THE MORAL RELATIONS OF PERSONS HOLDING THE PER SE DOCTRINE, ON THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY, TO THE PURCHASE AND CONSUMPTION OF SLAVE LABOR PRODUCTS.

Having noticed the political and economical relations of slavery, it may be expected that we shall say something of its moral relations. In attempting this, we choose not to traverse that interminable labyrinth, without a thread, which includes the moral character of the system, as it respects the relation between the master and the slave. The only aspect in which we care to consider it, is in the moral relations which the consumers of slave labor products sustain to slavery: and even on this, we shall offer no opinion, our aim being only to promote inquiry.

This view of the question is not an unimportant one. It includes the germ of the grand error in nearly all anti-slavery effort; and to which, chiefly, is to be attributed its want of moral power over the conscience of the slaveholder. The abolition movement, was designed to create a public sentiment, in the United States, that should be equally as potent in forcing emancipation, as was the public opinion of Great Britain. But why have not the Americans been as successful as the English? This is an inquiry of great importance. When the Anti-Slavery Convention, which met, December 6, 1833, in Philadelphia, declared, as a part of its creed: "That there is no difference in principle, between the African slave trade, and American slavery," it meant to be understood as teaching, that the person who purchased slaves imported from Africa, or who held their offspring as slaves, was particeps criminis—partaker in the crime—with the slave trader, on the principle that he who receives stolen property, knowing it be such, is equally guilty with the thief.

On this point Daniel O'Connell was very explicit, when, in a public assembly, he used this language: "When an American comes into society, he will be asked, 'are you one of the thieves, or are you an honest man? If you are an honest man, then you have given liberty to your slaves; if you are among the thieves, the sooner you take the outside of the house, the better.'"

The error just referred to was this: they based their opposition to slavery on the principle, that it was malum in se—a sin in itself—like the slave trade, robbery and murder; and, at the same time, continued to use the products of the labor of the slave as though they had been obtained from the labor of freemen. But this seeming inconsistency was not the only reason why they failed to create such a public sentiment as would procure the emancipation of our slaves. The English emancipationists began their work like philosophers—addressing themselves, respectfully to the power that could grant their requests. Beside the moral argument, which declared slavery a crime, the English philanthropists labored to convince Parliament, that emancipation would be advantageous to the commerce of the nation. The commercial value of the Islands had been reduced one-third, as a result of the abolition of the slave trade. Emancipation, it was argued, would more than restore their former prosperity, as the labor of freemen was twice as productive as that of slaves. But American abolitionists commenced their crusade against slavery, by charging those who sustained it, and who alone, held the power to manumit, with crimes of the blackest dye. This placed the parties in instant antagonism, causing all the arguments on human rights, and the sinfulness of slavery, to fall without effect upon the ears of angry men. The error on this point, consisted in failing to discriminate between the sources of the power over emancipation in England and in the United States. With Great Britain, the power was in Parliament. The masters, in the West Indies, had no voice in the question. It was the voters in England alone who controlled the elections, and, consequently, controlled Parliament. But the condition of things in the United States is the reverse of what it was in England. With us, the power of emancipation is in the States, not in Congress. The slaveholders elect the members to the State Legislatures; and they choose none but such as agree with them in opinion. It matters not, therefore, what public sentiment may be at the North, as it has no power over the Legislatures of the South. Here, then, is the difference: with us the slaveholder controls the question of emancipation, while in England the consent of the master was not necessary to the execution of that work.

Our anti-slavery men seem to have fallen into their errors of policy, by following the lead of those of England, who manifested a total ignorance of the relations existing between our General Government and the State Governments. On the abolition platform, slaveholders found themselves placed in the same category with slave traders and thieves. They were told that all laws, giving them power over the slave, were void in the sight of heaven; and that their appropriation of the fruits of the labor of the slave, without giving him compensation, was robbery. Had the preaching of these principles produced conviction, it must have promoted emancipation. But, unfortunately, while these doctrines were held up to the gaze of slaveholders, in the one hand of the exhorter, they beheld his other hand stretched out, from beneath his cloak of seeming sanctity, to clutch the products of the very robbery he was professing to condemn! Take a fact in proof of this view of the subject.

At the date of the declarations of Daniel O'Connell, on behalf of the English, and by the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Convention, on the part of Americans, the British manufacturers were purchasing, annually, about 300,000,000 lbs. of cotton, from the very men denounced as equally criminal with slave traders and thieves; and the people of the United States were almost wholly dependent upon slave labor for their supplies of cotton and groceries. It is no matter for wonder, therefore, that slaveholders, should treat, as fiction, the doctrine that slave labor products are the fruits of robbery, so long as they are purchased without scruple, by all classes of men, in Europe and America. The pecuniary argument for emancipation, that free labor is more profitable than slave labor, was also urged here, but was treated as the greatest absurdity. The masters had, before their eyes, the evidence of the falsity of the assertion, that, if emancipated, the slaves would be doubly profitable as free laborers. The reverse was admitted, on all hands, to be true in relation to our colored people.

But this question, of the moral relations which the consumers of slave labor products sustain to slavery, is one of too important a nature to be passed over without a closer examination; and, beside, it is involved in less obscurity than the morality of the relation existing between the master and the slave. Its consideration, too, affords an opportunity of discriminating between the different opinions entertained on the broad question of the morality of the institution, and enables us to judge of the consistency and conscientiousness of every man, by the standard which he himself adopts.

The prevalent opinions, as to the morality of the institution of slavery, in the United States, may be classified under three heads: 1. That it is justified by Scripture example and precept. 2. That it is a great civil and social evil, resulting from ignorance and degradation, like despotic systems of government, and may be tolerated until its subjects are sufficiently enlightened to render it safe to grant them equal rights. 3. That it is malum in se, like robbery and murder, and can not be sustained, for a moment, without sin; and, like sin, should be immediately abandoned.

Those who consider slavery sanctioned by the Bible, conceive that they can, consistently with their creed, not only hold slaves, and use the products of slave labor, without doing violence to their consciences, but may adopt measures to perpetuate the system. Those who consider slavery merely a great civil and social evil, a despotism that may engender oppression, or may not, are of opinion that they may purchase and use its products, or interchange their own for those of the slaveholder, as free governments hold commercial and diplomatic intercourse with despotic ones, without being responsible for the moral evils connected with the system, But the position of those who believe slavery malum in se, like the slave trade, robbery and murder, is a very different one from either of the other classes, as it regards the purchase and use of slave labor products. Let us illustrate this by a case in point.

A company of men hold a number of their fellow men in bondage under the laws of the commonwealth in which they live, so that they can compel them to work their plantations, and raise horses, cattle, hogs, and cotton. These products of the labor of the oppressed, are appropriated by the oppressors to their own use, and taken into the markets for sale. Another company proceed to a community of freemen, on the coast of Africa, who have labored voluntarily during the year, seize their persons, bind them, convey away their horses, cattle, hogs, and cotton, and take the property to market. The first association represents the slaveholders; the second a band of robbers. The commodities of both parties, are openly offered for sale, and every one knows how the property of each was obtained. Those who believe the per se doctrine, place both these associations in the same moral category, and call them robbers. Judged by this rule, the first band are the more criminal, as they have deprived their victims of personal liberty, forced them into servitude, and then "despoiled them of the fruits of their labor."[92] The second band have only deprived their victims of liberty, while they robbed them; and thus have committed but two crimes, while the first have perpetrated three. These parties attempt to negotiate the sale of their cotton, say in London. The first company dispose of their cargo without difficulty—no one manifesting the slightest scruple at purchasing the products of slave labor. But the second company are not so fortunate. As soon as their true character is ascertained, the police drag its members to Court, where they are sentenced to Bridewell. In vain do these robbers quote the Philadelphia Anti-Slavery Convention, and Daniel O'Connell, to prove that their cotton was obtained by means no more criminal than that of the slaveholders, and that, therefore, judgment ought to be reversed. The Court will not entertain such a plea, and they have to endure the penalty of the law. Now, why this difference, if slavery be malum in se? And if the receiver of stolen property is particeps criminis with the thief, why is it, that the Englishman, who should receive and sell the cotton of the robbers, would run the risk of being sent to prison with them, while if he acted as agent of the slaveholders, he would be treated as an honorable man? If the master has no moral right to hold his slaves, in what respect can the products of their labor differ from the property acquired by robbery? And if the property be the fruits of robbery, how can any one use it, without violating conscience?

We have met with the following sage exposition of the question, in justification of the use of slave labor products, by those who believe the per se doctrine: The master owns the lands, gives his skill and intelligence to direct the labor, and feeds and clothes the slaves. The slaves, therefore, are entitled only to a part of the proceeds of their labor, while the master is also justly entitled to a part of the crop. When brought into the market, the purchaser can not know what part belongs, rightfully, to the master, and what to his slaves, as the whole is offered in bulk. He may, therefore, purchase the whole, innocently, and throw the sinfulness of the transaction upon the master, who sells what belongs to others. But if the per se doctrine be true, this apology for the purchaser is not a justification. Where a "confusion of goods" has been made by one of the owners, so that they can not be separated, he who "confused" them can have no advantage, in law, from his own wrong, but the goods are awarded to the innocent party. On this well known principle of law, this most equitable rule, the master forfeits his right in the property, and the purchaser, knowing the facts, becomes a party in his guilt. But aside from this, the "confusion of goods," by the master, can give him no moral right to dispose of the interest of his slaves therein for his own benefit; and the persons purchasing such property, acquire no moral right to its possession and use. These are sound, logical views. The argument offered, in justification of those who hold that slavery is malum in se, is the strongest that can be made. It is apparent, then, from a fair analysis of their own principles, that they are participes criminis with slaveholders.

Again, if the laws regulating the institution of slavery, be morally null and void, and not binding on the conscience, then the slaves have a moral right to the proceeds of their labor. This right can not be alienated by any act of the master, but attaches to the property wherever it may be taken, and to whomsoever it may be sold. This principle, in law, is also well established. The recent decision on the "Gardiner fraud," confirms it; the Court asserting, that the money paid out of the Treasury of the United States, under such circumstances, continued its character as the money and property of the United States, and may be followed into the hands of those who cashed the orders of Gardiner, and subsequently drew the money, but who are not the true owners of the said fund; and decreeing that the amount of funds, thus obtained, be collected off the estate of said Gardiner, and off those who drew funds from the treasury, on his orders.

These principles of law are so well understood, by every man of intelligence, that we can not conceive how those advocating the per se doctrines, if sincere, can continue in the constant use of slave grown products, without a perpetual violation of conscience and of all moral law. Taking them under protest, against the slavery which produced them, is ridiculous. Refusing to fellowship the slaveholder, while eagerly appropriating the products of the labor of the slave, which he brings in his hand, is contemptible. The most noted case of the kind, is that of the British Committee, who had charge of the preliminary arrangements for the admission of members to the World's Christian Evangelical Alliance. One of the rules it adopted, but which the Alliance afterward modified, excluded all American clergymen, suspected of a want of orthodoxy on the per se doctrine, from seats in that body. Their language, to American clergymen, was virtually, "Stand aside, I am holier than thou;" while, at the same moment, their parishioners, the manufacturers, had about completed the purchase of 624,000,000 lbs. of cotton, for the consumption of their mills, during the year; the bales of which, piled together, would have reached mountain-high, displaying, mostly, the brands, "New Orleans," "Mobile," "Charleston."

As not a word was said, by the Committee, against the Englishmen who were buying and manufacturing American cotton, the case may be viewed as one in which the fruits of robbery were taken under protest against the robbers themselves. To all intelligent men, the conduct of the people of Britain, in protesting against slavery, as a system of robbery, while continuing to purchase such enormous quantities of the cotton produced by slaves, appears as Pharasaical as the conduct of the conscientious Scotchman, in early times, in Eastern Pennsylvania, who married his wife under protest against the constitution and laws of the Government, and especially, against the authority, power, and right of the magistrate who had just tied the knot.[93]

Such pliable consciences, doubtless, are very convenient in cases of emergency. But as they relax when selfish ends are to be subserved, and retain their rigidity only when judging the conduct of others, the inference is, that the persons possessing them are either hypocritical, or else, as was acknowledged by Parson D., in similar circumstances, they have mistaken their prejudices for their consciences.

So far as Britain is concerned, she is, manifestly, much more willing to receive American slave labor cotton for her factories, than American republican principles for her people. And why so? The profits derived by her, from the purchase and manufacture of slave labor cotton, constitute so large a portion of the means of her prosperity, that the Government could not sustain itself were the supplies of this article cut off. It is easy to divine, therefore, why the people of England are boundless in their denunciation of American slavery, while not a single remonstrance goes up to the throne, against the importation of American cotton. Should she exclude it, the act would render her unable to pay the interest on her national debt; and many a declaimer against slavery, losing his income, would have to go supperless to bed.

Let us contrast the conduct of a pagan government with that of Great Britain. When the Emperor of China became fully convinced of his inability to resist the prowess of the British arms, in the famous "Opium War," efforts were made to induce him to legalize the traffic in opium, by levying a duty on its import, that should yield him a heavy profit. This he refused to do, and recorded his decision in these memorable words:

"It is true, I can not prevent the introduction of the flowing poison. Gain-seeking and corrupt men will, for profit and sensuality, defeat my wishes, but nothing will induce me to derive a revenue from the vice and misery of my people."[94]

Let us revert a moment to the case of robbery, before cited, in further illustration of this subject. The prisoners serve out their term in Bridewell, and, after a year or two, again visit London with a cargo of cotton. The police recognize them, and they are a second time arraigned before the court for trial. The judge demands why they should have dared to revisit the soil of England, to offer for sale the products of their robbery. The prisoners assure his honor that they have neither outraged the public sentiment of the kingdom, nor violated its laws. "While in your prison, sir," they go on to say, "we became instructed in the morals of British economics. Anxious to atone for our former fault, and to restore ourselves to the confidence and respect of the pious subjects of your most gracious Queen, no sooner were we released from prison, than we hastened to the African coast, from whence our former cargo was obtained, and seizing the self-same men whom we had formerly robbed, we bore them off, bodily, to the soil of Texas. They resisted sturdily, it is true, but we mastered them. We touched none of the fruits of their previous labors. Their cotton we left in the fields, to be drenched by the rains or drifted by the winds; because, to have brought it into your markets would have subjected us, anew, to a place in your dungeons. In Texas, we brought our prisoners under the control of the laws, which there give us power to hold them as slaves. Stimulated to labor, under the lash of the overseer, they have produced a crop of cotton, which is now offered in your markets as a lawful article of commerce. We are not subjects of your Government, and, therefore, not indictable under your laws against slave trading. Your honor, will perceive, then, that our moral relations are changed. We come now to your shores, not as dealers in stolen property, but as slaveholders, with the products of slave labor. We are aware that bunkum speakers, at your public assemblies, denounce the slaveholder as a thief, and his appropriation of the fruits of the labor of his slaves, as robbery. We comprehend the motives prompting such utterances. We come not to attend meetings of Ecclesiastical Conventions, representing the republican principles of America, to unsettle the doctrines upon which the throne of your kingdom is based. But we come as cotton planters, to supply your looms with cotton, that British commerce may not be abridged, and England, the great civilizer of the world, may not be forced to slack her pace in the performance of her mission. This is our character and position; and your honor will at once see that it is your duty, and the interest of your Government, to treat us as gentlemen and your most faithful allies." The judge at once admits the justice of their plea, rebukes the police, apologizes to the prisoners, assures them that they have violated no law of the realm; and that, though the public sentiment of the nation denounces the slaveholder as a thief, yet the public necessity demands a full supply of cotton from the planter. He then orders their immediate discharge, and invites them to partake of the hospitalities of his house during their stay in London.

This is a fair example of British consistency, on the subject of slavery, so far as the supply of cotton is concerned. The English manufacturers are under the absolute necessity of procuring it; but as free labor is incapable of increasing its production, slave labor must be made to remedy the defect.

The reason can now be clearly comprehended, why abolitionists have had so little moral power over the conscience of the slaveholder. Their practice has been inconsistent with their precepts; or, at least, their conduct has been liable to this construction. Nor do we perceive how they can exert a more potent influence, in the future, unless their energies are directed to efforts such as will relieve them from a position so inconsistent with their professions, as that of constantly purchasing products which they, themselves, declare to be the fruits of robbery. While, therefore, things remain as they are, with the world so largely dependent upon slave labor, how can it be otherwise, than that the system will continue to flourish? And while its products are used by all classes, of every sentiment, and country, nearly, how can the slaveholder be brought to see any thing, in the practice of the world, to alarm his conscience, and make him cringe, before his fellow-men, as a guilty robber?

But, has nothing worse occurred from the advocacy of the per se doctrine, than an exhibition of inconsistency on the part of abolitionists, and the perpetuation of slavery resulting from their conduct? This has occurred. Three highly respectable religious denominations, now limited to the North, had once many flourishing congregations in the South. On the adoption of the per se doctrine, by their respective Synods, their congregations became disturbed, were soon after broken up, or the ministers in charge had to seek other fields of labor. Their system of religious instruction, for the family, being quite thorough, the slaves were deriving much advantage from the influence of these bodies. But when they resolved to withhold the gospel from the master, unless he would emancipate, they also withdrew the means of grace from the slave; and, so far as they were concerned, left him to perish eternally! Whether this course was proper, or whether it would have been better to have passed by the morality of the legal relation, in the creation of which the master had no agency, and considered him, under Providence, as the moral guardian of the slave, bound to discharge a guardian's duty to an immortal being, we shall not undertake to determine. Attention is called to the facts, merely to show the practical effects of the action of these churches upon the slave, and what the per se doctrine has done in depriving him of the gospel.

Another remark, and we have done with this topic. Nothing is more common, in certain circles, than denunciations of the Christian men and ministers, who refuse to adopt the per se principle. We leave others to judge whether these censures are merited. One thing is certain: those who believe that slavery is a great civil and social evil, entailed upon the country, and are extending the gospel to both master and slave, with the hope of removing it peacefully, can not be reproached with acting inconsistently with their principles; while those who declare slavery malum in se, and refuse to fellowship the Christian slaveholder, because they consider him a robber, but yet use the products of slave labor, may fairly be classified, on their own principles, with the hypocritical people of Israel, who were thus reproached by the Most High: "What hast thou to do to declare my statutes, or that thou shouldst take my covenant in thy mouth?..... When thou sawest a thief, then thou consentedst with him."[95]