CHAPTER XII

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THE SOUTHERN PACIFIC AND POLITICS

Appeals to Public

We may now consider in a more general fashion the political methods of the Southern Pacific group during the first thirty years of their railroad history. We have seen that they not only relied upon the talents of their legal staff in taking advantage of defects in the law, but that in two cases—the case of the railroad commission of 1880, and that of the subsidy in San Francisco in 1863—they probably resorted to the direct use of money to accomplish their ends. Yet a whole state cannot be bought, though individuals may be, and it would do injustice to the breadth of view of the associates to suppose that they limited themselves to any such crude device. Indeed, the frequency with which money bribes were offered probably diminished as time went on.

Consideration of the general policies of Mr. Stanford and of Mr. Huntington seems to show that they met the public demand for regulation of rates and fares in no less than five distinct ways.

The first method consisted of appeals to the general public through testimony before legislative committees, communications to the newspapers, letters to private organizations which interested themselves in the government control of corporations, and other similar devices. By these various means Stanford, at least, spread his philosophy of industry widely abroad. He took the general position that agitation upon the subject of railroads was due to misapprehension of the facts. Most alleged abuses were imaginary, but the Central Pacific stood ready to correct any that were shown to exist.[277] Railroad fares and freights were cheaper in California than anywhere else in the world, all things considered.[278] In case further reduction were desired, the true policy was to place as few burdens upon the railroads as possible, to encourage in this way new construction, and to rely on competition for the desired result. The interests of the railroad and of the public were the same.[279] Monopolies in the United States were possible only to the extent that they were beneficent. There was properly no right of control in the state. The Granger decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States were a flagrant violation of the principles of free government. If the people wanted to exercise control over a railroad they must do as the state does when it exercises the right of eminent domain; that is to say, they must pay to the individual owners the full value of whatever was taken for public use. Anything else was confiscation. Moreover, at best, regulation could not be complete, because it could not ever compel the shipper to ship equally over all lines, and because, while commerce was world-wide, American governments could regulate but one link in the chain. In California, regulation was peculiarly inexpedient so long as the railway system of the state was incomplete.[280]

Huntington’s Views

Mr. Huntington shared Mr. Stanford’s views, or at least approved the conclusion to which they led, but does not seem to have courted the same publicity in respect to the matter. Interviews he distrusted. “I notice,” he wrote in 1875, “that some correspondent of a San Diego paper has been interviewing Mr. Crocker. It is very difficult for any one to be interviewed by an infernal newspaper without getting hurt; and Mr. Crocker is not the most unlikely to get hurt of all the men I know.”

Yet in spite of this attitude towards the newspaper reporter, Huntington had a keen appreciation of the importance of shaping public opinion, and was familiar with the ordinary devices used for the purpose, including the manipulation of the press. He was concerned over the attitude of the Sacramento Record Union. “If I owned the paper,” he said, “I would control it or burn it.”[281] “I wish you would have it sent over the wires as often as you can that the Southern Pacific is being rapidly built,” he wrote Colton from New York in 1877.[282] Again, “Yours of November 28 with Northern Pacific clips is received. Many of the articles are very good. It is much better that all such articles with petitions be sent direct to members of the Senate and House, we keeping in the background as much as possible.”[283]

In November, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton that:

Gwynn left for the South yesterday. I think he can do us considerable good if he sticks for his hard money and anti-subsidy schemes; but if it was understood by the public that he was here in our interest, it would no doubt hurt us. When he left I told him he must not write to me, but when he wanted I should know his whereabouts, etc., to write to R. T. Colburn of Elizabeth, New Jersey.[284]

Influential Individuals Favored

A second method employed by the associates in their efforts to oppose public regulation of corporate affairs was that of paying personal attention to men who possessed or were believed to possess influence. In its simplest form this involved the employment at liberal salaries of the ablest legal talent which could be found. The policy was, however, pushed much further than the statement made would indicate. Huntington’s letters to his associates in the West were full of suggestions as to what should be done and of commendations for, or criticism of, what had been accomplished.

In April, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton that he had given Dr. Linderman, director of the United States Mint, a letter of introduction to him, Colton, at San Francisco. This was because the location of a new building for the Mint might be of importance to the Central Pacific.[285] In October of the same year Huntington gave a pass to a certain congressman and ex-governor, but warned Colton that the man was a slippery fellow and should not be trusted too much.[286] Crocker wrote to Colton in February, 1875:

I fully appreciate your position there and need of ... a Senator of the United States. We tried to get him off sooner the best we knew. I think he did not want to go, and I fear when he gets there he will not be earnest in our interest as formerly. Stanford thinks I am mistaken and I hope I am.[287]

A letter dated July 26, 1876, shows that Huntington was trying to get up a party of twenty-five southern members of Congress to visit California over the Southern Pacific. He wanted none but the best men—that is, men who would “go for the right as they understand it, and not as Tom Scott[288] or somebody else understands it,” but he was willing to pay the expenses of the trip for such men.[289] In order to help persuade representative men to make this trip, Huntington telegraphed Colton to have some of the prominent men in San Francisco wire Senator Gordon, of Georgia, urging that the visit should be made.[290] “I noticed you are looking after the State Railroad Commission,” Huntington adds in another letter to the same address, “I think it is time.”[291] Again:

I am sorry to learn that the receipts are so very poor south of San Francisco, but it is a good time to take the State Railroad Commissioners over the roads. I am glad to notice that you are looking after the Commissioners. I think it very important.[292]

Still again, in May, 1877, Huntington wrote:

I am glad you are paying some attention to General Taylor and Mr. Kasson. Taylor can do us much good in the South. I think, by the way, he would like to get some position with us in California. Mr. Kasson has always been our friend in Congress, and as he is a very able man, has been able to do us much good, and he has never lost us one dollar. I think I have written you before about Senator.... He may want to borrow some money, but we are so short this summer, I do not see how we can let him have any in California.[293]

Letters like these cover only one period and refer to the activity of only three out of the five associates, but there is sufficient outside evidence of a general nature to indicate that this policy was systematically followed by the Stanford group.

Lobbying in Washington and Sacramento

In addition to the attempt in a general way to gain the good-will of the public or of influential members of it, the Central Pacific was regularly represented at Washington and Sacramento when legislation was pending. Huntington, as has been said, took care of the company’s affairs in Washington. He had offices in New York and Boston also, and divided his time between the three places while Congress was in session—four days in Washington, two in New York, and one in Boston.[294] Stanford attended to matters in Sacramento, either in person or through representatives such as William Carr or Stephen T. Gage. The latter was also for many years the company’s agent in Nevada. Both Huntington and Stanford, of course, were assisted by a corps of lawyers and political aides-de-camp, some of whom were very highly paid. General Franchot, for instance, Huntington’s chief assistant, received at one time a salary of $20,000 a year, besides a liberal expense account. Much criticism has been directed at the activity of Central Pacific agents in the lobbies at Washington and Sacramento, but a large portion of it was probably legitimate.

Correspondence from Washington

Certainly the watch which the associates kept on legislation was very close. Huntington’s own activities in 1875, 1876, 1877, and 1878 are vividly described in the letters which he wrote Colton during these years, and some few of these deserve to be reproduced if only for the picture they suggest of the man who wrote them. In March, 1875, Huntington wrote:

I notice a bill passed the House some few days since, called up by Williams of Michigan. I forget its title, but it called for reports, etc., etc., from the Pacific roads. Of course it was something ugly or it would not have passed.[295]

This was mere routine. By June, 1876, however, the legislative work had increased. Mr. Huntington told Colton:

There is a terrible fight kept up on us in Washington. But while they may bite us, they will not eat us up. Sherrell telegraphed me to come to Washington in great haste, as Lawrence was to pass his bill at once; so I went over and got the committee to recall it from the House back to the committee, so the demagogue from Ohio cannot trouble us before the 6th of July. In the meantime we will be working on our land proposition in the Senate. Just what we can do I cannot say, but I shall surely keep trying.[296]

The following month he added:

I returned from Washington last night. Our matters look better there, but we are not out of danger. It has been so very hot here for the last few weeks that it has come near using me up. You know I do not spare myself when I have anything to do.[297]

In August, 1876, Huntington wrote Colton:

I have thought I could stand anything, but I am fearful this damnation Congress will kill me. Senator Edmunds told another Senator yesterday that he would pass his Pacific Railroad Sinking Fund Bill before Congress adjourned, but I think he will not, and I have some hope Congress will adjourn by the time this reaches you.[298]

And in March, 1877, he was able to say:

Congress has adjourned, and we have not been hurt, except by the paying out in Washington of some money for hotel bills, etc.

I am quite sure that we stand better in Washington at this time than we ever did before.

The Pacific Mail Steamship Co. got no aid. I will tell you some things about that some time. The Sinking Fund Bill did not pass, but is in a much better shape to pass than it has ever been before. I stayed in Washington two days to fix up the Railroad Committee in the Senate. Scott was there, working for the same thing, but I beat him for once certain, as the committee is just what we want it, which is a very important thing for us. You will no doubt notice before you get this that we were not able to pass the Texas-Pacific bill.[299]

The committee with which Huntington was so content was changed somewhat later, much to his disgust.[300]

It was not until the first part of 1878, however, that his letters show him again hard at work. In January, 1878, Huntington wrote to Colton:

I notice what you write of the communists in the California Legislature, and am very sorry to know it, but the feeling in Congress is not much better, and yet, somehow, I do not think we shall be much hurt, although Scott is working hard and developing more strength than I supposed he had. He had the Railroad Committee of the House. I think we have it now.[301]

The following month he said:

I returned from Washington last night, and I am as near used up as I ever was in my life before. I am spending my last winter at Washington. As I feel today, I would not agree to spend another there for all the property we all have. Our matters are looking fair in Washington, Scott is very bitter in the discussion. He used some business compliments and all such stuff, and I am compelled to play him; but it is very distasteful to me.[302]

This letter is followed in the record by a series of others of the same tenor, which will be presented without comment.

... I have done all I can to prevent certain bills from being reached, and do not think any bills can be that will hurt us, but if there are, they will pass, as this Congress is, I think, the worst set of men that have ever been collected together since man was created.[303]

I returned from Washington last night. I am almost happy to think I shall not be called there again this session, as Congress has adjourned its first session, and may the likes of it never meet again. I think in all the world’s history never before was such a wild set of demagogues honored by the name of Congress. We have been hurt some, but some of the worst bills have been defeated, but we cannot stand many such congresses.[304]

Friend Colton: I returned from Washington this morning and found on my desk yours of the 10th inst., No. 74. Thurman’s funding bill has not passed the House yet, but it will, I think, although I am endeavoring to get it to the Judiciary Committee. If I can I think we can get it amended, but even that is doubtful. There were some mistakes made by us when the bill was in the Senate; the greatest was in Gould going to Washington; but it is too long a story to write now. I will tell you when we meet, if we have nothing better to talk of. This Congress is nothing but an agrarian camp, the worst body of men that ever before got together in this country. Scott is making a hard fight on his Texas and Pacific bill. He has made a combination with the Northern Pacific, which will give him some strength, how much I cannot tell. The Northern Pacific are to ask for guarantee of their bonds by the United States. I shall come to California soon after Congress adjourns. Find some one to buy me out of everything there. I am tired and want to quit.[305]

... I notice what you say of Thurman’s Sinking Fund Bill—of course it is bad, but if we could have amended it so as to make it a finality, and give us 6 per cent on the fund, it would not have been so bad. It may not pass, but I think it will for this is the worst Congress we have ever had; if it should, we must beat it in the courts, if we can.

I go to Washington tonight; I should have gone last night, but for the reason that Clara has been quite sick for some days.

Mr. Sherrell telegraphed me yesterday that I must not fail of being there this morning. I cannot attend to this Washington business much longer.[306]

I returned from Washington last night. I hope to get through there without being hurt any more; but it seems as though every committee in both Houses had something before them that we had an interest in.[307]

Skilled Wire-Pulling

There is no need to comment in any detail upon these letters. Their occasional indication of discouragement doubtless meant nothing more than that Huntington sometimes grew tired and hot and angry with the opposition which he encountered. A characteristic of the man was that he never really gave up. The Thurman bill referred to will be described in another connection.

Scott was a railroad man, at one time president of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who was seeking to persuade Congress to subsidize a transcontinental railway by the southern route. The land proposition was a scheme of the associates to induce the federal legislature to buy back a portion of the Central Pacific land grant at the government price. As a whole, the letters so far quoted show that Huntington was a persistent and energetic lobbyist, although the record of Congressional legislation shows that he was far from uniformly successful.

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On the whole, the railroad managers pulled wires with a skill which rapidly increased with experience. Sometimes the company was made to appear prominently, and sometimes it was kept in the background when legislation was desired. Huntington found that some members of Congress were disinclined to talk to him concerning Southern Pacific matters. In such cases he had recourse to third parties—perhaps a constituent of the member in question, perhaps a friend. The same methods were employed in dealing with state legislation. In 1875 the Southern Pacific desired a franchise permitting it to build through Arizona. Huntington wrote Colton that he thought this would cost less if other interests than the associates stood at the front while the franchises were being obtained, but that after the charters were obtained it should be known that they were controlled by the Southern Pacific.[308] He said:

I am inclined to believe that if you could get the right man on that line in Arizona to work with the few papers they have there, to agitate the question in the territory, asking that some arrangement be made with the S. P., at the same time offer the S. P. a charter in the territory that would free the road from taxation, and one that would not allow for any interference with rates until ten per cent interest was declared on the common stock, I believe the Legislature could be called together by the people for $5,000 and such a charter granted. Then we would take the chances of having such a charter made good by Congress or the State when it became one.[309]

At one time Huntington even suggested that the Southern Pacific might bear the expense of an extra session of the Arizona legislature in order to hasten consideration of legislation favorable to the company.[310] The desired legislation was eventually obtained, but not until February, 1887.

Unethical Dealings

Did or did not the Huntington group, including Stanford at Sacramento and Reno, and Huntington at Washington, employ improper means in their endeavor to influence votes? This is another question upon the answer to which much depends. That passes were issued to members of the legislature, members of Congress, and judges of courts, and that gentlemen of these types were entertained at dinner in Sacramento was generally known. We have Mr. Gage’s statement, at least, that no more than this took place in Nevada. He told the United States Pacific Railway Commission of 1887, that his expenditures in that state over a period of eight years had amounted to $2,000, and added:

... and I would like to produce to you the files of the newspapers in order to show the existence of the misapprehensions that existed among the good people of Nevada, as indicated by their press, concerning my relations with the legislature of Nevada, session after session for the sixteen years. I remarked yesterday that it was one of the greatest sources of regret that I had, the imputations which were cast on my character, and which I feel I have not deserved, and which I feel I may not live long enough to outgrow. One of these is that I have spent money in the Nevada legislature for the Central Pacific like water; and those things were constantly asserted, and I believe frequently believed by a good many good people in the State, but they were not true. As I asserted to you yesterday, I have kept an accurate account of the expenses for the first eight years that I was attending the sessions of the Nevada legislature, which included my personal expenses during that time, and they figure up $2,000, or a fraction under it, as it was. Now, if any one thinks that $2,000, or less, could corrupt a legislature for eight years, including the personal expenses of myself, he must invoice members of the Nevada legislature at a very low price, and “buy them by the string.”[311]

Mr. Gage would not say, however, when asked pointblank, whether or not he had paid any money or made any provisions of advantage or reward to any member of the legislature of California or Nevada.[312] Nor would Mr. Stanford say more in reply to the inquiries of the United States Pacific Railway Commission than that the company would not include in any settlement with the United States, vouchers to which objections were made.[313]

On the whole, there is a good deal of evidence that the owners of the Central Pacific went further in influencing legislation than any strict system of ethics would allow. Huntington once stated his own position as follows:

If you have to pay money to have the right thing done, it is only just and fair to do it.... If a man has the power to do great evil and won’t do right unless he is bribed to do it, I think the time spent will be gained when it is a man’s duty to go up and bribe the judge. A man that will cry out against them himself will also do these things himself. If there was none for it, I would not hesitate.[314]

Further Evidence

More important than the record of such general expressions of opinion are the affidavits filed in the San Francisco subsidy litigation described in an earlier chapter. Nor is anyone likely to read the letters of Mr. Huntington to Mr. Colton in the late seventies without becoming convinced that the possibility of purchasing votes was constantly before Huntington’s mind. Huntington wrote Colton at one time that the (Southern Pacific) company could not get legislation unless it paid more than it was worth.[315] In another communication he said: “If we pass the Sinking Fund Bill and beat Scott and the Union Pacific, it will hurt us not less than half flora”;[316] and in still another we find the cheery comment: “Matters do not look well in Washington, but I think we shall not be much hurt, although the boys are very hungry and it will cost considerably to be saved.”[317]

In November, 1877, Huntington wrote Colton:

You have no idea how I am annoyed by this Washington business, and I must and will give it up after this session. If we are not hurt this session it will be because we pay much money to prevent it, and you know how hard it is to get it to pay for such purposes; and I do not see my way clear to get through here and pay the January interest with other bills payable to January 1st, with less than $2,000,000, and possibly not for that.... I think Congress will try very hard to pass some kind of a bill to make us commence paying on what we owe the Government. I am striving very hard to get a bill in such a shape that we can accept it, as this Washington business will kill me yet if I have to continue the fight from year to year, and then every year the fight grows more and more expensive; and rather than let it continue as it is from year to year, as it is, I would rather they take the road and be done with it.[318]

In one case where the salary to be paid a certain individual was under consideration, Huntington wrote Colton frankly that it was important that the man’s friends in Washington should be on the railroad’s side, and that if this could be brought about a salary of $10,000 to $20,000 a year would be worth while. Huntington wanted the man to make a proposition in writing, however, that he would control his friends for a fixed sum.[319] When asked about the meaning of his correspondence, Huntington denied that these expressions had any vicious significance. He said he kept on high ground,[320] and even objected to the free use of liquor and cigars.[321] Specifically, he gave instructions to his people never to use money in any immoral or illegal sense. “Buying votes in a legislature was bad policy,” said he, and his position in these matters received the formal support of Stanford. But such assertions are entitled to less weight than Huntington’s less guarded phrases.

Heavy General and Legal Expenses

There is no question that the control exercised by the Central Pacific management over the legal and miscellaneous expenses of the company was informal to the last degree. Huntington had a great deal of money to spend and he turned it over to trusted agents without too many questions. He would pay $5,000 or $10,000 at a time to General Franchot, for instance, without inquiring where it went or how it was paid.[322] Checks were made out in all cases to I. E. Gates, Mr. Huntington’s assistant in New York, and were indorsed by him either to payee or in blank.[323] Vouchers covering such items were made out simply to “Expense,” or to “Legal expense.”[324] In many cases expenditures authorized by Stanford, Crocker, or Huntington were represented by no vouchers at all,[325] the filing of vouchers being subsequently waived at stockholders’ meetings.

All in all, the general and legal expenses of the Central Pacific between the years 1875 and 1885 averaged over $500,000 annually. The only reply to the government inquiry as to what this money had been paid out for was Stanford’s statement already quoted that vouchers to which there were objections would not be included in any settlement with the United States, but that the moneys would be treated as still in the treasury.[326] This was plainly an evasion of the point at issue.

Company in Politics

Still another question is how far the headquarters of the Central Pacific in the various capitals were used as agencies for the election of legislators and other persons who owed their position to railroad influence. It is the unhesitating popular judgment that the railroad at an early date “entered politics.” In a long letter dated August 26, 1873, Eugene Casserly asserted that the Central Pacific aimed to be and was a third party in the politics of the state, holding the balance of power between the Democratic and the Republican parties, and controlling or seeking to control at will each or both of them. “This third party,” continued Mr. Casserly, “has the usual attributes of a political party, the same apparatus and appliances. It has its leaders, its managers, its editors, its orators, its adherents. It selects these from both parties, but mostly from the party in the majority. Whether they call themselves Republicans or Democrats, and however they divide or contend on party issues, they move as one man in the cause of the railroad against the people. To that cause they give their first allegiance.”

Bassett Polemic

This statement of Mr. Casserly calls to mind another charge or series of charges made by a man named J. M. Bassett in the years following 1892. Mr. Bassett was one of the early pioneers. He came to California in 1851, and was at various times miner, printer, newspaper man, railroad employee, and member of the Oakland city council. At one time he was Leland Stanford’s secretary. After Mr. Stanford had been forced out of the presidency of the Southern Pacific, Bassett began to publish a series of open letters to Collis P. Huntington, and continued them weekly, with occasional intervals, for several years. The sustained vivacity and pungency of this polemic, and the systematic virulence with which Bassett reviewed and criticized the Huntington policies make the series a noteworthy journalistic achievement. Mr. Bassett denounced Mr. Huntington for the overcapitalization of the Southern Pacific system, for its failure to pay taxes, for its carelessness of the lives of its employees and of the public, for its attempt to evade repayment of the debt which it owed to the United States government, and for the general mismanagement which, he asserted, had taken place under Huntington’s control. With respect to the interference of the Southern Pacific in politics, Bassett wrote to Huntington in 1895:

What chief executive of the State, before the present incumbent, has there been who did not owe his nomination and election to the Southern Pacific Company and in acknowledgment of his debt hasten to obey its slightest command? Has there ever been a Board of Railroad Commissioners before last November in which you did not own at least two members? Have you not named every Harbor Commissioner appointed during the past twelve years?

Have you not hitherto chosen San Francisco’s Police Commissions and do you not now exercise a dictatorial power over the city’s police, especially the Harbor Police? Were not the Judges of the two United States Courts in San Francisco appointed at the instance of Leland Stanford? How many Superior Courts are there in the State in which a citizen may bring an action against you in full confidence that he will be fairly and impartially dealt with? Doubtless there are such but the difficulty is to find them. Before the recent elections how long did you control the government of San Francisco? Have you not dictated the government of Oakland for the past twenty-five years? Until last election had you not continuous control of Alameda County’s government?...[327]

When one desires to test the accuracy of accusations like those of Casserly and of Bassett, one has first to remember that they are in accord with the substantially uncontradicted declarations of men of all degrees of prominence in California over a period of fifty years. Political campaigns have been waged on the question of the railroad versus the people. Not only newspapers like the Sacramento Union and the San Francisco Examiner, but men like John T. Doyle, at one time state railroad commissioner, General Howard, a leading member of the Constitutional Convention of 1879, and H. H. Haight, at one time governor of the state of California, have asserted that railroad influence was a real and important factor in the politics of California. While neither a corporation nor an individual can properly be convicted on the strength of current report, the presence of so much smoke, over so long a period, is fair evidence of some fire.

Documentary Evidence

Direct testimony relating to the political activity of the Huntington group comes from Mr. Huntington himself in two ways. In the first place there have been published certain letters which passed between Huntington and his associate, Mr. Colton, in the years 1875 to 1878. These documents have been referred to in other connections. They came out in the course of court proceedings, and have the weight of confidential communications, not intended for publication. Extracts from these letters will presently be given. Besides this, certain statements were given by Huntington to the press in 1890 which bear directly upon the point at issue. These statements were intended to discredit Stanford, but in the course of the heated controversy to which they gave rise they were not denied by Stanford nor withdrawn by their author.

On May 1, 1875, Huntington wrote Colton:

I noticed what you say of Piper; he is a wild hog; don’t let him come back to Washington, but as the house is to be largely Democratic, and if he was to be defeated, likely it would be charged to us, hence, I should think it would be well to beat him with a Democrat; but I would defeat him anyway, and if he got the nomination put up another Democrat and run against him, and in that way elect a Republican. Beat him.[328]

Asked to whom the letter referred, Huntington later said that if he remembered the person, and he thought he did, he was a man whose views ran contrary to all human interests.[329]

A letter in June, 1876, reads as follows:

I hope ... will be sent back to Congress. I think it would be a misfortune if he was not.... has not always been right, but he is a good fellow and is growing every day.... is always right, and it would be a misfortune to Cal. not to have him in Congress. Piper is a damned hog, and should not come back. It is shame enough for a great commercial city like San Francisco to send a scavenger like him to Congress once....[330]

Again, in November, 1876, Huntington wrote Colton:

I hope ... is elected and ... defeated, as it was generally understood here that our hand was over one and under the other....[331]

A still later letter relates to the pending election of a senator from California. Huntington said:

We should be very careful to get a U. S. Senator from Cal. that will be disposed to use us fairly, and then have the power to help us ..., I think, will be friendly, and there is no man in the Senate that can push a measure further than he can.[332]

Controversy between Associates

The correspondence which has just been cited is not offered in order to discredit Mr. Huntington, or for any reason except to show that it was Huntington’s belief in the years 1875, 1876, and 1877 that the influence of the Central Pacific should be used to advance the political interests of persons favorably inclined toward his railroad system and to discourage those in opposition. The personal controversy which took place between Stanford and Huntington in 1890 brought out some additional evidence of the same sort. This dispute arose ostensibly because of the election of Stanford in 1883-84 as senator from California in place of A. A. Sargent, one of Huntington’s friends. In reality it was probably only the final outcome of a growing tension between the two men, due to dissatisfaction on Huntington’s part with the small amount of time which Stanford devoted to railroad affairs, and perhaps to jealousy of the prominence which Stanford enjoyed in public estimation.[333]

However this may be, Stanford resigned the presidency of the Southern Pacific Company at the annual meeting of the stockholders on April 9, 1890, and Huntington was elected in his place. In his address to the board of directors of the company, Huntington used the following words:

Gentlemen, for the honor that you have done me in electing me President of the Southern Pacific Company ... I promise you that I will be as true to the interest of the company in the future as I have been in the past. I can promise you nothing more, for at all times my personal interest has been second to that of the company. It shall be so in the future, and in no case will I use this great corporation to advance my personal ambition at the expense of its owners, or put my hands into the treasury to defeat the people’s choice, and thereby put myself into positions that should be filled by others; but to the best of my ability will I work for the interest of the shareholders of the company and the people, whom it should serve.[334]

This statement attracted attention, and Huntingdon was asked to explain. In an interview with a reporter of the San Francisco Examiner he said further:

From this time on we are going to follow one business. We are railroad men and intend to conduct a legitimate railroad business. To do that successfully politics must be let alone.... If a man wants to make a business of politics, all well and good; if he wants to manage a railroad, all well and good; but he can’t do both at the same time.

I have seen the ante-rooms down here in this building full of men trying to learn or get something out of politics. Why should they come here? This is no place for them. But then they were not to blame. The tip went forth that political work was being done at Fourth and Townsend streets, and they merely followed the tip. Well, there won’t be any more tips sent out of these railroad offices. Politics have worked enough demoralization in our company already, and they have gone out of the door never to return....

Things have got to such a state, that if a man wants to be a constable he thinks he has first got to come down to Fourth and Townsend streets to get permission. Hereafter people who come to Fourth and Townsend streets must have railroad business to transact. The Southern Pacific Company is out of politics, and will attend to its business like any other private company or individual should do.[335]

Such statements naturally led to an open breach between Huntingdon and Stanford.[336]

The point at issue was not, however, whether it was proper for the Southern Pacific to defend itself against political attack. On this there is every reason to suppose that all parties were agreed. It was rather whether the company should be used as an instrument to advance the personal interests of individuals. In the same connection the question arose whether railroad men should act together in political matters not connected with railroad affairs. Huntington, who had little interest in general politics, thought they should not. It is probable enough that Stanford or some of his subordinates had, on the other hand, used their influence as railroad men for personal and party ends.

Unscrupulousness of Associates

One rises from the study of the political activities of the owners of the Central Pacific with a feeling of indignation at the selfishness of these men, their indifference to all save considerations of private gain, and their readiness to use any and all methods which would advance their financial interests. The associates met the proposal of government regulation as a threat to rob them of their property and resisted it as they would have opposed any other attack. They never conceded that any question of public interest was involved which it was necessary for them to respect. They frankly defended the use of money as a method of persuading men to do what was right—which inevitably meant, of course, what in their judgment was right. They fell out among themselves, not because any one of them questioned the philosophy which inspired their opposition to public control, but because one of them was suspected of using power, developed in the course of the defense of railroad interests, to advance personal ambitions which ran counter to the views of his associates. These things should be plainly stated and their force clearly understood.

It is the writer’s opinion, however, that the amount of money spent by the Central Pacific in the purchase of legislative or other votes has probably been overestimated in the public mind. Direct bribery is a clumsy weapon and one difficult to conceal if practiced on any considerable scale. It was probably also unnecessary to a corporation such as the Central Pacific with other favors to bestow. Members of Congress might, indeed, be employed by the railroad when legislation was pending. Huntington maintained that this was legitimate,[337] and Gage once admitted that the company had to employ everybody who could pull a pound. The practice was more easily defensible than bribery, and could be applied to a better class of men. Other men might be reached through patronage, still others through discrimination in rates or through preferences. The suggestion that unfavorable legislation would hinder construction was potent with legislators from districts which still lacked rail connection. Yet Huntington once said of a man who was opposing him and whom he thought he could bribe, that his better judgment told him the associates could not afford to take the scamp into camp,[338] and this probably represented the situation at most times. Whether this worked for the eventual salvation of the Huntington group, is for the moralist to say.


                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                           

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