William Eleroy Curtis

Lincoln tells us that before he left the telegraph office at Springfield on the night of the election in November, 1860, he had practically selected his Cabinet. The superintendent of the telegraph company gave him a room from which all other visitors were excluded, and, with no company but two operators, he read the reports as they came in. Between times he had plenty of opportunity for meditation, and, always confident, the returns soon convinced him of his election and his mind naturally turned upon the next important act for him to perform. "When I finally left that room," he said afterwards, "I had substantially completed the framework of my Cabinet as it now exists."

To begin with, he decided to offer posts of honor to those who had been his rivals for the Presidential nomination,—Seward, Chase, Cameron, and Bates,—and to fill the remaining places with representatives of the various elements that had combined to form the Republican party. It was to be a composite Cabinet, purely political, including no intimate friends, no personal adherents, and in the entire list there was not one with whom he ever had confidential relations. His plan seems to have been to combine, as one of his secretaries said, the experience of Seward, the integrity of Chase, the popularity of Cameron, and to hold the West with Bates, attract New England with Welles, please the Whigs through Smith, and convince the Democrats through Blair. Lincoln always had a great respect for names. No one had studied more closely the careers of American politicians, although his personal acquaintances outside of his own State were limited, and he was more familiar with the personal qualifications and political records of the gentlemen he had chosen than were they with his. Perhaps he overestimated their ability and the value of their advice, as he was likely to do because of his own modesty and inexperience. He saw distinctly the impending crisis, and felt the need of support from leaders of experience, ability, and influence, as well as popular sympathy. But at the same time the combination he selected had in it all the seeds of disaster because of personal jealousy, previous political rivalry, and the intrigues of their henchmen. Yet by his great tact, patience, and strength of purpose he made them instruments of his will. As finally chosen, his Cabinet represented every faction of the new Republican party and the ablest representative of each division as evenly as an odd number could. When reminded that he had selected four Democrats and only three Whigs, he promptly replied that he was himself a Whig, and hoped that he should often be at Cabinet meetings to make the parties even. This was a famous jest during the early part of the administration.

Although he had decided in his own mind upon five of seven of his future advisers before the votes that elected him were counted, he treated with patience and courtesy the crowds of politicians that came from different parts of the country to advise and persuade him in the interest of their friends. He listened attentively to all that his visitors had to say and gave their suggestions careful reflection. He said to Thurlow Weed that he supposed the latter had some experience in cabinet-making, and, as he had never learned that trade himself, he was disposed to avail himself of the suggestions of friends. The making of a Cabinet, he added, was by no means as easy as he had supposed, partly, he believed, because, while the population had increased, great men were scarcer than they used to be.

He was extremely anxious to get two Southerners for the Cabinet, as he believed that such an act might go far to reconcile the loyal people of that section to his election and establish him in their confidence, but from the beginning he saw that his hopes were not to be realized. In order to draw out public sentiment, he wrote a brief anonymous editorial for the Illinois State Journal on the subject, in which he asked whether it was known that any Southern gentlemen of character would accept such an appointment, and, if so, on what terms would they surrender their political differences to Mr. Lincoln or Mr. Lincoln to them.

"There are men in Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Tennessee," said Thurlow Weed, "for whose loyalty under any circumstances and in any event I would vouch."

"Let's have the names of your white blackbirds," replied Lincoln, and Weed gave him four, Mr. Seward suggested several, and Mr. Greeley suggested five. Of all the gentlemen named, Lincoln preferred John A. Gilmer, of North Carolina, with whom he had served in Congress, and who had been a prominent leader of the Whig party in that State. He invited Gilmer to Springfield, but the latter would not come, and after canvassing the various suggestions which were made him, he found that he must limit his choice to the border States, and selected Edward Bates, of Missouri, and Montgomery Blair, of Maryland.

Mr. Bates was an able lawyer and a highly respected and popular antislavery Whig from a slave State. He had been a candidate for the Presidential nomination at Chicago, and had received 48 votes out of 465 cast by delegates from Delaware, Maryland, Missouri, Texas, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Connecticut. Early in December he sent word to Mr. Bates that he would be in St. Louis the next day to consult him about matters of importance; but Mr. Bates would not permit him to make the journey, and started at once for Springfield. They had been acquainted for several years and were very good friends, and after cordial greetings, Lincoln explained that he would like to have Mr. Bates accept the post of Attorney-General in his Cabinet, for which the latter was in every way qualified, and which he would find congenial. Mr. Bates accepted, and the next day the announcement was given to the newspapers for the purpose of quieting the demands of the conservative Republicans and antislavery Whigs in the border States for recognition.

A few days later he offered a Cabinet position to Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, without assigning him to any particular portfolio. This was done to relieve him from the pressure that was being brought by Schuyler Colfax, whose friends were exceedingly persistent. Mr. Colfax was very much disappointed, and attributed his failure to obtain the appointment to Lincoln's resentment towards him because he had favored the re-election of Douglas to the United States Senate in 1858. Lincoln was not aware of this supposition until after he had entered upon his duties as President, when he showed his candor and good-nature by writing a friendly letter to Mr. Colfax explaining that "a tender of the appointment was not withheld in any part because of anything that happened in 1858. Indeed, I should have decided as I did, easier than I did, had that matter never existed. I had partly made up my mind in favor of Mr. Smith—not conclusively, of course—before your name was mentioned in that connection. When you were brought forward I said, 'Colfax is a young man already in a position, is running a brilliant career, and is sure of a bright future in any event. With Smith it is now or never.' I now have to beg that you will not do me the injustice to suppose for a moment that I remember anything against you in malice."

Mr. Smith did not remain in the Cabinet a great while, however. The duties of Secretary of the Interior were arduous and uncongenial, and he retired in December, 1862, at his own request, to accept an appointment to the United States District bench. He was succeeded by John P. Usher, also of Indiana, who continued in office until after the inauguration of Johnson, although he tendered his resignation early in 1865 to relieve President Lincoln from the criticism of having two members of his Cabinet from Indiana, Hugh McCulloch having been appointed Secretary of the Treasury. The President was reluctant to let Mr. Usher go, but accepted his resignation, and, for some reason never explained, fixed May 15, 1865, as the day when it should take effect. When that day arrived Lincoln had no further need of his services.

Mr. Bates proved a strong supporter of the war. He was a man of determination and belligerent disposition, notwithstanding his conservative education; and although he came from a slave State, he was one of the most radical of the President's advisers whenever the slavery question came up. When the Emancipation Proclamation was first proposed, Mr. Bates and Mr. Stanton were the only members of the Cabinet who gave it their unreserved approval, while Mr. Chase, who came nearer to being the representative of the abolition faction than any other member, and Mr. Seward, who was supposed to be the most radical of Republicans, were opposed to it.

Among Mr. Stanton's papers is a curious memorandum which throws a search-light upon his position and that of some of his colleagues.

"Tuesday, July 22.

"The President proposes to issue an order declaring free all slaves in States in rebellion on the —— day of ——.

"The Attorney-General and Stanton are for its immediate promulgation. "Seward against it; argues strongly in favor of cotton and foreign governments.

"Chase silent.

"Welles—

"Seward argues—That foreign nations will intervene to prevent the abolition of slavery for sake of cotton. Argues in a long speech against its immediate promulgation. Wants to wait for troops. Wants Halleck here. Wants drum and fife and public spirit. We break up our relations with foreign nations and the production of cotton for sixty years.

"Chase thinks it a measure of great danger, and would lead to universal emancipation.—The measure goes beyond anything I have recommended."

However, before 1864 Mr. Bates grew weary of his official labors and expressed to the President his desire to retire. He was offered a vacant judgeship in Missouri, but declined it on the ground that he could not work in harmony with the radicals who were in control of politics there. When he retired the Cabinet was left without a Southern member.

A few days before the meeting of the Supreme Court, in December, 1864, Lincoln sent for Titian J. Coffey, the Assistant Attorney-General, and said,—

"My Cabinet has shrunk up North, and I must find a Southern man. I suppose if the twelve apostles were to be chosen nowadays the shrieks of locality would have to be heeded. I have invited Judge Holt to become Attorney-General, but he seems unwilling to undertake the Supreme Court work. I want you to see him, remove his objection if you can, and bring me his answer."

"I then had charge of the government cases in the Supreme Court, and they were all ready for argument," said Mr. Coffey. "I saw Judge Holt, explained the situation, and assured him that he need not appear in court unless he chose to do so. He had, however, decided to decline the invitation, and I returned to the President and so informed him.

"'Then,' said the President, 'I will offer it to James Speed, of Louisville, a man I know well, though not so well as I know his brother Joshua. I slept with Joshua for four years, and I suppose I ought to know him well. But James is an honest man and a gentleman, and if he comes here you will find he is one of those well-poised men, not too common here, who are not spoiled by a big office.'"

Mr. Speed accepted the appointment and served until after the assassination.

The relations between several of the members of Lincoln's Cabinet were from the beginning to the end unfriendly, and no President without the tact, patience, and forbearance of Lincoln could have controlled them. He treated them all with unvarying kindness, and although he never disclosed any desire or intention to dominate, and, in fact, invariably yielded on matters of little importance, he was always their master, and on matters of great importance they were compelled to submit to his will. It is the highest testimony to their confidence in him that even those who had retired at his wish never afterwards failed to show him respect and even affection, and none of them ever retired from his post from feelings of dissatisfaction with the orders or the treatment he received from him.

During the early days of his administration he had a higher opinion of his advisers than they had of him, which was because they did not yet know one another. He recognized them as men who had made honorable records in the United States Senate and in other eminent positions, while they regarded him as an ordinary frontier lawyer, without experience, and the struggle for ascendancy and control puzzled a good many people from time to time. Mr. Seward was looked upon as the chief pillar of the temple for many months, Mr. Stanton's iron will was constantly felt by the public, Mr. Chase was regarded as an eminent statesman; but in all the critical issues of the war the uncouth Western lawyer, without experience in statecraft or executive administration, unused to power, asserted and maintained his official supremacy, and every member of his Cabinet yielded implicit obedience. They recognized his unselfish purpose, his purity of character, his keen perception, his foresight, and his common sense, and were usually willing to accept his judgment. While others fretted and became confused in the emergencies that overwhelmed them, Lincoln was never liable to excitement or impulsive action.

MONTGOMERY BLAIR, POSTMASTER-GENERAL

From a photograph by Brady

At the beginning of his administration the entire organization of the government was in a chaotic state. The Buchanan administration had filled the offices with Democrats and Southern sympathizers, who resigned immediately after Lincoln's inauguration and left their affairs in utter confusion. Their places had to be filled with untrained men who did not understand their duties and had not been accustomed to official labor or discipline. It would have been remarkable if they had conducted the routine work without friction, but the urgency and the magnitude of the responsibility and labor that were thrown upon them was more than a trained corps of officials could have executed without confusion and delay. The President was probably the only man connected with the government that did not lose his self-control. During all that most trying period, as was the case throughout his life, he was composed, serene, and confident. Oftentimes, when subordinate officials and outsiders came to him raging with indignation, he heard them with patience, replied with a jest on his lips, and quieted their nerves by talking of commonplace matters. His Cabinet officers were often fretful, and there was continual friction between the several departments. Several times it almost reached the breaking-point. But Lincoln soothed and satisfied all parties without taking the side of either.

Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, was not only a representative of the border State aristocracy, but belonged to one of the most prominent Democratic families in the country, was one of the founders of the Republican party, and was first known to Lincoln as the attorney who argued Dred Scott's case in the Supreme Court. He was a graduate of West Point Military Academy, had several years of military training in Indian campaigns, had studied law, and was appointed a judge of the Court of Common Pleas when he was a very young man. President Buchanan made him solicitor of the Court of Claims, but removed him because of his opposition to the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. This made a Republican of Blair, and, with the exception of his brother Francis P. Blair, of Missouri, and Cassius M. Clay, of Kentucky, he was the most conspicuous antislavery man in all the Southern States.

Blair could not be appointed to the Cabinet without a bitter controversy. He was opposed by Henry Winter Davis, one of the most able and brilliant young Whigs in the House of Representatives, and by other partisans in Maryland, who fought so hard and so persistently as to involve several of the leading Whigs of the country on his side, while the former Democrats in the Republican party rallied to the support of Blair. Davis had the powerful sympathy of Seward and Chase, Benjamin F. Wade, and other prominent abolitionists, and it became no longer a matter of personal rivalry between Blair and Davis, but a struggle for supremacy between the Whigs and the Democrats for the control of the administration. During the few days before the inauguration it seemed as if the Republican party would be split in twain, or at least that the entire Cabinet slate would be destroyed if either Blair or Davis received an appointment. Lincoln seemed to be the only man in Washington who was not involved in the controversy. He watched the situation with keen eyes, however, and was alert for every event or incident that might have a serious effect upon his administration; but his mind was made up, and when Norman B. Judd came bursting into his bedroom at Willard's Hotel on the night of March 3, to inquire in great excitement if he had decided to nominate Davis instead of Blair, Lincoln replied calmly but with emphasis,—

"When that slate breaks again it will break at the top."

Mr. Blair was a loyal and useful member of the Cabinet, and from the beginning was in favor of prompt and energetic measures against the secessionists. He had been a Democrat of the Jackson type, and urged Lincoln to adopt Jackson's vigorous policy against nullification. It might have been wiser and better for the country, it might have saved lives and money, sorrow and tears, if his advice had been adopted. He understood the South better than Seward or Chase or any other member of the Cabinet; but conditions would not permit the adoption of his energetic policy, and he became very restless. His temper and his character were revealed in a memorandum which he submitted with his colleagues at the request of Lincoln, concerning setting forth his views of the course that should be pursued.

Mr. Blair wrote,—

"First. As regards General Scott, I have no confidence in his judgment on the questions of the day. His political views control his judgment, and his course, as remarked on by the President, shows that whilst no one will question his patriotism, the results are the same as if he were in fact traitorous.

"Second. It is acknowledged to be possible to relieve Fort Sumter. It ought to be relieved without reference to Pickens or any other possession. South Carolina is the head and front of this rebellion, and when that State is safely delivered from the authority of the United States it will strike a blow against our authority, from which it will take us years of bloody strife to recover."

He opposed the Emancipation Proclamation on the ground of policy, and made an earnest effort to convince Lincoln that it was a mistake to take such radical action at that particular junction. He had been an emancipationist for years, the principle of the measure he approved, but he thought the time was inopportune, because he feared that it would drive the border States over to the Confederacy.

Mr. Blair was constantly coming into collision with Mr. Stanton. Like two flints, they struck fire whenever they met, and often engaged in acrimonious discussions at Cabinet meetings over actual or fancied grievances on the part of Mr. Blair, who felt that Mr. Stanton was continually interfering with his prerogatives. Mr. Blair's enmity to Mr. Seward was equally strong and often developed in an embarrassing manner, while the hostility between Mr. Chase and himself was concealed under the thinnest veneer of politeness.

In the summer of 1864 Mr. Blair desired to have certain orders issued relating to the postal service within the lines of the army. A draft of the proposed orders was made, but Mr. Stanton declined to issue them. General Markland, who was in charge of the army mails, says, "When I returned to Mr. Blair with the information that the orders would not be issued by the Secretary of War, he said, 'We will see,' and wrote a letter to Mr. Lincoln, which he gave to me to deliver with the accompanying papers. When I delivered the letter, Mr. Lincoln read it carefully and handed it back to me, saying,—

"'What is the matter between Blair and Stanton?' "I told him all I knew in reference to the proposed orders. He then said, 'If I understand the case, General Grant wants the orders issued, and Blair wants them issued, and you want them issued, and Stanton won't issue them. Now, don't you see what kind of a fix I will be in if I interfere? I'll tell you what to do. If you and General Grant understand one another, suppose you try to get along without the orders, and if Blair or Stanton makes a fuss, I may be called in as a reference, and I may decide in your favor.' The orders were never issued, and pleasant relations were maintained on that score all around."

Mr. Blair was not popular with the Union people of the North. The public distrust is strikingly illustrated by the following anecdote from the reminiscences of Henry Ward Beecher: "There was some talk, early in 1864, of a sort of compromise with the South. Blair had told the President he was satisfied that if he could be put in communication with some of the leading men of the South in some way or other, that some benefit would accrue. Lincoln had sent a delegation to meet Alexander Stephens, and that was all the North knew. We were all very much excited over that. The war lasted so long, and I was afraid Lincoln would be so anxious for peace, and I was afraid he would accept something that would be of advantage to the South, so I went to Washington and called upon him. I said to him, 'Mr. Lincoln, I come to you to know whether the public interest will permit you to explain to me what this Southern commission means? I am in an embarrassing position as editor and do not want to step in the dark.' Well, he listened very patiently, and looked up to the ceiling for a few moments, and said, 'Well, I am almost of a mind to show you all the documents.'

"'Well, Mr. Lincoln, I should like to see them if it is proper.' He went to his little secretary and came out and handed me a little card as long as my finger and an inch wide, and on that was written,—

"'You will pass the bearer through the lines' [or something to that effect].

"'A. Lincoln.'

"'There,' he said, 'is all there is of it. Now, Blair thinks something can be done, but I don't; but I have no objection to have him try his hand. He has no authority whatever but to go and see what he can do.'"

The President was continually receiving letters, resolutions, and even delegations demanding the removal of his Postmaster-General, and Mr. Blair did not improve the situation by his own conduct. He continued to write letters and make speeches, and indulged in caustic and sometimes cruel criticism of his colleagues and the Republican leaders in Washington until the situation became so strained that the President was compelled to ask his resignation. Before this was done, however, a little incident occurred which forcibly illustrates the President's patience, dignity, and at the same time his determination. The incident is probably without parallel in the history of the government.

General Halleck, in command of the army, called the attention of the Secretary of War to a speech made by Mr. Blair just after General Early's raid upon Washington and the destruction of Mr. Blair's property over the District border in Maryland, in which the army and its commander were denounced for cowardice and inefficiency. General Halleck declared that if the charge was true the names of the officers should be stricken from the rolls of the army. If it were not true, he said, the slanderer should be dismissed from the Cabinet.

Secretary Stanton handed the letter to the President without comment, whereupon Lincoln replied to General Halleck:

"Whether the remarks were really made I do not know, nor do I suppose such knowledge is necessary to a correct response. If they were made, I do not approve them; and yet, under the circumstances, I would not dismiss a member of the Cabinet therefor. I do not consider what may have been hastily said in a moment of vexation at so severe a loss is sufficient ground for so grave a step. Besides this, truth is generally the best vindication against slander. I propose continuing to be myself the judge as to when a member of the Cabinet shall be dismissed."

Not satisfied with this, the President, when the Cabinet came together, read them this impressive little lecture:

"I must myself be the judge how long to retain and when to remove any of you from his position. It would greatly pain me to discover any of you endeavoring to procure another's removal, or in any way to prejudice him before the public. Such endeavor would be a wrong to me, and, much worse, a wrong to the country. My wish is that on this subject no remark be made or question asked by any of you, here or elsewhere, now or hereafter."

This occurred in July, but Mr. Blair continued to exasperate every person with whom he came in contact. He accused Seward, Stanton, and Chase of a conspiracy to break down the administration, and wearied the President with his suspicions of the motives and actions of all the leading Republicans of the country, until Lincoln finally wrote him a kindly letter, saying, "You have generously said to me more than once that whenever your resignation could be a relief to me it was at my disposal. The time has come. You know very well that this proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally or officially. Your uniform kindness has been unsurpassed by that of any other friend."

Mr. Blair's loyalty to Lincoln and the Union was in no way affected by his dismissal. He immediately took the stump in behalf of Lincoln's re-election and his personal fidelity and friendship were never shaken. Lincoln offered him the choice between the Austrian and Spanish missions, but he declined the honor with thanks.

Mr. Blair's successor was William Dennison, of Ohio, a man of the highest character, who had been Governor of that State at the outbreak of the war, and had sustained the administration at Washington with great ability and loyalty. He was a man of fine presence, winning manners, and amiable disposition, wise in counsel, and energetic in action.

Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, was a candidate for the Presidential nomination at Chicago and received fifty votes. His friends reached some sort of an understanding with David Davis, who was looked upon as Lincoln's personal representative at the Convention, under which they transferred their votes to the latter, although it was distinctly understood that Davis had no authority to make pledges or promises and could only recommend to Lincoln that Mr. Cameron be recognized in as honorable and notable a manner as possible. It was, however, perfectly natural for the President to select a member of his official family from a State of such importance as Pennsylvania, and Mr. Cameron was recognized as the representative of the protective tariff element in the Republican party. Hence, after a "balancing of matters," as he called it, he invited Mr. Cameron to Springfield during the holidays in 1860, had a frank talk with him, and tendered him a seat in the Cabinet either as Secretary of the Treasury or Secretary of War, "which of the two I have not yet definitely decided."

There was a volcanic eruption in Pennsylvania after the announcement, and bitter hostility was immediately developed among the members of Mr. Cameron's own party, headed by the newly elected Governor and chairman of the Republican State Committee, who protested against his appointment, and claimed the right to be consulted if a member of the Cabinet was to be selected from their State. Being a strict party man, the President recognized their claim, and therefore wrote a polite and friendly note to Mr. Cameron, explaining that it was impossible to take him into the Cabinet under the circumstances, and suggesting that he decline the appointment. "Better do this at once," he wrote, "before things change so that you cannot honorably decline and I be compelled to openly recall the tender. No person living knows or has an intimation that I write this letter." This, of itself, is sufficient answer to the frequent charge that there was a corrupt bargain at Chicago between Lincoln and Cameron.

As might be expected, Mr. Cameron was deeply disappointed, and sent a friend to Springfield to demand a further explanation of the President-elect. Whereupon Lincoln wrote a conciliatory reply, expressing regret that Mr. Cameron's feelings were wounded by the tone of his letter, and saying that it had been written "under great anxiety, and perhaps I was not so guarded in its terms as I should have been. My great object was to have you act quickly, if possible, before the matter should be complicated with the Pennsylvania Senatorial election. Destroy the offensive letter or return it to me. I say to you now that I have not doubted that you would perform the duties of a department ably and faithfully. Nor have I for a moment intended to ostracize your friends. If I should make a Cabinet appointment for Penn. before I reach Washington, I will not do so without consulting you and giving all the weight to your views and wishes which I consistently can. This I have always intended."

This was purely personal, and attached to it was a letter in more formal language which Mr. Cameron was authorized to show to his friends. In it Lincoln stated that Mr. Cameron came to Springfield by his invitation and not upon any suggestion of his own; that he had been offered an appointment in the Cabinet, but that complications had arisen which made it necessary to recall the offer.

In this way Mr. Cameron was "let down easy," and while he did not conceal his disappointment and chagrin, he kept his temper and conducted himself in so dignified a manner that Lincoln was greatly impressed. Cameron's enemies, still fearing that he might be taken into the Cabinet, resorted to despicable measures to prejudice Lincoln against him, while, on the other hand, he was earnestly defended by some of the best people of Pennsylvania; hence the President decided to revive his original plan, and placed Mr. Cameron's name on the slate as Secretary of War.

It proved to be an unfortunate decision, for before active hostilities began it had been clearly demonstrated that he was not qualified to fill that important post. Scandals and dissensions of the most serious character were immediately developed in the War Department, so that Congress appointed a special committee to make an investigation. Its report was sensational and was too grave for Lincoln to overlook. About the time the report was made Mr. Cameron took the liberty to announce in his annual report the policy of the administration in regard to arming the negroes and enlisting them in the military service. So radical an announcement, without even consulting him, was not only a shock to Lincoln, but passed the limits of his forbearance. Fortunately, Mr. Cameron's report had not reached the public. Printed copies had been sent to the press to be published as soon as the telegraph had announced that the President's message had been read in Congress. Every copy was recalled to Washington, the objectionable paragraphs were modified, a new edition was published, and Mr. Cameron expressed a wish to exchange the onerous responsibilities of the War Department for a foreign mission. Lincoln wrote him a brief note, keeping up the pretence by saying, "As you have more than once expressed a desire for a change of position, I can now gratify you consistently with my view of the public interest. I therefore propose to nominate you to the Senate next Monday as Minister to Russia."

As was the case with Mr. Blair, the dissolution of relations caused no break in the friendship between the President and his former minister. Cameron remained one of the most devoted of Lincoln's supporters and one of the most earnest and effective advocates of his renomination to the Presidency.

Gideon Welles was altogether the most agreeable and satisfactory of the fifteen members of Lincoln's official advisers. He invariably sustained him in any position that he took or in any measure that he desired. He gave him consistent and cordial support and the least trouble and anxiety of any of his official family. Mr. Welles was selected as the representative of New England. Amos Tuck, of New Hampshire, George Ashmun, of Boston, and several other eminent gentlemen were also under consideration.

The morning after his speech in Hartford, in the spring of 1860, Lincoln took a long stroll through the principal streets of that beautiful city. As he approached the hotel he stepped into a book-store, where a gentleman who had been in his audience the evening before approached and introduced himself. There seemed to be a mutual attraction, and for two hours they discussed various subjects of interest, politics, law, and literature. The next time they met was after the Chicago Convention, to which Mr. Welles was a delegate, and during the campaign they exchanged frequent letters, until Lincoln was thoroughly convinced of the fitness, availability, and character of the Connecticut lawyer for a position in his Cabinet. The special knowledge of maritime law shown by the latter seems to have suggested his assignment to the Navy Department. Mr. Welles showed a vigorous determination, a high sense of patriotism, and great executive ability from the start, but almost immediately after the organization of the Cabinet came into collision with Mr. Seward because of the interference of the latter with naval affairs, and they never became friends. Notwithstanding the intensity of their hostility, however, both remained through the entire administration, and were the only members of the original Cabinet who continued in that relation until Lincoln's death. Although there were many complaints of his arrogant manner and irritable temper, Mr. Welles always showed a loyal affection for the President, and in August, 1862, refused to sign the "round robin" which Seward and Chase had prepared, demanding the dismissal of General McClellan. He agreed heartily with them, but refused to sign because of his deep respect for the President and a fear of wounding his feelings.

The first member of the Cabinet selected was William H. Seward. There was no delay, doubt, or hesitation in Lincoln's intention to offer him the highest honor in his gift from the hour that he received the news of his nomination, and it was entirely fitting that it should be so. At that time Mr. Seward was pre-eminent among the members of the Republican party. He was its leader in the Senate and was recognized as its logical candidate for the Presidency. He had the largest number of supporters at the Convention, and was defeated only by a combination of the minority. He had been longer in public life, was higher in official rank, and had been more conspicuous and successful in statesmanship than any other of Lincoln's supporters; he had been Governor of the greatest State in the Union, and was just completing his second term in the United States Senate. He had the best organization behind him that had ever been known in American politics up to that time, with Thurlow Weed, recognized as the most consummate politician in the country, as his manager. It certainly would have been strange if the President-elect had not selected such a man as Secretary of State. Nevertheless, there was considerable opposition to Seward's appointment in his own State as well as elsewhere. It came from personal jealousy and enmity, and also from patriotic and honorable people who feared that he might dominate the administration, they not liking his methods; but Lincoln did not hesitate. He wrote Mr. Seward at once after the election, asking permission to nominate him as Secretary of State, and saying that such had been his intention from the day of the nomination at Chicago. "With the belief that your position in the public eye, your integrity, ability and learning and great experience, all combine to render it an appointment pre-eminently fit to be made."

Mr. Seward took three weeks for reflection, and with "much self-distrust" finally relieved Lincoln's anxiety by admitting, in a lofty manner, that he considered it his duty to accept. The tone of this letter did not please Lincoln; and from that moment, with the instinct of self-protection which he often displayed,—and his instincts were exceedingly accurate,—he was on his guard in dealing with the great man from New York. Nevertheless, he treated him with frankness and delicate courtesy and continued to correspond with him concerning confidential matters.

Upon his arrival in Washington he immediately handed a copy of his inaugural address to his future Secretary of State, and the latter revised it in such a vigorous and arrogant manner that the unfavorable impression was deepened. Mr. Seward was always at hand to offer advice and give directions upon every subject. Lincoln listened with respectful attention, but continued to exercise his own judgment, and the spirit of independence he showed concerning several matters which Mr. Seward undertook to decide for him so alarmed the latter that two days before the inauguration he wrote a polite note asking leave to withdraw his acceptance of the office of Secretary of State. The note was received on Saturday. Any other man but Lincoln would have been disconcerted, at least, and would have immediately sought advice and assistance; but he did not mention the matter to any one, nor did he make any reply until Monday morning. Then, while waiting at Willard's Hotel for President Buchanan to escort him to the Capitol, he dictated a brief note, saying, "I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should, and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction."

He handed the note to Mr. Nicolay, saying, "I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick."

After the return of the inaugural procession to the White House the two men had a long and confidential talk. No one knows what they said to each other, but Mr. Seward accepted the office and his nomination was sent to the Senate the next morning.

Mr. Seward at once assumed that he was Prime Minister with independent and autocratic powers. He sent agents upon secret missions, he indicated to his visitors the policy of the administration,—and made pledges on behalf of the President without consulting him. He opened negotiations with the secession leaders upon his own responsibility. He issued orders to officers of the army and navy over the heads of his associates in charge of those departments, and gave assurances to the representatives of foreign governments without the approval or even the knowledge of the President. He seemed cheerfully to assume responsibility for the entire government, and did not hesitate to permit the official representatives of the Southern States and the public generally to presume that he and not Lincoln was the highest and final authority. He even attempted to deceive his wife on this subject. "I will try to save freedom and my country," he wrote her. "I have assumed a sort of dictatorship.... It seems to me if I am absent only eight days, this administration, the Congress and the District would fall into consternation and despair.... I am the only hopeful, calm, and conciliatory person here...." Again he writes, "Only the soothing words which I have spoken have saved us and carried us along thus far. And still again the cares chiefly fall on me."

Secretary Welles wrote a book to describe the controversies between Mr. Seward and the rest of the Cabinet, in which he shows a good deal of resentment but a good deal of truth. Mr. Seward's moral perceptions were obscured by the responsibilities and power that had been assumed by him. Although he did not suspect it, he was gradually drifting into a collision with a stronger character than his own, and but for the magnanimity and generous nature of the President, his political career might have been swallowed up in his vanity and arrogance.

Upon April 1, after the new administration had been in control for a little more than three weeks, under the title "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," he submitted the most extraordinary proposition that appears among the archives of the Department of State. Assuming that he, and not Lincoln, was responsible for the conduct of the administration and the management of the government; writing as if he were the Prime Minister and Lincoln an impotent king; he laid down his plan of action and the line of policy he intended to pursue. He proposed that Lincoln should practically relinquish his Presidential responsibilities and authority; that he should repudiate the party that had elected him; that he should ignore the principles upon which the Presidential campaign had been fought and surrender the moral triumph of the victory; that he should convene Congress and declare war against Great Britain, Russia, France, and Spain, and endeavor to negotiate for an offensive and defensive alliance with Canada, Mexico, and Central America against Europe. The following is the text:

"SOME THOUGHTS FOR THE PRESIDENT'S CONSIDERATION, APRIL 1, 1861.

"First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.

"Second. This, however, is not culpable, and it has even been unavoidable. The presence of the Senate, with the need to meet applications for patronage, have prevented attention to other and more grave matters.

"Third. But further delay to adopt and prosecute our policies for both domestic and foreign affairs would not only bring scandal on the administration, but danger upon the country.

"Fourth. To do this we must dismiss the applicants for office. But how? I suggest that we make the local appointments forthwith, leaving foreign or general ones for ulterior and occasional action.

"Fifth. The policy at home. I am aware that my views are singular, and perhaps not sufficiently explained. My system is built upon this idea as a ruling one,—namely, that we must

"Change the question before the public from one upon slavery, or about slavery, for a question upon UNION OR DISUNION:

"In other words, from what would be regarded as a party question, to one of patriotism or union.

"The occupation or evacuation of Fort Sumter, although not in fact a slavery or a party question, is so regarded. Witness the temper manifested by the Republicans in the free States, and even by the Union men in the South.

"I would therefore terminate it as a safe means for changing the issue. I deem it fortunate that the last administration created the necessity.

"For the rest, I would simultaneously defend and re-enforce all the ports in the Gulf, and have the navy recalled from foreign stations to be prepared for a blockade. Put the island of Key West under martial law.

"This will raise distinctly the question of union or disunion. I would maintain every fort and possession in the South.

"FOR FOREIGN NATIONS.

"I would demand explanations from Spain and France, categorically, at once.

"I would seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous continental spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention.

"And, if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France,

"Would convene Congress and declare war against them.

"But whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it.

"For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

"Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

"Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.

"It is not my especial province; but I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility."

It is impossible for any one to conceive the feelings of the President when he read this boastful and insolent document. But his self-control was so perfect, his anxiety to preserve harmony among those who were trying to save the Union was so great, and his patience so limitless that he returned the memorandum to Mr. Seward with the following firm and conclusive but courteous rebuke, and the subject was never alluded to again by either of them:

"Executive Mansion, April 1, 1861.

"Hon. W. H. Seward.

"My Dear Sir: Since parting with you, I have been considering your paper dated this day, and entitled 'Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' The first proposition in it is, 'First. We are at the end of a month's administration, and yet without a policy, either domestic or foreign.'

"At the beginning of that month, in the inaugural, I said, 'The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the government, and to collect the duties and imposts.' This had your distinct approval at the time; and taken in connection with the order I immediately gave General Scott, directing him to employ every means in his power to strengthen and hold the forts, comprises the exact domestic policy you now urge, with the single exception that it does not propose to abandon Fort Sumter.

"Again, I do not perceive how the reinforcement of Fort Sumter would be done on a slavery or party issue, while that of Fort Pickens would be on a more national and patriotic one.

"The news received yesterday in regard to San Domingo certainly brings a new item within the range of our foreign policy; but up to that time we have been preparing circulars and instructions to ministers and the like, all in perfect harmony, without even a suggestion that we had no foreign policy.

"Upon your closing proposition—that 'whatever policy we adopt, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. "'For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly.

"'Either the President must do it himself, and be all the while active in it, or

"'Devolve it on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debates on it must end, and all agree and abide.'—I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend that there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.

"Your obedient servant,

"A. Lincoln."

The President never revealed this amazing incident to anybody but Mr. Nicolay, and it was never suspected by any member of his Cabinet until the correspondence was published by Nicolay and Hay in the Century Magazine, nearly thirty years after. Mr. Seward recognized his master at last and wrote his wife, "Executive force and vigor are rare qualities. The President is the best of us."

From that time there were no serious differences between the President and his Secretary of State, although they frequently differed upon matters of policy as well as details of administration. Mr. Seward was loyal, devoted, and always respectful to his chief.

The same cannot be said of Secretary Chase. He also had been a rival of Lincoln for the Presidential nomination in 1860, and had gone into the Cabinet feeling that his supporters from Ohio had made Lincoln's nomination possible and that he was entitled to special consideration for that reason. He supported Lincoln cordially through the campaign, and among the first telegrams of congratulation received by the President-elect was one from him which read, "I congratulate you and thank God. The great object of my wishes and labors for nineteen years is accomplished in the overthrow of the slave power. The space is now clear for the establishment of the policy of freedom on safe and firm grounds. The lead is yours. The responsibility is great. May God strengthen you for your great duties."

After January 1 following the election, Mr. Chase was invited to Springfield, and upon his arrival the President-elect waived all ceremony and called upon him at his hotel. "I have done with you," said he, "what I would not have ventured to do with any other man in the country,—sent for you to ask you whether you will accept the appointment of Secretary of the Treasury without, however, being exactly prepared to offer it to you." Concerning this conversation Mr. Chase wrote to a friend as follows:

"He said he had felt bound to offer the position of Secretary of State to Mr. Seward as the generally recognized leader of the Republican party, intending, if he declined it, to offer it to me. He did not wish that Mr. Seward should decline it, and was glad that he had accepted, and now desired to have me take the place of Secretary of the Treasury."

Mr. Chase told the President-elect that he was not prepared to give a definite answer because he wanted to ask the advice of friends and be governed by the course of events. He valued the trust and its opportunities, but was reluctant to leave the Senate. No further communication took place between the two on the subject; but, assuming that Mr. Chase had accepted, Lincoln sent his name to the Senate on March 5 with those of other members of his Cabinet.

From the beginning of the administration Mr. Chase advocated a radical policy; was very urgent in advocating the relief of Fort Sumter and pushing the war, while Seward hung back. Mr. Chase's policy was presented in a memorandum, with similar ones from other members of the Cabinet, at the request of the President, in March, and reads as follows:

"If war is to be the consequence of an attempt to provision Fort Sumter, war will just as certainly result from the attempt to maintain possession of Fort Pickens.

"I am clearly in favor of maintaining Fort Pickens and just as clearly in favor of provisioning Fort Sumter. If that attempt should be resisted by military force, Fort Sumter should, in my judgment, be reinforced.

"If war is to be the result, I perceive no reason why it may not be best begun by military resistance to the efforts of the administration to sustain troops of the Union, stationed under the authority of the government, in a fort of the Union, in the ordinary course of service."

In the beginning Mr. Chase was a very strong supporter of General McClellan and frequently called the attention of the latter to his obligations to him. "The country was indebted to me," he wrote McClellan, "in some considerable degree for the change of your commission from Ohio into a commission of major-general of the army of the Union;" and he wrote a friend the good news, "McClellan is Commander-in-Chief! let us thank God and take courage!" but this was his habit. He invariably worshipped the rising sun, and was usually one of the first to turn his back upon old friends when they met with misfortunes. He usually cultivated the closest relations with those generals who had grievances against the administration. His correspondence and his diary, as published by his chosen biographer, are full of caustic and unkind criticisms of his chief. He received many letters containing violent abuse of the President and his colleagues in the government, and neither defended them nor rebuked the writers. He records in his diary a conversation with an officer who, meeting him, the Secretary of the Treasury, for the first time, was rude enough to utter a gross insult directed at the President. In his comments Mr. Chase seems to approve the remarks, and describes the President's assailant as "well read and extremely intelligent." But Mr. Chase never defended his colleagues when they were attacked. In reply to a violent criticism from an enemy of the administration, he wrote, "I am not responsible for the management of the war and have no voice in it, except that I am not forbidden to make suggestions, and do so now and then when I can't help it."

He soon lost his confidence in and admiration for McClellan, however, and in his criticisms concerning his dilatory tactics was the most bitter of all the Cabinet. He once drew up a paper, which he induced several of his colleagues to sign, demanding McClellan's removal. He continually offered advice and suggestions, and when they were not accepted he usually took the trouble to record his resentment in his diary or to express it in vigorous terms in a letter to some friend.

Chase was in favor of the unconditional emancipation of the slaves, and when the President laid before the Cabinet the Emancipation Proclamation he writes in his diary, "I said that I should give to such a measure my cordial support, but I should prefer that no expression on the subject of compensation should be made, and I thought that the measure of emancipation could be better and more quickly accomplished by allowing generals to organize and arm the slaves and by directing the commanders of departments to proclaim emancipation within their districts as soon as practicable. But I regarded this as so much better than inaction on the subject that I could give it my entire support."

The President was not unaware of the disposition of Mr. Seward to criticise himself and the members of his Cabinet, but placed so high a value upon his ability and his importance to the government that he treated him with the same patience that he did Mr. Stanton and others who were critical and petulant concerning his deliberation and other peculiarities. The extent to which this forbearance was exercised may be illustrated by a note addressed to the President by his Secretary of the Treasury, April 25, 1861, in which the latter was guilty of such bad taste and impertinence that Lincoln would have been justified in asking his instant resignation. Mr. Chase held the President practically responsible for the demoralized condition of affairs in the country and for all that had happened before his inauguration as well as since, and said, "Let me beg of you to remember that the disunionists have anticipated us in everything, and that as yet we have accomplished nothing but the destruction of our own property. Let me beg of you to remember also that it has been a darling object with the disunionists to secure the passage of a secession ordinance by Maryland.... Save us from this new humiliation. You alone can give the word."

Mr. Chase was in consultation with the President daily, he had been consulted about every situation and movement, he was quite as familiar with what had been done and what was intended as the President himself, and the reasons which prompted him to address his chief in such a manner can only be conjectured. It is believed that he was prompted to do so by one of the many hostile critics of the administration, and wrote the letter without realizing its tone and impertinence. But Lincoln received it with his usual complacency, made no complaint to any one about it, and calmly filed it away among his other correspondence.

Like Mr. Seward, he went into the Cabinet with the opinion that the President was incapable and inexperienced, and that it was his duty to support and assist him in the management of the government; but, unlike Mr. Seward, he was never able to rid himself of a sense of his own superiority. He had an honest conviction that he was more competent and would make a much better President himself, and that if his advice were accepted and his suggestions carried out, the war would be brought to a close much sooner than otherwise. He lacked confidence in his colleagues also and never lost an opportunity to express it. He considered himself their superior in zeal, ability, and devotion to the general welfare. He imagined that every disaster which occurred in the field was due to the refusal of the President and the Secretary of War to carry out the plans he suggested, and that every victory could be directly attributed to his wise counsel. This was not known at the time. Had it been, the people of the country would have been less charitable towards Mr. Chase. His egotism, jealousy, contempt, and hostility towards Lincoln and his fellow-members of the Cabinet were not fully disclosed until the publication of his biography, which contained extracts from his diary and copies of his voluminous correspondence.

The President would not allow the conduct or the disposition of his Secretary of the Treasury to make the slightest difference in his treatment of that official or to affect the policy of his administration, for in his management of the finances, without previous experience or preparation, Mr. Chase had shown genius equal to that of Alexander Hamilton, unswerving integrity, and untiring industry. So highly did Lincoln esteem his public services in this respect that he would have forgiven him anything; and Mr. Chase not only had his constant support, but he was less interfered with in the administration of his department than any other member of the Cabinet.

Mr. Chase began a serious and systematic canvass for the Presidential nomination as early as the fall of 1863, and although he continued to delude himself and assure his friends that he was indifferent to advancement and anxious only for the public good, he found plenty of leisure in the midst of his arduous duties and immense responsibilities to write hundreds of letters to friends in different parts of the Union pointing out the mistakes of the President and leaving the irresistible conclusion that he was the only man capable of saving the country. Many of these letters are published in his biography, and it is inexplicable that he preserved the documentary evidence of his treachery, and even more remarkable that his family thus exposed him to public censure and contempt.

Although Lincoln had the full confidence of the loyal people of the North, many disappointed politicians and other citizens in different parts of the country were dissatisfied with his management of affairs. The critics naturally gravitated together and sought to organize a movement to prevent his renomination. They found it difficult to contend against the popularity of the President, and looked among the discordant elements for a standard-bearer. Neither in Congress nor in the army was there any one who was willing to undertake the hopeless task until some of the leaders consulted Mr. Chase and, to their surprise, found him so indiscreet and disloyal as to encourage their opposition to the administration of which he was a member, and so foolish as to believe that he was strong enough to lead them to victory.

Mr. Chase fell willingly into the trap, although he continued to protest his loyalty and attachment to Lincoln. His only excuse was that the President's intellect and capacity for government were inferior to his own, and in its great emergency his beloved country needed the strongest man. He wrote his son-in-law, Governor Sprague, of Rhode Island, "If I were controlled by merely personal sentiments I would prefer the re-election of Mr. Lincoln to that of any other man, but I think a man of different qualities from those the President has will be needed for the next four years."

President Lincoln was fully informed concerning every movement Mr. Chase made, for the latter was surrounded by false friends who were willing to destroy him. However, he rebuked the tale-bearers and discouraged all conversation concerning the ambition of his Secretary of the Treasury, and when the criticisms uttered by Mr. Chase of himself and the members of his Cabinet were brought to his attention, he declined to listen to them.

"I have determined," he said, "to shut my eyes so far as possible to everything of the sort. Mr. Chase makes a good Secretary and I shall keep him where he is. If he becomes President, all right. I hope we may never have a worse man. I am entirely indifferent as to his success or failure in these schemes as long as he does his duty at the head of the Treasury Department." He appointed Chase's partisans and wire-pullers to office as fast as the latter proposed them, although he knew perfectly well what he was doing. He was more amused than otherwise at the protestations of his own friends; but all the time he was conscious that he had every reason for magnanimity. With his usual political perspicuity, he was perfectly confident of his own nomination and re-election, and recognized that Chase was daily making mistakes that were fatal to his own political prospects. He endeavored to conceal his knowledge, and avoided explanations from his Secretary of the Treasury until the publication of a secret circular in the Washington newspapers signed by Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, compelled Mr. Chase to allude to the subject. It was a spiteful, unjust, and untruthful attack upon the President, and proposed the nomination of Mr. Chase as his successor, appealing to patriotic citizens to organize in his support and correspond with the chairman of his committee.

Mr. Chase at once disavowed all knowledge of or responsibility for this circular, but explained that he had yielded to the urgent solicitations of friends and had consented to be a candidate for the Presidential nomination. "If there is anything in my action or position which in your judgment will prejudice the public interest under my charge, I beg you to say so. I do not wish to administer the Treasury Department one day without your entire confidence. For yourself I cherish sincere respect and esteem and, permit me to add, affection."

The next day the President acknowledged the receipt of this letter and promised to answer it more fully later, which he did, saying,—

"... My knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's letter having been made public came to me only the day you wrote; but I had, in spite of myself, known of its existence several days before. I have not yet read it, and I think I shall not. I was not shocked or surprised by the appearance of the letter, because I had had knowledge of Mr. Pomeroy's committee, and of secret issues which I supposed came from it, and of secret agents who I supposed were sent out by it, for several weeks. I have known just as little of these things as my friends have allowed me to know. They bring the documents to me, but I do not read them: they tell me what they think fit to tell me, but I do not inquire for more....

"Whether you shall remain at the head of the Treasury Department is a question which I will not allow myself to consider from any stand-point other than my judgment of the public service, and, in that view, I do not perceive occasion for a change."

If anything was needed to complete the collapse of the plans of Mr. Chase, the reputation of the man who signed the circular was sufficient. As fast as conventions were held delegations were instructed for Lincoln. The Republican members of the Ohio Legislature were so fearful lest they might be suspected of sympathizing with the ambition of Mr. Chase that they held a caucus and unanimously endorsed the President. Even little Rhode Island, supposed to be a pocket borough absolutely controlled by its Governor, who was a son-in-law of Mr. Chase, bolted and declared for Lincoln. The Secretary of the Treasury, left without a supporter in the Republican party, sought consolation from the Democrats, but they repudiated him and selected as their candidate General McClellan, a man who had been alternately eulogized and anathematized by him.

The retirement of Mr. Chase from the Cabinet was due to his determination to control the patronage of the Treasury Department in the State of New York without reference to the wishes of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Harris, the Senators from that State. There was also friction over Treasury appointments in other parts of the country. Mr. Chase's failure as a Presidential candidate made him very irritable, and whenever the President or any member of the Cabinet offered the slightest opposition to his plans or wishes, he showed so much temper that it was impossible to get along with him except by conceding all his demands. Lincoln, valuing his services in the Treasury so highly, endeavored to gratify him as far as possible, and assured other members of his Cabinet that, as Mr. Chase's ability, industry, and integrity were beyond question, he had a right to select men for whose proper conduct he was responsible. But when Mr. Chase invaded the political provinces of the members of the Senate, the President found it difficult to reconcile the differences, and on two occasions the Secretary of the Treasury tendered his resignation rather than yield what he considered to be his right to select all of his subordinates. Maunsell B. Field, the Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, quotes Lincoln as saying, "I went directly up to him [Chase] with the resignation in my hand, and putting my arm around his neck, said, 'Here is a paper with which I wish to have nothing to do. Take it back and be reasonable.' I had to plead with him a long time, but I finally succeeded, and heard nothing more of that resignation." But this state of affairs could not endure. There came an occasion upon which the President was not able to give way, and when the two New York Senators objected to the appointment of the same Maunsell B. Field as Assistant Treasurer of New York, he was compelled to recognize their wishes. He wrote Mr. Chase, "As the proverb goes, no man knows so well where the shoe pinches as he who wears it. I do not think Mr. Field a very proper man for the place, but I would trust your judgment and forego this were the greater difficulty out of the way.... Strained as I already am at this point, I do not think that I can make this appointment in the direction of still greater strain." But Mr. Chase felt that the President was acting badly and must be disciplined, and so he resigned again. To submit to Mr. Chase under the circumstances would be to abdicate in his favor and to offend his loyal supporters in New York; hence, without hesitation, he wrote Mr. Chase as follows: "Of all I have said in commendation of your ability and fidelity I have nothing to unsay, yet you and I have reached a point of mutual embarrassment in our official relations which it seems cannot be overcome or longer sustained consistently with the public service."

Mr. Chase was taken entirely by surprise. He supposed that the President, like himself, believed that his presence in the Treasury Department was indispensable to the salvation of the government. Governor Todd, of Ohio, was nominated as his successor, but declined, and the President then sent to the Senate the nomination of William Pitt Fessenden, a Senator from Maine and chairman of the Committee on Finance, entirely without that gentleman's knowledge.

After the President's secretary had left for the Capitol with the nomination, Mr. Fessenden appeared at the White House and, after preliminary conversation, suggested the appointment of Hugh McCulloch, who had served with great ability since the beginning of the war as Comptroller of the Currency. Lincoln listened to his eulogy of Mr. McCulloch with a gentle smile, and then informed him that he had already sent his own name to the Senate. Mr. Fessenden protested and declared that he would decline.

"If you decline," replied the President, "you must do it in open day, for I cannot recall the nomination."

The significance and appropriateness of Mr. Fessenden's nomination to succeed Mr. Chase was immediately recognized as a coup d'État on the part of the President, and the former could not decline the responsibility. He served for only a few months, however, and was succeeded by Hugh McCulloch.

Mr. Chase could not suppress his sense of injury or cease talking about it. After he left the Cabinet, his criticisms of the President personally and the administration of the government became more frequent and bold than ever; but as soon as the death of Chief-Justice Taney of the Supreme Court was announced, he immediately claimed the vacancy. Notwithstanding all that had occurred, he was willing to forgive and forget, provided the President would make him Chief-Justice. Samuel Bowles, editor of the Springfield Republican, writes on December 4, 1864, two months after Taney's death, "Chase is going around peddling his grief in private ears and sowing dissatisfaction about Lincoln. Oh, how little great men can be!" The President at once made up his mind to appoint Mr. Chase, but would not announce his intention until he had heard the views of every Republican of importance. In the mean time Mr. Chase was appealing to his friends for support and endorsement and prophesying disasters for the government unless his appointment was made. One day Mr. Nicolay brought the President a letter from Mr. Chase.

"What is it about?" inquired Lincoln.

"Simply a kind and friendly letter." "File it with the other recommendations," was the laconic reply.

On December 6, when the Senate met, Mr. Chase's nomination appeared among others. It was written out in Lincoln's own hand instead of upon a printed blank, as was customary. The nomination was confirmed without reference to a committee, and the same evening Mr. Chase wrote the President a very grateful acknowledgment. "Be assured," he said, "that I apprize your confidence and good-will more than any nomination to office."

Lincoln afterwards told Mr. Boutwell that he never had any intention of refusing the office to Mr. Chase. "There were three reasons why he should be appointed and one reason why he should not be," said the President. "In the first place, he occupies a larger space in the public mind with reference to the office than any other person. Then we want a man who will sustain the Legal Tender Act and the Proclamation of Emancipation. We cannot ask a candidate what he would do, and if we did and he should answer we should only despise him for it. But Chase wants to be President, and if he does not give that up it will be a great injury to him and a great injury to me. He can never be President."

Among the most urgent friends of Mr. Chase were Senator Sumner and Representative Alley, of Massachusetts, who went to Washington to plead with the President in his behalf.

"We found, to our dismay," said Mr. Alley, "that the President had heard of the bitter criticisms of Mr. Chase upon himself and his administration. Mr. Lincoln urged many of Mr. Chase's defects, to discover, as we afterwards learned, how his objection could be answered. We were both discouraged and made up our minds that the President did not mean to appoint Mr. Chase. It really seemed too much to expect of poor human nature. But early one morning in the following December I went to the White House, found the President in his library, and was cordially received. As I entered he made to me this declaration:

"'I have something to tell you that will make you happy. I have just sent Mr. Chase word that he is to be appointed Chief-Justice, and you are the first man I have told of it.'

"I said, 'Mr. President, this is an exhibition of magnanimity and patriotism that could hardly be expected of any one. After what he has said against your administration, which has undoubtedly been reported to you, it was hardly to be expected that you would bestow the most important office within your gift on such a man.'

"His quaint reply was, 'Although I may have appeared to you and to Mr. Sumner to have been opposed to Chase's appointment, there never has been a moment since the breath left old Taney's body that I did not conceive it to be the best thing to do to appoint Mr. Chase to that high office; and to have done otherwise I should have been recreant to my convictions of duty to the Republican party and to the country.'

"I repeated again my sense of his magnanimity and his patriotism in making the appointment.

"He replied, 'As to his talk about me, I do not mind that. Chase is, on the whole, a pretty good fellow and a very able man. His only trouble is that he has "the White House fever" a little too bad, but I hope this may cure him and that he will be satisfied.'"

One would suppose, after this exhibition of magnanimity on the part of the President, that he would escape the criticism of Mr. Chase at least, but the latter still considered himself the inspired critic of the administration and sought the Democratic nomination for the Presidency. Nor was this all. His decisions upon the bench were in direct contradiction to the positions he had taken as a member of the Cabinet. He had criticised the President for his weakness in refusing to attack the doctrine of State rights, yet, on the first opportunity, he appeared as the judicial champion and defender of that doctrine; from his place on the bench he declared unconstitutional the Legal Tender Act which he had himself assisted in preparing and whose passage through the House of Representatives had been secured by his personal influence. While he was Secretary of the Treasury he sustained and encouraged Mr. Stanton in the exercise of the "war power" more earnestly and took more radical grounds than any other member of the Cabinet, yet when those very transactions came before the Supreme Court he denounced them as illegal and unjustified. The only explanation, the only apology that could be made by the friends of Mr. Chase was that his mind was soured by disappointment. He was a man of unbounded ambition, he had been working all his life to become President, he was convinced of his own great talents, and could not reconcile himself to disappointment.

President Lincoln's character and methods are nowhere better illustrated than in the story of his relations with Edwin M. Stanton, his great Secretary of War, a man of intense personality, of arbitrary disposition, impetuous in action, impatient under restraint, and intolerant of opposition. Combined with these qualities Mr. Stanton had great learning, unselfish patriotism, and conscientious convictions of duty. He was a native of Ohio, a graduate of Kenyon College, and when still young in years attained a high rank in the practice of his profession of the law, making his head-quarters first at Pittsburgh and in 1856 at Washington. He was born and bred in Democratic principles, but had a profound hatred of slavery, and during the administration of President Buchanan was pronounced in his opposition to the disunion schemes of the Southern politicians. Shortly after the election in 1860, when the situation at Washington was becoming critical, President Buchanan sought his advice, and Mr. Stanton prepared an argument to prove that a State could be coerced into remaining in the Union. A few weeks later Mr. Buchanan called him into his Cabinet as Attorney-General, and he immediately joined with the loyal members of the Cabinet and the Republican leaders in Congress in vigorous efforts to save the Union. But after Lincoln was inaugurated Mr. Stanton became the most scornful and unsparing critic of the new administration. He called the President an imbecile, charged Cameron with corruption, and declared that the administration was treating the treasure of the nation as booty to be divided among thieves. He predicted disaster in every direction; he declared that in less than thirty days Jefferson Davis would be in possession of Washington, and used the most intemperate and unjust language that his lips could frame in his comments upon the character and the conduct of the President and his advisers. Therefore, when he was invited to succeed Mr. Cameron, the chief object of his detestation and attack, he was placed in a peculiar situation, but was broad-minded enough to appreciate Lincoln's magnanimity, and accepted the war portfolio as the highest duty that could be assigned to a citizen. He wrote ex-President Buchanan, "My accession to my present position was quite as sudden and unexpected as the confidence you bestowed upon me in calling me to your Cabinet. And the responsible trust was accepted in both instances from the same motives and will be executed with the same fidelity to the Constitution and the laws." In another letter he wrote, "I knew that everything that I cherish and hold dear would be sacrificed by accepting office, but I thought I might help to save the country, and for that I was willing to perish."

When some one objected to Stanton's appointment on account of his ungovernable temper, and stated that he was in the habit of jumping up and down when he lost his patience, Lincoln replied,—

"Well, if he gets to jumping too much, we will treat him as they used to treat a minister I knew out West. He would get so excited and wrought up at revival meetings that they had to put bricks in his pockets to keep him down. But I guess we will let Stanton jump a while first."

Lincoln and his new Secretary of War had met before, and the President had no reason to be friendly towards him. The story is told in the chapter relating to Lincoln's legal career. But the President was willing to submerge his personal feelings in his patriotism in order to secure the support and assistance of a man for whose ability, energy, and patriotism he had the highest respect. He selected Mr. Stanton for the same reason that he retained McClellan in command and postponed the Emancipation Proclamation. He was not thinking of himself, but of his country. He was not seeking a friend or an agreeable companion, but a man of executive ability, iron will, stern integrity, and physical endurance to relieve him from what was becoming an unendurable burden; for, up to this time, he had borne almost alone the responsibility for military movements in the field as well as the organization and equipment of the army. Months before he had foreseen that Mr. Cameron must soon leave the Cabinet, and had been on the lookout for a suitable Secretary of War. With the silent sagacity and foresight that were among his most remarkable characteristics, he had searched the list of public men, and, finding no one available among his friends, had gone over into the ranks of his opponents and had chosen perhaps the most unfriendly and vigorous critic of his administration. He had learned of Mr. Stanton's tremendous energy and keen perceptions and recognized at once how useful those traits would be in the War Department; while his fearless candor, his indifference to criticism, and the public confidence in his integrity were qualities equally valuable under the circumstances.

Within a few weeks he was satisfied of the accuracy of his judgment in making the selection, and their daily intercourse brought the two men into relations which could not have existed between men of weaker character. Unlike Mr. Chase, his colleague of the Treasury Department, Mr. Stanton had the highest admiration for Lincoln's ability and judgment, and his imperious will and stubborn convictions would not have yielded to any one else. On the other hand, no one appreciated so much as Lincoln the genuine worth, the deep sincerity, and the rare ability to organize and execute that existed in his new Secretary of War. There were continual differences of opinion between them. Men of strong character seldom think alike, and with his peculiar temperament and impulsive disposition Mr. Stanton could not have served under a chief less amiable and considerate than Lincoln.

There is no doubt that the President's patience was often sorely tried, but the same spirit that governed him when he invited Mr. Stanton into the Cabinet continued to recognize the necessity of toleration and forbearance. While he usually yielded to his War Secretary in details, in matters of supreme importance he invariably insisted upon following his own judgment, and with a gentle but unyielding firmness compelled Mr. Stanton to submit to his will. For example, Mr. Stanton refused to carry out an order of the President concerning the enlistment of rebel prisoners of war who wished to enter the service of the Union, and when the order was repeated, refused a second time. General Fry, the Provost-Marshal-General, who was present at the interview, describes the incident as follows:

"'Now, Mr. President, those are the facts, and you must see that your order cannot be executed,' exclaimed Stanton.

"Lincoln sat upon a sofa with his legs crossed, and did not say a word until the Secretary's last remark. Then he said, in a somewhat positive tone, 'Mr. Secretary, I reckon you'll have to execute the order.'

"Stanton replied with asperity, 'Mr. President, I cannot do it.'

"Lincoln fixed his eyes upon Stanton, and in a firm voice, and with an accent that clearly showed his determination, he said, 'Mr. Secretary, it will have to be done.'

"Stanton realized that he was overmatched. He had made a square issue with the President and had been defeated, notwithstanding the fact that he was in the right. Upon an intimation from him I withdrew and did not witness his surrender. A few minutes after I reached my office I received instructions from the Secretary to carry out the President's order."

The President "always liked to get something on Stanton," as he used to say. Judge Shellabarger, of Ohio, relates this incident:

"A young man in the army, Ben Tappan, wanted a transfer from the volunteer service to the regular army, retaining his rank of Lieutenant and with staff duty. There was some regulation against such transfer; but Tappan's step-father, Frank Wright, thought it could be done. He had been to Secretary Stanton, who was an uncle of Tappan by marriage, and, on account of this so-called relationship, the Secretary declined to act in the matter. Wright and I therefore went up to the White House to see the President about it. After talking it over, Mr. Lincoln told a story, the application of which was that the army was getting to be all staff and no army, there was such a rush for staff duty by young officers. However, he looked over Lieutenant Tappan's paper, heard what Secretary Stanton had told us about his delicacy in transferring Lieutenant Tappan against the regulation because of his relationship by marriage. Then Mr. Lincoln wrote across the application something like the following endorsement:

"'Lieutenant Tappan, of —— Regiment Volunteers, desires transfer to —— Regiment, Regular service, and assigned to staff duty with present rank. If the only objection is Lieutenant Tappan's relationship to the Secretary of War, that objection is overruled.

"'A. Lincoln.'

"Of course this threw the responsibility of breaking the regulation on Secretary Stanton. We never heard anything more about the transfer."

General Fry says, "A story has long been current that Lincoln sent an application for office with a note to the Secretary of War, directing that a letter of appointment be prepared for the man to the office he sought; that the applicant returned to the President and announced that Stanton refused to obey the order; that the President looked disappointed, but merely expressed his regret at the result, and remarked that he had not much influence with the administration. The anecdote has generally been interpreted as meaning that Lincoln could not control Stanton. The inference is erroneous. Lincoln, so far as I could discover, was in every respect the actual head of the administration, and whenever he chose to do so he controlled Stanton as well as all the other Cabinet ministers."

Ex-Representative John A. Kasson, of Iowa, says, "Numerous officers in the field had written me to have Colonel ——, of —— Iowa Regiment, promoted to be a brigadier-general. The colonel deserved the promotion, but it was difficult to obtain. At last there came an Iowa resignation, and I went to the President, who signed an order to the Secretary of War to let Colonel —— have the commission in place of the resigning brigadier. Mr. Stanton was seated on a sofa talking with a friend. I told him my errand, and handed him the President's order. He glanced at it, and said, in an angry tone,—

"'I shan't do it, sir; I shan't do it!' and passed the paper up to his clerk.

"Utterly amazed at these words, and indignant at his tone, I inquired why he refused to obey the President's order.

"'It isn't the way to do it, sir, and I shan't do it.'

"I was going on to speak of the merits of the officer and of the proceeding, my wrath rising, when he cut me off with,—

"'I don't propose to argue the question with you, sir; I shan't do it.'

"Utterly indignant, I turned to the clerk and asked to withdraw the paper.

"'Don't you let him have it, sir,' said Stanton; 'don't let him have it.'

"The clerk, whose hands were trembling like an Eastern slave before his pasha, withdrew the document which he was in the act of giving to me. I felt my indignation getting too strong for me, and, putting on my hat and turning my back to the Secretary, I slowly went to the door, with set teeth, saying to myself, 'As you will not hear me in your own forum, you shall hear from me in mine.'

"A few days later, after recovering my coolness, I reported the affair to the President. A look of vexation came over his face. Then he gave me a positive order for the promotion of the colonel to be a brigadier, and told me to take it over to the War Department. I replied that I could not speak again with Mr. Stanton till he apologized for his insulting manner to me on the previous occasion.

"'Oh,' said the President, 'Stanton has gone to Fortress Monroe and Dana is acting. He will attend to it for you.'"

Judge Usher, Lincoln's Secretary of the Interior, says, "Chief among his great characteristics were his gentleness and humanity, and yet he did not hesitate promptly to approve the sentences of Kennedy and Beall. During the entire war there are but few other evidences to be found of a willingness on his part that any one should suffer the penalty of death. His great effort seemed to be to find some excuse, some palliation for offences charged. He strove at all times to relieve the citizens on both sides of the inconveniences and hardships resulting from the war. It has often been reported that Secretary of War Stanton arbitrarily refused to carry out his orders. In all such cases reported it will be found that the President had given directions to him to issue permits to persons who had applied to go through the lines into the insurgent districts. The President said at one time, referring to Stanton's refusal to issue the permits and the severe remarks made by the persons who were disobliged,—

"'I cannot always know whether a permit ought to be granted, and I want to oblige everybody when I can, and Stanton and I have an understanding that if I send an order to him that cannot be consistently granted, he is to refuse it, which he sometimes does; and that led to a remark which I made the other day to a man who complained of Stanton, that I hadn't much influence with this administration, but expected to have more with the next.'"

Mr. George W. Julian, a Representative in Congress, said, "I called on the President respecting the appointments I had recommended under the conscription law, and took occasion to refer to the failure of General FrÉmont to get a command. He said he did not know where to place him, and that it reminded him of the old man who advised his son to take a wife, to which the young man responded, 'Whose wife shall I take?'

"At another time," said Mr. Julian, "a committee of Western men, headed by Mr. Lovejoy, procured from the President an important order looking to the exchange of Eastern and Western soldiers, with a view to more effective work. Repairing to the office of the Secretary, Mr. Lovejoy explained the scheme, as he had done before the President, but was met by a flat refusal.

"'But we have the President's order, sir,' said Lovejoy.

"'Did Lincoln give you an order of that kind?' said Stanton.

"'He did, sir.'

"'Then he is a d—d fool,' said the irate Secretary.

"'Do you mean to say the President is a d—d fool?' asked Lovejoy in amazement.

"'Yes, sir, if he gave you such an order as that.'

"The bewildered Congressman from Illinois betook himself at once to the President and related the result of his conference.

"'Did Stanton say I was a d—d fool?' asked Lincoln, at the close of the recital.

"'He did, sir, and repeated it.'

"After a moment's pause, and looking up, the President said,—

"'If Stanton said I was a d—d fool, then I must be one, for he is nearly always right, and generally says what he means. I will step over and see him.'"

Mr. Stanton was entirely without a sense of humor, and was the only member of the Cabinet who could not tolerate and could never understand Lincoln's stories and the reasons for his frequent resort to comic anecdotes and books of humor to relieve his mind from anxiety and the terrible strain that was always upon him. He never told a story himself, and would not waste his time listening to stories from others. With his unsympathetic disposition and nerveless constitution he could not understand the need of relaxation, and his serious mind regarded with disapproval and even contempt the simple remedies which the President applied as relief to his anxieties and care. Charles A. Dana, who was Mr. Stanton's assistant in the War Department, referring to this fact in his reminiscences, says,—

"The political struggle (November, 1864) had been most intense, and the interest taken in it, both in the White House and in the War Department, had been almost painful. I went over to the War Department about half-past eight in the evening and found the President and Mr. Stanton together in the Secretary's office. General Eckert, who then had charge of the telegraph department of the War Office, was coming in continually with telegrams containing election returns. Mr. Stanton would read them and the President would look at them and comment upon them. Presently there came a lull in the returns, and Mr. Lincoln called me up to a place by his side.

"'Dana,' said he, 'have you ever read any of the writings of Petroleum V. Nasby?'

"'No, sir,' I said. 'I have only looked at some of them, and they seemed to me quite funny.'

"'Well,' said he, 'let me read you a specimen,' and, pulling out a thin yellow-covered pamphlet from his breast-pocket, he began to read aloud. Mr. Stanton viewed this proceeding with great impatience, as I could see, but Mr. Lincoln paid no attention to that. He would read a page or a story, pause to con a new election telegram, and then open the book again and go ahead with a new passage. Finally Mr. Chase came in and presently Mr. Whitelaw Reid, and then the reading was interrupted. Mr. Stanton went to the door and beckoned me into the next room. I shall never forget the fire of his indignation at what seemed to him to be mere nonsense. The idea that when the safety of the republic was thus at issue, when the control of an empire was to be determined by a few figures brought in by the telegraph, the leader, the man most deeply concerned, not merely for himself but for his country, could turn aside to read such balderdash and to laugh at such frivolous jests, was to his mind something most repugnant and damnable. He could not understand, apparently, that it was by the relief which these jests afforded to the strain of mind under which Lincoln had so long been living and to the natural gloom of a melancholy and desponding temperament—this was Mr. Lincoln's prevailing characteristic—that the safety and sanity of his intelligence were maintained and preserved."