The Philadelphia & Reading Railroad has been peculiarly unfortunate. Although serving a region of abundant traffic, it failed three times between 1880 and 1895, and was in the hands of receivers ten years. It was reorganized after each failure, and each reorganization was marked by bitter struggles between contending parties, due in part to divergence in financial interests, and in part to personal rivalries. In 1833 the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad was chartered by the Legislature of Pennsylvania to build a road from Philadelphia to Reading, a distance of 58 miles. Its early history does not concern us. In 1862 it leased, owned, and operated 437.4 miles of track, equivalent, roughly, to 119.4 miles of line; and derived $2,879,419 out of its gross earnings of $3,911,830 from the carriage of coal. Its capitalization was extremely high, roughly, $193,417 per mile of line,155 and the necessary payments each year, not including dividends, took up $1,454,635. At this time the road owned no coal lands, but, like the Lehigh Valley Railroad and the Schuylkill Canal, remained a common carrier, and relied upon the advantages of its position in respect to the Southern coal fields to secure the tonnage which it required. From 1862 to 1865 inclusive the Reading enjoyed a period of extreme prosperity. The Navy Department, during the war, required large quantities of fuel, and in the revival of business after the conclusion of peace the Reading took its part. Merchandise earnings increased from $523,416 in 1862 to $1,165,277 in 1865; coal earnings from $2,879,419 to $8,627,292; and though expenses In 1869 an entirely new departure in Reading policy occurred. Whereas the road had previously owned no coal lands, with the advent of Mr. F.B. Gowen to the presidency it began to purchase on an enormous scale. “The repeated and serious interruptions of the business of the company,” said the annual report for 1871, “caused by strikers in the coal regions during the last few years, and the many fluctuations in the coal trade, produced by alternate periods of expansion and depression resulting therefrom, have attracted the attention of the managers of the company to the necessity of exercising some control over the production of coal, so as to prevent a recurrence of the difficulties heretofore experienced; and it was believed that the best way to accomplish this result, without injuriously affecting individual interests, was for the company to become the owner of coal lands situate upon the line of its several branches.”156 Further, it was felt that some steps were necessary to retain for the Reading even the coal tonnage which it enjoyed. In 1871 every rival carrier had invested large sums in coal properties, and all the fields but the Schuylkill and Mahanoy (western middle) were occupied, while carriers had begun to enter the Mahanoy district, and it was reported to be their intention to build lines straight through to the Schuylkill fields. The anthracite coal regions of Pennsylvania lie in four main districts: the Northern or Wyoming; the Southern or Schuylkill; and two smaller intermediate fields known respectively as the Eastern Middle or Lehigh region and the Western Middle or Mahanoy and Shamokin basins. The Northern field is the more easily worked, It is unquestionable that the Reading did acquire an enormously valuable property in the decade succeeding 1870. It seems just as clear that it paid more for this than was necessary; but what is perhaps more to the point is the fact that the Reading paid more than it could afford. Whatever the ultimate advantages to be gained by exclusive possession of any considerable section of the coal fields, the Reading was not large enough nor financially strong enough to make such vast purchases within so short a space of time. The prosperity of the Civil War had disappeared, net profits were fluctuating without marked tendency to increase, the figures for 1870 being actually less than those of 1863, while the interest on bonds had more than doubled since 1867, and the sum required for dividends had increased. To advance $54,886,647 to the Coal & Iron Company under these conditions, and to become responsible as guarantor for $14,929,557 more, would have been ill-advised even had the prices paid by the company been in strict accord with the commercial estimate of the time. Under the best of circumstances returns from much of the property acquired could not be secured for many years. The parts of the coal fields which were worked yielded an income, though it was seldom that the collieries were allowed to run to their full capacity; but those districts which (a) To pay the interest on prior liens in full. (b) To pay one-half the interest on the general mortgage bonds (c) To pay for five years in scrip the interest on the debenture bonds of both the Railroad and Coal & Iron Companies; the convertible bonds of the Railroad Company, the bonds due in 1885, 1902, and 1918 of the Tidewater & Susquehanna Canal Company, and so much of the rent due to the Schuylkill Navigation Company as was applicable to the payment of dividends to stockholders of the Company and to the interest upon its mortgage loan of 1895. (d) To suspend the drawings for the payments of sinking funds and of the improvement and general mortgage bonds for a period not exceeding four years, if so long a time should be required for the payment of the floating debt.161 “The relief to be obtained from the above,” said President Gowen, “will undoubtedly enable the managers, even with no improvement in traffic or increase of rates, to meet the fixed charges on all obligations of both companies other than those above named, and to pay off the entire floating debt within such time as will be satisfactory to the holders thereof.” Certain modifications were suggested by the London securityholders, providing for trustees with some power to protect the creditors,162 and the plan went quietly into effect. From now on matters went from bad to worse. The year 1878 showed a falling off in almost every source of revenue, while expenses and charges remained very nearly the same. Depression in the coal trade and connection with the Coal & Iron Company, general dulness of business after 1873, troubles with employees, over-capitalization, all had their share in pushing the company still further into the mire. It became unable to keep its share of the existing business, and the percentages of the Schuylkill output carried by it steadily decreased from 83.49 in 1877 to 75.45 in 1881, while its percentage of the aggregate output from all the anthracite region diminished from 32.82 to 24.44. “It appears, therefore,” said the annual report for 1881, “that while other companies have steadily increased their capacity of production by regular and judicious expenditures Throughout 1879 there was trouble over the payment of wages, perhaps as good a sign of financial difficulty as can be desired. Employees were paid in scrip, not cash, and even scrip wages were left overdue. President Gowen went to Europe toward the middle of the year, but not at all, as he carefully explained, in order to place a new loan, or to transact any business except a little in relation to some railroads for the company; in fact, the condition of the Reading was an open secret, and new loans were impossible to obtain. In May, 1880, the New York and Philadelphia banks began to refuse further accommodations. At the same time the period during which, according to the agreement of 1877, cash payment of general mortgage coupons was suspended, drew to a close, and on May 21 the Philadelphia & Reading announced its inability to meet its obligations. As was said at the time, the company did not fall with a crash because it had not far to fall. The failure occurred on May 21, and on May 24 Messrs. F.B. Gowen (president of the company), Edwin A. Lewis, and Stephen A. Caldwell were appointed receivers. Their resources were scanty and they had to do with them as best they could. On the one hand they applied to the court for authority to borrow $1,000,000 to pay the wages of employees and interest falling due July 1, and on the other they cut down expenses by reducing the working force in the repair shops, by putting the shops on short time, by discontinuing many of the trains on different lines, and by ceasing all dead work at the collieries. Before any plan could be proposed for the rehabilitation of the company the condition of its finances had to be known, and this again the receivers took in charge. Their report in June, 1880, showed a sufficiently serious state of affairs. The floating debt of the Railroad Company had mounted up to $10,254,766, besides $1,900,482 more for the Coal & Iron Company. This represented The stock of the two companies amounted to $42,278,175, and the stock in the hands of the public to $39,278,175. The grand total of liabilities was thus the enormous sum of $145,494,005. The charges for interest and sinking funds were $7,542,094, and the annual payment of $5,629,764, due on $87,558,482 of railroad bonded indebtedness, shows that the rate of interest upon the bonds was high. The net revenue was $5,494,979, and there was therefore a deficit of $2,047,115. Meanwhile the Coal & Iron Company had reported a regular deficit up to 1880, which, though not significant in itself, because of close relations with the Railroad Company and the impossibility of determining how much the Coal Company’s rightful profits were reduced by exorbitant transportation rates, yet made it very clear that from this source the Railroad Company could expect no aid toward the cancellation of the railroad deficit revealed. The combined companies were unable to earn their fixed charges: the continuation of the struggle to do so was sure to mean, as it had in the past, merely a piling up of the floating debt. The coupon-funding scheme of 1877 had shown the inevitable result of temporary measures of relief; and though business in 1880 was rapidly improving, there was need for a radical reduction in the burden resting upon the company. Pending action, a bill for foreclosure was introduced under the general mortgage of 1874.165 A valuation of the Reading coal properties, to which reference has already been made, was started. It was entrusted at first to Mr. S.B. Whitney, The first suggestion for a plan of reorganization came from England. The consolidated mortgage, prior to the general mortgage, was to be foreclosed; general mortgage bonds were to be deprived of their right to sue or to foreclose; all unsecured bonds and junior mortgages were to be exchanged for preferred stock; and a $15 assessment was to be levied upon the stock, for which collateral trust 7 per cent bonds were to be given. This assessment was relied on to pay off the floating debt, and the new company was to start free, with but $33,564,000 of mortgage indebtedness.167 This plan was a step in the right direction. It recognized the validity of prior liens, followed a sound principle in providing for the floating debt by assessments upon the stock, and relieved the company from the likelihood of a future failure by its treatment of the general mortgage bonds; but it was weak in that it reduced the general mortgage to the anomalous position of a bond entitled to a fixed return without the power to enforce it. Stockholders, moreover, objected strenuously to the assessment, maintaining that business conditions were now such as to make milder measures sufficient. In October, 1880, Mr. J.W. Jones, formerly vice-president of the Reading Company, urged that an assessment on the stock was not necessary, and proposed the following: (1) To convert the income, debenture, and convertible bonds and scrip into second preferred stock bearing 5 per cent interest if earned; (2) To issue $15,000,000 of first preferred stock, with which to retire the floating debt; (3) To scale the Coal Company mortgage bonds $200,000 per annum, which could possibly be done by consent of holders, if not, then by foreclosure.168 The main difference between this and the English scheme lay in the treatment of the floating debt. It is improbable, however, that In October a representative of the English bondholders arrived in Philadelphia for the purpose of examining into the condition of the company, and the following month agreed with the board of managers upon a reorganization committee to act in the United States. “The probabilities are,” said this gentleman (Mr. Thomas Wilde Powell), “that it will be found that the bondholders in London will be willing to do as they did in the case of the Erie, that is, fund a reasonable number of coupons ... for the purpose of setting at liberty a portion of the revenue to pay unfunded claims.”169 The next move in the reorganization of the company came, however, not from this committee but from President Gowen, the man who had led the Reading into the purchase of coal lands, and who still remained in office in spite of the hostility shown toward him. His scheme comprised two parts: the first an issue of income bonds with which to pay off the floating debt (together with $5,000,000 mortgage bonds); the second a grand general mortgage to retire existing indebtedness. The plan in more detail was as follows: (1) The company was to create $34,300,000 deferred income bonds, on which interest was to be deferred to a dividend of 6 per cent on the common stock. After this amount had been paid the bonds were to take all revenue up to 6 per cent and were then to rank pari passu with the common shares for further dividends. The debentures were to be issued at 30 per cent of their par value, or $15 per bond; and before selling or disposing of said bonds in the market the option of taking a pro rata share was to be first offered to the stockholders of the company.170 (2) A more permanent relief for the company was to be obtained from the proposal to issue a new long time or perpetual 5 per cent funding mortgage of $150,000,000, divided into two classes, A and B, of $75,000,000 each: class A having priority of lien and interest charge over class B. With this issue it was proposed, by purchase In part this plan was commendable; in part it was inadequate, and in part it relied on a mere juggling with words. The proposal to unify all classes of indebtedness by a grand consolidated 5 per cent mortgage was a good one, both in the simplification of accounts which was to be expected, and in the reduction in fixed charges so far as this reduction went; but on the one hand a reduction of $2,700,000 in charges was too little for a company which had reported for that very year a deficit of $2,000,000, and on the other hand too little allowance was made for the difficulty of forcing securityholders without a foreclosure sale to submit to a definitive scaling down of their holdings, with not even a preferred stock to show for the sacrifice. In its handling of the floating debt, the plan was a second edition of Mr. Jones’s stock-selling scheme, with all the good points left out. What justification there could have been for calling securities, such as the deferred incomes, “bonds,” which were to be issued for no definite time, ranked even after the common stock for dividends, and were of such doubtful character that Mr. Gowen himself proposed to sell them for one-third of their face value, does not appear; unless it be that the lack of voting power, itself a disadvantage, entitled them to the more respected name. The deferred income bonds were a device for saddling the holders of the unsecured debt with a worthless certificate which they might be induced to accept because of its name, and to which not even the Reading stockholders could object. Furthermore, even if the creditors had been eager for this new issue, in itself it would not have been sufficient. The issue, if taken up, would have yielded $10,200,000. It was proposed besides to sell $5,000,000 of unissued However poor the prospect, there was no lack of syndicate guarantee. In November, 1880, a London syndicate agreed to deposit with an American bank, to be named by the company, the sum of $2,058,000, to be forfeited in case they failed to take at the issue price all deferred income bonds not taken by the shareholders. This syndicate further agreed that the company might retain, up to $1,000,000, out of the deposit money, whatever might be necessary to make up a second instalment of $4 on such neglected bonds.173 Nothing was asked from the company in return except the chance to sell the bonds purchased at a premium. “As long as the bond- and shareholders find the money,” remarked the London Times, “there is nothing to be said. In all probability, however, these deferred bonds will become a medium for the very worst kind of gambling, and their chances for a dividend appear to us to be very small.”174 In December Mr. Gowen’s plan received the approval of the American committee and of the board of managers of the company. Bondholders were in no way injured by the worthlessness of the deferred income bonds, and only the most far-sighted could be expected to have demanded a larger reduction in their claims. The same month a meeting of London bond- and shareholders passed unanimously a resolution expressing confidence in President Gowen, and adopting his scheme.175 Opposition came from the influential London banking firm of McCalmont Bros., and the struggle centred about the annual election set for January 10, 1881. The last of November or first of December President Gowen issued a circular in which he said: “As I am about to visit Europe on business of the company, and as it is possible that I may not return until the first week in January, I think it proper to call your attention to the fact that it is highly important that all shareholders who can possibly do so should attend the annual meeting in Philadelphia Meanwhile in America both parties had recourse to the courts: the McCalmonts, to prevent the issue of the deferred income bonds, and the friends of Mr. Gowen to get the election postponed in order to give the president time to return from Europe. The latter suit was the first decided. Judge McKennan, of the United States Circuit Court, refused to grant an order, but unofficially advised postponement. The board of managers therefore withdrew the notice of the annual meeting, and on January 12 voted to postpone it indefinitely. Counsel for the McCalmonts then made application to the Court of Common Pleas in Philadelphia for a mandamus to compel the board to call a meeting. They obtained a peremptory mandamus on January 24, but accepted the date of March 14 as satisfactory, and forbore further proceedings. The matter of the deferred income bonds was complicated by a full and complete authorization which Mr. Gowen had before obtained from the Circuit Court for the issue of his bonds. The request of the McCalmonts was twofold: the court was prayed to revoke the previous decree, and to enjoin any further action in the negotiation or consummation of the said scheme; or, failing this, to direct the In January the Coal & Iron Company quietly held its annual election, and chose Mr. Gowen president. As the time for the postponed election of the Railroad Company came round, the activity of both sides became intense. Both Gowen, who was still in London, and the McCalmonts issued calls for proxies. The former appealed to the shareholders to save the property from passing into the hands of the Pennsylvania Central Railroad Company, which he said was believed to be the ruling power behind the McCalmont litigation. The latter objected vigorously to this charge, and pointed out that the Reading managers held only 16,500 shares of the company’s stock, and that some of them had barely enough to qualify them for the positions which they held.181 The McCalmonts, furthermore, applied to the courts for an injunction to prevent Gowen from voting on the shares pledged as collateral for the floating debt. They maintained with some justification that these shares could not legally be voted, and that it was particularly illegal for the president to use them to elect himself.182 On March 12 the Court of Common Pleas issued a decree regulating the conditions under which the election should be held, providing for the separate count of votes of shares transferred three On March 12, two days before the appointed date, Mr. Gowen issued a letter to the shareholders. “I hold,” said he, “up to the present time, the proxies of 1921 shareholders of the company, owning 359,500 shares of the capital stock, being very considerably more than a majority of all the shares.... Of the shares for which I hold proxies, so large a proportion, however, may possibly be disenfranchised by failure to register, that if the legal meeting of the stockholders is held on Monday next, and it should subsequently be determined by the Court that three months’ prior registry is essential to confer the right of voting, it may be possible that the wishes of the great majority of bona fide shareholders may be overruled by a minority.... I have determined to abstain from attending the meeting, and I earnestly request all shareholders who support the present management to absent themselves from the meeting on Monday, and thus to give legal effect to their wishes by making it impossible for the minority to secure the attendance of a quorum....”183 Mr. Gowen’s friends, English and American, followed his suggestion; and at the meeting on Monday but 211,095 out of 687,663 registered shares appeared to vote. The immediate result was the almost unanimous election of Mr. Bond, the candidate of the During all this time the deferred income bond scheme had not remained untouched. In April, 1881, on application of the McCalmonts, the United States Circuit Court at Philadelphia had granted a preliminary injunction against it. “Whatever power the defendant has in the premises can only be found in the general authority to borrow money,” said Judge McKennan, and went on to state that the issue did not constitute a loan, because a loan implied reimbursement, and the income bonds were redeemable at no special time.184 Once out of the presidency Mr. Gowen endeavored to induce the McCalmonts to accept his plan. If they would adopt the deferred income bond scheme, he said in an address to shareholders, he would resign the receivership of the road at once, give bonds never to stand for the presidency again, and further coÖperate with them in selecting a new board of directors. As an alternative he offered to buy the McCalmont shares at $40 each, and threatened to beat that party at the next election if it refused.186 In September he assured the stockholders that he could without difficulty put the road upon its feet. “If Bond and his colleagues will resign and reinstate the old management,” he cabled from London, “and advise me by cable of the change, I can, before sailing on Saturday, procure sufficient advances against the proceeds of preferred [deferred?] income bonds and new 5 per cent consols to pay the floating debt, receivers’ certificates, and all arrears of interest.”187 Finally, appealing to Mr. Bond direct, Gowen made formal application that the new board should adopt his plan after changing the form of the proposed obligations by making them payable in 100 or 200 years.188 Bond refused. He pointed out that the deferred income bondholders would be in constant conflict with the management in their endeavor to secure dividends on their holdings, and would attempt to prevent proper and necessary expenditures upon the property from current net revenues. He declared that it was questionable whether the company had authority to sell its unsecured obligations below par, and that in any case the process would be enormously expensive; and, further, that the language of the obligation did not limit the payment of interest to the source of net revenue only, but might be construed to compel the declaration of 6 per cent on the income bonds whenever 6 per cent should be paid on the common stock.189 Failing in his attempts to win over his opponents, Gowen turned his energies toward securing their defeat. Meanwhile President Bond brought forward a plan of his own. (1) The issue of a mass of worthless obligations in the deferred income bonds; (2) The high level of fixed charges which a $150,000,000 5 per cent mortgage entailed; (3) The lack of any security which had a right to interest only when earned, and which might be given to the bondholders in return for sacrifices which they would otherwise refuse to make. He proposed, therefore, to create a general consolidated mortgage to cover all the property of the Reading Railroad and Coal & Iron Companies, together with the interest of both companies in all other corporations and property, whether owned or controlled by lease or otherwise. This mortgage was to be junior to the consolidated and to the improvement mortgages only, but was to contain a provision by which, as bonds under these senior mortgages should be retired, additional bonds might be issued under the new mortgage, which was eventually to become a first lien upon all the properties of both companies.190 The total was to be $150,000,000, to be divided into two series: of which series A, for $90,000,000, was to run for fifty years, and was to have a prior lien over series B upon the revenues for interest at the rate of 4½ per cent, with a right to enforce foreclosure in case of a twelve months’ default; and series B was to run sixty years, and was to carry interest at 3 per cent, with a right to enforce foreclosure in case of a three years’ default. In prosperous years series B might receive more than 3 per cent: thus the mortgage provided that from current net revenue applicable to dividends it should get 1½ per cent additional interest before any dividend should be paid on the stock of the company; after that 3 per cent might be paid on the capital stock, and then 1½ per cent additional might be paid on series B; it being understood that the interest in excess of 3 per cent should not be cumulative, but was to be paid only from current net revenues of the company otherwise applicable to dividends. These two issues of unequal worth were to be used for different purposes. Series A was to be in part reserved to retire the senior obligations, and in part to be sold to pay off the general mortgage bonds, the general mortgage scrip, the income bonds, the floating What this meant for the immediate future was that all prior liens were to remain untouched, while everything from the general mortgage down was to be funded into the new obligations. In some ways this resembled the earlier scheme of Mr. Gowen, since in each case there was to be a $150,000,000 general mortgage in two parts, of which one part was to have priority over the other, and in each case this grand mortgage was to be used ultimately to retire all previously existing indebtedness. An innovation was now made, however, in the difference introduced between the two series. In Gowen’s scheme the amount of each series was to be the same, and each was to fare alike, except for the priority of series A; in that of President Bond, series A was to be half again as large as series B, and was to bear a higher rate of compulsory interest; although, a point of extreme importance, the return upon series B was to run from a minimum of 3 per cent to a maximum of 6 per cent whenever the road should earn it. Thus President Bond gained two things: he reduced the rate of interest which his new bonds could claim in any year from 5 per cent (as under Gowen’s scheme) to an average of something under 4 per cent, which would yet, in prosperous times, net them as much as the old bonds surrendered; and as a still further concession, he gave to the 3 per cent bonds a term of sixty instead of fifty years, raising their value to that extent. As the various existing issues of bonds had different market values, he thought it proper to equalize these values in the exchange by the grant of a bonus in stock, for which the capital stock of the company was to be increased one-third. Here were two of Gowen’s problems in a fair way of solution: the reduction of fixed charges was accomplished, while some incentive was given to the junior bondholders to assent. Scarcely less from the point of view of sound finance was the gain from the abandonment of the anomalous deferred income bond scheme, with its $34,300,000 of worthless speculative securities. Yet while the advance which the plan of President Bond marks over that of President Gowen may be recognized, its defects must also be observed. It was, in the first place, in common with all other schemes suggested, too mild, too little drastic in its operations. The condition of the Reading companies was desperate in the extreme. By President Bond’s own figures the previous five years had shown a deficit of $11,479,217, or an average loss per annum of $2,295,853. The net earnings for 1881 by the same computation had been $8,418,009, and the fixed charges $11,265,666.191 What was needed was a radical scaling down of indebtedness, to take effect not in the far distant future but at once. President Gowen, face to face with a similar situation, had evolved a reduction in fixed charges from about $11,000,000 to about $7,000,000, but had explained that, owing to the impossibility of retiring all of the prior liens at once, the actual figures would be approximately $7,957,000. President Bond, less optimistic, or more honest, stated that the ultimate charge under his plan would be about $6,000,000; but that the immediate reduction would be to about $8,339,000 only, scarcely more than $100,000 below the net earnings of the current year. Both estimates would probably have been under the mark; but the relief which President Bond proposed was utterly inadequate even on his own showing. A margin of surplus earnings which could be wiped out in a single month was no answer to the demand for a restoration of the Reading companies to solvency. In regard to the floating debt, too, Bond’s plan left something to be desired, in that it provided for no assessment, but cared for the floating obligations by the sale of bonds. The danger in relying upon To return now to Mr. Gowen. This gentleman had been strengthening his following in every possible way, and had secured one ally of particular importance in the person of Mr. Vanderbilt, who in October, 1881, was reported to be buying largely of the company’s stock. Early in November Mr. Gowen and President Bond both issued addresses to the shareholders. The former maintained that although the present management had been in power for over four months it had done nothing to extricate the company from its difficulties, and promised that if elected he would “retain the office long enough to place the company in a good financial condition, by completing the issue of deferred income bonds and by issuing and selling the 5 per cent consolidated mortgage bonds, the result of which will be the resumption of dividends upon the company’s shares.”193 The business prospects of the company were never better, he continued, and the wisdom of the purchase of the great anthracite coal estate was being demonstrated. Bond, on the other hand, alluded to the failure of Mr. Gowen’s many promises, to the wasteful expenditure of money, to the coal speculations in which the road had been engaged, to the payment of unearned dividends, and to other points of Gowen’s policy, actual or alleged;194 and his statements were repeated by the McCalmonts in spite of Mr. Gowen’s vehement denials.195 Gowen’s plan was now triumphantly brought forward, with the few alterations which time had suggested. There was to be as before a deferred income bond issue of $34,300,000, which was to retire the floating debt; the general mortgage was to be increased in amount from $150,000,000 to $160,000,000, but was still to be divided into two series, equal in amount, and differing in privileges only on the point of priority of lien; of which series A was ultimately to exchange for the senior, series B for the junior obligations of the company. $13,500,000 of the first series and $10,000,000 of the second series were to be put out at once, and $4,000,000 convertible adjustment scrip were to be issued to settle back coupons. Time had apparently made more modest Mr. Gowen’s estimate of the saving to be secured; for instead of not more than $7,000,000 as before, he now hoped for fixed charges of not more than $8,000,000; but with undaunted optimism he made up for this admission by glowing pictures of what the company in the future was going to earn. “Net earnings last year” (1881), said he, “were over $10,000,000—in 1882 they may be expected to reach $11,000,000, and they will before long be over $12,000,000. With net earnings of $12,000,000, and fixed charges of $8,000,000, there will remain a dividend fund of $4,000,000, equal to 6 per cent on the share capital, and 6 per cent upon the par, or 20 per cent upon the issue price, of the deferred income bonds. “In order to get the property out of the hands of the receivers an earnest effort was made to sell the $13,500,000 series A One of the first acts of the reconstructed company was the lease for 999 years of the Central Railroad of New Jersey. This road in many ways formed a natural complement to the Reading system. Like it, it was a coal road, carrying something less than half as great a tonnage as the Reading itself, and owning extensive coal lands in the Wyoming region; while in location it supplied the necessary connection between the Reading lines and New York. At a later date Mr. Joseph S. Harris testified that all the business of the Reading coming from the South or Southwest went to New York over the Central; while, on the other hand, business from the Northwest was carried by the Jersey Central from Scranton, where its lines began, to Bethlehem, and was there handed to the Reading for transportation to Philadelphia.199 The advantages of the Central to the Reading were thus enumerated by General Traffic Manager Bell in 1885: “The joint traffic with the Central Railroad, outside of coal, and outside of passengers, adds $1,500,000 to the revenue of the old Reading system. By means of the Lehigh & Susquehanna division of the Central Road we extend from Phillipsburg to Scranton or Green Ridge through the entire Lehigh Valley; that system feeds our North Pennsylvania line; it is our connection for the Catawissa system by way of Tamanend and Tamaqua; it is the connecting link in the cross line or Allentown system; it creates the shortest line from interior Pennsylvania, and from Northwest Pennsylvania to New York waters. Through the operations of the lease we reach the largest slate territory in Pennsylvania, and the largest iron producing furnaces anywhere in this country, with the exception of Pittsburg.” Rumors of a lease were abroad in 1882, and after the termination of the Reading receivership the operation was pushed to a speedy conclusion. The Reading undertook to assume all the obligations of the Central, and to pay 6 per cent on its capital stock then outstanding, as well as $18,000 annually for maintaining the corporate organization of the lessor. In case any of the Central bonds should be retired, or rentals or interest reduced, the rental to be paid by the Reading was likewise to be reduced. The roadbed and rolling stock of the Central was to be maintained undiminished, but if the Reading should make any additions or improvements, or if from its own funds it should pay off any of the Central’s obligations, it was to receive equivalent bonds with interest not exceeding 6 per cent from the Central Company. The lease was terminable on 60 days’ notice in case the lessee should fail at any time to carry out its provisions.201 This involved something more than a nominal obligation. The net earnings of the Jersey Central in 1882 had been $5,091,072, while the sum due for rentals, interest, 6 per cent dividends, etc., had mounted up to $5,898,087, not including payments on car trusts or certain contingent obligations. Broadly speaking, the Reading proposed to guarantee 6 per cent on the stock of a road which had failed because unable to meet its fixed charges; and however great the ultimate advantages, it is apparent that the prospect of a drain upon the Reading Company was real. In order to get the road out of receivers’ hands, the Reading had further to take care of a floating debt of $2,062,000, and to compromise with certain creditors by settling back interest on their bonds. This was done, and on May 29, 1883, possession formally passed over. The same day was concluded another arrangement, whereby the Central of New Jersey leased the coal and railroad companies comprised in the Lehigh Coal & Navigation Company for one-third of their gross receipts, and the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad became liable for the The year 1883 now seemed to find the Reading imbued with new life. Earnings increased, both gross and net, fixed charges as reported rose less rapidly, and the net profits for the year, or balance on all operations, showed a threefold increase. “The company,” said Mr. Gowen, “has now surmounted the difficulties of the last four eventful years.”203 The annual meeting in January was a genuine love-feast, marked by the presentation of resolutions highly flattering to Mr. Gowen. “We trust,” said one, “we thankfully appreciate your herculean efforts in our behalf, in the face of unparalleled difficulties and obstacles, in rescuing our property from bankruptcy against the malignant and determined efforts of its enemies and conspirators to foreclose and wreck it.” “As citizens of this great commonwealth,” said another, “we beg to add our gratitude and admiration for your untiring, brave, honest, and able devotion, which has preserved the Philadelphia & Reading Company intact, and has fairly started it on a broader career of usefulness.”204 Not less extraordinary was the further action of this harmonious meeting. In the first place, it authorized the creation of a collateral trust loan of $12,000,000 for the purpose of paying the floating debt, the balance due upon the purchase of Central Railroad Company of New Jersey stock, and the retirement of the outstanding income mortgage bonds. What, may be inquired, had become of the deferred income bonds of which Mr. Gowen had been so proud, and the $5,000,000 additional first series consols which with them were to cover the floating debt, if a new collateral loan was needed for the purpose for which they had been considered ample? As for the purchase of Jersey Central shares, an account would require In the second place, the meeting proposed a dividend of 21 per cent on the preferred stock, representing arrears due, and of 3 per cent on the common; both cash, and to be paid in case the collateral loan should succeed.205 In order to give shareholders time to consider, an adjournment was taken for two weeks, after which the dividend on the preferred stock was approved, though that on the common was not. It seems almost superfluous to insist upon the folly of this dividend. The Reading had not, in reality, “surmounted the difficulties of the last four eventful years.” Scarcely any of the benefits promised by Mr. Gowen’s plan of reorganization had been secured; fixed charges had not been reduced, because it had been found impossible to get creditors to take new securities in exchange for the old, and equally impossible to sell any considerable amount of the new securities for cash. While old charges had remained unabated, new charges had been added through the lease of the Jersey Central, new car trusts, and the like, and the very gain in earnings which might have been construed as favorable was due to increased mileage, and was not proportional to the growth of the system.206 A fitting sequel to Mr. Gowen’s words and acts was the scrip payment for labor and supplies which took place in May, 1884, and the accompanying fall in the prices of the company’s securities. On June 2 the company again passed into receivers’ hands. The same judges were applied to as in 1880, and the same receivers were appointed, The various creditors had now to do what should have been done before, and, by lightening the charges upon the road, to put it in a position where its solvency could be maintained. The chances for obtaining radical action from the bondholders were somewhat brighter, since even the most obstinate were being forced to realize that no halfway measures would avail; and a reasonable solution was even thus early hinted at in the suggestion that some of the bonds under which the road was staggering should be replaced by stock. Nevertheless, we shall find in this reorganization a slow working out of the requirements for a plan, and a slow process of at least partial reconcilement to the inevitable. The receivers’ report was issued in October, but contained little not known or suspected before. From November 30, 1883, to June 2, 1884, there had been a net loss in operation for the Railroad Company of $2,322,282, and for the Coal & Iron Company of $1,049,702, showing conclusively the condition of the companies. The total bonded indebtedness was $94,613,042; a total to be compared with the $78,101,894 of four years previous. The total floating debt was $16,549,968 as compared with $10,254,766 at the beginning of the previous receivership. Including the Central of New Jersey, the total fixed charges for the Railroad and Coal & Iron Companies were $18,241,051; a sum which certain offsets, however, reduced to $16,584,732.208 The first suggestion for a reorganization came from a committee primarily representing the general mortgage bondholders, though including other interests as well. The chairman was Mr. Townsend Whelen, and the committee may be taken to represent the views of the management. “The present fixed charges of the company,” said Mr. Whelen, “are in round numbers $16,650,000, while the earnings of the past fiscal year are, in round numbers and after proper deductions, $12,900,000. The objects sought to be accomplished by the committee are: “(1) To reduce fixed charges to the limit of last year’s earnings; “(2) To preserve the proper order of priorities of each class of securities, so that no income applicable to any senior security that “(3) To provide a method of paying the floating debt.” The plan was, roughly, to leave the prior liens untouched, to fund one-half the coupons upon the general mortgage for three years, and to convert all of the other obligations into income bonds. Preferred stock was to be changed from cumulative to non-cumulative; rents of leased lines, including the Central of New Jersey, were to be reduced to the amounts which the properties had earned; the canal leases were to be reduced; the interest on some of the divisional coal land mortgages was to be reduced, and on some was to be paid in full. In regard to the floating debt the committee decided to postpone any attempt to raise money for its extinction. If the bondholders should accept the scaling down of their indebtedness, the company might have no difficulty in procuring cash by a collateral loan; if this should prove impossible, the duty of providing funds would devolve upon the junior securities.209 The committee found it impossible to prepare within the short time at their disposal a complete plan of reorganization with exact figures of present and proposed fixed charges; and it is therefore impossible to ascertain how great was the saving which they expected to secure. The plan marks sufficiently well the advance which had been made since the reorganization of 1880–3. The best that could then be imagined had been the creation of a grand general mortgage for which the old bondholders might, but mostly did not, exchange their holdings; while now the very first suggestion endeavored to retain for all bondholders a chance for the same return as before, and found the salvation of the company in the transformance of certain bonds from mortgage to debenture obligations. The general criticisms which may be made are three: first, that it was unwise to defer all provision for the floating debt; second, that the new income bonds might better have been replaced by stock; and third, that the probable reduction in fixed charges would have been insufficient. So far as the committee suggested any action in relation to the floating debt, it favored a funding of it. This funding might have been either into mortgage or into income bonds: if the former, the fixed charges of the company would have been increased, or else the other The Whelen plan was reported to the general managers’ committee, and was approved by them. Some slight modifications were made, and a large number of signatures was secured. Opposition was not slow to spring up. In February a meeting of general mortgage bondholders elected a committee, known as the Bartol Committee, to prepare a plan more suited to their interests. This body In April, ten months after the beginning of the receivership, the Reading managers evolved a plan for dealing with the floating debt. Holders were to agree to accept renewals at intervals of three months for three years, with interest at the rate of 6 per cent, paid at the time of each renewal, and to hold the collateral pledged as security until the whole of the debt should have been discharged. In case the Philadelphia & Reading should fail at any time punctually to pay the interest on any of the obligations agreed to be renewed, or should fail to cause the same to be renewed, or in case nine-tenths of the floating-debt holders should not assent to the plan, or in case an adverse judicial sale should be made, the obligation to accept further renewals should immediately cease.213 The scheme deservedly fell through. Creditors were asked to tie up their assets for three years, with no concession in return except the payment of interest quarterly in advance; while the unofficial suggestion that the Reading pay ¼ per cent commission on each renewal was felt to be too expensive for the company to entertain. The following month the Whelen and Bartol committees came out with a new edition of the Whelen plan, which introduced an assessment on the junior bonds and stock, but preserved the same method of dealing with the old securities as before.214 Assent to the plan was to be on the condition that sufficient money should be raised to pay off the floating debt. Interest on such debt was not to have priority of payment over interest on the general mortgage for longer than three years; and during those three years the preference was to be limited to that part of the floating debt secured by collateral yielding income to cover interest, or important for other reasons to be retained. There were to be seven reorganization trustees to receive the assents of parties in interest, and to receive Matters now went on in much the same old way. The seven reorganization trustees, representing the principal interests concerned, held meeting after meeting with no apparent result. The courts became impatient; bondholders clamored for their interest; but after the failure of the earlier plan the way out seemed harder and harder to find. In September, 1885, Mr. E. Dunbar Lockwood addressed (1) “The trustees should recognize promptly and unequivocally that the Reading Railroad is bankrupt, and has not sufficient available assets to meet its obligations. (2) “Two dollars of obligations cannot be paid with one dollar and a half of assets, and the sooner all persons interested ... recognize this fact, and agree to scale both principal and interest sufficient to meet the obligations of the company and put it upon a strong financial basis, with sufficient working capital to enable it to conduct its future business economically, the better it will be for all concerned. (3) “The trustees should look only at the facts as they exist ... and while endeavoring to rehabilitate the road, also bring it into harmonious relations with its adversaries. (4) “The trustees should consider the problem ... precisely as business men consider the matter of the settlement of a bankrupt firm. The question at once presents itself, is it best that the company should continue in business, or should it be wound up?”217 In his reply Mr. Garrett pointed out the difficulties to be overcome, and concluded by saying that in his judgment no reorganization would be final that did not ensure the establishment of credit, the entrusting of the management to an interest having an actual equity in the property, and just expectation of pecuniary return from it, and harmony with competing lines, coupled with due regard for the rights of the public.218 The reorganization trustees by this time appeared discouraged, and the following month called a conference of creditors at which a resolution was passed looking toward foreclosure. In November a suit was actually begun, supplementary to a similar suit instituted a year before. It was during the pendency of these proceedings that the plan of reorganization devised by the reorganization trustees themselves came out, and marked a third effort to rehabilitate the road. The first plan proposed, it will be remembered, had suggested the conversion of all of the junior securities into income bonds, plus a funding of one-half the general mortgage coupons for three years; and the second had introduced an assessment on the junior bonds and stock. This third plan, while preserving the Various points in the plan deserve mention. For the first time since the failure of 1880 it was proposed to use two kinds of securities, of which interest on one should be fixed, and interest on the other optional. For the retirement of senior bonds President Bond had suggested a bond on which half the interest should be fixed and the other half variable, but his plan had been inferior in flexibility to the one now proposed. The junior securities received less favorable treatment than before; but the general mortgage itself did not escape, and was required to accept 3 per cent plus preferred stock instead of a mere funding of its coupons. The increase in the amount of stock was very great, and naturally so, in view of the new uses to which it was put.220 Assessments were made heavier, and for the first time the management frankly excluded from their calculations the Central of New Jersey, foreshadowing the abandonment of the lease. To repeat, the first two plans described had developed the idea of an assessment and the conversion of the junior bonds into In February, 1886, the reorganization trustees received a letter signed by J. Pierpont Morgan and John Lowber Welsh, which is important enough to be quoted in full. “A syndicate has been formed,” said these gentlemen, “composed of leading bankers and capitalists here and in Europe, together with corporations or their representatives controlling large transportation and coal producing interests, who have agreed to subscribe in the aggregate $15,000,000 for the purpose of aiding in the reorganization of the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company and its affiliated lines. The syndicate has no commitment of any kind with any other railroads or corporations upon this subject beyond securing a management in harmony with the principle that capital invested in internal improvements should be so managed as to result in a fair return in the way of interest and dividends. Their object and purpose is to secure the reorganization on business principles for the Philadelphia & Reading bondholders, stockholders, and creditors without prejudice to the relative position of either, and in their interest only. “To do this effectually there must be suitable arrangements made with the Pennsylvania Railroad and other kindred coal interests for harmonious relations, in order that suitable prices may be obtained for coal produced and shipped. These objects we shall endeavor to secure, and we now enclose you a copy of a correspondence “As the reorganization shall proceed our effort and expectation will be to bring about satisfactory arrangements with all the anthracite coal roads, and also the trunk lines, which shall secure to the Philadelphia & Reading Railroad Company, when reorganized, its just share of the business at remunerative rates. “The syndicate have believed that your plan was, in the main, suitable for the purpose of reorganization, and that your board was composed of gentlemen who would command the confidence of all parties in interest. “They therefore prefer to make an arrangement with you and to aid you in working out a plan. “But they also think that there should be certain modifications as to your organization, and also as to your plan, as follows: “(1) The syndicate would wish two persons, to be named by them, added to your board. “(2) Your plan should be made so flexible that it could be modified hereafter in such respects as may be found necessary to success. “(3) There should be an executive committee of five to take charge of the foreclosure proceedings, the purchase of the property, the organization of the new company, and generally of whatever may properly appertain to reconstruction under the plan. There should be five voting trustees who should vote on the stock when deposited under the plan, and to whom the power of voting on the stock in the reorganized company should be confided for five years after reorganization. These two committees should be composed of parties satisfactory to the syndicate and the trustees, and shall fill their own vacancies. But in case the syndicate and trustees cannot agree upon the five, then, and in that case, three shall be named by the syndicate and two by the trustees, and each class shall fill any vacancy occurring in its own number. “(4) The compensation to be allowed to the syndicate shall be 5 per cent on the amount of the syndicate capital. “(5) The syndicate to be allowed interest at the rate of 6 per cent upon any amount they may advance the company in the course of the process of foreclosure and reorganization. The correspondence with Mr. Roberts referred to contained the assurance that the Pennsylvania Company would not hold aloof from an understanding with the Reading either in respect to the coal or transportation business, and would, moreover, “cordially unite in the arbitration of all differences.”222 This could not, of course, force distasteful terms upon the Reading bondholders, but it could and did supply sufficient capital to ensure the success of any plan adopted, and it infused confidence and vigor into the action of the nearly discouraged reorganization trustees. The executive committee which they were to name was perhaps a useful tool, but the suggestion of a voting trust was a genuine contribution, and aided powerfully in securing necessary backing for future schemes. It is to be remarked that the syndicate appeared with no panacea, was without a plan of its own, and at first merely adopted that of the trustees, with a few modifications which it thought advisable; but that by March, 1886, it had so worked over the proposals of the reorganization trustees as to make in many respects a new plan; which retained the assessments, likewise the combination of fixed and optional charges and the use of preferred stock, but reserved 4 per cent bonds against prior liens, gave 4 per cent bonds with preferred stock in exchange for the general mortgage instead of 3 per cents, and created four classes of stock instead of three. Somewhat more in detail this plan was as follows: The Reading was to issue a new 4 per cent general mortgage for $100,000,000, and four kinds of stock: a preferred, income, consolidated, and common. Of the general mortgage $9,792,000 were to be for future use in the improvement A comparison of this with the plan of the reorganization trustees at first announced will show the changes made. Nothing of value which previous reorganizations had worked out was cast aside. The fixed interest allowed the general mortgage bondholders was raised in the hope that they might support the plan, and more care was taken to follow the order of priority in the advantages offered to the various classes of junior securityholders; an end to which the four classes of stock were admirably adapted. The voting trust was altogether new, and was doubtless intended to ensure a policy in In opposition to the plan the Lockwood Committee urged that the scheme was unjust to certain classes of bonds; that it was cumbersome, expensive, conferred power on the trustees which should have been reserved for the direction of the new company, and that the reserved powers to change any part of the plan, and the uncertainties connected with the settlements under it, involved risks which creditors should not accept.224 The objections were not weighty. If the Lockwood or any other committee had proved itself able to formulate and carry through a plan, or if the syndicate arrangement had been proposed at the very beginning of the receivership, bondholders might fairly have criticised its expense. In point of fact numerous attempts to reconcile divergent interests had failed, and what with Messrs. Lockwood, Bartol, Whelen, Gowen, and their respective followings, the future offered no more promising result. Meanwhile bondholders were going without their interest, and costs of the receivership were mounting up; so that a greater expense than that of which Mr. Lockwood complained was being incurred by delay. As for the general mortgage bondholders, they were given a chance at their old interest whenever the road should earn it, and could fairly ask no more; while that it was inequitable to ask income bondholders to accept a reduction to $50 in their annual interest, or holders of the first series 5s to wait for their interest until liens before theirs had been satisfied, are conclusions to which few will agree. In April Messrs. Whelen and William H. Kemble, representing the Reading consolidated mortgage bondholders, announced that they had determined not to accept the syndicate plan. Even before this Mr. Gowen announced that he was organizing a syndicate and would soon be able to pay off overdue coupons on the general mortgage bonds, and to prevent any foreclosure under that mortgage.225 It is scarcely necessary to say that he had a plan of his own. He proposed A comparison of this with the syndicate plan shows that Mr. Gowen gave up the idea of an assessment; provided for the floating debt through first preference bonds; swept away three of the four classes of stock, replacing them by two kinds of income bonds; and retained the deferred income bonds which the syndicate proposed to retire. His plan was to be carried through without foreclosure, but outside of this its advantages are rather difficult to ascertain. The abandonment of the assessment was distinctly bad; the retention of the deferred income issue was also bad; the reduction in the number of kinds of securities tended towards simplicity, but made impossible the nice distinction of priority on which the syndicate had relied; while even the replacement of stock by income bonds must be condemned, substituting as it did an obligation without any very distinct character of its own for a stock which represented frankly only a share in the profits of the enterprise. These things were realized, and the plan received no serious support; but as every plan so far proposed contributed something to the final product, so Mr. Gowen’s income bonds and his aversion to foreclosure were not without influence upon the scheme which ultimately attained success. The next few months saw active hostilities between Mr. Gowen and the syndicate; the former taking the position that he would As in many cases before, the struggle ended in a compromise. The new agreement was as follows: The syndicate was to be enlarged by $4,000,000 additional subscriptions, and the reconstruction trustees increased to thirteen by the addition of certain friends of Mr. Gowen, one of whom was also to be given place upon the executive committee. The syndicate plan was to be carried through without foreclosure, providing sufficient assents could be obtained, and was to be modified by the substitution of first, second, and third 4 per cent income bonds for preferred, income, and consolidated 5 per cent stock. Dividends on the bonds, like those on the stock, were to be payable from net earnings only; but net earnings were defined as the profits derived from all sources after paying operating expenses, taxes, and existing rentals, guarantees and interest charges, but not fixed charges of the same sort subsequently created. All third preference bonds issued for convertible bonds were to have the right to be converted into common stock; and the company was to have the privilege of increasing the issue, subject for five years to the approval of the voting trustees. As finally worked out, the first preference bonds were to be given for assessments; the second preference for all securities which had been promised income or consolidated stock; and the third preference for the second series 5s, convertible and debenture bonds, and preferred stock to which common stock The total capital and charges under the plan were to be as follows:
We have now the reorganization in its final shape, and it will be interesting to review briefly the gradual way in which this shape was fashioned. With the company plunged anew into bankruptcy That the compromise plan last mentioned succeeded was in part Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose that the plan was unanimously accepted from the start. The Lockwood Committee of general mortgage bondholders were prompt in their disapproval, pronouncing it “unjust, uncertain, and indefinite”; saying that reorganization under it would be unduly expensive, and that it was more objectionable than the plans which had preceded it.229 Equally decided was a small group of capitalists which held a majority of the first series 5s outstanding, the members of which were said to have agreed to hold their bonds and to abide the result.230 The original time limit for deposits expired on March 1, 1887; it was then extended to March 15, and again to March 31, and deposits of $110,409,464 out of a total of $117,972,859 were secured. By October certain other bondholders had been induced to come in, and the trustees declared the plan operative. Holders of $3,348,000 of first series 5s stayed out, and forced an arrangement by which they were practically paid off in cash.231 Arrangements were made with some of the subsidiary Reading lines, but the lease of the Central of New Jersey was not renewed. Only odds and ends now remained to be cleared up, and all through the rest of the year the managers were busy paying off receivers’ certificates, floating debt, overdue interest, etc. On January 1, 1888, without formalities, the Reading passed out of receivers’ hands and into the control of the stockholders. |