Two of the most important propositions of His Holiness the Pope more especially deserve earnest consideration. They are indeed supported by the Allies who are purposely fighting for their adoption.

In his note of the first of August, 1917, addressed to the Rulers of the belligerent nations, the Pope says in part:—

"At first, the fundamental point must be to substitute the moral force of Right to the material force of arms."

No truer proposition could be enounced. If Germany had put this principle into practice, she never would have violated Belgian territory.

When England protested against the proposed invasion of Belgium, she did so in obedience to the sacred principle enunciated by the Sovereign Pontiff. She strongly insisted to the last minute that the moral force of solemn treaties should prevail upon the material force of arms.

In a letter dated October 7, 1917, His Eminence Cardinal Gasparri, Secretary of State to His Holiness, addressing the Archbishop of Lens, wrote as follows respecting conscription:—

Cardinal Gasparri then points to the ante-war British and American systems of military "voluntarism", in the following terms:—

It should be very gratifying indeed to all the loyal subjects of the British Empire to ascertain, from the declarations of Cardinal Gasparri, that the Pope is in so complete accord with England on this the most important question to be settled by the future peace treaty.

As proved in one of the first chapters of this work, the Government of Great Britain, supported in this course by almost the unanimous opinion of the peoples of the United Kingdom, was the first to suggest the holding of the Hague conferences to consider the best means to adopt to favour the world with the blessings of permanent peace. Their own view, which they forcibly expressed, was that the surest way to reach that much desired result was to limit the military armaments, both on land and sea. For more than twenty years previous to the war, they pressed, and even implored, for the adoption of their program.

I have also proved how obdurate Germany was in resisting England's propositions, and her successful intrigues to thwart Great Britain's efforts to have them adopted and put into practice.

England's policy has not changed. On the contrary, it is more than ever favourable to the limitation, and even to the complete abolition, of armaments, if one or the other can be achieved. It is the principal war aim of Great Britain, only coming next after her determination to avenge Belgium.

The future peace of the world could no doubt be well guaranteed by a large measure of disarmament. But it would certainly be much more so, if complete abolition could be obtained by an international agreement binding on all nations, with, of course, the allowance of the necessary forces required for the maintenance of interior public order.

The whole world can safely depend on the strenuous support of England for either the limitation or the abolition of armaments whenever the question is seriously taken up for consideration.

Evidently the problem will be difficult to solve. However, it should not be beyond the resources of statesmanship which, assuredly, ought to rise superior to all prejudiced aspirations after the terrible ordeal Humanity will have experienced during the present war.

The maintenance of internal public order, and permanent preparedness for foreign wars, are two very different questions to examine. The first can safely be left to the care of every nation sure to attend to it if willing to maintain her authority. The second has a much wider scope and will tax the ability of statesmanship to the utmost limit.

Will the great civilized nations decide, when the war is over, to completely abolish conscription to return to voluntary military service within a very limited organization, thus doing away by a bold and single stroke with a system which, for more than a hundred years, has been the curse of continental Europe?

Or will they, at least as an initial attempt, come to the conclusion to only limit armaments, maintaining compulsory service for the reduced strength of the armies?

If armaments are either abolished, or merely reduced, will they be so on sea as well as on land? I would answer at once:—of course, they should.

Looking at the question from the British stand-point—and I can also say from that of the United States—it should be easily solved.

Public opinion in Great Britain and all over the British Empire, as well as in the United States, has always been against conscription in peace times, until the present war.

Not exactly foreseeing the full extent of the effort she would be called upon to make, England entered into the conflict determined to meet the requirements of her military situation out of the resources of voluntary enlistment. Canada, joining in the struggle, did the same. Both have done wonderfully well during the three first years of the prolonged war.

I can, without the slightest hesitation, positively assert that public opinion, in the whole British Empire, and, not only in the United States, but in the whole of the two American continents, is, as a matter of principle, as much hostile to compulsory military service as it was before the present war, and would exult at its complete abolition as one of the happiest results of the gigantic contest still going on.

It is to be deplored, but still it is a fact, that great questions of public interest too often cannot be settled solely in conformity with the principles they imply.

If Great Britain, if the United States, if Canada, could consider the question of conscription exclusively from their own stand-point, they would most surely decide at once, and with great enthusiasm, to abolish the obligatory military service they have adopted only as a last resort under the stress of imperious necessity.

Moreover, I have no hesitation to express my own opinion that whatever will be the military system of continental Europe after the war, the British Empire and the United States will certainly not be cursed with permanent conscription. They are both so happily situated that, in peace times, they cannot be called upon to go very extensively into the costly preparedness which the European continental nations will have again to submit themselves to, if they are not wise enough to put an end forever to the barbarous militarism they have too long endured for fear of Teutonic domination.

Under the worst European situation, England, with a territorial army of a million of men ready to be called to the Colours, or actually flying them, backed by her mighty fleet maintained to its highest state of efficiency, could always face any continental enemy. And such an army of a ready million of well trained officers and men, voluntary service would easily produce.

If future conditions would require it, Canada herself could do her share to prepare for any emergency by reverting to voluntary enlistment, but in improving the service so as to produce more immediate efficiency.

Very apparently, the United States will come out of the present conflict with flying Colours and will dispense with compulsory service under any circumstances in the peace days to follow.

What then will the continental powers do? Blessed they will be, if they make up their mind to do away, once for all, with a system which has crushed the peoples so unmercifully.

To speak in all frankness, I believe it would be almost vain, however much desirable it is, to indulge in fond hopes of the complete abolition of militarism on the European continent. The canker is too deep in the flesh and blood of nations to be extirpated as if by magic. Such a reversal of conditions grown to extravagant proportions, during more than a century, will not likely be accomplished at the first stroke. Let us all hope that, at least, a good start will be made by a large limitation of armaments which may, with time, lead to the final achievement for which the whole world would be forever grateful to the Almighty. I have positively stated that extravagant militarism should be discontinued on sea as well as on land. Such has been the policy of England for many years past. I have proved it by the diplomatic correspondence between Great Britain and Germany, and the solemn declarations of all the leading British statesmen for the last quarter of a century. How persistingly England has implored Germany to agree with her in stopping that ruinous race in the building of war vessels, we have seen.

So, the assent, nay more, the determination of England to adhere to her old and noble policy, is a foregone conclusion.

The closing sentence of the last quoted paragraph of Cardinal Gasparri's letter expresses the opinion that "the right to make peace or war should be given to the people by way of referendum, or at least to Parliament."

The system preconized by the Eminent Cardinal has been in existence in England for a number of years; ever since the day when complete ministerial responsibility was adopted as the fundamental principle of the British constitution. That system was carried to the letter by Great Britain with regard to her intervention in the present war.

The right to declare war and to make peace is one of the most important prerogatives of the British Crown. This prerogative of the Crown, like all the others, is held in trust by the Sovereign for the benefit of the people and exercised by Him ONLY UPON THE ADVICE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF HIS MINISTERS.

In conformity with this great British constitutional principle, what happened in London, in August, 1914? The then Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in his own name and in those of his colleagues, advised His Majesty King George V. to declare war against Germany because she had invaded Belgian territory in violation of the treaties by which these two countries were, in honour bound, to protect Belgium's neutrality. They were constitutionally responsible to the Imperial Parliament and to the people of the United Kingdom for their advice to their Sovereign.

In his admirable statement to the British House of Commons, Sir Edward Grey, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, said:—

"I have assured the House—and the Prime Minister has assured the House more than once—that if any crisis such as this arose, we should come before the House of Commons and be able to say to the House that it was free to decide what the British attitude should be, that we would have no secret engagement which we should spring upon the House, and tell the House that, because we had entered into that engagement, there was an obligation of honour upon the country."

The British House of Commons, had they considered it to be their duty, had the right to disapprove the foreign policy of the Cabinet and to censure the ministers for the advice they had given, or had decided to give, to the Sovereign. On the other hand, the House of Commons had the right to approve the stand taken by the Government. They did so unanimously, and were most admirably supported by the people.

I must say that I consider it would be very difficult, if not absolutely impracticable, to have questions of war or peace dealt with by way of "Referendum." Crises suddenly created lead almost instantly to declarations of war. But this outcome could hardly be so rapidly produced that Parliament could not be called to deal with the emergency.

How could France have been able to oppose the crushing German invasion, in 1914, if her Government and her representative Houses had been obliged to wait for the result of a "Referendum" whether she would fight or kneel down?

But the whole world—outside the Central Empires and their Allies—witnessed with unbounded delight the spontaneous and unanimous decision of the heroic French nation to fight to the last. She threw herself with the most admirable courage against the invading waves of Teutonic barbarism, and succeeded by the great and glorious Marne victory in forcing them to ebb, thus giving England and the other Allies the time necessary to organize and train their armies which, by their united efforts will save Civilization from destruction and the world from the threatened German domination.