The battle of the Aisne, destined to develop into the longest conflict on record—it extended over two whole months—began on the afternoon of Sunday, September 13. To follow its complexities it is necessary clearly to grasp, not only the military purposes or objectives the two sides had immediately in view, but the respective situations of the opposing masses as regards fighting efficiency. When operations are on this gigantic scale a certain amount of imagination must be exercised to realise even the barest facts.

From CompiÈgne eastward to Rheims the Allied line was formed by the 6th French, the British, and the 5th French armies. To the first for the moment was assigned the duty of forcing the passages of the Aisne from below Soissons, clearing the enemy off the western end of the ridge, and pushing him up to Noyon on the Oise.

The business which fell to the British army was that of delivering a frontal attack on this natural hill fortress from Soissons as far as Craonne.

The 6th French army, which by a vigorous forward thrust had driven the enemy out of Rheims, was to push up through the transverse gap to Berry-au-Bac, and assault the hostile positions on the hillsides along the east side of the gap. Along these hills the Germans had settled themselves in force. Here, too, there were many chalk quarries and caves, which the Germans were using as shelters and stores.

At first sight it might well seem that the frontal attack undertaken by the British was not strictly a necessary operation. Clearly, the feasible way of driving the Germans out of their fastness was to turn the flanks of the position on the west through Lassigny and Noyon, and on the east through Berry-au-Bac. The main operation was, of course, that of turning the position from the west, for the right of the German position remained its vulnerable point. It was essential, however, to the success of that operation that General von Kluck should not be able to meet it in force until, at all events, the Allied troops had taken a firm grip.

Now, if the British army had assumed a merely watching attitude on the south side of the Aisne, and had in consequence been able to extend their line from the south of Craonne down the river to, say, Attichy, some ten miles below Soissons, that, while leaving nearly the whole strength of the 6th French army free to undertake the turning movement, would at the same time have left General von Kluck also free to throw his main strength against it.

A vigorous and pressing attack along his front was consequently essential, in order to keep his main force employed. Not only was the attack essential, but it had to be launched against him without delay, and before he could recover from the effects of his retreat.

Including the troops recalled from Amiens, Generals von Kluck and von BÜlow had under their command, nominally at any rate, ten army corps. If, deducting losses and war wastages, we put their strength in effectives at not more than the equivalent of six corps—it could have been very little more—yet six corps was, in the positions they held, a force fully able to cope with the nine corps making up the three Allied armies pitted then against them. Bearing in mind, indeed, the natural defensive advantages of the ridges on which the Germans had established themselves, and their facility for moving troops either for the purposes of defence or of counter-attack, their strongholds could have been held by three corps, leaving the remainder to be used on the flank for active operations.

Intended to frustrate that manoeuvre, the British attack compelled the German commanders to await, before they could make any such attempt, the arrival of reinforcements. On both sides there was now a race against time. French reinforcements and reserves had to be brought up and massed against the flank of the German position. Many of those troops had, however, to cover long distances afoot. The movements of mass armies are comparatively slow. After all, the roads and railways traversing a country have a capacity which is limited. Some idea of what such movement involves may be formed from the traffic on a popular bank holiday. In the case of armies there is, in addition to human numbers, the artillery, the munitions, the camp equipment, the foodstuffs, and all the rest of the transport. No one, therefore, can be surprised that by the time these masses could be concentrated on the German flank, there were German masses who, under the same conditions, had been hurried forward to meet them. From the very necessities of time and space the race resulted to a great extent in a draw.

The Battle of the Aisne is in every respect unique. A battle in the ordinary sense of field operations it was not. It was a siege. Nothing at all like it had ever occurred before in war. There have been many sieges of banditti in mountain retreats. There have been sieges in old times of fortified camps. There had never been the siege under such conditions of a great army.

The operations in this amazing and gigantic conflict, though inter-related, must for the purposes of clear narration be dealt with in sections. The story divides itself into:—

The attack upon the German positions north of the Aisne.

The struggle for and around Rheims.

The operations on and against the German right flank.

In this chapter it is proposed to deal with the attack upon the German positions north of the Aisne. The manner in which the British troops forced the passage of that river and secured a footing on the ridge, and held on to it, forms a particularly brilliant feat of arms.

As stated in the official account:—

The country across which the army has had to force its way is undulating and covered with patches of thick wood.

Within the area which faced the British before the advance commenced, right up to Laon, the chief feature of tactical importance is the fact that there are six rivers running right across the direction of advance, at all of which it was possible that the Germans might make a resistance.

These are, in order from the south, the Marne, the Ourcq, the Vesle, the Aisne, the Lette, and the Oise.

The Lette, it may here be stated, is a tributary of the Oise. Rising just to the north of Craonne and flowing westward through an upland valley, it is used in the lower part of its course as a section of the Oise and Aisne Canal.

On Friday, the 11th, the official account goes on to say, but little opposition was met with by us along any part of our front, and the direction of advance was, for the purpose of co-operating with our Allies, turned slightly to the north-east. The day was spent in pushing forward and in gathering in various hostile detachments, and by nightfall our forces had reached a line to the north of the Ourcq, extending from Oulchy Le ChÂteau to Long Pont.

On this day there was also a general advance on the part of the French along their whole line, which ended in substantial success, in one portion of the field Duke Albrecht of WÜrtemberg's fourth army being driven back across the Saulx; and elsewhere the whole of the corps artillery of a German corps being captured. Several German colours also were taken.

It was only on this day that the full extent of the victory gained by the Allies was appreciated by them. The moral effect of this success has been enormous.

When the British pushed forward on September 12 to the Aisne, they found that the Germans still held the heights to the south of the river above Soissons. German outposts also held the strip of hilly country between the Aisne and its tributary the Vesle.

The first step was to drive the Germans across the Aisne at Soissons. This was undertaken by the 3rd army corps. Pushing forward to Buzancy, south-east of Soissons, the troops won the heights overlooking the old city and the Aisne valley, which here opens to its greatest width. It was a stiff fight. Despite, however, a heavy bombardment from across the valley, the British, side by side with troops of General Maunoury, swept the Germans down into and through Soissons, and as the enemy crowded over the two bridges the artillery of the 3rd corps poured upon them a rain of shells. Immediately the Germans had crossed, the bridges, which had been mined, went up in two terrific explosions.

While this action was in progress, Sir John French had thrown the 1st army corps across the Vesle at Fismes. They advanced to Vaucere with but little opposition.

At Braisne on the Vesle, however, the Germans for a time made a resolute stand. They held the town in force, and covered the bridge with machine guns. They were strongly supported by artillery. Notwithstanding this, they were ousted out of the place by the 1st British Cavalry Division under General Allenby. While a brigade of British infantry cleared the enemy out of the town, which lies mainly on the south bank, the cavalry rushed the passage of the river under a galling fire and turned the hostile position. So rapidly did the Germans take to flight that they had to throw a large amount of their artillery ammunition into the river. There was no time to reload it into the caissons.[22] This feat of the British horse ranks among the finest bits of "derring do" in the campaign. The Queen's Bays have been mentioned in despatches as rendering distinguished service. Conspicuous gallantry was shown by the whole division. As a result of these operations from Braisne and Fismes, the British secured the country up to the Aisne.

Left and right, therefore, the advance had been completely successful. In the centre, however, the 2nd army corps had an exceptionally tough piece to negotiate. They advanced up to the Aisne between Soissons and Missy. The latter place lies on the north bank, just below the junction of the Aisne and the Vesle. Here there is a broad stretch of meadow flats, commanded north, east, and south by bluffs. On the south is the Sermoise bluff or spur; across the flats, directly opposite to the north, stands out the Chivre spur. The summit of the latter is crowned by an old defence work, the Fort de CondÉ. This the Germans held, and they made use of the spur, like a miniature Gibraltar, to sweep the flats of the valley with their guns. On this 12th September the 5th division found themselves unable to make headway. They advanced to the Aisne, which just here sweeps close under the Chivres spur, leaving between the cliff and the bank a narrow strip, occupied by the village of CondÉ-sur-Aisne. Across the river at CondÉ there was a road bridge, and the enemy had left the bridge intact, both because they held the houses of the village, which they had loop-holed, and because their guns above commanded the approach road. It may be stated that they held on to the Chivre spur and on to CondÉ all through the battle.

On the night of September 12 the British had possession of all the south bank of the Aisne from Soissons up to Maizy, immediately to the south of Craonne.

At daybreak on Sunday, September 13, Sir John French ordered a general advance across the river. Opposite the places where the waterway could most readily be crossed, the enemy had posted strong bodies of infantry with machine guns. Along the bluffs, and behind the side valleys above, they had disposed their artillery in a range of batteries upwards of fifteen miles in length.

The battle began with one of the most tremendous and concentrated artillery duels that has ever taken place, for the line was prolonged both east and west by the French artillery, until it stretched out to more than twice the length of the British front.

Of the nine bridges over this section of the Aisne, all save that at CondÉ had been blown up. Near a little place called Bourg on the north bank, some three miles below Maizy, the valley is crossed by an aqueduct carrying the Oise and Aisne canal. This canal passes in a series of locks over the ridge north-west. The canal is much used in connection with the chalk quarries.

Troops of the 1st British division, defying a fierce bombardment, advanced in rushes along the towing path, or crept along the parapets of the aqueduct. Every man deliberately took his life in his hands. Others crept breast high in the water along the canal sides. The German guns stormed at them, and many fell, but foot by foot and yard by yard they crawled on, while supporting riflemen from the ridges behind them picked off the Germans who strove to oppose their passage. The resistance was furious. They won, however, a footing on the north bank. Once there, no counter-assaults could dislodge them.

This bridgehead formed at the opposite end of the aqueduct, more troops rushed across, covered by a concentration of the British artillery. In this way, at length, the whole division got over, including the cavalry. Forthwith they advanced up the road leading across the ridge from Bourg, along the side valley, towards Chamouille.

While these events were taking place, troops of the 2nd division were, five miles farther down the river, near Vailly, carrying out a feat of equal daring. Just about Vailly, the Aisne is crossed obliquely by the railway line from Soissons. The railway bridge, a structure of iron, now lay in the stream. Most of the confusion of massive ribs and girders was under water, and the deep and smoothly sweeping current, swollen by recent rains, foamed and chafed against the obstacle. One of the long girders, however, still showed an edge above the flood. It was possible for men to cross upon this girder, but only in single file. Not more than two feet in breadth at the outside, not less than 250 feet in length, this path of iron resembled, if anything could, that bridge, narrow as the edge of a scimitar, over which the faithful Mussulman is fabled to pass into Paradise. It was swept by shot and shell. From the heights across the valley belched without ceasing the hail of death. Wounded or unnerved a man saw his end as surely in the grey-green swirl of waters. But the soldiers who undertook this service did not hesitate. It may be doubted if there has ever been anything in ancient or in modern war more coolly heroic. Here was the spirit which has made Britain the mother of mighty nations. Not a few of these heroes fell, inevitably, but the spirit was in all, and if some fell, others won their way over, and having won it kept their footing against heavy odds.

In sight of this struggle, amid the unceasing roar of the batteries on either side, the 4th Guards Brigade were, a mile away at Chavonne, ferrying themselves over in boats. Notwithstanding the furious efforts to annihilate them, both as they crossed and as they sprang ashore, a whole battalion in this way got across and made good their foothold.

Half-way between CondÉ and Soissons, at the village of Venizel, at the same time, the 14th brigade were rafting themselves over on tree-trunks crossed with planks, derelict doors, and stairways.

These footholds won, the troops, like the 1st division, lost no time in pushing forward to seize points of vantage before the enemy could rally from his astonishment. The 2nd division advanced along the road from Vailly towards CourteÇon; the 12th brigade made an attack in the direction of Chivres, situated in a small side valley to the west of the Chivres bluff. Slightly higher up this side valley, and on its opposite slope, the Germans held the hillside village of Vregny in force. The cleft at once became the scene of a furious combat.

Coincidently the work went on of throwing pontoon bridges across the river. Under persistent bombardment the Royal Engineers stuck to this business with grim resolve. The battle had gone on without a pause from daybreak. At half-past five in the evening, opposite Bucy-le-Long, three miles above Soissons, the first pontoon bridge had been completed, and the 10th brigade crossing by it drove the enemy out of Bucy. Working right through the night the Engineers completed eight pontoon bridges and one footbridge. On the following day they temporarily repaired the road bridges at Venizel, Missy, and Vailly, and the bridge at Villers. The army had thus twelve bridges connecting with the south bank, and was able to move across in force with a large part of his artillery.

Crossing the Aisne at Soissons, the main road running for about a mile and a half north-east to the little village of Crouy, there divides. On the right is a lower road eastward up the valley of the Aisne, past and under the bluffs on the north side to Berry-au-Bac. On the left is a road which climbs up hill, carried in some places through cuttings and tunnels, at others over short viaducts, until it reaches the summit of the ridge. There, parallel in direction with the lower road three miles away, it continues for some twelve miles to Craonne. From this summit road there is, between the patches of woods, a wide view of the country—to the north the valley of the Lette, and beyond it the height round which lies the town and fortress of Laon, to the south the rich woodland glimpses of the Aisne valley. This panoramic highway is the famous Chemins des Dames.

It is evident that command of the higher and of the lower roads meant command of all the part of the ridge between Soissons and Berry, and the operations were an effort on the one side to obtain, and on the other to retain, that command.

Already, with the exception of the break at CondÉ, the lower road, and the villages and the town of Vailly lying along its length, were, as the result of the fighting on September 13, in the hands of the British. The higher road remained in the possession of the Germans. Up the clefts and side valleys are a number of small villages and hamlets, inhabited for the most part by quarrymen and lime-burners, but with, here and there, a small factory. A sprinkling of these civilians were Germans. Most were known to the enemy, and were active spies, and one of the first measures taken by the Germans was to establish at various points secret telephones, forming an exchange of intercommunication with and along their positions. Where telephones could not be employed they arranged a system of ruses and signals. Among these devices was that of smoke from cottage chimneys.

On the morning of September 14, the 13th, 14th, and 15th Brigades, defeating a heavy counter-attack, seized the roads between CondÉ and Soissons. The object was to cut into the centre of the German defence.

During this day further bodies of British troops crossed the river. The forces already on the north side were heavily engaged. Towards nightfall the Germans attempted a counter-attack. It was beaten off after severe fighting. Three hours later, about ten o'clock at night, they again descended in force against the positions and villages held by the British troops. While the clefts and side valleys blazed with flashing fire of infantry, the valley of the Aisne was lit up for miles with the fluctuating and lurid flare from the heavy guns. Masses of German infantry tried to drive the British troops out of the villages they had seized. It was evidently hoped to prevail by weight of numbers. The onset fell back crippled by the losses sustained.

By this time the fact was becoming plain that the battle was no mere rearguard action. The enemy had manifestly resolved to make a stand. To ascertain the character and strength of his disposition, Sir John French ordered a general advance. It was timed to begin at daybreak.

The dawn broke amid rain and heavy mists, but this, if a disadvantage to the attack, was equally a disadvantage to the defence. One of the leading features of this offensive was what Sir John French has justly called the bold and decisive action of the 1st army corps, commanded by Sir Douglas Haig.

From Bourg, the scene of the crossing on the aqueduct, there runs northward climbing to the summit of the ridge a road to the village of Cerny, about half-way along the Chemin des Dames. The distance from Bourg to Cerny is rather more than three miles. It is, however, a stiff climb. Two-thirds of the way up, where the road bends sharply to the left round a spur, is the village of Vendresse-et-Troyon. The capture of this place was one of the immediate objectives, and the troops told off to accomplish it were the 1st infantry brigade and the 25th artillery brigade, under General Bulfin.[23] At Cerny there is a slight dip on the level of the ridge.

Vendresse is on the west slope of this side valley, and Troyon on the east slope just behind the spur. The Germans held in strong force both the spur and the houses on each slope. At Troyon they had fortified themselves in a factory.

Few operations could be more ticklish than the seizure of such a place. From the spur the Germans came down in a counter-attack like a human avalanche. After stemming this rush by a withering fire the Northamptons were ordered to carry the spur at the point of the bayonet. They did it. As they were chasing the survivors of the counter-attack up the slope there suddenly appeared on the skyline a second mass of German infantry, the reserves supporting the counter-attacking column. In a matter of seconds, however, the fugitives and the Northamptons were on them. Their ranks broken, they also turned and fled in rout across the plateau.

In the meantime the North Lancashires had stormed the factory and cleared the enemy out of Vendresse at the point of the bayonet. Other troops of the 1st army corps pushed on to Meulins, a mile to the south-east, and seized positions along the east end of the ridge. During the fighting the Germans lost 12 field guns and 600 prisoners. Many of the latter were found to belong to the Landwehr, proving that the enemy had already been compelled to fill up his formations from second reserves.

The fury of this fighting was intense. There could be no better evidence of its character than an unposted letter found later on an officer of the 7th German army reserve corps. The letter runs:—

Cerny, S. of Laon, Sept. 17, 1914.

My dear Parents,—Our corps has the task of holding the heights south of Cerny in all circumstances till the 15th corps on our left flank can grip the enemy's flank. On our right are other corps. We are fighting with the English Guards, Highlanders, and Zouaves.[24] The losses on both sides have been enormous. For the most part this is due to the too brilliant French artillery. The English are marvellously trained in making use of the ground. One never sees them, and one is constantly under fire.

Three days ago our division took possession of these heights, dug itself in, &c. Two days ago, early in the morning, we were attacked by immensely superior English forces (one brigade and two battalions), and were turned out of our positions; the fellows took five guns from us. It was a tremendous hand-to-hand fight. How I escaped myself I am not clear. I then had to bring up supports on foot (my horse was wounded and the others were too far in rear). Then came up the Guard Jager Battalion, 4th Jager, 65th Regiment, Reserve Regiment 13, Landwehr Regiments 13 and 16, and with the help of the artillery drove back the fellows out of the position again.

... During the first two days of the battle[25] I had only one piece of bread and no water, spent the night in the rain without my great coat. The rest of my kit was on the horses which have been left miles behind with the baggage, which cannot come up into the battle because as soon as you put your nose out from behind cover the bullets whistle.

Yesterday evening about six p.m., in the valley in which our reserves stood, there was such a terrible cannonade that we saw nothing of the sky but a cloud of smoke. We had few casualties.

Just to the west of Vendresse the 5th infantry brigade advanced against the part of the ridge where is situated the village of CourteÇon. Simultaneously the 4th Guards Brigade, with the 36th brigade of artillery, debouched from Bourg along the Aisne and Oise canal, with the object of seizing Ostel. They had to fight their way, opposed foot by foot, through dense woods. The 6th brigade pressed up farther along the canal to Braye-en-Laonnois. It is immediately to the north of that place that the plateau is at the narrowest. Evidently to obtain possession of that neck would be a great advantage. The enemy held on to Braye at all costs.

Further west, again, the British advanced from Vailly to Aizy along another of the approaches to the plateau. The object was to hem in the Germans holding the Chivres bluff and CondÉ. On the farther side of the bluff from Aizy the division of Sir Charles Fergusson held on to Chivres village in the face of a succession of determined onslaughts.

As the outcome of this day's fighting, which had been very severe, the 1st army corps had won close up to the ridge by Craonne, and held positions extending along the plateau across the canal to Soupir, a distance of nearly nine miles. Concurrently the 2nd and 3rd corps had gained the plateau from Chavonne westward to Croucy, and with the exception of the Chivres bluff all the outer or southern edge of the plateau, as well as the intervening side valleys, were in the British hands, from Soissons to Craonne.

As soon as they had gained these positions the British troops set about digging themselves in, and although the rain fell all night in torrents, and the men had been through a long and fierce struggle since daybreak, they worked magnificently.

Next day (September 15) heavy rain blurred the view. Neither force could see the movements of the other, but when the mists lifted somewhat the Germans must have been surprised to discover that the foe were already in their stronghold.

On their side they had not been idle. They had brought along from Maubeuge the batteries of heavy howitzers used to destroy the forts at that place, and were putting them into well-concealed positions. Besides this they worked with energy to strengthen their entrenchments. These lines of trenches among and along the edges of the woods crowning the slopes of the ridge were elaborately made, and in general cleverly hidden.

They were so placed as to sweep with rifle and machine gun fire the approaches to the plateau up the various clefts. Lengths of barbed-wire entanglements and rabbit fencing further defended the approaches, both in the woods and across open ground. Where behind or between the lines of trenches the land rose—the top of the plateau had been worn by ages of weather into sweeping undulations—there were batteries of field guns, so arranged that they laid approaches under a cross fire. Round and in front of these knobs of land the trenches swept like ditches round bastions. Everything, in fact, that resource could suggest had been done to make the positions impregnable.[26]

In addition to trenches, hamlets and villages were held by the two armies as advanced posts, and had been turned roughly into groups of block houses.

[22] A buried store of the enemy's munitions of war was also found not far from the Aisne, ten wagon-loads of live shell and two wagons of cable being dug up; and traces were discovered of large quantities of stores having been burnt, all tending to show that so far back as the Aisne the German retirement was hurried.