Brock, in 1805, was made full colonel. After the incident of the mutiny he had taken over the active command at Fort George as well as at York, and at the former, as at the latter, a new and kindlier order of discipline was worked out. In this, Lieutenant-Colonel Sheaffe seems to have helped. No doubt he was influenced by reflecting on the trouble he had helped to cause. Later on, in reporting the excellent discipline of the 49th, Brock gave a good deal of the credit to Sheaffe. Desertions were in bad odor, for the commanding officer gave his men no reason for leaving him.

In October Brock went to England on leave. While he was glad to see his old friends again, he made business his first consideration and discussed with the British commander-in-chief, the Duke of York, the military situation in the Canadas. He proposed the establishment of veteran battalions. He instanced the attractiveness of desertion to the soldier quartered near the United States border and pointed out that the immigration from the United States to Canada of undesirable settlers—undesirable since they owed no allegiance to the British flag—might possibly counterbalance the devotion of the United Empire Loyalists. He suggested that these veterans should serve a certain time and that they should then be given an opportunity to settle on the land. The Duke warmly thanked Brock, and later on the plan was adopted.

Brock turned his steps Guernsey-wards, but after a few days there news of real trouble with the United States made it imperative that he should return to his command. Shortening his leave, he set sail on June 26th, 1806, and never returned to England.

When he arrived in Quebec he found himself the senior officer of military rank in the Canadas and, as such, at once assumed the command of all the forces.

The war cloud was gathering. Although Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar had finally shattered Napoleon’s dream of invading England, he still hoped to cripple her by destroying her commerce and cutting off her food supply. Rapidly he subjugated Austria and Prussia, and when these two countries were at his feet, from the capital of Prussia he issued the famous Berlin Decree. This decree forbade France or any of her allies to trade with Britain and declared that any ship engaged in such trade might be lawfully seized as a prize of war. Britain did not meekly submit, but by various orders in council forbade the ships of any nation to trade with France or any of her allies. Both the Berlin Decree and the orders in council were very high handed proceedings and bore with special severity on the neutral nations.

At this time the relations between the United States and Great Britain were very strained. In order to maintain her navy at its full strength, Britain had revived her ancient “right of search.” She claimed and exercised the right to search the ships of neutral nations to find if they were carrying British subjects who were deserters from the British navy. The United States protested strongly against this action of Great Britain, holding that once a British seaman had crossed the decks of an American ship he was an American, and, moreover, she declined to acknowledge any right of Great Britain to hold up and to search her ships on the chance of finding deserters. And now came the British orders in council as a further source of irritation.

It is true that the commerce of the United States with foreign nations had practically ceased as a result of the actions of the warring powers in Europe, but for this the Berlin Decrees were as much to blame as the orders in council. In fact at this time the United States suffered innumerable humiliations at the hands of the French. But in spite of this the whole anger of the United States seemed to be directed against Great Britain. The bitterness produced by the Revolutionary War had not yet died down, and there was a strong party in the country who made it its business to increase the flame of hatred. This party looked with covetous eyes on Canada, and desired to incorporate it into the United States. Without question that was the underlying reason for the War of 1812-14.

President Jefferson was a bitter enemy of Great Britain. While Brock was still in England, the president addressed Congress and said that “the impressment of American seamen by British cruisers, not at all checked by the remonstrances of the American Government, was a growing source of irritation and complaint.... She [Britain] plainly showed a disposition to narrow the limits of the commerce of neutrals by denying to them the right of carrying on a trade with belligerents which she did not interdict with her own subjects.” Britain’s view was that as she was trying to beat the man who was doing his best to conquer Europe, the United States should see that if extreme measures were necessary they must be borne with, even though they hurt for the moment.

At the end of 1805 President Jefferson went further. He came out flatly and said that “the foreign relations of the United States had been materially changed since the preceding session.” He charged Britain with piracy and infesting the American coast with private armed vessels, “which had perpetrated acts beyond their commission.” And he said: “It is due to ourselves to provide effective opposition to a doctrine which is as infamous as it is unwarranted.”

Brock recognized the veiled threat in the words “effective opposition” and was convinced that Jefferson and that section of the United States for which he stood wanted war. Hence his quick return to Canada. He knew that Jefferson’s first act in the event of war would be to try and get control of the lakes and rivers and to capture the fortified posts. Brock realized better than any man how weak was the resistance that could be offered unless the defences of the Canadas were immediately strengthened. As soon as he had taken up his new command he set about preparing the defence Canada was to offer. In this he was hampered rather than helped by the civil authorities. The governor-general of the Canadas at this time, Sir Robert Prescott, does not seem to have taken his position very seriously, and Thomas Dunn, president of the Executive Council, the man with whom Brock had directly to deal, appears to have been of one mind with Prescott.

Early in 1807, Brock was greatly heartened by proposals from Colonel John Macdonell, who was lieutenant of the county of Glengarry and had been for four years commanding officer of the Glengarry Militia Regiment, for forming a company of Highland Fencibles. Brock forwarded the scheme to the war office in London and backed it up. It would be, he said, “essentially useful in checking any seditious disposition which the wavering sentiments of a large population in the Montreal district might at any time manifest.” This is an indication that Brock was by no means sure which way the habitant would go in case of war.

Brock thought he had ground for his suspicions, and he decided to get to know the folk of Lower Canada better. When Sir James Craig arrived in Quebec, Brock’s tenure of the office of commander-in-chief ended. Sir James became that and governor-general in one, but he appointed Brock as acting brigadier-general. This was confirmed in London. Brock was sent to Montreal in command of the troops there and quartered in the old Chateau de Ramesay at Montreal, then a rich centre and the only city of pleasure and gaiety in Canada.

In Montreal he managed to see a good deal of the fur lords and great business men of the place. He entered into their social life, and the French-Canadian then, as now, knew how to be hospitable. This gave the brigadier a chance to judge somewhat as to where French-Canada stood, and he had even better facilities when, in September, 1808, he was superseded in the Montreal command by General Drummond and was moved back to Quebec. Here he had many friends and he entertained and was entertained. All sorts of regattas and land sports were held by the officers of the garrison and, here, as in Montreal, he found a good deal of pleasure in social affairs. He writes of “a vast assemblage of all descriptions”—an occasion when he entertained Lieutenant-Governor Gore, of Upper Canada, and his wife at a dinner and ball. During these days he unquestionably became reassured as to the loyalty of the people of Lower Canada.

He had perhaps been unduly suspicious. The people of Lower Canada, of course, were almost entirely of French descent. They spoke French, and Brock feared that in a Franco-America alliance, French Canada would remember its descent and support Napoleon. There were signs of leaning France-wards. The French Canadians publicly rejoiced when news of a fresh victory for Napoleon reached them, and Brock at first certainly deemed them disloyal. He so expressed himself in his letters again and again. He could not understand why they should be, for they were much freer and happier under British rule than they had been when Bigot and others, during the French regime, had governed them. Yet even in the early days, Brock was in two minds about them for he wrote: “It may appear surprising that men petted as they have been and indulged in everything they could desire should wish for a change, but so it is, and I am inclined to think that were Englishmen placed in the same situation they would show even more impatience to escape from French rule.”

But, on the whole, Brock need not have feared. The French Canadians did not want another rule. Their priests and men in high authority were loyal to Britain, and they represented the mass of opinion more than the Napoleonic or American agent who was to be found here and there in Lower Canada.

In these days, Brock was not particularly happy. He was worried by the possibility of war, and taking it on the whole he was not in love with Canada. Perhaps he was homesick. He heard of former comrades winning their spurs on the battlefields of Europe, and he compared their lot to his in a “remote, inactive corner” as he dubbed Canada in a letter to England. And we know that he had enlisted his brother Savery’s efforts to have him transferred. It was natural. He was a man of action and had as keen a desire as any soldier for risk and fame.

Brock’s first measure in strengthening the defences of Canada was to make Quebec attack-proof. Sir Guy Carleton, in 1775-1776, had defended Quebec against American forces under General Montgomery. There might soon be another attack, and Brock wanted to have Quebec in such shape that it could repel invasion. He appealed to the council for a thousand men and sufficient carts for six months to strengthen the walls. But the civil government of Lower Canada thought his move was a political one and gave little or no aid. They told him he must do the work himself, and he did. In a letter to the president of the council he scouts the suspicions of the civil government and states that his “sole object was to state the assistance required by the military to remedy a glaring defect in the fortifications of Quebec, should his Honor conceive that preparatory measures were necessary to be adopted in consequence ... of the ... aggressive proceedings in the proclamation of the American Government.”

He went ahead and erected a battery mounting eight thirty-six pounders in the centre of the citadel at Quebec, commanding the heights opposite. This was first christened “Brock’s Battery,” but when the newly-arrived governor-general, Sir James Craig, saw it, he thought, says Brock, “that anything so pre-eminent should be distinguished by the most exalted name.” It was therefore called “The King’s Battery,” and, wrote Brock, “this is the greatest compliment that he could pay to my judgment.”

Altogether, at great expense, the fortifications of Quebec were greatly improved. Proper drill grounds were made and a good hospital created. Quartermasters at Amherstburg and Kingston were appointed to take charge of new fleets of schooners and military batteaux which he had constructed.

He was not a moment too soon with his work. The international situation was rapidly complicating. Mention has been made of Britain’s stopping and searching American vessels for British deserters. This continued and became more general, and there does not seem to be room for doubt that, in some cases, British commanders were very autocratic. They gave the United States legitimate cause for complaint by sometimes carrying off seamen whom they pretended were British, but who were really American citizens. The case of the Chesapeake brought matters to a head. It was suspected by Admiral Berkeley, stationed at Halifax, that some sailors, whose offence was particularly flagrant, had deserted from the British sloop Halifax and had found refuge on the Chesapeake. The Admiral ordered Captain Humphreys of the frigate Leopard to insist on the return of these deserters. Commodore Barron commanding the Chesapeake refused point blank to surrender the men in question, and Humphreys fired on the United States frigate, which did not return the fire. She was seized, and the deserters secured by the British commander. Naturally the United States threatened war. This was answered by an honorable apology from Britain, however, and the war cloud passed for the moment. But Brock thought it could not long be delayed. The heart of the trouble was still there, and sooner or later the irritation which each nation felt at the other was bound to find outlet in actual conflict. Hence Brock’s rush to make preparations for adequate defence.