"Unless we had order, unless we had certainty, in the moving of large masses, the day of battle, which might come, would be to us a day of disaster."—Colonel McMurdo, late Inspector-General of the Volunteer Forces, January 9th, 1865.

Der Tag, which came on August 4th, 1914, was not fated after all, as we know, to be a day of disaster. That it was not so is perhaps attributable in the main to two causes. "Miraculous" is the manner in which escape from disaster has been described; but as we have already seen (and of this fact we cannot remind ourselves too often), the miracle was performed primarily and essentially by the loss of those "many thousands of brave men whose sacrifice we deplore, while we regard their splendid gallantry and self-devotion with unstinted admiration and gratitude." A secondary, but by no means inconsiderable, cause contributory to the successful working of the miracle lay in the fact that we did possess the "order," the "certainty," in regard to the moving—not exactly of "large masses" in the more recently accepted meaning of the term, but at any rate—of that part of the Army which was detailed for home defence, and of the six divisions of which the original Expeditionary Force was composed, and which were flung across the Channel to assist in stemming the initial German onrush. And it is with regard to this "order," this "certainty," and the attendant successful working of the railways that the ensuing pages are concerned.

We have already traced in some degree of detail the antecedents of the Railway Executive Committee, that body of distinguished civilian railway experts, who, from the time that the Government assumed, under provisions of the Act of 1871, nominal control of the railways, became, and throughout the war remained, responsible to the Government for the maintenance and the efficient working of the entire railway systems of the British Isles; and in order to acquire some insight into the amazing and complex detail involved in this efficient working, we cannot very well do better than probe a few of the more salient facts concerning the London and North-Western Railway, which, on the outbreak of hostilities, and appropriately enough, was deputed to act as the "Secretary" Company to the Western and Eastern Commands and afterwards to the Central Force, that is to say, the Company specified by the Army Command Headquarters, for the purpose of making arrangements with the other railway companies concerned in the Commands named for the main troop movements during the first two months of the war.

In an extremely interesting report, dated October 1st, 1914, Mr. L. W. Horne, who, prior to his appointment as secretary to the "Secretary" Company to the Commands previously mentioned, was acting secretary to the Railway Executive Committee, describes the measures that were adopted both prior to and during mobilisation, in conformity with the War Office programme.

A Communications' Board "consisting of representatives of all Government departments and also the Railway Executive Committee," was instituted to consider Government "recommendations to meet their various requirements so far as the railways were concerned." Owing to the "very drastic alterations in the mobilisation time tables" made by the War Office, a staff was specially appointed to deal with the matter, and as a result of herculean efforts on the part of this devoted body of enthusiasts, involving many hours of overtime, "on mobilisation being ordered, not only was our scheme complete, but time tables and sheets numbering many thousands were ready for immediate issue."

Existing accommodation at certain stations on the line, where large concentrations of troops were foreshadowed, was totally inadequate, so that plans and estimates were at once prepared for the necessary extensions, and the Company arranged to carry out the work with all possible speed.

Special troop trains, of which 1465 (exclusive of "empties" to and from entraining and detraining stations respectively) were run between August 4th and September 30th, 1914, were "signalled by a special code of 4-4-4 beats," this code signifying "precedence over all other trains," the ordinary passenger service being curtailed as occasion demanded. Seven hundred and fifty-one was the total of special trains required for the "large quantities of stores, equipment, etc.," and "in order to ensure that such consignments should be worked forward without delay," it was agreed that "they should be given 'Perishable transit.'"

As will doubtless be within the memory of most of us, already on August 3rd, 1914, Sir Edward Grey was in a position to inform the House that "the mobilisation of the Fleet has taken place," the credit for the promptitude of this precautionary measure being in due course claimed by Mr. Winston Churchill, and resulting shortly afterwards in the resignation from his post as a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty of Prince Louis of Battenberg, eldest son of Prince Alexander of Hesse; and "at this grave moment in our national history," so ran the message spontaneously addressed by His Majesty the King to Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, "I send you, and through you to the officers and men of the Fleets of which you have assumed command, the assurance of my confidence that under your direction they will revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy, and prove once again the sure shield of Britain and of her Empire in the hour of trial." To enable officers and men to "revive and renew the old glories of the Royal Navy," coal, not canvas, was needed, this entailing the provision forthwith of six hundred and fifty-one special trains for the conveyance of approximately 150,000 tons of Admiralty coal from the South Wales collieries to certain points on the East Coast.

Various difficulties presented themselves in regard to the "supply of rolling stock, and the making-up of the troop trains of the required composition"; in regard to the working of Westinghouse and Vacuum stock, as the case might be; in regard to congestion of traffic, necessitating the diversion of trains by alternative routes; and in regard to the requisitioning by the Government of certain steamers, goods-vans, horses, motors, etc., belonging to the Company.

But, as Mr. Horne points out, "no hitch whatever occurred so far as the London and North-Western Company was concerned in carrying out, not only the pre-arranged programme, but also the additional movements which have been arranged at short notice. The time-keeping of the trains has been excellent both from a traffic department and locomotive department standpoint, and the entraining and detraining at the various stations on the London and North-Western line were successfully carried out in every case."

Apropos of all of which data, one cannot but call to mind once again the ungrudging acknowledgment which the late Lord Kitchener saw fit to make on the occasion of his first appearance in the House of Lords as Secretary of State for War: "I have to remark that when war was declared, mobilisation took place without any hitch whatever.... We know how deeply the French people appreciate the prompt assistance we have been able to afford them at the very outset of the war." The official announcement, too, issued by the Press Bureau on Tuesday, August 18th, 1914, itself remains a landmark in the epic chapter of events: "The Expeditionary Force as detailed for foreign service has been landed in France ... and without a single casualty."

It is a matter of common knowledge that during the initial stages of the war the French authorities undertook the whole of the transport by rail of the British Army in France, basing their decision and ability to do so largely, no doubt, upon the opinion prevalent at the time, which was to the effect that for various seemingly obvious reasons—of which perhaps the most palpable was the unprecedented and unparalleled strain necessarily imposed upon the human and material resources of the belligerent nations—the war could not continue for a period exceeding a few weeks, or months, at the outside. We even find it stated in the Times of August 20th, 1914, under the heading "Peace Insurance Rate," that "for a premium of 25 per cent., underwriters yesterday undertook to pay a total loss claim should Germany ask for peace on or before September 30th next."

When, however, it began to dawn upon the parties engaged that the struggle, far from diminishing in intensity, was becoming increasingly bitter and severe, the advisability of, or perhaps rather the necessity for, easing the onus devolving upon the French railways was obvious to all. In the early part of 1915, therefore, rolling stock on a small scale was sent over from England; but in proportion as the numerical strength of the British overseas forces rose, so did the requirements in respect of means of transport increase, until towards the winter of 1916, a period synchronising with the British offensive on the Somme, matters reached such a pitch that the only solution to the difficulty seemed to lie in the appointment of a "mission" of home railway experts for the purpose of investigating the situation on the spot. With this end in view the more prominent of the two world-renowned "Geddes-Goddesses," to wit, Sir Eric, was nominated the responsible head, and as a result of his inquiry and subsequent report, there came into being the office of "Director-General of Transportation," the sound principle underlying this new departure being that of employing "individuals in war, on work which they have been accustomed to perform in peace," the immediate outcome, too, being that the important position was filled au dÉbut by none other than Sir Eric Geddes himself, who, as the Earl of Derby was at some pains to impress upon his noble confrÈres in the House of Lords (cp. the Times, November 30th, 1916), undertook the work only "from purely patriotic reasons."

In the issue dated September 6th, 1919, of that practical and very-much-up-to-date weekly journal, Modern Transport, is to be found tabulated in full and comprehensive form the "pedigree stock" emanating from the Director-General of Transportation; numerous personalities, bearing awe-inspiring affixes such as D.G.M.R., I.G.T., A.D.G.M.R., D.D.R.T., etc., ad lib.; appearing on the scenes as representing the direct lineal descent of the great D.G.T. himself. And subsidiary to these personalities, or heads of sections and sub-sections, was enrolled a galaxy of assistants, engineers furnished in part by the British railway companies on recommendation from the Railway Executive Committee, in part by colonial or foreign railways, and under whom, in turn, there served a numerous personnel, whose name was "legion," recruited mostly from the home railways.

And the reason for this gigantic scheme of organisation cannot be explained in any manner more convincing than in the words of Sir Douglas Haig, who, dealing in his final despatch with the "Rearward Services," insists that "the immense expansion of the Army from 6 to over 60 infantry divisions, combined with the constant multiplication of auxiliary arms, called inevitably for a large increase in the size and scope of the services concerned in the supply and maintenance of our fighting forces."

Some staggering statistics now stare us in the face. "By the end of November, 1918," for instance, we learn that "the number of individual landings in France at the various ports managed by us exceeded 10-1/4 million persons," and "during the eleven months, January to November, 1918, the tonnage landed at these ports averaged some 175,000 tons per week."

One can easily imagine the resultant effect upon these different ports situated on the northern coast of France. Let us take Boulogne, as being, perhaps, one of the most familiar of all, and any one who has chanced upon a little volume, bearing as its title "An Airman's Outings," cannot fail to recall the distinctly happy vein in which the author, writing under the nom-de-plume of "Contact," describes the inevitable change which came over the place during the war. "It (Boulogne)," so he tells us, "has become almost a new town. Formerly a head-quarters of pleasure, a fishing centre, and a principal port of call for Anglo-Continental travel, it has been transformed into an important military base.... The multitude of visitors from across the Channel is larger than ever; but instead of Paris, the Mediterranean, and the East, they are bound for less attractive destinations—the muddy battle area and Kingdom Come."

Small wonder, then, that the strain of supplying the means of transit, not only for these multitudes of visitors but for their personal impedimenta and food supplies as well, became too great for the French camel's back. The whole business, if such it may be termed, was assuming a degree of which the proportions were verging on the prodigious. Thus, "for the maintenance of a single division for one day, nearly 200 tons dead-weight of supplies and stores are needed," and "for an army of 2,700,000 men (the total feeding strength of our forces in France) the addition of one ounce to each man's daily rations involves the carrying of an extra 75 tons of goods."

Again, "in the six months May to October, 1918, a weekly average of 1,800 trains were run for British Army traffic, carrying a weekly average load of approximately 400,000 tons, while a further 130,000 tons were carried weekly by our light railways." Kolossal, indeed, with a capital K, are the figures which the Field-Marshal asks us to digest.

And in order to cope with this vast volume of traffic, in order that it might move freely and speedily to the various points of distribution on the British Front, "the number of locomotives imported ... rose from 62 in 1916 to 1200 by the end of 1918; while the number of trucks rose from 3,840 to 52,600," and in addition to the already-existing mileage of permanent way available in the rearward areas, during 1918 "were built or reconstructed 2,340 miles of narrow-gauge railway."

As was reasonably to be expected, "the introduction of new weapons and methods of war" accounted largely for the "huge bulk of the supplies to be handled," and another factor further responsible for the gigantic nature of the task imposed was to be found in "the establishment of a higher standard of comfort for the troops." The force of the logic in regard to "feeding the brute" may be said to apply equally to the soldier as to the husband; "Une bataille ne se perd matÉriellement," in fact, Napoleon is said to have expressed the view that "the moral is to the material in war as three to one." Consequently "great installations were set up," not merely for the repair of damaged material, but "installations of all kinds," embracing "hutments, camps, and hospitals," and "the Expeditionary Force canteens made it possible to obtain additional comforts close up to the Front."

Without any shadow of doubt "no war has been fought with such ample means of quick transportation as were available during the recent struggle.... It was possible to effect great concentrations of troops with a speed which, having regard to the numbers of men and bulk of material moved, has never before been equalled."

Having noted, therefore, the more salient facts and figures, set out in so lucid a manner by Sir Douglas Haig, it is only natural, perhaps, that there should follow in direct sequence a desire to fathom, in some respect, the influences which rendered animate this gigantic scheme or organisation, this mammoth conglomeration of machinery, admirably planned no doubt, then set and kept in motion; to trace the sources whence flowed these "ample means of quick transportation"; and to become acquainted with the responsible practicians by whom they were provided. The influences at work—as a brief reflective glance through the pages of our mind will suffice to recall—are surely to be found in that "dauntless spirit of the people at home," and in "their incessant toil." The sources are clearly indicated by the "mine, the factory, the shipyard." The responsible practicians are personified by those "distinguished scientific men" who "placed their learning and their skill at the disposal of their country."

Briefly, the position amounted to this; the fighting line could not be held without the support and replenishment afforded by the rearward services; the rearward services could not perform their part unaided by the people at home, and, as was only to be expected, the London and North-Western Railway Company was second to none in stepping forward and rendering that aid which was vital to the continued sustenance of the rearward services.

But charity, as we know, begins at home, and even though no effort was spared in regard to supplying the wants of the overseas forces, the Company obviously could not afford so to denude itself of its available working resources as to court the risk of failure to "carry on," to carry out the task imposed upon it by the State at home.

A further report issued from the office of the Superintendent of the Line, dated July 8th, 1919, and retrospective of the strenuous times experienced by the Company during the war, describes how "the ramifications of the London and North-Western Railway system were quickly appreciated by the naval and military authorities," for being, as it was, "the main trunk line, the direct route to and from London and the west of England (vi Crewe) with the west, north and north-east of Scotland," it also afforded every facility to passengers travelling "between the north-east of England and the west and south-west of England." But apart from this it is an incontrovertible fact that the Company did absolutely "lay itself out," and in a manner unparalleled in any other quarter, to study the convenience, and to relieve the anxieties, of the military from the lordly "Brass Hat" to the humble Tommy with his tin helmet; with the result that, instinctively as it were, Euston became the quest of all, a haven of refuge to many thousands of war-worn warriors, home for a few days' leave.

As evidence of this, we may note that a total of 7,300,000 officers and men "on leave" were conveyed in "special trains"; that a further 2,864,000 specified as "small units of troops and pre-arranged by ordinary services," were accommodated in the ordinary trains; and that, in addition to these figures, there were many thousands of troops conveyed "every week in small units by the ordinary existing services, of which actual figures are not available," but of which most of us, retaining vivid recollections of overcrowded compartments and the crush of corridors, will no doubt be able to form some vague if inadequate estimate.

Luggage evidently was not in the habit of getting lost or left behind, as the figure "89,745 tons of baggage conveyed" will go to prove; 45,517 cycles received careful handling in transit, and the necessary accommodation was provided for the safe journeying of 500,000 horses, plus the rolling-stock necessary for the conveyance of 5,476 guns.

Then, in spite of a number of the vessels comprising the London and North-Western fleet being commandeered by the Admiralty, "a fairly regular service both for passengers and cargo" was maintained vi Holyhead and Dublin, "the principal route between England and Ireland"; the two other sea routes vi Fleetwood and Belfast, and Larne and Stranraer, respectively, assisting materially in the working of this "very heavy passenger and cargo traffic."

Turning next to "the requirements of the Fleet on the east and north-east coast of Scotland, there was a continuous coming and going of personnel, and movement of supplies, between the depÔts in Scotland and those in the south and west of England, and the Admiralty concentrated the whole of this traffic on the west coast route." In this connection (and incidentally we may note the strict observance by the naval authorities of the Fourth Commandment) for two consecutive years, and on every day of the week except the seventh, which is the Sabbath, a special train provided exclusively for the use of the Admiralty, was run "between Euston and Thurso (serving the Rosyth depÔt), the total number of men so conveyed being 500,000 and the mileage incurred over the L. & N. W. system alone being 388,700 miles." Then, "owing to the position of the Fleet, rail-borne coal was conveyed from the South Wales coalfields to such points as Newcastle, Grangemouth, Burntisland, etc., entailing an average of about twenty trains per day, in each direction, of loaded and empty wagons."

A further, and by no means inconsiderable, call to be made upon, as it was gladly accepted by, the Company, was that of tending the wounded on arrival in "Blighty." Special ambulance trains of the most approved design were supplied, and run with unfailing precision and regularity. Refugees were catered for; and in direct contrast to the treatment meted out by the enemy to our own men, enemy prisoners and captives in our own hands were shown such pity that special trains were actually provided for their conveyance by rail. When all is said and done, however,

"Be England what she will,

With all her faults she is my country still."