  McClellan’s withdrawal. From a contemporary sketch. During the night McClellan continued his withdrawal, and the next day found the Army of the Potomac safe at Harrison’s Landing Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing. From a contemporary sketch. In his official report of the campaign Lee stated: “Under ordinary circumstances the Federal Army should have been destroyed. Its escape was due to * * * the want of correct and timely information. This fact, attributable chiefly to the character of the country, enabled Gen. McClellan skillfully to conceal his retreat and to add much to the obstructions with which nature had beset the way of our pursuing columns * * *.” But his other objective had been achieved—Richmond was safe, at least for the time being. While McClellan had successfully changed his base of operations from the York to the James River and saved his army in the process, he had failed in his first objective of capturing Richmond and possibly ending the war. The decision to remove the army from the peninsula, rather than reinforce it for another attempt on Richmond, was made in Washington over McClellan’s strong objections. He wrote to Gen. Henry W. Halleck: “It is here on the banks of the James, that the fate of the Union should be decided.” McClellan’s cartographers. Courtesy, Library of Congress. Although McClellan wisely realized the advantages of another assault on Richmond on the line of the James, it was his own mistaken view of Lee’s strength that was the major reason for the withdrawal. As Halleck explained to him:
In August the Army of the Potomac was transported by water back to Washington to support Pope’s campaign in Northern Virginia. McClellan’s failure to capture the Confederate Capital, combined with Lee’s failure to destroy the Union Army, assured the nation a long, bitter war that became one of the great turning points in American history. |
|
