The reader who has come to this point has before him the picture of the Nation's industry at war—the whole teeming effort in its main outlines, its myriad ramifications, its boundless activity, its ten thousand enterprises, its infinite toil, its hosts of workers, its wonders of scientific achievement, its attainments, even its failures—in short that humming complex of work, planning, ambition, disappointment, triumph, shortcomings, ability, and driving force which was a mighty people concentrated with all of its powers upon a single objective.

It remains now to describe the place occupied by this effort in the whole strategic plan of the war against Germany. We did not go into the struggle as if we expected to fight a single-handed war. Whatever we did either with military personnel or with munitions we did with reference to what the nations associated with us were doing or could do in the same respects. The whole plan was coordinated more or less perfectly, and these international understandings and agreements touched and influenced even the most trivial of our enterprises.

The reader who has in mind the record set down on the preceding pages is now prepared to comprehend the force and extent of the international cooperation in the war and to judge how well America played her part in the general scheme. Let us go back, therefore, and review the history of these agreements.

For many months before America came into the struggle, England, France, and Italy had been engaged in grappling with the scientifically organized forces of German military autocracy. The world war had become a conflict of materials, almost as much as of men. All participants had mobilized their industrial resources in a manner and to an extent undreamed of in times of peace.

The allies had marshaled all available raw materials and factory production in their own lands, and still faced colossal deficiencies in supplies for their military programs. They had been forced to reach out into the markets of the world to meet these deficiencies. They had come to America and placed huge orders for raw materials and finished products. The normal capacity of America's peace-time production had been insufficient to meet their overwhelming needs.

In August, 1914, the total factory capacity in the United States for the manufacture of powder was 6,000,000 pounds a year. In April, 1917, under the stimulation of orders placed by the allies, the capacity had been increased more than sixty-fold. England, France, and Italy were taking this entire production and asking for more. They had absorbed our entire output. A huge stream of materials, supplies, and ammunition was flowing steadily from America to the front line trenches in France. The allied governments had moulded their military programs in reliance upon the continuation of this source of supply. Their troops were on the front and in contact with the enemy. Failure of supply meant disaster.

The flow of materials from America to the armies in France could not, under any circumstances, be interfered with or curtailed. This fact was promptly recognized by the United States, and the allied governments were assured that America's military program would be formulated and performed without interference with the allied programs of supply from this country.

America's industrial contribution to the war, as a nation, was to be over and above the industrial contribution to the allies then being made by our individual producers. This fundamental plank in the interallied platform of cooperation was laid down at the very commencement of America's preparation, and it was strictly adhered to until the end of hostilities.

A comprehensive cooperative plan for America's industrial participation in the war remained to be worked out. A survey had to be conducted of the new partner's strength and weakness in supply. A determination had to be made of what the allies could give to the new partner, and what they must receive from her. This was done by the Interallied Munitions Council sitting in Paris, by the foreign missions in Washington in conference with the War Department, and by the allied war ministries and Gen. Pershing abroad.

An analysis of the facts of the situation disclosed that:

A. The world over—

(1) There was a critical shortage of ocean tonnage which promised to become more critical as time passed on account of the success of German submarine operations.

B. In France and England—

(1) The output of factories was being seriously curtailed and limited by lack of raw materials and semifinished products.

(2) If an adequate supply of raw materials and semifinished products could be made available, the factories had a substantial surplus manufacturing capacity which could be placed at the disposal of the United States.

C. In the United States—

(1) A surplus of raw materials and semifinished products for transport to France and England could quickly be made available.

(2) It would be impossible, within less than a year, to build up additional manufacturing capacity in the United States sufficient to supply a large army.

The lack of ocean tonnage was recognized by all as the vitals of the problem. France, Italy, and the United States had comparatively little merchant tonnage. England's vast tonnage was suffering rapid depletion by submarine losses and was totally inadequate to meet allied needs. Ships were the biggest single deficiency in the interallied program.

The cooperative industrial program of the Allies and the United States had to be geared into the shipping problem. To do this the determination of what materials should be shipped from the United States had to be decided first on the basis of what economies could be effected in shipping space. If raw materials for aircraft occupied less cargo space than the finished product, the maximum utilization of available tonnage demanded the shipment to France of these raw materials to be made into the finished product there. If, on the other hand, finished nitrocellulose powder for artillery shell propellants, or finished picric acid for artillery shell explosives, occupied less cargo space than the raw component materials used in their production, the shipping shortage demanded manufacture of these explosives and propellants in the United States. Not a single ship could be freighted with an extra pound or cubic foot of cargo which by any effort could be saved.

The French Mission in the United States early recognized this fact and urged the manufacture in the United States of picric acid to be used as explosive in 75-millimeter and 155-millimeter shell, pointing out that the finished product occupied but one-nineteenth as much cargo space as the raw materials.

Gen. Pershing recognized the point, and in August, 1917, cabled as follows:

Subsequent computations made on this side of the ocean indicated that in the case of picric acid and other explosives this ratio between raw materials and finished product in bulk was too great, yet in principle these computations did not affect the desirability of shipping the finished product rather than the raw materials.

Again, Gen. Pershing cabled to the Chief of Staff in the United States urging the purchase of completed artillery, artillery ammunition, and airplanes abroad, in order that "saving of tonnage" might be effected, and pointing out the saving of cargo space resulting from the shipment to France of raw materials instead of finished products, saying:

In the above comparison in the ammunition item, finished explosives are regarded as raw materials.

The Interallied Munitions Council, sitting in Paris and containing among its membership the best military and industrial brains at the command of the allied cause, including Gen. Pershing, Gen. Robertson, chief of the imperial general staff of Great Britain, and Gen. Foch, then chief of the general staff of the French Army, came to the same conclusion, and Gen. Bliss transmitted its findings in a memorable cable, a part of which was reproduced in the preface to this report.

Every mind was in accord. Tonnage must be saved. It could be saved and in vast amounts by calling upon the United States to supply the raw and semifinished materials, and upon the French and British war factories to utilize these raw and semifinished materials in the manufacture of the finished products.

But could this solution of the vital shipping question be dovetailed into the industrial situations of the various nations concerned? Could the United States supply the essential raw and semifinished materials in quantities equivalent to the amounts consumed in the manufacture of the finished product? Did the French and British factories, with these materials laid down in their yards, have available a sufficient manufacturing surplus to supply the needs of their own armies and also to produce in part for the armies of America?

The foreign missions were in Washington. They knew intimately the economic and industrial situations in their respective countries; they knew the military plans of their general staffs; they knew in what respects their programs of supply for their armies in the field needed assistance, and in what respects these programs could be met or exceeded. With this information available, they were prepared to furnish the answer as to the manufacturing capacities of allied Europe.

The British War Mission in Washington communicated to the War Department a cable from the British minister of armament, setting out the position of the British Government on reciprocal supply:

Writing to Maj. Gen. Crozier, Chief of Ordnance, the French high commission urged the placement in France of orders for artillery and artillery ammunition and pointed out the existence of surplus factory capacity available for their production. The commission summarized the industrial situation in France in the following language:

The allies could deliver the artillery, artillery ammunition, and airplanes if America could deliver the raw and semifinished materials. America answered that she could and would produce and transport to Europe raw materials and semifinished products in amounts equivalent to the amounts consumed by allied factories in manufacturing the completed guns, shell, and airplanes.

The details remained to be worked out. The French high commission submitted statements showing the amounts of each component material consumed in French factories in the production of guns and ammunition of the various calibers. There were to be supplied by America 6 tons of steel for each 75-millimeter gun, 40 tons of steel for each 155-millimeter howitzer, and 60 tons of steel for each 155-millimeter gun, and proper proportionate amounts of necessary materials used in the manufacture of artillery ammunition.

The program of industrial and economic cooperation between the United States and the allies thus took form. It used in the most efficient manner every nook and cranny of every available ship. It utilized to the utmost the surplus manufacturing capacity of France and England. It brought into the war at the earliest moment the resources of America in raw and semifinished materials. It spanned the period during which America could go forward with her gigantic mobilization of manufacturing power and later convince the Central Empires of the futility of further struggle.

With the program mapped out, reciprocal agreements for supply remained to be made. Orders were promptly placed.

The United States ordered from France a total of 5,854 pieces of field and trench artillery of various calibers, of which 3,834 were delivered to the American Expeditionary Forces prior to the armistice.

By August, 1917, more artillery ammunition was on order with the French Government than was fired by the American Expeditionary Forces from January 18, 1918, when the first complete American division entered the line, until November 11, 1918, when the end of hostilities was announced to the world. Of the amount ordered 10,000,000 rounds were delivered before firing ceased.

In aircraft equipment, the French factories also had a surplus capacity and delivered to Gen. Pershing up to November 11, 1918, a total of 4,881 finished airplanes.

By the terms of our agreement with the French Government, America obligated herself to supply the raw materials and component parts of the finished products delivered to our forces in France. This agreement America performed twice over. For every ton of raw materials and semifinished products America agreed to furnish to France, she furnished two tons. According to French statements, our replacement obligation in raw materials was 350,000 tons. America furnished over 800,000 tons.

In exchange for the artillery and artillery ammunition of French manufacture fired by Pershing, America supplied to France in metals alone over 700,000 tons of steel, 30,000 tons of pig iron, 5,000 tons of brass and spelter, and 50,000 tons of copper.

In addition, and for use in the artillery ammunition received from French factories, America manufactured and supplied to France in a finished state all the principal materials used in loading all shell delivered to the American Army. These materials consisted of smokeless powder, used as a propellant to drive the shell from the guns, and of picric acid, used as a high-powered detonative to burst over the enemy lines. The French used 12,000 tons of smokeless powder in our shell. America delivered an equivalent amount of finished powder. The French consumed 18,000 tons of picric acid in loading shell for American use. America supplied 18,500 tons.

In exchange for the finished airplanes, again America supplied the raw materials and component parts. For the framework of the French planes driven by American aviators, America furnished 34,500,000 feet of spruce, fir, and cedar, enough to manufacture over 16,000 finished planes; for the propellors, America furnished 7,000,000 feet of mahogany and walnut, enough for 40,000 propellors; 4,000 tons of aluminum, enough for thousands of planes; and dopes for painting airplane wings, and miscellaneous aircraft materials and supplies far in excess of the number of finished planes delivered to Gen. Pershing. Under special contract made in August, 1917, and in addition to the above, America furnished to France all materials for 5,000 finished planes and all parts for 8,500 finished airplane engines, which were to be assembled in France for the American Expeditionary Forces. The engine parts were in forgings and needed only to be machined. For the use of the French Government in machining these engine parts, America built and delivered the necessary equipment and machinery.

Thousands of additional smaller items of all kinds were supplied by the various governments to each other from day to day. No deficiency in the military programs of any of them was permitted to exist, if it could be made good by any of the others.

All of America's vast contribution to the allied program of supply was not only produced in America, but it was taken to France in army transports. From August, 1917, to November 11, 1918, an average of 2,000 tons of American materials for French factories left American ports every day aboard American army transports. Through a submarine-infested ocean, in which the Germans sank over 21,000,000 tons of dead-weight shipping, these materials were carried in army transports manned by American crews, and laid down at the doors of French factories.

By February, 1918, Gen. Pershing estimated that 2,000,000 tons of cargo space had been saved by the adoption of this program of international and reciprocal supply, a saving of more tonnage than was then available for the use of the American Expeditionary Forces. The Franco-American commission on explosives estimated a reduction of 75 per cent in cargo space in the shipment of explosives alone.

So the silent drama of international cooperation was carried out. The story of British and American mutual aid during the war is the same story in substance as that of Franco-American cooperation, with changes only in the figures. Economy of shipping was effected. British and French factory capacity was utilized. The vast reservoir of American raw materials and explosives was thrown against the enemy. International cooperation on a scale and in a spirit of cordial, mutual helpfulness, such as the world had never dreamed of, helped to equip 2,000,000 American soldiers in France.

And it was done, all of it, without curtailment of the huge stream of material which was flowing from America to the allies when the United States entered the war. France and England received ever-increasing quantities to the last day. The more than 800,000 tons of replacement materials for artillery, artillery ammunition, and airplanes delivered to America was over and above the millions of tons secured by the allies for their own use directly from American producers.

It was partly by reason of the adoption of this program and its complete performance that Gen. Pershing, after the armistice, could say:

Beyond all this, our Government, as part of the interallied program, created vast faculties for the manufacture of supplies which England, France, and Italy still required for their own needs and which a comprehensive consideration of the entire program, with particular reference to shipping, showed could be best produced in this country. Factories for the production of immense additional quantities of picric acid, powder, and other materials were built by our War Department to fill the deficiencies in the military programs of our associates in the war.

And beyond and behind all this America went forward with her own gigantic preparations for the conquest of the dark forces which threatened world civilization. It was this mobilization of her might almost as much as the effect of her immediate force which helped to convince the German general staff of the futility of further resistance and assisted to bring the war to an early end.