AMERICAN VESSELS ESCORTED NINETY PER CENT OF SHIPPING BETWEEN ENGLAND AND MEDITERRANEAN—GREAT WORK ACCOMPLISHED BY SHIPS UNDER COMMAND OF ADMIRAL NIBLACK—U. S. NAVAL FORCES MADE POSSIBLE OPERATION OF CONVOY SYSTEM, ONE OF THE MOST EFFECTIVE MEASURES OF THE WAR.

Gibraltar was the gateway through which passed one-fourth of all the shipping of the Allies. When the convoy system was applied to the Mediterranean, July, 1917, it became the principal convoy port of the world.

United States naval vessels furnished ocean escort both going and returning for 90 per cent of all convoys between Gibraltar and Great Britain—200 of the 225 groups which sailed, 4,269 ships, representing 12,000,000 gross tons. The Mediterranean escort protected 5,120 vessels; our destroyers in that region, 1004; our Marseilles escort 73; and our men-of-war accompanied 12 other special ships, transports, cable layers and submarines. Thus the United States vessels of this force escorted a total of 10,478 ships.

Realizing the strategic importance of Gibraltar, the Navy Department, on July 5, 1917, decided to establish a base there, and on July 14th, directed 11 vessels, including gunboats and light cruisers, under command of Admiral Wilson, to prepare for distant service, and sail for Gibraltar at the earliest possible date. This base, one of the most important in Europe, was established by the Navy Department on its own initiative, as had been the bases at Brest and Bordeaux and the Azores. By the time our vessels arrived it became, for protection of Allied shipping, a point of prime importance.

The convoy system was inaugurated in the Mediterranean, by British Admiralty order, on July 22, 1917. Five days afterwards the first regular convoy of 14 ships sailed for England. August 6th the vanguard of the United States naval vessels, the cruiser Sacramento (Captain T. T. Craven) reached Gibraltar. On the 17th Admiral Wilson arrived in the Birmingham (Captain C. L. Hussey), followed next day by the Nashville (Captain H. E. Yarnell). Other ships followed—the gunboats Castine (Captain W. C. Asserson), Machias (Commander Austin Kautz), Wheeling (Commander H. W. Osterhaus), Paducah (Commander H. H. Royall), the cruiser Chester (Captain Philip Williams), the Coast Guard cutters Seneca (Captain W. J. Wheeler), Manning (Lieutenant Commander A. J. Henderson), Tampa (Lieutenant Commander Charles C. Satterlee), Ossipee (Lieutenant Commander W. H. Munter), Yamacraw (Lieutenant Commander Randolph Ridgely), Algonquin (Lieutenant Commander G. C. Carmine), the converted yachts Yankton (Lieutenant G. E. Lake), Nahma (Lieutenant Commander E. Friedrick), Druid (Lieutenant Commander J. F. Connor), Wenonah (Lieutenant Commander P. E. Speicher), Arcturus (Lieutenant Commander C. F. Howell), Lydonia (Lieutenant Commander R. P. McCullough), Cythera (Lieutenant Commander W. G. Roper), Wadena (Lieutenant Commander W. M. Falconer), and Venetia (Commander L. B. Porterfield), the Coast and Geodetic Survey vessel Surveyor (Commander R. E. Pope), the destroyers Bainbridge (Lieutenant T. A. Thomson, Jr.), Barry (Lieutenant H. P. Sampson), Chauncey (Lieutenant Commander W. E. Reno), Dale (Lieutenant Roy Pfaff), Decatur (Lieutenant Ralph R. Stewart), Gregory (Commander A. P. Fairfield), Dyer (Commander F. H. Poteet), Stribling (Commander G. C. Logan), Luce (Commander R. C. Parker), Israel (Lieutenant Commander G. N. Barker), Maury (Commander J. H. Newton), Lansdale (Lieutenant Commander C. W. Magruder), and Schley (Lieutenant Commander R. C. Giffen), and the destroyer tender Buffalo (Captain C. M. Tozer).

American vessels took a prominent part in escort duty practically from the beginning of convoy in that region, becoming in a short time, the largest factor in the system. In the latter part of October, Admiral Wilson was ordered to command our forces on the French coast, and was succeeded by Admiral A. P. Niblack, who directed our forces at Gibraltar to the end of the war, with fine judgment and ability. He and his force became a tower of strength in that region, to the Allies as well as our own Navy.

As the American vessels arrived, they were immediately placed on duty with convoys and as danger-zone escorts. The ships of the Allies were employed almost exclusively in the Mediterranean, with headquarters at Malta, and our naval vessels did nearly all the escort duty between Gibraltar and the United Kingdom. They also convoyed over 4,000 vessels in local Mediterranean traffic, or bound for Mediterranean and Far Eastern ports; ships supplying the American army through Marseilles, the French forces in North Africa; the Allied armies at Salonika; the British in Egypt and Palestine; and the forces of Italy.

Soon after our vessels arrived in August, 1917, Rear Admiral H. S. Grant, British Royal Navy, senior naval officer in command at Gibraltar, drew up the plans by which the "H. G." (Home-Gibraltar) and "G. H." (Gibraltar-Home) convoys were organized between the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. These also included ships bound to and from French ports in the Bay of Biscay and ships bound to the United States. Destroyers, sloops and special service vessels accompanied each convoy as a danger-zone escort through the Straits of Gibraltar to 10 degrees west longitude and there waited for, or met, an incoming convoy from England. Men-of-war acted as ocean escort to the convoys from that point to British waters, where they were met by a danger-zone escort at the end of the route.

At the beginning of October, 1917, a system of fast convoys, sailing every sixteen days, between the United Kingdom and Port Said, and vice versa, was organized. These were met at a rendezvous in approximately longitude 10 degrees west by naval vessels which escorted them to Gibraltar, where they were relieved usually by ships from the Malta command, to take them through the Mediterranean. These convoys were joined at Gibraltar by ships of over 10-1/2 knots speed, which were taken out by relief escorts and joined the convoy off Europa Point. The first of the through outward-bound convoys, O. E. 1 (outward eastward) passed Gibraltar October 11th, and the first through homeward bound convoy, H. E. 1, passed on November 26th. By December most merchantmen which arrived at Gibraltar had been in convoy at one time or another, and it was possible to sail ships bound for North and South American ports in separate small convoys, with one master and commodore, escorted through the danger zone to longitude 10 degrees west. Between that time and the middle of February, 1918, 207 ships were thus sailed to the Americas.

More escort ships being available, and enemy submarine cruisers becoming active, ships for United States and South American ports were, beginning February 27, formed into convoys, two, a fast and a slow one, sailing on the same day, each accompanied by the danger-zone escort to longitude 30 degrees west, then proceeding "on their own" to longitude 70 degrees west to be dispersed to their proper destinations. Under this revised system there were sailed to American ports 1,013 ships, totalling 4,371,063 gross tons. These were called W. A. Convoys (Western Atlantic).

The main artery for supply of the Allied armies operating in Egypt, Palestine, Greece, Italy, Northern Africa and Southern France ran through the Gibraltar area, requiring a great amount of offensive work against enemy submarines, in addition to escorting convoys. Patrol of the Straits was carried on by torpedo boats, motor launches, sub-chasers and vessels of small displacement, entailing hardships and exposure in every kind of weather.

Numerous attacks on U-boats were reported in this region. The British Admiralty credited the U. S. S. Lydonia (Lieutenant Commander R. P. McCullough) and H. M. S. Basilisk with sinking a submarine while escorting a Mediterranean convoy, May 8, 1918. In latitude 38 degrees 06´ north, longitude 3 degrees 3´ east, the Lydonia sighted the wake of a torpedo which sank the British steamship Ingleside. The British and American ships immediately attacked, dropping a barrage of depth-charges, which destroyed the enemy. The submarine was the German UB-70, and the British Admiralty awarded these vessels the credit, rarely given, of "known sunk."

Commander Richard P. McCullough, commanding the Lydonia, was officially commended by the British Admiralty and the British senior naval officer at Gibraltar, as well as by our own authorities. Lieutenant Claud F. Reynaud, the executive officer, was also given special commendation. Sighting the torpedo at the instant it was fired, Reynaud started his stop-watch, timed the run of the torpedo, made immediate change of course to the position of the submarine and noted its bearings. This enabled the commanding officer to track the probable movements of the submarine, which was destroyed by depth-charges from the Lydonia and the Basilisk.

Credit was also given for the sinking of a submarine by the Wheeling, Surveyor and Venetia. While on escort duty, May 15, 1918, in latitude 36-03 N., longitude 1-47 W., these vessels sighted the track of a torpedo which struck a merchant ship of the convoy. They dashed down the wake made by the U-boat's periscope, dropping depth-charges which soon put the submarine out of business.

The notable record of the Venetia is recited in Admiral Niblack's recommendation of its commanding officer, Commander L. B. Porterfield, for special commendation:

While escorting Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy, on May 11, 1918, an enemy submarine, which was not seen, torpedoed the French steamship Susette Fraisenette at 3:39 a. m. With excellent judgment he assumed that submarine had dived under the convoy, and in following out the theory sighted the submarine on the surface at daylight, compelling it to submerge. This submarine was subsequently sunk in the Adriatic, and the survivors testified that the attack of the Venetia on this occasion drove them off, and saved the convoy from further attack. Commended in British Senior Naval Officer's letter 78-14 of 24th May, 1918, and British Commander-Chief's Mediterranean letter No. 2089-93 of 23 June, 1918.

While escort to Gibraltar-Bizerta convoy on May 17, 1918, the British steamship Sculptor was torpedoed at 6:48 p. m. Submarine was not seen, but the Venetia, having been previously detailed to attack with depth-charges, and remain behind four hours to keep down submarine, did so. At 7:02 p. m. wake of submarine was sighted and depth-charges dropped. On May 18th an enemy submarine interned at Cartagena, Spain, and was officially assumed to have been damaged by the Venetia.

While on escort duty, Gibraltar-Genoa, the British steamship Messidor was torpedoed at 7:24 p. m., July 23, 1918, and the Venetia instantly made attack, dropping thirteen depth-charges on pre-arranged plan.

The cruiser Chester had two encounters with submarines. While on convoy duty November 9, 1917, it attacked with gunfire a submarine which had sunk one of the vessels of the convoy, compelling the U-boat to submerge. On September 5, 1918, at 1:04 a. m., the Chester, on ocean escort, sighted a submarine close aboard on the starboard bow. First the cruiser attempted to ram the enemy, then attacked the undersea craft with depth-charges, which apparently damaged the U-boat.

Four days later a submarine attacked Convoy GGA-54, torpedoing and sinking the British steamship Arabis. The Paducah attacked with depth-bombs and, according to reports, damaged the submarine. The Seneca on September 16th drove off a submarine which attacked Convoy OM-99. The U. S. S. Druid and H. M. S. Gilia repulsed an attack on Convoy BG-65, on September 22nd. Escorting Convoy BG-67, on September 30th, the Seneca sighted a periscope and attacked with depth-charges and gunfire.

Convoy BG-68, escorted by the Cythera, was attacked the night of October 3rd, and two steamships, the British Ariel and the French St. Luc, were torpedoed. The Cythera went for the submarine, laying a pattern of depth-charges. While being escorted through the Straits of Gibraltar by H. M. S. Defender and the U. S. S. Decatur, H. M. S. Britannia was torpedoed and sunk at 7 a. m., November 9, 1918. The Decatur attacked with depth-charges. The same day a torpedo was fired at the Parker, which was on temporary duty on the western barrage line, in the Straits. But the torpedo missed, and the Parker went after the U-boat, dropping depth-bombs around her.

German submarine activity around Gibraltar continued up to the very end of hostilities. On November 10, 1918, the day before the armistice, the Israel, which was operating on the barrage line with a sub-chaser, discovered and attacked a U-boat, and the same day Sub-chaser Unit C, while patrolling off Point Boassa, also made contact with a submarine.

Two vessels of the Gibraltar force were lost—the destroyer Chauncey, sunk in collision with the British steamship Rose, November 19, 1917, and the Coast Guard cutter Tampa, sunk in British waters September 30, 1918.

The six little destroyers sent from the Philippines to Gibraltar made the long voyage of 12,000 miles under their own steam, arriving in October. The work they did was amazing, when their small size and age are considered. One of them, the Decatur, 420 tons displacement, which had been condemned as not seaworthy enough to venture out of sight of land, successfully negotiated the long voyage from Manila, and in service at Gibraltar steamed over 48,000 miles, making a total of 60,000 miles steaming before her departure for the United States.

The Wenonah, an armed yacht of hardly more than 200 tons, steamed in escort work 29,979 miles. The U. S. Coast Guard cutter Seneca, which arrived at Gibraltar September 4, 1917, escorted 600 ships in convoys, carrying total cargoes of 2,100,000 tons. These are only a few of the phenomenal records made.

United States naval vessels based on Gibraltar assisted in escorting 562 convoys, and 79 single ships, furnishing an average of fifty per cent of all escorts. Under way 46 per cent of the time and 68 per cent available at all times for operation, our vessels were, in addition to the Gibraltar-England service and danger zone escort, employed in escorting ships to Bizerta, Genoa, Oran and Marseilles. They maintained a monthly service to the Azores, escorted cable ships, and also did other odd jobs.

No vessels performed more convoy duty than these, and Admiral Niblack, who commanded them, thus states what was expected of the system:

(a) That a relatively small number of escort vessels could protect more ships if they were in convoy than in any other way.

(b) That ships in convoy could not be visited and sunk by bombs, as were single ships.

(c) That ships in convoy would not be attacked by gunfire by submarines.

(d) That convoys, being few in number, would be difficult to find and consequently fewer attacks could be made by torpedo.

(e) That in the danger zones near ports where submarines would lay for convoys the escort by anti-submarine craft could be made so strong as to make the risk to submarines very hazardous.

"The great advantage of the convoy," said he, "was that the ships arrived in the danger zone collectively and at a definite time, where an adequate danger zone escort could be assembled, which was fitted with depth-charges and was in such numbers as to make the chances of submarines extremely small if it attempted to attack the convoy." But, in considering the effect of convoy in lessening sinkings, Admiral Niblack said:

I think we should take into consideration, as Admiral Mayo points out, the employment of new and offensive measures through the use of the depth-charges, mystery ships, airships, kite balloons, the laying of mine barrages, the firing of torpedoes from Allied submarines, combined with the use of organized patrols fitted with listening devices and hunting the submarine systematically. ****

One very important phase of the discussion of the convoy system which has been entirely overlooked is that during the entire war only one escorted convoy crossed from the United States to Gibraltar. *** All the rest of the million tons of shipping which crossed from the United States to Gibraltar went across as single ships, going "on their own," as it were. These ships depended on their armed guard gun crews, and were independent of the convoy system. They actually encountered submarines, but they relied on their guns for protection.

The convoy system, however, accomplished all that was expected of it, and was markedly successful.

It was our destroyers at Queenstown, our forces on the French coast and at Gibraltar, our cruisers escorting convoys crossing the Atlantic, that made it the success it was—and it was one of the most successful measures of the war.

President Wilson, as I have said, favored its adoption from the beginning; in fact, wondered why the Allies had not adopted it upon the outbreak of war in Europe. It was one of the first measures recommended by the General Board. But at the time this country entered the war, the Allies were pursuing exactly the opposite method; that is, dispersion of shipping.

When troop transportation was first determined upon, in May, 1917, we adopted the convoy system for troop-ships. It was in that month that the British decided to try out the plan for merchant ships, to see whether it would work. The first experimental convoy arrived in England from Gibraltar, May 20. A few convoys were despatched in June, and on June 22 Sims cabled me: "The British Admiralty have now adopted the convoy system and will put it into effect as fast as ships can be obtained for high sea convoy against raiders, and destroyers for escort duty in submarine zone." He reported two routes in operation, stated that eight convoys a week were planned, and recommended that we furnish one cruiser or battleship a week for high sea escort. On June 30, I informed him that the Department would assign seven cruisers for this duty. Our destroyers were engaged in the danger-zone from the time the first trans-Atlantic convoys were started.

Putting the convoy system into effect was a big job, involving the larger part of the world's shipping—a reversal of method that necessitated a radical change in the naval scheme. Concerning the part the United States Navy played in this great task, Admiral Sims wrote in the World's Work:

I do not wish to say that the convoy would not have been established had we not sent the destroyers for that purpose, yet I do not see how it could have been established in any complete and systematic way at such an early date. And we furnished other ships than destroyers, for, besides providing what I have called the modern convoy—protecting the compact mass of vessels from submarines—it was necessary also to furnish escorts after the old Napoleonic plan. It was the business of the destroyers to conduct merchantmen only through the submarine zone. They did not take them the whole distance across the ocean, for there was little danger of submarine attack until the ships reached the infested waters. This would have been impossible in any case with the limited number of destroyers.

But, from the time the convoys left the home port, say New York or Hampton Roads, there was the possibility of the same kind of attack as that to which convoys were subjected in Nelsonian days—that is, from raiders or cruisers. We always feared that German cruisers or raiders of the Moewe type might escape into the ocean and attack these merchant ships, and we therefore had to escort them across the ocean with battleships and cruisers just as they did a century ago. The British did not have ships enough available for this purpose, and here again the American Navy was able to supply the lack; for we had a number of pre-dreadnaughts and cruisers that were ideally adapted to this kind of work.