Definitions.

In the Field Service Regulations, night operations are divided into three classes—night marches, night advances, and night attacks—which may be briefly defined as follows:—

A night march is a movement along roads, or well defined tracks, in normal march formations, undertaken for the purpose of transferring troops under cover of darkness to some desired point.

A night advance is stated in the Field Service Regulations to be a forward movement of which the object “is to gain ground from which further progress will be made in daylight, and not to deliver a decisive assault during darkness.” During the advance the troops will either be deployed or at any rate will move in formations which admit of rapid deployment.

Night attacks are delivered for the purpose of gaining possession of some point or locality which is held by the enemy or of surprising “an ill-trained, ill-disciplined, or semi-civilised enemy.” (Field Service Regulations.)

A night march may be a necessary prelude to either a night advance or a night attack, but in that case the march is considered to have ended on the arrival of the force at the position of assembly.

Importance of Careful Preparation.

Whatever may be the nature of the operation, the most careful preparation is essential. The success of all operations in the dark, up to the moment of collision with the enemy at any rate, depends on the care and thoroughness with which the preparatory arrangements have been made, and these arrangements are just as necessary in the case of a night march, carried out at some distance from the enemy, as in that of a night attack. It is impossible to lay too much stress on the importance of this preparation, no detail is too trifling to be considered, every eventuality, whether probable or improbable, should be thought out and provided for, and nothing must be left to chance.

The first and most important step in the preparation of any night operation consists in obtaining accurate information concerning the ground to be traversed and the position of the enemy. This necessitates as close a reconnaissance as is possible, and the reconnaissance should be made by night as well as by day. Ground presents such a different appearance at night that it is often difficult to identify a spot which has only been seen previously in daylight, moreover, small accidents of the surface which may not attract attention in daytime are sometimes sufficient to throw troops into disorder, if they come upon them unexpectedly in the dark.

The chief points on which information is required being set forth in the Field Service Regulations, it is unnecessary to recapitulate them here, but the following details should be attended to as well:—

(1) The spots selected both for the position of assembly and position of deployment must not only be places which can be easily identified at night, but must also afford sufficient space for the troops to form up.

(2) Both the position of obstacles, and the direction in which they lie, must be accurately reported, and it must be noted if their direction is constant throughout.

(3) In reporting on the enemy’s position every effort must be made to discover the extent to which patrols are used, and the distance beyond the line of the advanced posts to which they penetrate.

Plan of Operations.

The plan of operations will be based on the information gained during the reconnaissance, and in preparing it the following maxims should be borne in mind:—

1. It is the quality and not the number of the troops that counts.

2. The larger the force the greater the difficulty.

3. Every detachment increases the risk of failure.

Though No. 3 is undoubtedly true, yet it will often be necessary to move in more than one column. In that case each column must be given a separate objective; each objective must be distinct from, and situated some distance away from, any other, and every possible precaution must be taken to prevent an accidental collision between any two columns, either before or after reaching their objectives. The Field Service Regulations direct that lateral communication is to be maintained between columns, so that the assaults may be delivered simultaneously, and recommend the use of telephones for the purpose. The maintenance of lateral communication is very important, but each column commander should understand that if his column is discovered he must press on to the assault without waiting for the others.

The Framing of Orders for Night Operations.

The rules for framing orders are clearly laid down in the Regulations, but, as the orders will only be communicated beforehand to those officers who are required to make the preliminary arrangements, it is necessary that extracts, containing those portions which are to be read to the troops at the position of assembly, should also be prepared. These extracts will probably have to be read in a very feeble light, and it is, therefore, important that they should be very clearly and legibly typewritten. Nothing is more trying than to have to try to grasp the meaning of a blurred hektograph copy of orders by the aid of an indifferent lamp, which probably has to be held under a coat.

In all operations which commence with a night march the selection of a suitable starting point is important. This point should be so situated that it is possible for the whole force to be drawn up in its order of march before the movement begins, and a staff officer must be detailed to ascertain that every unit is present, and in its proper place before the column moves off. This is an obvious precaution; but, as I have seen it neglected in South Africa, with serious results, I think it well to lay stress on it.

Protection During Operations.

The general principles governing the protection of forces during operations are the same by night as by day, except that at night both the strength of the protecting bodies and their distance from the troops they cover will be much reduced.

In night marches small advanced and rear-guards will be employed, but in night advances and night attacks these will be replaced by lines of scouts at a distance varying from 50 to 100 yards, according to the light.

To protect the flanks during a night march in close country the Regulations advise the use of flanking piquets, posted by the advanced guard, and withdrawn by the rear-guard. I have never seen this system tried at night, but I doubt its success; even if the advanced guard commander is able to identify quickly the points at which the piquets are to be left, there will be a certain amount of delay while they are quitting the column, and the rear-guard will be constantly delayed by waiting for them to withdraw. Thus the rear-guard will gradually fall further and further behind, and, unless the column is frequently halted to allow the rear-guard to close up, the rear companies will melt away into a long string of connecting files.

If flanking piquets are used, and it seems to be the safest plan, they should be found by a special unit, and, having taken up their positions before the march commences, should not be withdrawn till it is over.

In open country at all times, and in close country in the case of night advances and night attacks, the only moving protection which can safely be given to the flanks is that afforded by scouts, who must keep quite close to the column.

Maintenance of Connection.

The maintenance of connection between the various portions of a force when engaged in night operations is a matter of supreme importance. The facility with which units go astray when connection is lost is extraordinary, and when once they have gone astray it is often very difficult to find them. I have myself seen a whole brigade of infantry disappear and be lost for nearly two hours in an area which hardly exceeded a square mile.

Rifle Fire in Night Attacks.

It cannot be too strongly impressed upon all ranks that to fire during a night attack is not only useless, but to use the words of General Dragomirov, is absolutely criminal. The Regulations lay down that rifles are not to be loaded, but the magazines are to be charged and the cut-offs closed, and this order must be rigidly adhered to. Personally, I am against having the magazines charged; the proper weapon for the infantry soldier to use at night is the bayonet, and he should be taught to rely on that alone.

Caution Necessary in Planning Night Operations, but Resolution Essential in their Execution.

Although it is necessary to act with caution, and to weigh well the chances of success and failure before deciding on an offensive night operation, yet, when once the undertaking has been commenced, it must be carried through with the utmost resolution. It is exceedingly unlikely that the enemy will be completely surprised, but every second of delay between the discovery of the attacking force and the delivery of the assault is of priceless value to the defence; it must, therefore, be impressed upon all ranks that when the enemy opens fire the only course open to them is to press on to the assault, and decide the issue with the bayonet.

Defence Against Night Attacks.

Passive Defence Useless.

Unless the defenders are protected by an impenetrable obstacle, a passive defence is suicidal. Artillery and machine guns may be laid so as to sweep a particular area at night, but no reliance can be placed on the effect of rifle fire unless the rifles have been mechanically fixed. I do not overlook the fact that instances are on record of huge losses inflicted by rifle fire at night, but I maintain that the effect obtained is merely a matter of chance, and any officer who puts his trust in chance is likely to have to pay dearly for his mistake.

Every infantryman must be imbued with the idea that at night the bayonet is the only weapon which he can trust, and that the more promptly he uses it the better his chance of success will be. In the dark every advantage lies with the side that takes the initiative; numbers are of little account, for a resolute bayonet charge, delivered by even a single piquet may, if it comes unexpectedly, demoralise and throw into disorder a strong attacking column.

In short, when the attacking column reaches the outposts it must be received with vigorous local counter-attacks delivered with the bayonet by the nearest bodies of the defenders. If a counter-attack comes as a surprise, the chances of success are all in its favour, but any success gained must not be followed up, the outposts should be withdrawn to their original positions, and patrols sent out to keep touch with the retiring enemy. It is most important that all ranks should realise that to wait to receive a charge is fatal; the only course open is to advance boldly with the bayonet; even if the counter-attack is not successful, the outposts will still have fulfilled their duty and have gained a few minutes’ time for the supports and reserves to form up.