Within recent years we have had a closer view of operations over the sea in connection with wars on land. The war between Japan and China, between America and Spain, between England and the Transvaal, and finally the Chinese Expedition, have largely demonstrated the methods of transporting troops over the sea. Whilst Moltke has shown the insignificance of the land forces for such operations, the military authorities must in the future reckon on the important problem of preparing for and conducting a war across the sea.

Germany has greater resources for enterprises of this kind, and is more efficient, than any other country. The excellent training and readiness for war, the rapidity with which the troops can be mobilized, are not attained by any other power; then, too, Germany has the second largest merchant marine in the world, which affords a first-class transport fleet not surpassed even by England's. Finally, the constant improvement and strengthening of our battle fleet affords additional security in transporting troops. These especially favorable factors make possible a wide field for Germany's activity in world politics. It is feasible for us to build strong military forces which will be of great use to the Empire in this direction, to secure by fighting a feared and esteemed position in the world such as we have attained in Europe.

In this connection, it must be admitted that our navy cannot in the near future reach the degree of development where it would be in a position alone to solve for us the problems arising from energetic participation in world politics. This shows the advisability of impressing distant countries that believe themselves inaccessible to direct attack and that have hitherto held Germany in little respect, with the size and strength of our army. That is why we must keep in mind the land operations in expeditions over-sea.

These operations, through their extent and aims, are concerned with the most vital interests of the various nations, and include small enterprises which would serve to acquire commanding positions for war as well as for colonial requirements. All, however, emphasize the problems of transporting, which vary with the conditions of wars on land and which make distinct demands for preparation. These newly found difficulties should be carefully examined by Germany.