1 (return)
[ General Daumas (Manners and Customs of Algeria). Nocturnal Surprise and Extermination of a Camp.]

2 (return)
[ Among the Romans, mechanics and morale are so admirably united, that the one always comes to the aid of the other and never injures it.]

3 (return)
[ The Romans did not make light of the influence of a poet like Tyrtaeus. They did not despise any effective means. But they knew the value of each.]

4 (return)
[ Also their common sense led them to recognize immediately and appropriate arms better than their own.]

5 (return)
[ This is an excuse. The maniple was of perfect nobility and, without the least difficulty, could face in any direction.]

6 (return)
[ This was an enveloping attack of an army and not of men or groups. The Roman army formed a wedge and was attacked at the point and sides of the wedge; there was not a separate flank attack. That very day the maniple presented more depth than front.]

7 (return)
[ They had been sent to attack Hannibal's camp; they were repulsed and taken prisoner in their own camp after the battle.]

8 (return)
[ This extract is taken from the translation of Dom Thuillier. Livy does not state the precise number of Roman combatants. He says nothing had been neglected in order to render the Roman army the strongest possible, and from what he was told by some it numbered eighty-seven thousand two hundred men. That is the figure of Polybius. His account has killed, forty-five thousand; taken or escaped after the action, nineteen thousand. Total sixty-four thousand. What can have become of the twenty-three thousand remaining?]

9 (return)
[ The Numidian horsemen were a light irregular cavalry, excellent for skirmishing, harassing, terrifying, by their extraordinary shouts and their unbridled gallop. They were not able to hold out against a regular disciplined cavalry provided with bits and substantial arms. They were but a swarm of flies that always harasses and kills at the least mistake; elusive and perfect for a long pursuit and the massacre of the vanquished to whom the Numidians gave neither rest nor truce. They were like Arab cavalry, badly armed for the combat, but sufficiently armed for butchering, as results show. The Arabian knife, the Kabyle knife, the Indian knife of our days, which is the favorite of the barbarian or savage, must play its part.]

10 (return)
[ They formed the third Roman line according to the order of battle of the Legion. The contraction of the first line into a point would naturally hem them in.]

11 (return)
[ Brought back by Hannibal who had reserved to himself the command of the center.]

12 (return)
[ The triarians, the third Roman line.]

13 (return)
[ What effect this might have, was shown in the battle of Alisia, where Caesar's men, forewarned by him, were nevertheless troubled by war-whoops behind them. The din of battle in rear has always demoralized troops.]

14 (return)
[ His cavalry consisted of seven thousand horse, of which five hundred were Gauls or Germans, the best horsemen of that time, nine hundred Galicians, five hundred Thracians, and Thessalians, Macedonians and Italians in various numbers.]

15 (return)
[ Caesar's legions in battle order were in three lines: four cohorts in the first line, two in the second, and three in the third. In this way the cohorts of a legion were, in battle, always supported by cohorts of the same legion.]

16 (return)
[ Caesar stated that in order to make up the numerical inferiority of his cavalry, he had chosen four hundred of the most alert young men, from among those marching ahead of the standards, and by daily exercise had them accustomed to fighting between his horsemen. He had in this way obtained such results that his thousand riders dared, in open field, to cope with Pompey's seven thousand cavalry without becoming frightened at their number.]

17 (return)
[ Any one who wishes to read in extenso is referred to the fight of the ten thousand against Pharnabazus in Bithynia, Xenophon, par. 34, page 569, Lisken & Sauvan edition.—In Polybius, the battle of the Tecinus, Chapt. XIII, of Book III.—In Caesar or those who followed him the battles against Scipio, Labienus, and Afranius, the Getae and the Numidians, par. 61, page 282, and par. 69, 70, 71 and 72, pp. 283, 285, and 286, in the African war, Lisken & Sauvan edition.]

18 (return)
[ In ancient combat, there was almost only, dead or lightly wounded. In action, a severe wound or one that incapacitated a man was immediately followed by the finishing stroke.]

19 (return)
[ Hand-to-hand, sword-to-sword, serious fighting at short distances, was rare then. Likewise in the duels of our day blades are rarely crossed in actual practice.]

20 (return)
[ To-day, it is the riflemen who do nearly all the work of destruction.]

21 (return)
[ Considering Caesar's narrative what becomes of the mathematical theory of masses, which is still discussed? If that theory had the least use, how could Marius ever have held out against the tide of the armies of the Cimbri and Teutons? In the battle of Pharsalus, the advice given by Triarius to Pompey's army, a counsel which was followed and which was from a man of experience, who had seen things close at hand, shows that the shock, the physical impulse of the mass was a by-word. They knew what to think of it.]

22 (return)
[ The individual advance, in modern battle, in the midst of blind projectiles that do not choose, is much less dangerous than in ancient times, because it seldom goes up to the enemy.

At Pharsalus, the volunteer Crastinius, an old centurion, moved ahead with about a hundred men, saying to Caesar: "I am going to act, general, in such a way that, living or dead, to-day you may have cause to be proud of me."

Caesar, to whom these examples of blind devotion to his person were not displeasing, and whose troops had shown him that they were too mature, too experienced, to fear the contagion of this example, let Crastinius and his companions go out to be killed.

Such blind courage influences the action of the mass that follows. Probably for that reason, Caesar permitted it. But against reliable troops, as the example of Crastinius proves, to move ahead in this way, against the enemy, is to go to certain death.]

23 (return)
[ The men of the maniple, of the Roman company, mutually gave their word never to leave ranks, except to pick up an arrow, to save a comrade (a Roman citizen), or to kill an enemy. (Livy).]

24 (return)
[ A small body of troops falling into a trap might present a sort of mÊlÉe, for a second, the time necessary for its slaughter. In a rout it might be possible at some moment of the butchery to have conflict, a struggle of some men with courage, who want to sell their lives dearly. But this is not a real mÊlÉe. Men are hemmed in, overwhelmed, but not thrown into confusion.]

25 (return)
[ The Greek phalanx.]

26 (return)
[ The Romans lost no one as their companies entered the openings in the phalanx.]

27 (return)
[ The Roman velites, light-armed soldiers, of the primitive legion before Marius, were required to stand for an instant in the intervals of the maniples, while awaiting the onset. They maintained, but only for an instant, the continuity of support.]

28 (return)
[ A result forced by the improvement of war appliances.]

29 (return)
[ In troops without cohesion, this movement begins at fifty leagues from the enemy. Numbers enter the hospitals without any other complaint than the lack of morale, which very quickly becomes a real disease. A Draconian discipline no longer exists; cohesion alone can replace it.]

30 (return)
[ It is a troublesome matter to attack men who shoot six to eight shots a minute, no matter how badly aimed. Will he have the last word then, who has the last cartridge, who knows best how to make the enemy use his cartridges without using his own?

The reasoning is always the same. With arrows: Let us use up their arrows. With the club: Let us break their clubs. But how? That is always the question. In matters of war, above all, precept is easy; accomplishment is difficult.]

31 (return)
[ The more one imagines he is isolated, the more has he need of morale.]

32 (return)
[ Are not naval battles above all the battles of captains? All captains endeavor to promote a feeling of solidarity which will cause them all to fight unitedly on the day of action. Trafalgar—Lissa.

In 1588, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, preparing for a naval engagement, sent three commanders on light vessels to the advance-guard and three to the rearguard, with executioners, and ordered them to have every captain hanged who abandoned the post that had been assigned to him for the battle.

In 1702, the English Admiral Benbow, a courageous man, was left almost alone by his captains during three days of fighting. With an amputated leg and arm, before dying, he had four brought to trial. One was acquitted, three were hanged; and from that instant dates the inflexible English severity towards commanders of fleets and vessels, a severity necessary in order to force them to fight effectively.

Our commanders of battalions, our captains, our men, once under fire, are more at sea than these commanders of vessels.]

33 (return)
[ The effect of surprise would certainly not last long to-day. However, to-day wars are quickly decided.]

34 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

35 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

36 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

37 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

38 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents). (Editor's note).]

39 (return)
[ It is true that such measures are recommended in camps of instruction and in publications. But in maneuvers they are neglected in the mania for alignment, and in that other mad desire of generals to mix in details which do not concern them.]

40 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

41 (return)
[ See Appendix VI. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

42 (return)
[ See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

43 (return)
[ A propos of gaps: At the battle of Sempach thirteen hundred badly armed Swiss opposed three thousand Lorraine knights in phalanxes. The attack of the Swiss in a formation was ineffective, and they were threatened with envelopment. But Arnold von Winkelried created a gap; the Swiss penetrated and the massacre followed.]

44 (return)
[ See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

45 (return)
[ See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

46 (return)
[ See Appendix II. (Historical documents.) (Editor's note.)]

47 (return)
[ It is hard to determine what method of fire, at command or at will, was used. But what we find in the works of the best military authorities, from Montecuculli to Marshal Saxe, is general opposition to the replacement of the pike by the rifle. All predicted the abandonment of the rifle for the pike, and the future always proved them wrong. They ignored experience. They could not understand that stronger than all logic is the instinct of man, who prefers long range to close fighting, and who, having the rifle would not let it go, but continually improved it.]

48 (return)
[ The danger arising from this kind of fire, led to proposals to put the smallest men in the front rank, the tallest in the rear rank.]

49 (return)
[ Nothing is more difficult than to estimate range; in nothing is the eye more easily deceived. Practice and the use of instruments cannot make a man infallible. At Sebastopol, for two months, a distance of one thousand to twelve hundred meters could not be determined by the rifle, due to inability to see the shots. For three months it was impossible to measure by ranging shots, although all ranges were followed through, the distance to a certain battery which was only five hundred meters away, but higher and separated from us by a ravine. One day, after three months, two shots at five hundred meters were observed in the target. This distance was estimated by everybody as over one thousand meters; it was only five hundred. The village taken and the point of observation changed, the truth became evident.]

50 (return)
[ His war instructions prove this. His best generals, Zieten, Warnery, knew of such methods, saw nothing practicable in them and guarded against them in war as indeed he did himself. But Europe believed him, tried to imitate his maneuvers on the field of battle, and aligned her troops to be beaten by him. This is what he was after. He even deceived the Prussians. But they came back to sound methods after 1808, in 1813 and afterwards.]

51 (return)
[ It is noted here that French uniforms are of an absurd color, serving only to take the eye at a review. So the chasseurs, in black, are seen much further than a rifleman of the line in his gray coat. The red trousers are seen further than the gray—thus gray ought to be the basic color of the infantry uniform, above all that of skirmishers.

At night fall the Russians came up to our trenches without being seen by any one, thanks to their partridge-gray coats.]