of the Anarchistic teachings are anomistic, negating law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi); the other part are nomistic, affirming it for our future (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

As to their relation to property, the Anarchistic teachings are partly indoministic, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), partly doministic, affirming it for our future. The doministic teachings, again, are partly individualistic, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), partly collectivistic, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property that will sometimes be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), and, finally, partly communistic, affirming property solely for the collectivity (Kropotkin).

As to how they conceive their realization, the Anarchistic teachings divide into the reformatory, which conceive the transition from the negated to the affirmed condition as without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), and revolutionary, which conceive this transition as a breach of law. The revolutionary teachings, again, divide into renitent, which conceive the breach of law as without the use of force (Tucker, Tolstoi) and insurgent, which conceive it as attended by the use of force (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

II. The place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience.

1. There must be distinguished three lines of thought in the philosophy of law: that is, three fashions of judging law.

The first is jurisprudential dogmatism. It judges whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and it judges quite unconditionally, solely by what the institution consists of, without regard to its effect under this or that particular set of circumstances. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of a proper law: that is, the schools that seek to determine what law—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage—is under all circumstances to be approved or to be disapproved. Its best known form is "natural law."

The weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism lies in its not taking account of the fact that our judgment of legal institutions must depend on their effects, and that one and the same legal institution has under different circumstances altogether different effects.

The second line of thought is jurisprudential skepticism. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes judgment on whether a legal institution ought to exist or not, and pronounces judgment only on whether the tendency of evolution gives ground for expecting that a legal institution will persist or disappear, arise or remain non-existent. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of the evolution of law: that is, the schools that undertake to inform us what sort of law is to be expected in future—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage has a prospect of remaining in force among us. Its best-known forms are the historical school in the science of law, and Marxism.

The weakness of jurisprudential skepticism consists in its not meeting our want of a scientific basis that shall enable us to recognize as correct or incorrect the incessantly-appearing judgments on the value of legal institutions, and to approve or disapprove the manifold propositions for changes in law.

The third line of thought is jurisprudential criticism. In view of the weakness of jurisprudential dogmatism it foregoes passing judgment, without regard to the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, on whether that institution ought to exist or not; but yet in view of the weakness of jurisprudential skepticism it does not forego answering the question whether a legal institution ought to exist or not. It therefore sets up a supreme governing principle by which legal institutions are to be judged with regard to the particular circumstances under which they operate, the point being whether, under the particular circumstances under which a legal institution operates, it fulfils that supreme governing principle as well as is possible under these circumstances, or at least better than any other legal institution. It embraces, therefore, the doctrines of the propriety of law: that is, the schools that set up fundamental principles by which it is to be determined what law—for instance, whether the legal institution of marriage—ought under any particular circumstances to exist or not to exist.

2. With respect to the State these three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at different judgments, each one from its standpoint.

First, to the affirmation of the State.

So far as the schools of jurisprudential dogmatism affirm the State, they approve of it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Among the numerous affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism, the teachings of Hobbes, Hegel, and Jhering may perhaps be selected for emphasis as belonging to different sections of history.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism affirm the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will continue to exist.

The most notable representatives of jurisprudential skepticism, such as Puchta and Merkel, have offered no teaching regarding the State; but affirmative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism may be found, for instance, in Montaigne and Bernstein.

Finally, so far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism affirm the State, they commend it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

Jurisprudential criticism has thus far been most clearly set forth by Stammler, who, however, has offered no teaching with regard to the State; but, for instance, Spencer's teaching may rank as an affirmative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism.

Second, the three lines of thought in the philosophy of law may arrive at the negation of the State, each one from its standpoint.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential dogmatism negate the State, they reject it unconditionally, and so for our future as well as elsewhere, without any regard to its effects under this or that particular set of circumstances.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential dogmatism are the teachings of Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, and Tucker.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential skepticism negate the State, they foresee, looking to the course evolution is taking, that in our future the State will disappear.

Negative doctrines of the State in the sense of jurisprudential skepticism are the teachings of Bakunin and Kropotkin.

So far as the doctrines of jurisprudential criticism negate the State, they reject it for our future in consideration of the particular circumstances that at present prevail in our case.

A negative doctrine of the State in the sense of jurisprudential criticism is Tolstoi's teaching.

3. Therefore, the place of the Anarchistic teachings in the total realm of our experience is defined by the fact that they, as a species of doctrine about the State in the philosophy of law,—to wit, as negative doctrines of the State,—stand in opposition to the other species of doctrine about the State, the affirmative doctrines of the State.

This may be represented as shown in the table on the following page.

III. The concepts of Anarchism and its species.

1. Anarchism is the negation of the State in the philosophy of law: that is, it is that species of jurisprudential doctrine of the State which negates the State.

2. An Anarchistic teaching cannot be complete without stating on what basis it rests, what condition it affirms in contrast to the State, and how it conceives the transition to this condition as taking place. A basis, an affirmative side, and a conception of the transition to that which it affirms, are necessary constituents of any Anarchistic teaching. With regard to these constituents the following species of Anarchism may be distinguished.

First, as to basis, genetic Anarchism, which recognizes as supreme law of human procedure only a law of nature (Bakunin, Kropotkin), and critical Anarchism, which regards a norm as supreme law of human procedure; as subspecies of critical Anarchism, idealistic Anarchism, whose supreme law is a duty (Proudhon, Tolstoi), and eudemonistic Anarchism, whose supreme law is happiness; and, finally, as subspecies of eudemonistic Anarchism, altruistic Anarchism, for which the supreme law is the general happiness (Godwin), and egoistic Anarchism, for which the supreme law is the individual's happiness (Stirner, Tucker).

Second, as to the condition affirmed in contrast to the State, there may be distinguished federalistic Anarchism, which affirms for our future a social human life according to the legal norm that contracts must be lived up to (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker), and spontanistic Anarchism, which affirms for our future a social life according to a non-juridical governing principle (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi).

Third, as to the conception of the transition to the affirmed condition, there may be distinguished reformatory Anarchism, which conceives the transition from the State to the condition affirmed in contrast thereto as taking place without breach of law (Godwin, Proudhon), and revolutionary Anarchism, which conceives this transition as a breach of law; as subspecies of revolutionary Anarchism, renitent Anarchism, which conceives the breach of law as without the use of violence (Tucker, Tolstoi), and insurgent Anarchism, which conceives it as attended by the use of violence (Stirner, Bakunin, Kropotkin).

3. An Anarchistic teaching may be complete without taking up a position toward law or property. Whenever, therefore, an Anarchistic teaching takes up a position toward the one or the other, it contains an accidental adjunct. The Anarchistic teachings that contain this adjunct may be classified according to its character; but, since Anarchism as such can be classified only according to the character of the necessary constituents of every Anarchistic teaching, such a classification does not give us species of Anarchism.

So far as the Anarchistic teachings take up a position toward law, they are either anomistic—that is, they negate law for our future (Godwin, Stirner, Tolstoi)—or nomistic—that is, they affirm it for our future (Proudhon, Bakunin, Kropotkin, Tucker).

So far as they take up a position toward property, they are either indoministic, negating property for our future (Godwin, Proudhon, Stirner, Tolstoi), or doministic, affirming it for our future; the doministic teachings, again, are either individualistic, affirming property, without limitation, for the individual as well as for the collectivity (Tucker), or collectivistic, affirming as to supplies for direct consumption a property which may be the individual's, but as to the means of production a property that is only for the collectivity (Bakunin), or, last of all, communistic, affirming property for the collectivity alone (Kropotkin).

All this is brought before the eye in the table on page 302.

? [The table is given as compiled by Eltzbacher. For correction of errors either certain or probable, see footnotes to pages 80, 97, 278; note also that under "condition affirmed" the distinction is excessively fine between Stirner, who would have men agree on the terms of a union which they are to stick to as long as they find it advisable, and Bakunin and Tucker, who would have them bound together by a contract limited by the inalienable right of secession.]

[1170] "Der Anarchismus und seine TrÄger" pp. 127, 124, 125.