Three and a half days later, she was sent down the ways. As she slid into the water, officers and workmen cheered as they had never cheered before. This was the quickest time in which a vessel had ever been launched. But the record for completion—the Ward was commissioned in 70 days—was later bettered at the great Victory Plant at Squantum, Mass., where the Reid was finished and made ready for her trials in 45-1/2 working days.

Before war began we ordered scores of destroyers, and soon afterwards contracted for all that American yards could build. But we wanted more. The question was how to get them. The Navy Department, after conferring with one of the leading shipbuilders, determined on a bold stroke. All the contractors, those building engines and machinery as well as hulls, were summoned to Washington, and met with the Chief Constructor and Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy in my office. "One hundred and fifty more destroyers must be built," they were told. That proposition was a "stunner." They had already contracted to build every one for which they had facilities. And here was a demand that more than as many again be constructed. Some shipyards would have to be enlarged, some new ones built. The same was the case with engine manufacturers, and producers of forgings; for producing enough engines was quite as difficult as building hulls. Where companies could not finance additions, we agreed that the Government would build them, as well as the new factories or yards. Even at that, it was a staggering proposition. But the contractors were game and patriotic. They promised every coÖperation and with the Navy experts began working out the thousand details involved.

Congress was asked to appropriate $350,000,000 more for destroyers, to build new plants required, as well as for ship construction. When the bill was passed, October 6, 1917, the plans were ready, contracts were signed, and the enlarged program was under way. Ground was broken at Squantum the next day, October 7. Thousands of laborers were at work, dredging, draining, making roads, driving piles, erecting buildings, transforming that marsh into a fit habitation and working-place for 10,000 men. Buildings sprang up like magic. One concrete, steel and glass structure three stories high and 200 feet long was finished in two weeks. When winter came on, the laborers had to use picks and shovels to dig through the frozen clay to lay foundations, and all the workmen were handicapped by the bitter cold. Concrete poured hot—and thousands of tons were used—had to be protected by masses of hay and sheets of canvas, with heated air circulating inside to keep it from freezing. But the work never halted, and in spite of all handicaps, was completed in record time.

There were eighteen acres of shipyards covered by one continuous roof; the arrangements being so complete that raw material went in at one end and destroyers slid out at the other. There were hundreds of buildings, not a few of them covering one to three acres. There were enough ways for ten destroyers, and a score could have been under construction at the same time.

Six months after ground was broken I had the privilege of witnessing there the laying of the keels of five destroyers in one day.

The building of Squantum was rivaled by the erection of the big plants at Erie, Pa., to make forgings for destroyer shafts and turbines; the plant at Buffalo and by other feats of construction that would be difficult to excel. All were erected and in operation in half the time they could have been completed under ordinary conditions.

Our construction program embraced practically a thousand vessels—275 destroyers, 447 submarine-chasers, 99 submarines, 100 eagle boats, 54 mine-sweepers, and a number of gunboats and ships of other types. All these in addition to the capital ships and scout cruisers authorized in the three-year program. Though some contracts were cancelled after the armistice, all but 100 or so of these vessels were built, nearly 500 completed before the end of hostilities. In addition 1,597 privately-owned vessels, ranging from small patrol craft to huge transports, were converted by the Navy for war purposes.

Over 2,000 vessels were in naval service before hostilities ended—six times as many as were on the Navy list when war was declared. How was it possible, in a country where shipbuilding had declined until it was "a craft and not a trade," to build and alter and repair all these ships, and also to provide munitions and build great establishments ashore on both sides of the sea?

It was made possible by the foresight of Admirals Griffin and Taylor and their associates, who before the war had made designs for building various types of ships and for converting the ex-German vessels and privately-owned craft suitable for war service. I wish the whole country could know the true value of the work of these able officers and their naval and civilian assistants. But for their forehandedness and ability, our Navy would not have been able to have rendered such prompt and valuable service. Great credit is due, alike, to the shipbuilders who carried their plans into effect, devoting their talents and untiring efforts to further warship construction.

It was also because the 100,000 mechanics and workers in navy yards and naval plants, and the many more in private plants, who, with patriotic naval and civilian experts, worked as never before. Many of these "patriots in overalls" sacrificed their desire to enlist when told that they could do more to win the war by driving rivets, fashioning guns or making munitions. Labor was whole-heartedly in the war, and would not tolerate slackers in production or in service. In the heat of summer and the cold of winter, they rushed construction and astonished the world by the celerity with which American skill and industry turned out ships, weapons and supplies. On every war board labor had its representative—in the Cabinet as well—and its patriotism and unity made for a united and efficient America. The Navy and other war agencies found the militant spirit and wise counsel of Samuel Gompers worth a regiment of fighting men.

The Navy did not wait for war to begin building ships. When the program for 156 vessels was proposed in 1915, without awaiting congressional action, work was begun on plans so that on the very day that the bill became a law the plans and specifications were issued for 20 destroyers, 27 submarines, 4 dreadnaughts and 4 scout-cruisers. Contracts were placed for their construction as soon as the bids were received. "Such speed," said Admiral Taylor, "was without precedent in the history of the Navy Department. It was the result of the persistent insistence by the Secretary of the Navy that work should be pushed and his loyal support in this respect by bureaus concerned. There was no procrastination or dilatoriness in the largest undertaking ever entered into by the United States Navy, and the most important from the point of view of preparation for any eventuality. While the large vessels of the program had to be suspended during the war, the destroyers were pressed."

Completion of the destroyer program gives the United States Navy 267 destroyers of the latest pattern, in addition to those of older type, which, in the emergency of war, rendered such good service. These destroyers have an aggregate of 7,400,000 horse-power, and they cost approximately $600,000,000, counting $40,000,000 spent for new plants and building ways. This sum is greater than the cost of all the ships of the Navy available for service when we entered the war. The record of our destroyers overseas won the admiration of Allied navies, and reflected credit upon Congress, the naval administration and the country.

But, in view of the need of thousands to patrol the seas in 1917-18, where we only had scores, it has been asked, "Why did not the Navy Department build hundreds of destroyers in 1915 and 1916 and have them ready in 1917?" Looking backward, all of us admit that was the thing that should have been done. No naval experts, however, either in Europe or America, recommended in pre-war days such a building program.

All European admiralties, as well as our own, regretted that they had not built more destroyers against the day when they were so much needed. In reply to an inquiry made by a United States senator, Admiral Sims said:

If we could have imagined that the Germans would do what they did do we could have prepared for it and built destroyers galore, if we could have persuaded Congress to give us the money. Nobody had any experience with this kind of war at all, and nobody could be savage enough in his disposition to know what the Germans would do, and therefore to prepare for it; so that I would advise you to be a little gentle in criticisms of naval officers in general, because they were not prepared for this war, because we are a more or less civilized people.

After ruthless submarine warfare began, we contracted, as we have shown, for 275 destroyers, many more than any nation had ever attempted to build in anything like so short a time.

But destroyers were by no means the only anti-submarine craft we built. Realizing the usefulness of small craft, the Navy Department, in 1916, turned its attention to the utilization of motor yachts and other small power-driven vessels. Assistant Secretary Roosevelt conferred with owners and builders, and an inventory of such craft was taken. He started a campaign to interest owners of yachts and motor boats and induce them to design their boats so that they could readily be converted to war uses. Naval architects and their clients were encouraged to submit their designs to the Navy Department. To give further impetus to the movement, two small boats were constructed as models.

Early in 1917, before war was declared, the Department's construction experts, under the leadership of Captain J. A. Furer, naval constructor, in coÖperation with Mr. A. Loring Swazey, who later enrolled as lieutenant commander in the Naval Reserve, submitted to the General Board, in February, a design for those wonderful boats which became known as submarine-chasers. They were to be 110 feet long, with a speed of 14 knots and a cruising radius of 800 miles, armed with 3-inch guns, Y-guns for firing depth-charges, machine-guns and depth-bombs. The shortage of structural steel and of labor required for steel construction, necessitated building them of wood.

On March 19, 1917, orders were issued for building sixty chasers at the New York navy yard and four at the New Orleans yard. On March 21st orders were placed with private firms for 41 boats. Ten days later contracts were placed with private builders for 179 additional boats, and orders given for 71 more to be constructed at the navy yards at Norfolk, Charleston, Mare Island and Puget Sound, a total of 355, all ordered before war was declared. Fifty of these were, after completion, turned over to the French government. The French were so pleased with them that they ordered fifty more. A total of 447 chasers were ordered, and 441 were completed. Their service far surpassed expectations of designers and builders. Originally constructed for use in rivers and harbors and near home coasts, they crossed the ocean and became a reliance not only for patrol work but for offensive against the U-boats—chasing submarines.

In the three-year program, there was provision for 58 coast submarines, of which appropriations were made for thirty. On March 4, 1917, 20 additional submarines were provided for, and their construction was begun. The Portsmouth (N. H.) navy yard had been made a submarine construction yard and the orders were divided between that yard and private contractors. Forty were completed before the armistice. We sent several submarines to the Azores and a number to British waters, where they operated from Bantry Bay. They gave an excellent account of themselves, one, the AL-2 being credited with causing the destruction of the German UB-65.

Having ordered all the destroyers and sub-chasers that could be built, other sources were sought to produce more anti-submarine craft. On December 24, 1917, I received a letter from Mr. Henry Ford proposing quantity production of fabricated boats, suggesting that at least 500 could be built, and saying: "We will undertake the construction of these boats with all possible speed, and deliver them to the United States Government without profit to us." I telegraphed him, suggesting that he send his engineers and construction men to confer with our designers. Captain Robert Stocker and his associates in the Design Division completed the plans and specifications in a few days, and they were submitted to Mr. Ford. On January 15 he made a definite proposal to build 100 to 500 of these vessels. I consulted with the General Board, and two days later telegraphed him to proceed with construction of 100. Later twelve additional were ordered for the Italian Government. They were to be of 500 tons displacement, 200 feet long, speed 18 knots, with a cruising radius of 3,500 miles. They were to be armed with two 4-inch 50 caliber guns, discharge projectors, anti-aircraft and machine guns.

These "eagle boats," as they were named, were built specifically to hunt submarines. For their construction Mr. Ford erected a special plant on the River Rouge near Detroit. Though only a few were in service before the armistice, sixty in all were built. The completion of 23 in one month in 1919 indicated that Mr. Ford was not far wrong in his original estimate that it was possible, when his plant got into quantity production, to turn out 25 per month.

"Eagles" went from New York to Inverness, Scotland, over a 4,500-mile course, and after they had steamed 11,500 miles officers confirmed their seaworthiness and their fitness for the task for which they were built. Several sailed to Arctic waters, through fields of ice. They were used to maintain dispatch service between ports in Northern Russia, in which duty Admiral McCully reported they were very successful.

Orders for many mine-sweepers were placed early in 1917, their design permitting their construction by certain companies without interfering with the building of naval or merchant craft. Some were built at the Puget Sound and Philadelphia navy yards. The new mine-sweepers proved exceptionally seaworthy. Thirty-six were employed in sweeping the mines in the North Sea. In addition to the vessels designed and built for this purpose, we employed a fleet of privately-owned ships of all sorts and sizes, which were fitted out and used first as patrol and then as mine-sweepers.

While war was on, construction had to concentrate on destroyers and other anti-submarine craft. However, we completed two battleships, the Mississippi and New Mexico, and practically finished the Idaho; but work was suspended on capital ships that were not already far advanced.

Hostilities ended, attention was turned to the completion of the program authorized in 1916. Should we proceed with the dreadnaughts and battle-cruisers on the pre-war plans; or modify the plans, but still build two distinct types; or abandon the plans altogether and build a single type to do the work of both battleship and battle-cruiser? These were questions that addressed themselves to naval administration. Officers were debating them. From London came the information that the British Admiralty had built a capital ship, the Hood, a composite of the dreadnaught and the cruiser, which was said to combine the advantages of both.

After consultation with leading members of the Naval Affairs Committee, and upon their advice, accompanied by Admirals Griffin, Taylor and Earle, heads of the Bureaus of Engineering, Construction and Ordnance, I went to Europe to learn, at first hand, what changes, if any, war experience taught should be incorporated into the new ships to be constructed. An examination of the Hood by our expert officers disclosed that this new ship had more speed than earlier battle-cruisers, though less than that of our design; a heavier battery, though of only about half the power of that of our projected battleships; and had protection much greater than that of earlier battle-cruisers.

Upon our return from Europe all the information gathered was laid before the General Board. Admirals Mayo and Rodman, who had recently returned from Europe, where they had been interested in the question, were invited to act with them. The General Board made a unanimous recommendation that the twelve battleships should be "completed as expeditiously as possible on present lines of development in battleship construction." In view of the importance of protection as indicated by experience at the Battle of Jutland, where thinly protected battle-cruisers were unable to stand up under heavy fire, the Board recommended that "the six battle-cruisers now authorized be completed as expeditiously as possible, but with additional protection, particularly to turrets, conning towers, magazines and communications, at the expense of a small reduction in speed." The recommendations were approved, and directions given to press their construction.

The new battleships under construction will be 660 feet long, with displacement of 43,200 tons, with an extreme breadth of 105 feet and a mean draft of 33 feet. Engines developing 60,000 horse-power will drive them at a speed of 23 knots. Their twelve 16-inch guns will be mounted in four turrets, which revolve so that all can be fired simultaneously to either side of the vessel. In a single salvo these guns will throw 25,000 pounds of projectiles. In every way they outclass any ships of the line ever built.

The six battle-cruisers will be larger than any warships heretofore constructed. Each will have 43,500 tons displacement, practically the same as the battleships, but will be longer by over 200 feet, their length being 874 feet, and they will be ten knots faster, making 33-1/4 knots, 38 miles an hour. No less than 180,000 horse-power is required to drive these immense vessels through the water. Their engines will develop as much electric power as is required to supply a good-sized city. The six battle-cruisers will have a total of 1,080,000 horse-power. Each will be armed with eight 16-inch guns, firing 16,800 pounds of projectiles. The weight of metal is not, however, nearly as important in gunfire as is the range. The guns of our battle-cruisers will easily outrange those of any ships now afloat. Both battleships and battle-cruisers will be propelled by electric drive, the new method which, first installed on the New Mexico, proved its superiority, and was adopted for all our later major vessels.

With the completion of these eighteen capital ships, together with the scout cruisers and other types under construction, the Navy of the United States will be at least "equal to the most powerful maintained by any other nation of the world." That was the goal in view when the big three-year program proposed in 1915 was adopted by Congress in the act of August 29, 1916, to which, when this program is completed, the Navy will owe its supremacy.

It is a matter of gratification that the United States, which brought forth the steamship, the ironclad monitor, the torpedo boat, the aeroplane, the flying boat, has again taken the lead in naval construction and will soon have the most powerful of all armadas.

This country should keep that position for all time until—and unless—with a powerful navy and great national wealth, the United States succeeds in securing an international agreement to reduce armament. The very act making possible our supremacy on the seas, declared it to be the "policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation and arbitration"; authorized the President to invite a conference of all the great governments to formulate a plan of arbitration and "consider the question of disarmament"; and declared that the ships authorized but not already under contract were not to be built if international reduction of armament could be secured.

That statement of policy in the naval appropriation act of 1916—"a most unusual place," said the President in an address at Seattle—was in line with the policy of the Government from the day of Wilson's inauguration. It was the authorization for the international agreement looking to a reduction of armament contained in the Treaty of Versailles. The Bryan treaties, ratified by every European country except Germany, which insured cooling time and opportunity for discussion in a world forum, were a long step toward settling international differences by reason rather than by resort to war. It was about the time those treaties were proposed that Winston Churchill, First Lord of the British Admiralty, suggested a "naval holiday." In my first report in 1913, reiterated in every subsequent report, I declared: "It is not a vacation we need, but a permanent policy to guard against extravagant and needless expansion." I recommended then that "the war and navy officials, and other representatives of all nations, be invited to hold a conference to discuss whether they cannot agree upon a plan for lessening the cost of preparation for war" and added this observation:

It is recognized that the desired end of competitive building, carried on under whip and spur, could not be effective without agreement between great nations. It ought not to be difficult to secure an agreement by which navies will be adequate without being overgrown and without imposing over-heavy taxes upon the industries of a nation.

Long before the match was struck by the assassination of the Archduke Ferdinand, President Wilson, Ambassador Page and Colonel House were taking steps which, if Germany had been willing and Great Britain and France had sensed the coming conflict, might have averted the World War. To that end in the early part of 1914, President Wilson sent Colonel House abroad with letters to the Kaiser and the heads of the British and French governments, with whom earnest conferences were held. President Wilson and his associates in 1913-14, as this shows, had the vision of world agreement for peace to secure which he and the representatives of other free nations signed the treaty in Paris in 1919.

"The last thing Germany wants is war," said the Kaiser to Colonel House, just three months before he precipitated the conflict. The Kaiser was obsessed at that time, so Colonel House reported, with the thought of what he called "the Yellow Peril." The Kaiser said: "The white nations should join hands to oppose Japan and the other yellow nations, or some day they will destroy us." That fear, or simulated fear, and his statement that Germany could not hastily join a peace pact so long as 175,000,000 Slavs threatened his empire, furnished the excuse for brushing aside the suggested agreement to prevent war. Did he fear that President Wilson's tentative move early in 1914 toward a League of Nations for world peace would be successful? Was the Kaiser convinced that he must strike in that year, or surrender his mad ambition for world domination?

As these lines are written a conference of five nations, called by President Harding, is in session at Washington, where the discussion of reduction of naval armament was given first place in a proposal to scrap all pre-dreadnaughts and also the incompleted great dreadnaughts, and not to build or complete the battle-cruisers under construction. The plan presented by the American representatives is to adopt the ratio of capital ships for the United States, Great Britain, and Japan at five for the United States, five for Great Britain, and three for Japan. Such a program, if followed by scrapping all submarines and placing them in the category of outlaws, would, with reduction of land armament and regulation of aircraft, carry out the hopes of those responsible for the naval program authorized in 1916.