THE establishment of Francesco Sforza as Duke of Milan had virtually settled the affairs of Lombardy, for although the Emperor and the French King refused to recognise his rights to the Visconti succession, they deferred their respective claims upon that duchy till a fitter season. The Angevine pretensions to the crown of Naples were also in temporary abeyance, and the triple tiara had passed from the turbulent Eugenius to Nicholas V., whose early habits of scholarship continued undisturbed by ambitious dreams. There thus seemed no element of contention left, and a prolonged peace was the natural as well as the true policy of Italy. But, in the words of Sanzi,

So paltry were the pretexts, so remote the motives for renewed hostilities, that Sismondi is content to ascribe these to diplomatic intrigue, seconded by a general irritability of temperaments, and avows that, ere they were resumed, a review of interests and reconstruction of alliances became absolutely necessary. Venice and Florence had hitherto co-operated to protect themselves, and maintain a balance against the ambitious dynasties of Visconti and Aragon; but jealousy of the terra-firma acquisitions of the former having induced her sister republic to league with Sforza, she consulted at once her safety and her vengeance by an intimate union with Alfonso. Sigismondo Malatesta being retained in her service, the Duke of Milan bought him over by an offer of better terms, and the Count of Urbino, finding himself thus exposed to the same contact with his personal enemy which had recently annoyed him in the Maremma campaign, renounced his engagement with Sforza, and as a natural consequence transferred it to the other side. The King of Naples, disgusted by the late treachery of Sigismondo, and by similar instances of light faith on the part of other Italian condottieri, had announced his determination to employ none of them without sureties for their fidelity. But he made an exception in favour of Federigo, declining his offer of the Venetian signory as his sponsors, on the ground that he knew his word to be sufficient guarantee. In consequence, however, of the coronation of Frederick III. at Rome, and his stay in Italy, it was not until 1452 that these arrangements were so far completed as to enable the Venetians to declare war upon Sforza in May of that year, and Alfonso to publish hostilities with Florence in the following month.[90]

The King being desirous of bringing into notice his natural son Ferdinando Duke of Calabria, the destined heir of his crown, now placed him at the head of 8000 cavalry, and half that number of foot soldiers, but bestowed on Federigo the rank and title of Captain-general. Entering Tuscany by Cortona, this army penetrated by the valleys of Chiana and Arno, carrying terror almost to the gates of Florence, and overrunning a vast extent of country. But no permanent impression was made, for, trusting to the artillery of Siena, which was refused him, Alfonso had not provided his troops with the means of taking any strong places. It accordingly cost them six weeks to reduce Foiano, and after spending as long before Castellina, the bursting of their only battering-gun rendered further perseverance useless. Thus when they betook themselves to winter quarters at Aquaviva on the Mediterranean coast, they could boast no important result of the campaign. A colourable pretext was thus afforded for murmurs from the captains, many of whom served reluctantly under a commander so much their junior. Although these complaints reached Alfonso, they no way diminished his confidence in Federigo, whom he encouraged to meet such jealousy by redoubled exertions. In order to arrange a plan of operations, the Count repaired to Naples, and received from him a cordial welcome. As spring advanced, the pestilent air of the Maremma, which had formerly compromised the Neapolitan army in

"That sun-bright land of beauty,"

again proved their scourge. Many officers and men were attacked by fever, and among them the Captain-general, who was removed to Siena whilst his troops fell back upon Pitigliano.

The following letter, written by him during an earlier stage of his malady, and probably in reply to pressing invitations from the priors of that city, proves his reluctance to leave his post:—

This campaign differed little in tactics, and no way in results, from that in which Federigo, under the Florentine standard, had lately contested much of the same ground with Alfonso. We pass rapidly over the events of both, for although minutely dwelt upon by his biographers, and tending to develop his military science and reputation, they were marked by no brilliant incidents, and involved no general interests. Machiavelli, ever willing to sneer at mercenary warfare, observes that places were then deemed impregnable which in his day were abandoned as untenable, and explains the policy of the invaded to consist in avoiding a general engagement; "for they deemed it impossible to be ultimately worsted, so long as they were not beaten in any pitched battle, the loss of petty castles being recovered with returning peace, while more important places were secure in the enemy's inability to assault them."[92]

The Count's engagement was renewed by the King of Naples in autumn for another year on the same terms, which appear from the Oliveriana MSS. to have been 1500 ducats a month for his own pay, 8 ducats, of ten gigli, for each lance, and 2 for each foot-soldier; his company to consist of 700 lances and 600 infantry. No active service was, however, required; and the general pacification, to which Alfonso reluctantly acceded in January, 1455, restored matters to their former state,—the usual issue of such contests.

Europe was now startled by an event which exposed Italy to peculiar peril. The Eastern Empire had long been falling into feeble senility, and in proportion as her vigour relaxed and her frontier receded, the Crescent extended its domination, and menaced the Bosphorus. The Greeks appealed for aid to Western Christendom; but men's enthusiasm had become selfishness; the crusading spirit was extinct, and the cry echoed unheeded along the Mediterranean shores. The siege of Constantinople by Mahomet II., a barbarian endowed with qualities which would have shone in any sphere, might have been prevented or raised by very moderate efforts of the Italian powers; and it was not until the loss of that great capital, that they perceived the folly of their neglect, which had sacrificed the best bulwark of Europe against Ottoman aggression. But besides this general consternation, the maritime republics staggered beneath the blow, for it annihilated that trade with the Archipelago and the Euxine which had crowded their ports and filled their coffers; and when Constantinople fell, many wealthy Christian merchants, there resident, were stripped of their property, and passed into menial slavery. It was in the moment of universal alarm, that Nicholas V. urged a general reconciliation and league of Italy, with a zeal which, notwithstanding the doubts of Simonetta adopted by Sismondi, we believe to have been sincere. The congress held for this purpose at Rome was, however, distracted by narrow views and shallow intrigues, and broke up without effecting its object. Yet, ere long, policy prevailed over petty ends, and the peace of Lodi, signed in April, 1454, to which at first only Venice and Milan were parties, was ratified within a few months by all the Peninsular states, and secured to them a long period of comparative repose.

This pacification of Italy, which the Pontiff had ardently desired, he was not long spared to witness, for he closed his exemplary life on the 24th of March. Tommaso de' Parentucelli, though of Pisan parentage, was born and brought up at Sarzana, from whence he took his usual designation. He was early vowed to the Church in consequence of his mother's dream, and at the University of Bologna his progress attracted notice from the bishop, who took him into his family, where he remained for about twenty years. On the return of Eugenius to Rome, in 1443, he was elevated to the purple, as vice-camerlingo; and three years and a half later, was chosen to succeed that Pontiff. The tastes and habits of scholarship which Nicholas had formed in early youth preserved their ascendency after this remarkable advancement. The first object of his government was the maintenance of general peace; and when he had failed to effect this, his uniform policy was neutrality. His attention was thus left free to follow out, for the benefit of his subjects, and of mankind, those aspirations for justice, and those enlarged views of mental development which formed his character. The revenues which other pontiffs of that age misapplied to promote miserable contests, or lavished on schemes of nepotism and courtly vices, he directed into more wholesome channels. Magnificent in all that could lend dignity to the religion of whose faith and ritual he was the guardian, careful of whatever could promote the dignity of his sacred office, an economical management enabled him largely to gratify his literary longings. At his court, habits of study were an unfailing recommendation; mental acquirements were duly honoured, and men of letters were sure of finding a generous and enlightened friend. With him originated the Vatican library, which, under liberal popes, and by favourable opportunities, has since been gradually augmented into one of the brightest ornaments of the papacy. His mild and useful reign ended far too soon for the welfare of Italy and the interests of letters, but the light which it diffused scattered the last shadows of the dark ages, and still gilds the remainder of this century.

It chanced that a few days before peace had been concluded, a subsidy of 36,000 ducats reached Federigo from the King of Naples, which he immediately offered to return, as no longer required. Regarding this as an act of unusual conscientiousness, Alfonso desired him to retain the money on account of future services; whereupon the Count, after sending home his company from the Tuscan war, attended the Duke of Calabria to Naples, to offer acknowledgments in person. To his suggestion, while there, has been ascribed by Muzio and Baldi a double matrimonial alliance, now proposed between the hitherto hostile houses of Aragon and Sforza, as a means of cementing the new league, but of which only that of Hippolita Maria Sforza took effect. On the same authority we must attribute to him a selfish and ill-timed counsel, which marred that measure and perilled the peace of Italy. Whilst a party to the losing game which Sforza played in La Marca during 1445-6, several of his townships were seized by the Lord of Rimini, in whose possession they had since remained. With the ultimate hope of reclaiming these on some fitting opportunity, he is alleged to have reminded Alfonso of the scurvy trick played upon him in 1448 by Sigismondo, in passing over to the service of Florence after receiving his pay, and to have suggested such treachery as sufficient ground for specially excluding the latter from the league, and for reserving a right to make reprisals. The King adopted this hint the more readily, that he had other wrongs to settle with the Genoese and with Astorre Manfredi, seigneur of Imola; he accordingly, on ratifying the treaty of Lodi in January, 1455, introduced an exceptional clause against these three states, the effect of which was not only to keep up petty warfare in Romagna and Liguria, but eventually to entail upon his son a disputed succession which well-nigh cost him his crown.

It was the destiny of Urbino long to endure the full weight of Malatesta's troublesome qualities; to be in turn agitated by his intrigues, compromised by his instability, deluded by his duplicity, harassed anew by his inroads, and again cajoled by his hollow repentance. The Count, whose sense of honour was delicately susceptible, and who felt warmly for his people's welfare, could no longer brook such aggressions. Bent upon signally punishing them, he, however, before concerting measures with Alfonso, judged it prudent to visit Florence, Bologna, Milan, and Mantua, in order to justify to their governments the necessity of making an example of his inveterate foe. Nothing could exceed the honourable reception accorded him at these places; but he did not obtain anything beyond general assurances or cold civilities in regard to the matter he had in view. The proffered mediation of Borso d'Este, Duke of Modena and Marquis of Ferrara, held out one last hope of an arrangement; so he paid him a visit on his return homewards, in May, 1457, and found that Malatesta was already his guest. The interview of these rivals is described by Sanzi and Baldi with details probably more dramatic than historical. The Lord of Rimini came reluctantly, with arms at his side and implacable passions in his breast; he commenced the discussion with a long catalogue of grievances, and quickly wrought himself up to violent and insulting language, which Federigo met by mild but firm remonstrance, ending with a proposal to settle by single combat, "hand to hand, in field, or plain, or valley," whatever misunderstandings could not be amicably disposed of by their host. Sigismondo, for answer, drew his sword, and after the parties had exchanged ferocious defiance, the Duke separated them, grieved at the total failure of his intervention. Before leaving Ferrara, the Count offered to submit to his arbitration their differences, the chief of which was as to restoration of the places in Montefeltro retained by Malatesta; but the latter declined any reference of the sort.

After provocations so aggravated, and in the certainty that opportunity alone was wanting to renew them in manner more perilous to his interests, Federigo no longer hesitated to act upon the reservations of the treaty of Lodi, and in June hastened to Naples, in order to obtain assistance. It happened that Giacopo, son of NicolÒ Piccinino, was then in the Abruzzi with his company of adventure, retained by Alfonso, but waiting the chances of war. The Count, therefore, applied for permission to employ him against Malatesta, who, like a true braggart, lost courage on finding himself exposed to just vengeance, and virtually excluded from assistance by the terms of the league. Recurring as usual to intrigue, he sent his eldest son Roberto to Naples, that he might gain favour with the beautiful Lucrezia Allagno, or del Lagno, who, though said to have equalled her Roman namesake in propriety, held the elderly monarch by the silken chain of youthful passion. Her dragon-like virtue did not exempt her from womanly weakness, and in exchange for the most brilliant ruby which the jewellers of Venice could supply, backed by an offer of his hand for her niece, Roberto gained her influence in his father's behalf. Months were lost in the counteracting this back-stairs interposition; and meanwhile Federigo was widowed by the death of Gentile, of whom nothing is known beyond the excessive stoutness of her person. These delays enabled him to prepare the munitions of war, and he addressed to the magistrates of Siena this request for a person qualified to cast mortars:—

It was in this month of November that the Count and Piccinino at length took the field, although the season already warned them to winter-quarters in the inclement climate of the Apennines. After reducing several places near Fossombrone, Federigo, in order to save his own people, seized some townships of Carpegna, a tiny fief held by a branch of his family with whom he was at variance, and there left the troublesome troops of Giacopo until the spring. When it opened, notwithstanding the dilatory and heartless tactics of their leader, who, like a true condottiere, regarded decisive movements as fatal to his trade, this "war of petty sieges by petty armies," as it is aptly called by Sismondi, soon exhausted and humbled the refractory Sigismondo, whose unhappy condition is thus pitiably described in another interesting despatch to the Sienese authorities.

These sanguine anticipations were, however, premature, as fortune had still some trials in store for Federigo. Alfonso's death took place on the 1st of July, that of Pope Calixtus III. a few weeks later; both events materially affected the struggle which he had thus regarded as at an end. Indeed, the whole state of parties in that strife curiously illustrates the chances and changes on which depended success in the intestine broils of Italian feudatories and captains of adventure. The great ambition of the latter was to attain the sovereignty of some petty state, and Piccinino conceived himself, as representative of the Braccian influence, well entitled to watch an opportunity of turning it to such account. His calculation probably was that he might be able to possess himself of one at least of the seigneuries which Malatesta's ruin would vacate; but as the contest went on, that wily intriguer appears to have suggested to him Urbino as a richer guerdon, attainable by gradually wasting Federigo's resources, and finally at a fitting moment turning round to crush him.

The Duke of Milan's sympathies were naturally with the Count, who had stood by him single-handed in adversity, and in his cause had incurred those losses he was now endeavouring to recover, whilst the Lord of Rimini had betrayed him again and again, and with his own hands had strangled his natural daughter, the third wife murdered by this Bluebeard of real life.[*95] Yet such was Sforza's detestation of Giacopo as head of the old Braccian faction, and fear lest his ambition of sovereignty should be gratified, that he actually advanced money to support Sigismondo, who also obtained similar assistance from the Duke of Modena, jealous perhaps of the growing Montefeltrian influence. The Pontiff's death opened a new hope to Piccinino, and on the speculation of possibly making good a footing in Perugia, he profited by this vacancy of the Holy See to seize upon Assisi, Nocera, and Gualdo. Thus, within three months after his letter to Siena, Federigo found himself deprived of his only ally Alfonso, deserted by his confederate Piccinino, and left to maintain the contest single-handed against an adversary suddenly enabled to rally under his standard some of the boldest adventurers of Romagna.

But the reaction in his favour was not long postponed. Ferdinand continued his commission as captain-general, with a pension of 6000 ducats assigned to him by Alfonso three years before; and fully aware of the importance of conciliating papal sanction to his own questionable sovereignty, commanded Giacopo to quit the ecclesiastical territory and return to the banner of Montefeltro. A miserable contest of sacked villages and barbarous reprisals was continued during autumn and winter, and though the advantage preponderated on the Count's side, these successes were at his people's cost.

Meanwhile the repose of Italy was exposed to more serious interruption. Alfonso V. of Aragon and Sicily had maintained his very doubtful title to the crown of Naples[96] by a happy union of energy and judgment. Devoting his life to Italy, he first established his reputation by a series of victories over his Angevine competitor, and then cemented his popularity by an easy and accessible address, by lavish profusion of treasure and honours, by a zealous pursuit and patronage of learning. The epithet of Magnanimous, which graces his name, was merited by his testamentary disposition as well as by his character. Having no legitimate issue, he left to his brother John his hereditary dominions in Spain and the islands, but conceived himself at liberty to bestow the crown of Naples, received at first as a gift and retained by the sword, upon his natural son Ferdinand, whose substitution to it had been sanctioned by two popes, recognised in various treaties, and formally voted by a native parliament. His chief confidant and agent in these arrangements had been his countryman Cardinal Alfonso Borgia, who at his death filled the papal throne with the title of Calixtus III., and who, anticipating that bad faith and unscrupulous nepotism which, under Alexander VI., consigned to enduring infamy their subsequently canonised name, used his authority to supplant Ferdinand by his own nephew Pierluigi Borgia. With this view he, as suzerain of Naples, declared its sovereignty lapsed on the King's death without a legitimate son, and although he published a notice calling upon all claimants to appear for their interests, his real object was divulged by an offer to Francesco Sforza of his father's fiefs in the Abruzzi and Apulia, on condition of his enabling him to place the crown on Pierluigi's head. These intrigues were, however, frustrated by this Pope's death on the 8th of August; and his successor Pius II., a man in all respects his opposite, hastened to recognise Ferdinand, maintenance of peace in the Peninsula being the first requisite towards his grand project of a crusade against the Turks.

Full of this scheme, he summoned a congress of European powers at Mantua, which proved one of the most interesting assemblages recorded in mediÆval history, and offered to Christendom the rare spectacle of a pontiff engaged in reconciling his universal flock. From the British Isles no adequate response answered his summons, "England being hopelessly convulsed by civil broils, and Scotland hidden in the ocean depths." His self-imposed task including the arrangement of all disputes, those of the rival Lords of Urbino and Rimini attracted early notice. Sigismondo attended at Mantua in person to plead his cause: that of Federigo, who reluctantly consented to transact with one whom he well knew no award, no promise, could bind, was conducted by an envoy. The treachery of the former being made manifest, he was condemned by the Pope to a pecuniary mulct, and, failing payment, to the surrender of some fastnesses in security. Thereupon new difficulties arose, Malatesta avowing himself as yet unconquered, and ready to brave extremities rather than accept the proffered terms. His swaggering was thus checked by Pius:—"Hold your peace; our care is not for you, but for your house: our pity belongs to your subjects, not yourself, whose manner of life merits no commiseration. However you may defend it by a multitude of words, your whole life tells against you, and your sole plea is upon the deeds of an ancestry deserving well of the Romish Church. Hence is it that we seek to pacify your foes; and if you now resile from what is fair and equitable, we shall leave you in the slough wherein we found you: nor would it surprise us were the divine mercy to permit the poor to be afflicted for a season, that you may finally expiate your guilt by a bloody end, or by a wretched and impoverished exile." Daunted by these words, Sigismondo succumbed to terms approaching the award; but the other party, elated by success, would make no concession, though the Pontiff, indignant at such clinging to victory rather than conciliation, strove to settle the points still at issue.[*97] It was in this state of matters that he indited the following brief.

The Pontiff's eventual decision was, that their conquests should be mutually restored, but that La Pergola, Pietrarobbia, and other townships should be given over to the Count, in compensation of damages; also that Malatesta should consign Sinigaglia and Mondavio as security for payment to Ferdinand of 50,000 ducats, in full of his debts to the crown of Naples; this money, or, failing it, these towns, to be given to Piccinino in lieu of all demands on account of services to Alfonso and Federigo. The only difficulty in carrying out these terms appears to have originated with that selfish adventurer, who, trusting to the terror with which his robber bands were regarded, and conceiving that he might extort still greater advantages from a Pontiff intent on promptly settling every divisive element in Italian politics, made several demonstrations against the ecclesiastical territory. But the temporising Nicholas had been succeeded by a practical and energetic statesman, who at once ordered the Count of Urbino to protect the interests of the Church.[99] In the following spring an interview between the rivals, in token of their perfect reconciliation, was brought about by the Duke of Milan. It took place in presence of a numerous and noble concourse, witnesses to studied displays of affectionate cordiality, which on one side were neither voluntary nor sincere.