[1] "Principles of Psychology," vol. i, p. 336.

[2] Galileo's "heresy," that the earth moves round the sun, was condemned by a papal decree in the sixteenth century as "absurd, philosophically false, and formally heretical, because it is expressly contrary to Holy Scripture." No Roman Catholic now dreams of disputing what the Florentine astronomer maintained; and the evolutionists are perpetually foretelling that the time will come when to question their doctrine will be admitted to be as ridiculous as was the papal interdict fulminated against Galileo. If their doctrine had nothing to confront it but a similar condemnation, proceeding from some ecclesiastical authority claiming to be "infallible," or, if it could be met only by the assertion that it is "contrary to Holy Scripture," there would be some analogy between the two cases. But there is a vast unlikeness between the two cases. While the hypothesis of animal evolution is plainly enough "contrary to Holy Scripture," no one who has any perception of the weakness of its proofs is obliged to rest his rejection of it on that ground. If, in the sixteenth century, there had been as good scientific and physical grounds on which to refute Galileo as there now are for questioning the doctrine of the evolution of distinct species out of other species, the papal condemnation would have been superfluous even for churchmen. We must not forget the age in which we live, or allow any kind of truth to fail of vindication, from fear of being classed with those who in some former age have blunderingly mistaken the means of vindicating truth. Belief in special creations, whatever the Bible may say, does not now, and in all probability never will, stand on a par with the belief that the sun moves round the earth.

[3] Macaulay's "Essays," etc., Riverside edition, vol. ii, 502-504.

[4] Grote's "Plato," i, 4.

[5] Thales flourished 620-560 B. C. Plato's life extended from 427-347 B. C.

[6] Grote's "Plato," i, 10. I follow Mr. Grote in describing the hypothesis of the Pythagoreans.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Grote, iii, 290.

[9] Ibid., 287, 288.

[10] Grote, iii, 289.

[11] It should be stated that the passage from Macaulay's writings here commented on was written and first published in 1840, before the speculations of the scientists who maintain the doctrines of evolution had attracted much attention, or been promulgated in their present shape.

[12] Rotation was considered the movement most conformable to reason and intelligence, and it is impracticable to any figure but the spherical. Grote, iii, 253.

[13] The primitive gods of Plato's conception (in the "TimÆus") are not to be confounded with the gods of the poetic and popular faith. As Mr. Grote has pointed out, there is nothing more remarkable in Plato's writings than the subtilty and skill with which he contrived to elude the charge of impiety and infidelity toward the gods of tradition and of the popular faith. In a passage of the "TimÆus," on which Mr. Grote seems to be in doubt whether it was ironical or sincere, Plato boldly confronts the difficulty by saying that we must believe competent witnesses whose testimony we have, respecting the genesis of the remaining gods who have personal names and were believed in by his contemporaries. For his own part, he says, he does not pretend to account for their generation. The sons of the gods, the heroic and sacred families, who must have known their own fathers and all about their own family affairs, have given us their family traditions, and we must obey the law and believe. But concerning the primitive gods, the first progenitors of the remaining gods, we are at liberty to speculate. The ingenuity of this admission of authority where authority has spoken, reconcilable with speculation upon matters on which authority has not spoken, is admirable. Plato, as Mr. Grote has observed, was willing to incur the risk of one count of the indictment which was brought against his master Socrates, that of introducing new divine persons. In legal parlance he might have demurred to this count, as not charging any offense against the established religion. But the other count, for not acknowledging the gods whom the city acknowledged, he did not choose to encounter. As to them, he prudently, and perhaps sarcastically, accepts the testimony of witnesses who speak by inspiration and authority. But as to the primitive gods, the progenitors of the gods from whom were descended the heroic and sacred families of men, he expresses in the "TimÆus" his own convictions, without appealing to authority and without intimating that he is speaking of mysteries beyond the comprehension of his reason. The boldness of this flight beyond all authority into the realms of pure reason is very striking, even if it does end in nothing but probability, which is all that Plato claims for his theory.

[14] It must be remembered that, in the formation of the cosmical soul, the ingredients were the eternal Ideas; of these there could be a remnant after the cosmical soul was formed. But the cosmical body, which was formed out of the material elements, comprehended the whole of them, and there could be no remnant or surplus of them remaining outside. But portions of them could be borrowed for a limited period of mortal existence, and would return to their place in the Kosmos when that existence terminated. If this distinction be carried along, Plato will not be found to be inconsistent with himself.

[15] It does not distinctly appear what was to become of the rational soul if it finally failed in the conflict with evil, at the lowest end of the transmigration. Being immortal, it could not perish. But in providing for it an opportunity of final success through all the forms of animal life to which it might be condemned, it would seem that Plato was pressed by a reluctance to encounter the idea of endless misery. This point, however, does not obscure his explanation of the process by which species of animals, and a succession of inferior animals, came to exist.

[16] Mr. Grote has pointed out that in his other writings, notably in the "Republic" and in the "Leges", Plato is not consistent with this idea that the gods are responsible for the evil that man causes to himself; and that in the "TimÆus" he plainly makes the Demiurgus responsible, because he brings, or allows to be brought, an immortal soul down from its star, where it was living pure, intelligent, and in harmony with reason, and makes it incur corruption, disturbance, and stupidity, by junction with a mortal body and two mortal and inferior souls.

[17] I have omitted the description of the influence of disease induced by an over-indulgence of appetite, etc., in aiding the process of debasement from the primitive type. The reader can find this influence developed in Grote, or can consult the original Greek of the "TimÆus." It would appear that Plato considered the effect of all the appetites, when too much indulged, as tending in the primitive non-sexual type toward the development of that lower kind of animal which the gods saw fit to treat as fit only to become woman.

[18] Grote.

[19] Grote's "Plato," iii, 282.

[20] See, as to the reception of the Platonic Demiurgus by the Alexandrian Jews, first chapter.

[21] "Origin of Species," p. 428, American edition, from the sixth English. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1882.

[22] Mr. Darwin refers to Mr. Herbert Spencer's theory of "the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation"; and indeed it is apparent that this class of philosophers have constructed a theory which denies the creation of the human mind as a spiritual essence, independent of matter, although some of them may adhere to the idea that it was God who caused matter to evolve out of its own action the substance or existence that we call mind.

[23] "Origin of Species," p. 69.

[24] For the illustrations of both kinds of selection I must refer the reader to Mr. Darwin's works. In regard to birds, he makes the sexual selection operate less by the "law of battle" among the males, or by fighting, and more by the attractions of plumage and voice, by which the males carry on their rivalry for the choice of the females in pairing. But he attributes the same effect to the sexual selection in birds as in the other animals, namely, the transmission to offspring, and chiefly to the male offspring, of those peculiarities of structure which have given to the male parent the victory over his competitors.

[25] A very low form of fish, without brain, vertebral column, or heart, classed by the older naturalists among the worms. ("Descent of Man," p. 159.) The technical name of the lancelet is Amphioxus.

[26] "Origin of Species," p. 146.

[27] The kangaroos and opossums are of this group.

[28] Animals with four hands.

[29] Animals which produce living young, and nourish them after birth by milk from the teats of the mother.

[30] The lemur is one of a genus of four-handed mammals, allied to the apes, baboons, and monkeys, but with a form approaching that of quadrupeds.

[31] "Descent of Man," p. 165.—The reader will need to observe that monkey is the popular name of the ape and the baboon. In zoÖlogy, monkey designates the animals of the genus Simia, which have long tails. The three classes are apes, without tails; monkeys, with long tails; baboons, with short tails.

[32] Grote, iii, p. 276.

[33] "Descent of Man," p. 65.

[34] "Descent of Man," p. 65.

[35] "Descent of Man," pp. 164, 609.

[36] "Descent of Man," p. 159.

[37] "Origin of Species," p. 148.

[38] "Descent of Man," p. 165.

[39] "Descent of Man," p. 158.

[40] "Descent of Man," p. 155.

[41] Ibid.

[42] "Descent of Man," pp. 156, 157.

[43] Ibid., p. 156.

[44] "Descent of Man," p. 156.

[45] "Descent of Man," p. 6.

[46] Ibid., p. 8.

[47] Ibid.

[48] "Descent of Man," pp. 9, 10, quoting Huxley, "Man's Place in Nature," p. 65.

[49] "Descent of Man," p. 11 et seq.

[50] Ibid.

[51] "Descent of Man," p. 24. Consult Mr. Darwin's note on Prof. Bianconi's explanation of homologous structures upon mechanical principles, in accordance with their uses.

[52] Mr. Herbert Spencer's peculiar views are not here included in the discussion, but they will be considered hereafter.

[53] It is immaterial, of course, in this discussion, whether the formation of man preceded that of the other animals, according to the Platonic idea, or whether, as in the account given in the book of Genesis, the other animals were first formed. So far as an ideal plan entered into all of them, that plan may have been devised for and first applied to any part of the series, and then varied accordingly.

[54] The popular terms—"fish" and "flesh"—present to the mind the most vivid idea of this change from the characteristic substance of one of these animals to that of another.

[55] See the note on amputation, or severance of parts, at the end of this chapter.

[56] "Descent of Man," p. 25.

[57] "The Principles of Biology," by Herbert Spencer, vol. i, p. 334 et seq. I use the American edition, D. Appleton & Co., 1881.

[58] "Biology," i, p. 336.

[59] "Biology," i, pp. 336, 337.

[60] Webster's "Dictionary of the English Language."

[61] Let it be remembered that the sense which is here considered comprehends not only material objects, but also ideas, images, and in short whatever, in its kind, had no previous existence. This is just as true of an original poem, or picture, or statue, or musical composition, as it is of a machine that is both original and new as a piece of mechanism.

[62] Perhaps I owe an apology to a large class of readers for having bestowed so much attention upon the logical formula with which Mr. Spencer aims to dispose of the idea of creation. But I have observed, especially among young persons and others whose habits of thinking are unformed or not corrected by sound and comprehensive reasoning, a popular reception of this particular dogma, which makes it necessary to subject it to some careful analysis. In fact, one of my chief objects in writing this book has been to contribute what I might to the formation of habits of testing philosophical and scientific theories by something better than specious assumptions which can be thrown into the plausible form of logical propositions. There is nothing more valuable than logic, when its forms represent a true and correct ratiocination; and, when they do not, there is nothing that is more delusive. It needs some discipline of mind to enable people to see when logic is valuable and when it is not.

[63] "Biology," i, p. 340 et seq.

[64] This is given almost verbatim from Mr. Spencer's "Biology," i, p. 340 et seq.

[65] In treating of the existence of physical and moral evil, I do not mean to include sin in the discussion. I mean now by moral evil that loss or diminution of happiness, for the individual or a race, which results from physical evil produced by causes for which the sufferer is not responsible. The sin that is in the world is a matter that is to be considered entirely with reference to the accountability of man as a moral being; and the reasons which may be assigned for its permission may be quite distinct from those which relate to the existence of physical suffering for which man is not responsible upon any rational theory of moral accountability.

[66] "Biology," i, p. 354.

[67] "Biology," i, p. 339.

[68] "Biology," i, pp. 344, 355.

[69] "Biology," i, pp. 346-348 et seq.

[70] Concerning the nebular hypothesis, and what astronomers now consider, see post.

[71] "Biology," i.

[72] "Biology," i, pp. 349, 350.

[73] "Biology," i, p. 351. I am not quite sure that I understand what Mr. Spencer means by "direct" proof. In the passage immediately following the sentence last quoted, he speaks of "the kind and quantity of direct evidence that all organic beings have gradually arisen," etc., whereas, in a previous passage, he had admitted that the facts at present assignable in direct proof of this hypothesis are insufficient. I presume he meant insufficient in number. (Compare "Biology," i, pp. 351 and 352). Now, I should say that direct proof of the hypothesis that all animal organisms have arisen successively out of one another would require more or less positive evidence of such occurrences; and that the proof which is afforded by what has taken place within the limits of a single species in the course of successive generations would be indirect evidence of what may have taken place in the evolution of different species, because it requires the aid of analogy to connect the two. I am not aware that there is supposed to be any proof of the evolution of species out of species, excepting that which is derived from what has taken place in single races in the development of the ovum into the infant, the development of the infant into the mature animal, and the limited varieties of structure appearing among individuals of the same race. As I go on through the examination of Mr. Spencer's argument, it will appear whether there are grounds for regarding this kind of reasoning as satisfactory or the reverse.

[74] I have stated here, in reference to the pedigree of an individual, a far more liberal rule of evidence than would probably be allowed in courts of justice, where anything of value was depending upon the establishment of a descent from a certain ancestor. But I have purposely suggested the broadest rule that can be applied to family or race resemblances as a means of aiding a pedigree in popular determination or in a judicium rusticum. For example, suppose that there were persons now living in this country who trace their descent from the English husband of Pocahontas, the daughter of an Indian chief, and from her. They bear, we will suppose, the family name of the Englishman whom she is known to have married, and perhaps one of them bears very strong resemblance to the Indian race in features, complexion, and hair. In a judicial trial of this person's supposed pedigree I do not suppose that these resemblances, if they constituted his sole evidence, together with the name of Rolfe which he bears, and which a certain number of his ancestors may have borne before him, would be received as evidence of his descent from the Indian girl whose name was Pocahontas, and who married an Englishman of the name of Rolfe more than two centuries ago. It would be necessary to make some proof of the whole pedigree by the kind of evidence which the law admits in such cases, and then the resemblances of the individual to the Indian race might possibly be received as confirmatory proof, in aid of the proof derived from the family name of Pocahontas's English husband, from reputation, written or oral declarations of deceased witnesses, family documents, ancient gravestones, and the like. In popular judgment most persons would be apt to accept the family name of Rolfe and the apparent trace of Indian blood as sufficient proof of the descent of the individual from the Indian girl who married John Rolfe. But in a court of justice these facts would go for nothing without some independent proof of the pedigree.

[75] See the table of the Darwinian pedigree of man, ante. Any other mode of arranging the order of evolution that will admit of the application of the steps of supposed development to what is known of the animal kingdom, will equally serve to illustrate the theory.

[76] Darwin's "Descent of Man," Prof. Huxley's note, p. 199 et seq.

[77] Mr. Spencer observes that the hypothesis of special creations is one "which formulates absolute ignorance into a semblance of positive knowledge...." Thus, however regarded, the hypothesis of special creations turns out to be worthless—worthless by its derivation; worthless in its intrinsic incoherence; worthless as absolutely without evidence; worthless as not satisfying a moral want. "We must therefore consider it as counting for nothing, in opposition to any other hypothesis respecting the origin of organic beings." There is a great deal more in the same tone. (See "Biology," i, pp. 344, 345, and passim throughout Chapters II and III of Part III of that work.) Mr. Darwin, who is sufficiently positive, is much more moderate, and in my opinion a much better reasoner, although I can not subscribe to his reasoning or his conclusions. A rather irreverent naval officer of my acquaintance once extolled a doctrinal sermon, which he had just heard preached by a Unitarian clergyman, in this fashion: "I tell you what, sir, the preacher did not leave the Trinity a leg to stand upon." Probably some of Mr. Spencer's readers think that he has equally demolished the doctrine of special creations.

[78] "Descent of Man," p. 155.

[79] "Biology," i, p. 366.

[80] "In the presence of the various genealogical trees of animal descent which have been put forward so frequently of late, a judicious skepticism seems the attitude best warranted by the evidence yet obtained. If so many similar forms have arisen in mutual independence, then the affinities of the animal kingdom can never be represented by the symbol of a tree. Rather, we should conceive of the existence of a grove of trees, closely approximated, greatly differing in age and size, with their branches interlaced in a most complex entanglement. The great group of apes is composed of two such branches; but their relations one to another, to the other branches which represent mammalian groups, and to the trunks from which such branches diverge, are problems still awaiting solution."—"EncyclopÆdia Britannica," article "Apes."

[81] "Biology," i, pp. 380-382.

[82] I use these terms with quotation-marks, because I do not admit any philosophical antagonism such as they are intended to imply.

[83] "Homology" is defined by lexicographers as "the doctrine of similar parts." "Homologous organs" is a term used by scientific writers to describe organs having a relation of some proportion to each other. In this particular case of the vertebral column, the different parts of the column are treated as if they were different organs, and they are said to be homologous organs in the same animal, because they bear a certain relation or ratio of proportion to each other.

[84] See the discussion of how evolution works, post.

[85] "Biology," i, p. 387.

[86] The Greek philosophers, as we have seen, before Plato and Aristotle, found that their systems of causes, which did not involve the idea of power as abstracted from substance, would not account for the phenomena of nature. With all their subtilty and ingenuity, they did not reach the truth that secondary causes are necessarily limited in their action, and that there must be an unlimited cause.

[87] "Biology," i, pp. 369, 370.

[88] "Biology," i, p. 388.

[89] "Biology," i, pp. 390, 391.

[90] "Biology," i, p. 396.

[91] "Biology," i, p. 399. It is to be noted that the relationship here referred to is supposed or apparent kinship between the aggregate of the surviving and the aggregate of the extinct forms which have died out in recent geologic times. But this does not supply the steps of descent by which any one surviving form can be traced back to any one extinct form.

[92] "Biology," i, p. 401.

[93] "Essays," vol. iii, pp. 293-296.

[94] For the answer to the objection that we thus ascribe anthropomorphic attributes to the Supreme Being, see infra.

[95] Webster's Dictionary, "Phenomenon."

[96] Our other American lexicographer, Worcester, who was pretty strict in regard to the words which he admitted into the English language, gives the word "noumenon," but he was careful to designate its arbitrary use. His definition is this:

"Noumenon, n. [Gr. ????, the mind.] In the philosophy of Kant, an
object in itself, not relatively to us; opposed to phenomenon.
Fleming."