| INTRODUCTION |
| Subject of our Study: Religious Sociology and the Theory of Knowledge | PAGE |
| I.—Principal subject of the book: analysis of the simplest religion known to determine the elementary forms of the religious life—Why they are more easily found and explained in the primitive religions | 1 |
| II.—Secondary subject of research: the genesis of the fundamental notions of thought or the categories—Reasons for believing that their origin is religious and consequently social—How a way of restating the theory of knowledge is thus seen | 9 |
BOOK I
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS |
CHAPTER I
Definition of Religious Phenomena and of Religion |
| Usefulness of a preliminary definition of religion; method to be followed in seeking this definition—Why the usual definitions should be examined first | 23 |
| I.—Religion defined by the supernatural and mysterious—Criticism: the notion of mystery is not primitive | 24 |
| II.—Religion defined in connection with the idea of God or a spiritual being.—Religions without gods—Rites in deistic religions which imply no idea of divinity | 29 |
| III.—Search for a positive definition—Distinction between beliefs and rites—Definition of beliefs—First characteristic: division of things between sacred and profane—Distinctive characteristics of this definition—Definition of rites in relation to beliefs—Definition of religion | 36 |
| IV.—Necessity of another characteristic to distinguish magic from religion—The idea of the Church—Do individualistic religions exclude the idea of a Church? | 42 |
CHAPTER II
Leading Conceptions of the Elementary Religion
I.—Animism |
| Distinction of animism and naturism | 48 |
| I—The three theses of animism: Genesis of the idea of the soul; Formation of the idea of spirits; Transformation of the cult of spirits into the cult of nature | 49 |
| II.—Criticism of the first thesis—Distinction of the idea of the soul from that of a double—Dreams do not account for the idea of the soul | 55 |
| III.—Criticism of the second thesis—Death does not explain the transformation of a soul into a spirit—The cult of the souls of the dead is not primitive | 60 |
| IV.—Criticism of the third thesis—The anthropomorphic instinct—Spencer's criticism of it; reservations on this point—Examination of the facts by which this instinct is said to be proved—Difference between a soul and the spirits of nature—Religious anthropomorphism is not primitive | 65 |
| V.—Conclusion: animism reduces religion to nothing more than a system of hallucinations | 68 |
CHAPTER III
Leading Conceptions of the Elementary Religion—(continued)
II.—Naturism |
| History of the theory | 71 |
| I.—Exposition of Max MÜller's naturism | 73 |
| II.—If the object of religion is to express natural forces, it is hard to see how it has maintained itself, for it expresses them in an erroneous manner—Pretended distinction between religion and mythology | 78 |
| III.—Naturism does not explain the division of things into sacred and profane | 84 |
CHAPTER IV
Totemism as an Elementary Religion |
| I.—Brief history of the question of totemism | 88 |
| II.—Reasons of method for which our study will be given specially to the totemism of Australia—The place which will be given to facts from America | 93 |
BOOK II
THE ELEMENTARY BELIEFS |
CHAPTER I
Totemic Beliefs
The Totem as Name and as Emblem |
| I.—Definition of the clan—The totem as name of the clan—Nature of the things which serve as totems—Ways in which the totem is acquired—The totems of phratries; of matrimonial classes | 102 |
| II.—The totem as emblem—Totemic designs engraved or carved upon objects; tatooings or designs upon the body | 113 |
| III.—Sacred character of the totemic emblem—The churinga—The nurtunja—The waninga—Conventional character of totemic emblems | | 416 |
| How religious individualism and cosmopolitanism are explained in this theory | 424 |
| II.—The eternal element in religion—Concerning the conflict between science and religion; it has to do solely with the speculative side of religion—What this side seems destined to become | 427 |
| III.—How has society been able to be the source of logical, that is to say conceptual, thought? Definition of the concept: not to be confounded with the general idea; characterized by its impersonality and communicability—It has a collective origin—The analysis of its contents bears witness in the same sense Collective representations as types of ideas which individuals accept—In regard to the objection that they are impersonal only on condition of being true—Conceptual thought is coeval with humanity | 431 |
| IV.—How the categories express social things—The chief category is the concept of totality which could be suggested only by society—Why the relations expressed by the categories could become conscious only in society—Society is not an a-logical being—How the categories tend to detach themselves from geographically determined groups | 439 |
| The unity of science on the one hand, and of morals and religion on the other—How the society accounts for this unity—Explanation of the rÔle attributed to society: its creative power—Reactions of sociology upon the science of man | 445 |
