Sir Charles Warren and Spion Kop: A Vindication

CHAPTER II

POSITION OF AFFAIRS

Leaving Sir Charles Warren on the north side of the Tugela in advance of Trichard’s Drift and Sir Redvers Buller at Spearman’s Hill, with Major-General Lyttelton at Potgieter’s, let us pause to consider the general position of affairs. In order to understand it we must know the features of the country between the Tugela and Ladysmith, the relief of which was the object of the operations; the numbers of the forces employed on each side; the positions occupied by the enemy, and the ways in which they could best be attacked.

We cannot do better, in the first instance, than quote from Sir Charles Warren himself as to the country between the Tugela and Ladysmith and the strategy adopted. The extract is from a contribution last autumn to the ‘National Review’ entitled ‘Lessons from the South African War.’

‘If the Colonial farm map[3] is examined it will be seen that immediately south of Ladysmith is the rugged country of Grobelaar’s Kloof, extending to the Tugela and Colenso, some twelve miles from Ladysmith, and that the only practicable directions of advance within easy access of the rail-head at Frere were that to the right, following the line of railway to Pieters through very rugged mountains, and that to the left, by Potgieter’s and Skiet’s Drifts, through comparatively open country, with a fairly good wagon road of sixteen miles from Frere to Potgieter’s Drift, and a good wagon road of fourteen miles into Ladysmith over open country, the only hills to be met with being those commanding Potgieter’s Drift from the south, and Lancers Hill, held by the Boers investing Ladysmith and six miles from that city. This open country is, however, commanded on the south by the Doorn Kloof range resting on the Tugela.

‘It was the left-hand advance that was chosen, but, though the Boer lines on the north side of the Tugela about Potgieter’s Drift and Vaalkrantz were commanded by the high ground of Mount Alice and Zwart Kop, 1,000 feet above the Tugela, the attack was not at once made upon their position. Again, there was a choice of making a dÉtour, either to the right by Doorn Kloof, or to the left over the Spion Kop range and its adjuncts.

‘So far as the map will indicate there is much in favour of an advance by Doorn Kloof, particularly because its possession seemed to be a necessity to cover the advance over the open country between Potgieter’s Drift and Lancers Hill.

‘On the left is the Spion Kop range, stretching ten miles north from the Tugela and separating the open country about Acton Homes from the open country about Potgieter’s. This range is 1,000 to 1,500 feet above the Tugela, and behind it lay the principal camps of the Boer army. The result of taking the left-hand route would very much increase the distance for wagons into Ladysmith.

From Potgieter’s Drift			to Lancers Hill, 8 miles.
”	”	”	past Fair View to Lancers Hill, 24 miles
”	”	”	past Acton Homes to Lancers Hill, 35 miles.

Moreover, Acton Homes was on the line of communication of the Orange Free State Boers with some of their mountain passes, and they kept a large force in the hills above to secure their retreat.’

As to the strength of the Boer force opposed to the British on the Tugela there is the greatest difference of opinion. Sir Redvers Buller has put it at some 7,000 men, a Boer writer says it was little over half that number, while Sir Charles Warren thinks it was much greater than 7,000. It is generally agreed that the British Intelligence Office rightly estimated the combined forces of the enemy at about 60,000, increased probably by foreigners and rebels to 80,000, and that about half of that number were in Natal. If, then, a very liberal allowance be made for the numbers required to guard the lines of communication to the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, to carry on the investment of Ladysmith, to patrol and reconnoitre the country, a very large force would still be available for watching the British Brigade at Chieveley and opposing the British forces at Potgieter’s and Trichard’s Drifts; and whatever the number may have been on the Tugela the Boers were all mounted and acting on interior lines, and could easily and rapidly concentrate a large force in any direction on the Tugela front.

It is not unreasonable to suppose that during the month which had elapsed since the battle of Colenso the Boers had largely increased their forces on the Tugela, and we know that they had been busy preparing long lines of intrenchment in favourable positions right away beyond Acton Homes to the positions defending the roads leading to the passes to the Orange Free State. All round the Acton Homes basin the hills had been fortified, pom-poms and guns were in position along the western slopes of the Rangeworthy hills, and guns and rifles on the road to the Harrismith Pass. The Boers were quite prepared all along the line, and, although they were uncertain where the British were going to cross the river and strike, and were so badly commanded that they allowed the crossings to be made without serious resistance, they were quite ready with camps in sheltered positions, with retired ‘schanzes’ on the hills, with outposts on the slopes to the river, to concentrate a large front in any direction from which they might be attacked.

Mr. Winston Spencer Churchill, in his ‘London to Ladysmith via Pretoria,’ thus describes the position in front of Sir Redvers Buller and Sir Charles Warren:—

‘When Buller had arrived at Potgieter’s he found himself confronted by a horseshoe position of great strength, enclosing and closing the debouches from the ford where he had secured a practical bridgehead. He therefore masked Potgieter’s with seven battalions and twenty-four guns, and sent Warren with twelve battalions and thirty-six guns to turn the right, which rested on the lofty hill—almost mountain—of Spion Kop. The Boers, to meet this turning movement, extended their line westwards along the heights of the Tugela valley almost as far as Acton Homes. Their whole position was therefore shaped like a note of interrogation laid on its side, —?, the curve in front of General Lyttelton, the straight line before Sir Charles Warren. At the angle formed by the junction of the curve and the line stands Spion Kop—“Look-out Hill.” The straight position in front of Sir Charles Warren ran in two lines along the edge and crest of a plateau which rises steeply two miles from the river, but is approachable by numerous long arÊtes and dongas.’

Let us now consider what were the operations Sir Redvers Buller proposed to execute. The instructions[4] he issued to Sir Charles Warren are necessarily the official record of what was in his mind at the time. But they are vague where they should be definite, and definite where they should be elastic. They tell Sir Charles Warren that, finding the Boers in front of Potgieter’s too strongly posted to allow of a direct attack upon their positions, his chief has decided to send him with the larger part of the army to turn their flank by crossing the Tugela near Trichard’s Drift and ‘moving up to the west of Spion Kop.’

But what the west of Spion Kop meant, whether the road by Acton Homes, or that by Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie, the former twice as long as the latter, is not explained and it is impossible to gather from these instructions. Lord Roberts, in his despatch, though evidently in some perplexity, seems to think it meant the Acton Homes road.

Next Sir Charles Warren was instructed to act as circumstances require, but he was to continue to refuse his right and throw his left forward till he gained the open plain north of Spion Kop, where he was told he would command the rear of the position facing Potgieter’s Drift, which he would be able to render untenable. While Sir Charles Warren was so employed, Sir Redvers Buller undertook to threaten both of the positions in front of Potgieter’s and also to attempt a crossing at Skiet’s Drift, so as to hold the enemy off Sir Charles Warren as much as possible.

But the turning force of 12,000 men had fifteen miles of wagons accompanying it, and was to take with it only four days’ provisions, which, of course, could be filled up by Sir Redvers Buller so long as it was in road communication with him; but, as soon as this was broken, Sir Charles Warren’s operations were limited to what he could do in four days. And that Sir Redvers Buller intended the road communication to be broken is shown by his request in the instructions that as soon as Sir Charles Warren had made the passage of the river he should, if possible, send the pontoons to him. Finally, Sir Charles Warren was directed by these instructions to send the eight naval 12-pr. guns to Sir Redvers Buller, a step which had a very important bearing upon the final issue of the undertaking.

The success of Sir Charles Warren, therefore, depended upon his being able to accomplish his flanking movement in four days from the time of leaving his temporary base, upon his having no necessity for long-range guns, and upon the right flank of the Boers, which he was to turn, being within easy reach.

It is, however, well to read the views of others on the spot of the intentions of Sir Redvers Buller.

Thus Bishop Baynes of Natal, in ‘My Diocese during the War,’ gives some information on the subject, which was obtained at first hand from Major-General Lyttelton. On pages 180 and 181 he says:

‘Tuesday, Jan. 16th.—I went up the hill after breakfast: when I came back to lunch I found the camp in a stir. At last the orders had come to move, and the plan of campaign was declared, and General Lyttelton explained it to me. Our brigade is to move off about 2.30 to the river, and two battalions are to cross Potgieter’s Drift to-night and the rest to-morrow. To-morrow our big guns will open on the Boers and we shall make a big demonstration. Meanwhile Sir Charles Warren, with his other brigade (General Woodgate’s), and with General Clery’s Division (consisting of General Hildyard’s and General Hart’s brigades), is to move away to a point five or six miles higher up the river, cross there, and approach the flank of the Boer position up the slopes of Spion Kop. The hope is that the Boers will not be able to spare men enough from here (besides Colenso and Ladysmith) to offer effective opposition to Sir Charles Warren, or, if they do, then we may get through their defences here. General Lyttelton called the colonels of his battalions together and explained the plan to them.’

Mr. J. B. Atkins, in his ‘Relief of Ladysmith,’ writes:

‘On Friday, January 19, I crossed Waggon Drift and rode some five miles further to the advanced position of Sir Charles Warren, who was now marching west. Obviously the plan was this: Warren was to make a long march round and attack the Boer hills in the rear, and the force remaining at Potgieter’s Drift would simultaneously attack them in front. Warren’s troops were, in a word, to become a detached force; they would disappear round the stretching hills, and when we heard them banging away behind Spion Kop, we, who stayed behind, would have our signal to advance.’

Mr. Bennet Burleigh, in ‘The Natal Campaign,’ says:

‘Whilst this demonstration was proceeding near Potgieter’s, Sir Charles Warren, with his guns and part of Clery’s division, advanced towards a drift near Trieghardt’s Farm, commonly so called, six miles west of Mount Alice.[5] It was upon the direct Acton Homes road and led to the rough ground, foothills, and detached ranges behind, on the west of Spion Kop. The possession of these, it was trusted, would drive the Boers from the vicinity of Potgieter’s, and Spion Kop must fall into our hands.’

It is now understood that Sir Redvers Buller intended Sir Charles Warren to advance by the Fair View and Groote Hoek or Rosalie road, because he says in the memorandum ‘not necessarily for publication,’ just published: ‘From the first there could be no question but that the only practicable road for his column was the one by Fair View. The problem was to get rid of the enemy who were holding it.’ And it seems more likely he would call the Fair View road that from Fair View to Groote Hoek than that to Acton Homes, which he would probably call the Acton Homes road. And, indeed, there is this corroboration—that the troops were furnished with a list of the wells of water on the road from Trichard’s Drift to Groote Hoek, or Rosalie, by Fair View Farm. The length of the road from Fair View to a point near Groote Hoek is nine miles, and the length of the road to the same point by way of Acton Homes is twenty miles, more than double the length. Yet Lord Roberts had both Buller’s memorandum and also his secret instructions to Warren before him when he wrote in his covering despatch:

‘The plan of operations is not very clearly described in the despatches themselves, but it may be gathered from them and the accompanying documents that the original intention was to cross the Tugela at or near Trichard’s Drift, and thence, by following the road past Fair View and Acton Homes, to gain the open plain north of Spion Kop, the Boer position in front of Potgieter’s Drift being too strong to be taken by direct attack.’

The truth is that the information possessed as to the country was extremely small. No general description of it was available. There were no road reports, no reconnaissances—in fact, it was to all intents and purposes ‘an unknown country.’ From the high ground on the south side of the Tugela the hills to the north could be scanned, and it could be seen that to the west of Spion Kop the Rangeworthy hills appeared to terminate abruptly in the Bastion or Sugar Loaf Hill. Here it was supposed that the Boer trenches ended and were held by only a small force. It was this range that Sir Charles Warren was directed to attack, by pivoting the right of his line on Spion Kop and swinging round his left until he gained the so-called open country to the north of Spion Kop.

Beyond, towards Acton Homes, other hills could be seen, but nothing was known about them. It was generally supposed that the ground was good for cavalry for a certain distance; but the information given was that the Acton Homes road, leading through Clydesdale, passed through a country full of dongas and small kopjes, and passed eight or nine miles north of Potgieter’s. The open country immediately north of Spion Kop could only be reached by wagons by the road leading past Fair View to Groote Hoek. The farm map, procured from the office of the Surveyor-General of Natal and available for the troops, gave a fairly good idea of the ground about Spion Kop; but it was uncertain how far it could be relied upon. It showed that mountain ranges beyond Spion Kop extended to the west, range after range, with a large hill both to the north and north-east of Acton Homes, the high road from Acton Homes to Ladysmith passing up a valley between high hills. It was also evident, from the lines taken by the rivers and streams, that the water-parting continues from Spion Kop several miles to the north-east of Acton Homes.

The Orange Free State Boers encamped on the Tugela drew their supplies from Harrismith. Their communications were by two roads leading through the Drakensberg mountains to the south of Van Reenan’s pass, the more southerly passing Oliver’s Hoek. These two roads meet at Acton Homes. Acton Homes, which lies in a basin, is surrounded on three sides by hills, and these hills formed an important strategic position. On the north and north-east they guarded the investing lines of Ladysmith, and on the north-west and west the communications of the Orange Free State Boers with their base. It was not difficult to believe that these hills were covered with intrenchments strongly held, or able at short notice to be strongly held.

In regard both to the positions held by the Boers and the numbers of the enemy there was a good deal of information which must have been at the disposal of Sir Charles Warren; but the difficulty would no doubt have been to know how much of it was reliable.

It seems to have been certainly known that, since the troops had marched westwards to Potgieter’s on 10th January, large bodies of Boers had been moving up the river from the neighbourhood of Colenso, and massing behind Spion Kop and Acton Homes, and that near the latter place there was a large Boer camp which supplied the camp behind Spion Kop with provisions.

It was also understood that the Orange Free State Boers were posted along the right of the line as far as Spion Kop, and that thence the Transvaal Boers were extended to the left or eastward; that, in the vicinity of Spion Kop and Groote Hoek, there were five or six large camps, their position being very central, as from that point the Boers could easily go in an hour either west to Acton Homes on the one side, or east to Doorn Kloof on the other.

Thus, in whatever direction our troops marched along the Boer lines, they were always confronted by a large body of Boers.

A trench had been cut along the Boer lines behind Potgieter’s Drift as far west as Spion Kop, with a number of men always in it so long as the main body of the British force faced them. On Spion Kop itself, on the east side, were four guns, which, it was said, would rake Trichard’s Drift at long ranges, while to the west of Spion Kop, on the Rangeworthy hills, an intrenchment had been made and was held by the enemy, who could be readily reinforced should the British cross the drift.

It must not, however, be supposed that Boers can fight only behind prepared trenches. They are experts at quickly raising up ‘schanzes,’ which they make in a few minutes, and they only construct regular trenches when they have considerable time at their disposal, or when there is no natural material lying handy on the ground. On Spion Kop, and to the west over the Rangeworthy hills and beyond, the Boers did not require trenches to make an effectual resistance. There was plenty of material to enable them to hold the crests of the hills against a far superior force; but they preferred to make their position almost impregnable by selecting continuous grassy slopes, over which an advance would be impracticable in daylight. From such positions nothing but artillery fire could drive them out.

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