But the subject of the relations of American slavery to the economical interests of the world, demands a still closer scrutiny, in order that the causes of the failure of abolitionism to arrest its progress, as well as the present relations of the institution to the politics of the country, may fully appear.

Slave labor has seldom been made profitable where it has been wholly employed in grazing and grain growing; but it becomes remunerative in proportion as the planters can devote their attention to cotton, sugar, rice, or tobacco. To render Southern slavery profitable in the highest degree, therefore, the slaves must be employed upon some one of these articles, and be sustained by a supply of food and draught animals from Northern agriculturists; and before the planter's supplies are complete, to these must be added cotton gins, implements of husbandry, furniture, and tools, from Northern mechanics. This is a point of the utmost moment, and must be considered more at length.

It has long been a vital question to the success of the slaveholder, to know how he could render the labor of his slaves the most profitable. The grain growing States had to emancipate their slaves, to rid themselves of a profitless system. The cotton-growing States, ever after the invention of the cotton gin, had found the production of that staple highly remunerative. The logical conclusion, from these different results, was, that the less provisions, and the more cotton grown by the planter, the greater would be his profits. This must be noted with special care. Markets for the surplus products of the farmer of the North, were equally as important to him as the supply of Provisions was to the planter. But the planter, to be eminently successful, must purchase his supplies at the lowest possible prices; while the farmer, to secure his prosperity, must sell his products at the highest possible rates. Few, indeed, can be so ill informed, as not to know, that these two topics, for many years, were involved in the "Free Trade" and "Protective Tariff" doctrines, and afforded the materiel of the political contests between the North and the South—between free labor and slave labor. A very brief notice of the history of that controversy, will demonstrate the truth of this assertion.

The attempt of the agricultural States, thirty years since, to establish the protective policy, and promote "Domestic Manufactures," was a struggle to create such a division of labor as would afford a "Home Market" for their products, no longer in demand abroad. The first decisive action on the question, by Congress, was in 1824; when the distress in these States, and the measures proposed for their relief, by national legislation, were discussed on the passage of the "Tariff Bill" of that year. The ablest men in the nation were engaged in the controversy. As provisions are the most important item on the one hand, and cotton on the other, we shall use these two terms as the representatives of the two classes of products, belonging, respectively, to free labor and to slave labor.

Mr. Clay, in the course of the debate, said: "What, again, I would ask, is the cause of the unhappy condition of our country, which I have fairly depicted? It is to be found in the fact that, during almost the whole existence of this government, we have shaped our industry, our navigation, and our commerce, in reference to an extraordinary war in Europe, and to foreign markets which no longer exist; in the fact that we have depended too much on foreign sources of supply, and excited too little the native; in the fact that, while we have cultivated, with assiduous care, our foreign resources, we have suffered those at home to wither, in a state of neglect and abandonment. The consequence of the termination of the war of Europe, has been the resumption of European commerce, European navigation, and the extension of European agriculture, in all its branches. Europe, therefore, has no longer occasion for any thing like the same extent as that which she had during her wars, for American commerce, American navigation, the produce of American industry. Europe in commotion, and convulsed throughout all her members, is to America no longer the same Europe as she is now, tranquil, and watching with the most vigilant attention, all her own peculiar interests, without regard to their operation on us. The effect of this altered state of Europe upon us, has been to circumscribe the employment of our marine, and greatly to reduce the value of the produce of our territorial labor..... The greatest want of civilized society is a market for the sale and exchange of the surplus of the products of the labor of its members. This market may exist at home or abroad, or both, but it must exist somewhere, if society prospers; and, wherever it does exist, it should be competent to the absorption of the entire surplus production. It is most desirable that there should be both a home and a foreign market. But with respect to their relative superiority, I can not entertain a doubt. The home market is first in order, and paramount in importance. The object of the bill under consideration, is to create this home market, and to lay the foundation of a genuine American policy. It is opposed; and it is incumbent on the partisans of the foreign policy (terms which I shall use without any invidious intent) to demonstrate that the foreign market is an adequate vent for the surplus produce of our labor. But is it so? 1. Foreign nations can not, if they would, take our surplus produce..... 2. If they could, they would not..... We have seen, I think, the causes of the distress of the country. We have seen that an exclusive dependence upon the foreign market must lead to a still severer distress, to impoverishment, to ruin. We must, then, change somewhat our course. We must give a new direction to some portion of our industry. We must speedily adopt a genuine American policy. Still cherishing a foreign market, let us create also a home market, to give further scope to the consumption of the produce of American industry. Let us counteract the policy of foreigners, and withdraw the support which we now give to their industry, and stimulate that of our own country..... The creation of a home market is not only necessary to procure for our agriculture a just reward of its labors, but it is indispensable to obtain a supply of our necessary wants. If we can not sell, we can not buy. That portion of our population (and we have seen that it is not less than four-fifths) which makes comparatively nothing that foreigners will buy, has nothing to make purchases with from foreigners. It is in vain that we are told of the amount of our exports, supplied by the planting interest. They may enable the planting interest to supply all its wants; but they bring no ability to the interests not planting, unless, which can not be pretended, the planting interest was an adequate vent for the surplus produce of all the labor of all other interests..... But this home market, highly desirable as it is, can only be created and cherished by the protection of our own legislation against the inevitable prostration of our industry, which must ensue from the action of foreign policy and legislation..... The sole object of the tariff is to tax the produce of foreign industry, with the view of promoting American industry..... But it is said by the honorable gentleman from Virginia, that the South, owing to the character of a certain portion of its population, can not engage in the business of manufacturing..... The circumstances of its degradation unfits it for manufacturing arts. The well-being of the other, and the larger part of our population, requires the introduction of those arts.

"What is to be done in this conflict? The gentleman would have us abstain from adopting a policy called for by the interests of the greater and freer part of the population. But is that reasonable? Can it be expected that the interests of the greater part should be made to bend to the condition of the servile part of our population? That, in effect, would be to make us the slaves of slaves..... I am sure that the patriotism of the South may be exclusively relied upon to reject a policy which should be dictated by considerations altogether connected with that degraded class, to the prejudice of the residue of our population. But does not a perseverance in the foreign policy, as it now exists, in fact, make all parts of the Union, not planting, tributary to the planting parts? What is the argument? It is, that we must continue freely to receive the produce of foreign industry, without regard to the protection of American industry, that a market may be retained for the sale abroad of the produce of the planting portion of the country; and that, if we lessen the consumption, in all parts of America, those which are not planting, as well as the planting sections, of foreign manufactures, we diminish to that extent the foreign market for the planting produce. The existing state of things, indeed, presents a sort of tacit compact between the cotton-grower and the British manufacturer, the stipulations of which are, on the part of the cotton-grower, that the whole of the United States, the other portions as well as the cotton-growing, shall remain open and unrestricted in the consumption of British manufactures; and, on the part of the British manufacturer, that, in consideration thereof, he will continue to purchase the cotton of the South. Thus, then, we perceive that the proposed measure, instead of sacrificing the South to the other parts of the Union, seeks only to preserve them from being actually sacrificed under the operation of the tacit compact which I have described."

The opposition to the Protective Tariff, by the South, arose from two causes: the first openly avowed at the time, and the second clearly deducible from the policy it pursued: the one to secure the foreign market for its cotton, the other to obtain a bountiful supply of provisions at cheap rates. Cotton was admitted free of duty into foreign countries, and Southern statesmen feared its exclusion, if our government increased the duties on foreign fabrics. The South exported about twice as much of that staple as was supplied to Europe by all other countries, and there were indications favoring the desire it entertained of monopolizing the foreign markets. The West India planters could not import food, but at such high rates as to make it impracticable to grow cotton at prices low enough to suit the English manufacturer. To purchase cotton cheaply, was essential to the success of his scheme of monopolizing its manufacture, and supplying the world with clothing. The close proximity of the provision and cotton-growing districts in the United States, gave its planters advantages over all other portions of the world. But they could not monopolize the markets, unless they could obtain a cheap supply of food and clothing for their negroes, and raise their cotton at such reduced prices as to undersell their rivals. A manufacturing population, with its mechanical coadjutors, in the midst of the provision-growers, on a scale such as the protective policy contemplated, it was conceived, would create a permanent market for their products, and enhance the price; whereas, if this manufacturing could be prevented, and a system of free trade adopted, the South would constitute the principal provision market of the country, and the fertile lands of the North supply the cheap food demanded for its slaves. As the tariff policy, in the outset, contemplated the encouragement of the production of iron, hemp, whisky, and the establishment of woolen manufactories, principally, the South found its interests but slightly identified with the system—the coarser qualities of cottons, only, being manufactured in the country, and, even these, on a diminished scale, as compared with the cotton crops of the South. Cotton, up to the date when this controversy had been fairly commenced, had been worth, in the English market, an average price of from 29⁷/₁₀ to 48⁴/₁₀ cents per lb.[31] But at this period, a wide spread and ruinous depression both in the culture and manufacture of the article, occurred—cotton, in 1826, having fallen, in England, as low as 11⁹/₁₀ to 18⁹/₁₀ cents per lb. The home market, then, was too inconsiderable to be of much importance, and there existed little hope of its enlargement to the extent demanded by its increasing cultivation. The planters, therefore, looked abroad to the existing markets, rather than to wait for tardily creating one at home. For success in the foreign markets, they relied, mainly, upon preparing themselves to produce cotton at the reduced prices then prevailing in Europe. All agricultural products, except cotton, being excluded from foreign markets, the planters found themselves almost the sole exporters of the country; and it was to them a source of chagrin, that the North did not, at once, co-operate with them in augmenting the commerce of the nation.

At this point in the history of the controversy, politicians found it an easy matter to produce feelings of the deepest hostility between the opposing parties. The planters were led to believe that the millions of revenue collected off the goods imported, was so much deducted from the value of the cotton that paid for them, either in the diminished price they received abroad, or in the increased price which they paid for the imported articles. To enhance the duties, for the protection of our manufacturers, they were persuaded, would be so much of an additional tax upon themselves, for the benefit of the North; and, beside, to give the manufacturer such a monopoly of the home market for his fabrics, would enable him to charge purchasers an excess over the true value of his stuffs, to the whole amount of the duty. By the protective policy, the planters expected to have the cost of both provisions and clothing increased, and their ability to monopolize the foreign markets diminished in a corresponding degree. If they could establish free trade, it would insure the American market to foreign manufacturers; secure the foreign markets for their leading staple; repress home manufactures; force a large number of the Northern men into agriculture; multiply the growth, and diminish the price of provisions; feed and clothe their slaves at lower rates; produce their cotton for a third or fourth of former prices; rival all other countries in its cultivation; monopolize the trade in the article throughout the whole of Europe; and build up a commerce and a navy that would make us ruler of the seas.