General Faunce and his men had worked hard and well. By May, 1888, the advance had been made good as far as TÔklaing, called Fort White. But although that place was only a short distance (thirty miles) from Falam, the main settlement of the Tashons, we had not been able to reach it. This tribe was known to be the most numerous and the most influential of the Chins in these parts, and their subjugation was essential.

The character of the country which was the scene of operations has been described in the preceding chapter. For a successful effort to conquer it much and timely preparation was necessary. Several circumstances had made this impossible. It will be remembered, in the first place, the Government of India had viewed the enterprise askance. The head of an Indian province looks mainly to his own affairs; and not having a free hand, and being without direct responsibility for the financing of a military expedition, he presses hard for what he wants. To the Supreme Government, far from the scene of raids and disorder, and less directly concerned with the causes and consequences of them, the financial aspect looms largest. The Government of India were beginning to take alarm at the heavy burden with which the annexation of the new province was loading them. They were aware of the very wide extent of territory under the nominal sway of the dethroned King, and of the distant boundaries, ill-defined and seemingly endless, marching not only with China and Siam, but with savage peoples of whom hardly the names were known. They feared, naturally enough, that the local authorities might allow their zeal to push them on too hastily if not too far. Little was known about the relations of the King's Government to the wide region lying between the Irrawaddy Valley and the Mekong. The northern and north-eastern boundaries were very indistinctly defined, and no thought had been given to the great wedge of mountainous country between Burma proper and Bengal.

The end of 1888 found us engaged in all these outlying regions. Active operations were going on in the Shan States, in the difficult hills east of Bhamo, and in the rugged country about the Ruby Mines. In the far north there were disturbances all around Mogaung, which was inadequately garrisoned and difficult to get at. Added to this, there were still districts of Upper Burma which were harassed by gangs of guerillas. There was more than enough work for every soldier and every civilian in the country and for every penny that the Treasury could afford. Facts, however, had proved strong, and the Chins themselves forced us to act. But General Faunce's force started too late, and therefore without adequate preparation for a big campaign. Added to this came the unfortunate Gangaw affair, which interrupted his supplies and called off some of his best troops.

In the summer of 1889 the position at Fort White was hardly encouraging. The place had proved very unhealthy, and the garrison had few men fit for service. Not only had we failed to touch the Tashons, who had been chiefly responsible for the troubles of the past year, but we were far from having come to terms with the Siyins and Kanhows, on which tribes our hand had been heavy. The political officer, indeed, still believed that hunger would bring them in. The Kanhows had made a partial and half-hearted submission, retaining, however, most of their Burman captives. The others would have no truck with us, and treated our demands, as well as our advances, with obstinate silence. Their courage was higher, and the pressure on them less than had been thought. The BaungshÈs, moreover, to the south of the Tashons, including the Yokwa Haka and Thetta clans, had been continuously on the warpath, and had had no communication with our officers since the winter of 1887.

There were only two courses open—either to make a well-prepared systematic advance into the Chin Hills and bring these people under British rule, not necessarily administration in the full meaning; or to retire altogether and leave an enclave of savagery between Burma and Bengal, trusting for the protection of the Burman villages to frontier posts and spasmodic expeditions. The long history of the dealings of the Bengal Government with the Lushais and Nagas, very similar people, had proved the futility of the latter course. The inclination in Burma was all for the former, and this met with the thorough approval of the Supreme Government. The work was to be undertaken in a whole-hearted manner that would ensure success.

During the inactive season of 1889, the scheme of operations was carefully worked out. The plan of campaign approved by the Supreme Government was very much on the lines sketched in the Chief Commissioner's minute of the 21st of July, 1888. The central object was the Tashon tribe. On their north we already had in Fort White a footing in the hills with communications secured to Kalewa, on the Chindwin. It was decided to make the attack from the Burma side in two strong columns. The Northern Column was to gather at Fort White, and was to deal in the first instance with the still refractory tribes in its immediate neighbourhood. The Southern Column was to muster at Pakokku and, making its base at Kan in the Myittha Valley, to move up deliberately into the hills to Yokwa and Haka, subjugating the villages as the force advanced and securing the release of the captives. Then, leaving a garrison in Haka, it was to move northward and, in combination with the Fort White Column, to make a simultaneous attack on Falam, the Tashon capital, from both sides. Meanwhile, a third force was to enter the hills from Bengal territory and open communications or, if necessary, join hands with the Burma columns. For the operations of this last force the Burma Administration had no responsibility.

To protect the villages in the plains from raids and to keep open communications while the expeditions were in progress, it was decided to establish ten posts along the more northern portion of the Chin-Burman frontier. The force to be employed from Burma was to be nearly four thousand fighting men, besides some military police. The number of transport animals and of coolies necessary for such a body would be very great. Carts were useless after the first few marches from the Irrawaddy. Some fodder for ponies and bullocks might be procurable, but it was certain that once in the hills almost every ounce of food for man and beast would have to be sent up from the Irrawaddy Valley.

The success of the campaign, therefore, was a question of transport and supply. Kan, which was to be the base of the Southern Column, was to be fed from Pakokku on the Irrawaddy, distant 165 miles through difficult and sparsely inhabited country. Work had been begun in 1888 on the road; but labour was scarce and the cart-track was not open for more than half the distance. Provisions for Fort White and its communications, as well as for the frontier posts, could be sent up by steamer to Kalewa on the Chindwin. The difficulty was to move them thence to Kalemyo within reach of the troops. If the Myittha were navigable, it would be invaluable; all the frontier posts from Kalemyo to Kan were on that river, but its waters were unknown. Mules and coolies in large numbers, men from Assam and from the Northern Punjab able to carry loads on hill paths, were promised by India. Arrangements for collecting some eight or nine hundred carts at Pakokku were put in train; and contracts for the hire of country boats, of which Pakokku is the great building centre, were given.

In August I went up the Chindwin to Kalewa to meet Major Raikes, who had been stationed at Fort White since the close of the active operations, and had been busy acquiring information of the people and country and endeavouring to induce the Chins to come to terms. I brought with me two naval officers—Captain Wilson, R.N., then Port Officer at Rangoon, and Commander Holland, of the Royal Indian Marine Service. These officers were deputed to ascertain how far the Myittha could be navigated; and, as their inquiries gave reason for hoping that the river might be navigable, the task of exploring it was entrusted to Commander Holland. The results of his work were encouraging, and he was directed to organize a transport service of boats.

But to return to Kalewa. The Chief Commissioner, after discussing matters closely with Major Raikes, resolved to inform the Tashons that the British Representative, with an armed force, would proceed to Falam, their head village, and there receive the submission of the tribe, and if necessary enforce it. A proclamation to that effect was sent to the chiefs in the following terms:—

"A British army will march to the Tashon Ywama. The British Government wishes to preserve your tribe, and does not desire to punish you as it has punished the Kanhows and Siyins who have resisted the British forces.

"The British Government desires from you only two things: First, that the captives taken from Burman villages shall be released. Secondly, that you shall in the future behave peacefully, and cease to attack the subjects of the Government.

"Therefore the Chief Commissioner hereby declares and promises that you will be excused from punishment for the past if you comply with the following terms:—

"(i) That you shall assist the British troops in their march through your country to your Ywama, and that you will neither attack nor oppose them;

"(ii) That you shall to the utmost of your power compel the Siyin and Kanhow tribes to surrender their captives.

"(iii) That the chiefs shall meet the officer in command of the British forces at the Ywama, and deliver up to him all the captives in the possession of your tribe and pay a fine of 10,000 rupees.

"(iv) That you shall render annually a tribute of two elephant tusks and ten silk pieces to the British Government.

"If you comply with these terms your lives and property will be spared, and the former orders requiring you to deliver up the ShwÈgyobyu and other rebels will not be enforced.

"On the other hand, if you will not comply with these conditions the Chief Commissioner will direct the troops to punish you severely."

Up to this time the surrender of the Burman outlaws had been made a condition of peace with the Tashons. It was now said by those who knew them best that the surrender of the refugees was repugnant to Chin honour; and in the hope of making it easier for them to yield, the Chief Commissioner consented to waive this demand. Permission was also given to Major Raikes to reduce the fine, if it would make negotiations more hopeful. But on the other points, especially the condition that the troops should march to Falam, their capital, and there receive the formal and public submission of the chiefs to the British Government, no concession whatever was to be made. Negotiations on this basis continued between the political officer and the Tashons without result.

In the beginning of December the chiefs agreed to meet Major Raikes at Sihaung. The terms of the proclamation were explained to them, and they were made to understand that they were final and would be enforced. The chiefs were impracticable. They affirmed that if our men advanced they could not control their tribesmen. The ex-Sawbwa of KalÈ was present at this meeting, having come down with the Chins. He wisely took the opportunity of surrendering to Major Raikes, and was sent to Pakokku, where he lived afterwards in receipt of a pension from the Government. His surrender exploded a theory which had been started, that the Tashons were holding out in order to procure his reinstatement in KalÈ.

A proclamation in similar terms was sent to the Haka and Yokwa Chins.

Meanwhile the work of collecting transport and forwarding stores was pushed on; the boat service on the Myittha was organized, and was worked by Commander Holland with great energy and success.

Brigadier-General Faunce had left Burma. He was succeeded in command of the brigade by Colonel W. P. Symons (well known as General Sir W. Penn Symons), who met his death in the first action of the Boer War. Colonel Symons had made his reputation already as an active and able soldier. He was much more. He was peculiarly fitted by temper, tact, and administrative ability to conduct a difficult business like that now in hand. The command of the Chin-Lushai expedition was given to him by the Chief Commissioner's request. The question arose whether he should have also the control of the negotiations and arrangements with the Chins.

For some time the feeling in India had been, as it still is, against the division of authority in expeditions of this kind. No doubt, as a rule, the man who holds the military command should have control of the negotiations also. At the same time the circumstances of each case and the qualifications of the man must be taken into account. In Burma hitherto it had been found more convenient, if not necessary, to divide the duties and to give what is called the political business to a civil officer acquainted with the language and customs of the people to be dealt with. In the present instance it happened that Major Raikes had from the beginning dealt, under the Chief Commissioner's orders, with the Chin tribes. He had had more opportunities than any one of acquiring a knowledge of their character and politics. It was somewhat difficult to ask him now to work in subordination to the military commander who had had no part in the business.

The Chief Commissioner was ready to brush aside this personal difficulty and to allow Major Raikes to resign his post if he preferred to go. He would willingly have placed the chief authority unreservedly in General Symons's hands. The question was carefully considered and discussed. Finally, by General Symons's desire it was arranged to leave to the civil officer the negotiations with the Chins and the arrangements to be made with them when they submitted. It happened, however, that before the advance into the hills had well begun, Major Raikes was compelled by illness to go away. General Symons was then put in undivided control of the whole business, under the Chief Commissioner's orders. Two civil officers were selected to serve as his assistants, absolutely in subordination to him. Mr. D. Ross was posted to the Southern Column and Mr. B. S. Carey to the Northern. This arrangement worked admirably.

The rains of 1889 were unfortunately late. The Southern Column, 1,869[56] strong, was concentrated at Pakokku. From Pakokku to Kan, which was to be the base for the operations, was one hundred and sixty-five miles. Shelters had been erected at the halting-places, and such provisions as could be procured were gathered and stored by the civil district officers. The troops began to move on the 23rd of November, and the march was successfully carried out in fifteen days, by detachments of one hundred fighting men with followers marching in succession daily. The first detachment left Pakokku on the 23rd of November, and the leading columns were only just able to get through the falling rivers and the drying country. The ground was heavy and the heat great. Nevertheless, troops and followers arrived at Kan in good condition, with only a nominal sick list.

By the middle of November the Northern Column, 1,622[57] strong, was ready at Fort White and was waiting for the hill-coolies who were to form the transport, before it should move out.

The garrisons for the ten posts which were to protect the frontier were sent up the Chindwin to Kalewa, and had to march down the Myittha Valley. Late rains had flooded the KalÈ Valley, and as late as the end of November the country was impassable to anything but an elephant. On the 24th of October it took fifteen hours to get one hundred and seventy fresh mules, with elephants to carry their saddles and gear, through the bogs and swamps on the last five and a half miles of the road into Kalemyo, which was the distributing base for supplies for Fort White and for the posts in the KalÈ Valley. By the end of December these ten posts were built, occupied, and rationed—a testimony to the qualities of the officers and men who overcame such difficulties.

By the end of January, 1890, five hundred and fifty-one tons of stores had been sent by road to Kan, and six hundred and thirty-eight tons landed at Kalemyo by water. The river transport service not only did this, but also provided, as a by-work, carriage for many men joining their corps and for sick sent down to the rear. From the beginning of February, when the country had become dry, all supplies for the Southern Column were brought in carts from Pakokku to Kan and on to Haka on hired pack-bullocks and Government transport animals. To add to the difficulties, virulent cattle disease broke out in the Myittha and KalÈ Valleys, and caused enormous loss.

One-third of the pack-bullocks had died. The sickness was not confined to the transport animals. It was said that the villagers in the KalÈ State lost 90 per cent. of their buffaloes.

The first troops of the Southern Column reached Kan on the 7th of December. On the 9th the sappers, with a covering escort, commenced work on the road to Haka, which was sixty-four miles distant. Every one thought that our men would be in Haka in ten or twelve days, and all calculations were based on this estimate. It was sixty-six days before the leading files entered Haka, and the mule-road did not reach that place until the seventy-seventh day. This, although the whole strength of the force was devoted to road work: every man who could dig was set to it. The country opposed to the engineers a tumbled network of steep hills and deep ravines. The climate proved deadly. Soldiers and coolies were ill with fever. Out of seven Royal Engineer officers, at the end of December six were lying ill. In comparison with the difficulties caused by the nature of the country and the climate, the fiercest opposition of the Chins was insignificant.

"This disappointing delay," wrote General Symons, "was not without its compensating advantages in dealing with the Chins. They expected us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady, persistent advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into touch with them and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed their spirits and efforts for resistance, and thus tribe after tribe submitted and yielded to our terms."

This is, no doubt, the true way of dealing with savages. They are like children. They are terrified if they see a person approaching them steadily, with measured steps and outstretched arms. But it is much more difficult and requires more resources in money and men and transport to advance into a difficult country, making each step good and permanent, than to rush in, burn, slay, and retire. The latter method of warfare the savage understands. His enemies appear suddenly, set fire to his village, kill those they come across, and are away again. He flees into the jungle at the first alarm, and comes back little the worse as soon as the other side retires. That the better method was not followed in 1887-8, and that the more barbarous system was adopted, was not voluntary. Circumstances forced it upon the authorities in Burma, as the only means at their disposal for protecting the peaceful population in the plains. Besides, it is only fair to say that the tribes dealt with the former year, the Siyins and Kanhows, were by far the most warlike and bloodthirsty of the Chins. The severe chastisement inflicted on them, and the maintenance of the garrison in Fort White during the year, had brought home to all the folly of trying conclusions with disciplined and well-armed troops.

On the 17th of December the advance-guard of the Southern Column occupied Taungtek on the road to Haka. From that date to the 28th of December the Chins from time to time made feeble attempts to resist, harassing the troops by firing into camp. On the 28th, near Taungtek, they had a considerable number of men in action; according to their own account five hundred men, of whom three hundred had fire-arms. But they could do nothing. From that day they gave up the fight and made no further opposition.

On the 8th of January two Yokwa Chins came into camp. The objects of our coming and the conditions of peace were explained to these two men, and they were sent back to repeat them to their chiefs. But therein lay the difficulty. Who were the real chiefs? There were numbers of chiefs, each with his own following, each bitterly jealous of his fellows. To negotiate under such conditions required the tact and patience which General Symons fortunately possessed. The most intelligent and influential of the rivals had to be discovered, and his position strengthened by dealing through him.

Henceforth affairs progressed well, and there was no combined opposition to the advance. One unfortunate incident, however, occurred. Some Chins lying in ambush shot Lieutenant Foster, of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The tribes had been fully warned that acts of treachery would meet with punishment. The nearest village was destroyed. This, happily, was the sole occasion on which the Southern Column was compelled to use violence.

A few days afterwards Yokwa was occupied, and this section of the BaungshÈs yielded. The terms imposed on them were the surrender of the captives, the payment of a fine and of an annual tribute, and an engagement to keep the peace in future. The mule-path, meanwhile, was being pushed forward on to Haka, the headquarters of an important section. The same tactics soon led to their submission. The subjugation of the whole BaungshÈ clan was now complete, for the minor sections followed the lead of the premier communities. The headquarters of the expedition were fixed henceforward at Haka, and negotiations for the surrender of the captives were begun.

This was not an easy or speedy business. Nominal rolls of the persons held in durance by the Chins had been prepared, and it was known by which tribe and by which village the captives had been taken. But some of the raids had been committed months before. Slaves were current coin in the hills, and passed from hand to hand as easily as a bank-note in more civilized regions. Their value was fixed with reference to the customary ransom paid by their Burmese relatives, and seems to have averaged ten or twelve pounds sterling. In barter, according to Mr. Carey, a slave would exchange for three or four head of cattle, a good gun, a dozen pigs, or a wife. However willing the tribe or the village, or even the original captor, might be to keep faith, it was often difficult to trace the slave and obtain his release from the present holder, who had bought him with a price and did not see why he should be at a loss. A view not unreasonable from a Chin point of view, but quite inadmissible from our side.

While these negotiations were proceeding at Haka, and the mule-road was being completed to that place, reconnaissance parties were sent out to the west, the country was explored, the submission of a western tribe, the Klanklangs, was secured, and communication with the Chittagong Column, under Brigadier-General Tregear,[58] was opened. The advance parties of General Symons and General Tregear's forces met on the 26th of February, at Tao village, fifty-two miles west of Haka. This meeting was notable for the recovery of the heads of Lieutenant John Stewart, of the Leinster Regiment, and the soldiers (two British and one Indian) who had been killed by Hoswata Shendoos on the 3rd of February, 1888, when surveying in the Chittagong Hill tracts. Their skulls had decorated the village of some Chin chief at Haka ever since. As to how they came to Haka nothing is known. The chief may have taken them himself, or he may have purchased the trophies from the real heroes. No inquiry was made, and no retaliation was inflicted on the accomplices in the murder of our fellow-countrymen.

The Southern Column being thus engaged, the Northern Column, under Colonel Skene, with Mr. Bertram Carey as civil officer, had not been idle. Mr. Carey had to do with a very difficult position. The tribes with whom he was immediately concerned were as defiant in December, 1889, as they had been a year before; and he had no medium of communication with them. Gradually, by patience and skilful handling, the Sagyilain Chins living in the nearest villages were induced to bring supplies of eggs and fowls to market. Trading led to closer intercourse. Mr. Carey established himself at Yawlu on the road from Fort White to Falam, the chief Tashon village, and very soon Tashons as well as Sagyilains came to Yawlu daily to sell their produce, and the situation became less strained, while the troops procured better food. After a little ManglÖn, the chief of the Sagyilains, came to see Mr. Carey, and made his submission to the British Government. This was a most welcome event. ManglÖn became a medium in all negotiations with the Siyins, and remained loyal and trustworthy in subsequent troubles.

No progress, however, was made with the Siyins, who promised to surrender if the Tashons made peace. The best months for active operations were passing. But it was thought inexpedient to adopt rough methods against them until a settlement had been made with the Tashons.[59] After some negotiations with the chief of Mwebingyi (an important village), who promised to surrender and invited a visit, Mr. Carey, with Colonel Skene and a small force, guided by Sagyilain men, marched to Mwebingyi. Three miles from the village they were fired on by Chins from all sides. A sharp skirmish followed. The Chins, driven back to their village, set it on fire and took to the hillsides. We lost two men severely wounded owing to this treacherous attack.

The time had now come when the much-delayed advance of the Southern Column made the combined movements of the Northern and Southern Columns upon the Tashon Ywama possible. The reduction of this tribe was the main object of the campaign, to which all the other operations were leading. It was important to avoid a hostile collision with it. It would have been easy enough to harass and punish the tribe village by village, but at the cost of life, destruction of property, and misery. General Symons's instructions were to accept no surrender and to conclude no negotiations except at Falam, the Tashon head village; and his purpose was to make resistance hopeless by placing the forces from Haka and Fort White simultaneously on the north and south of the Ywama. Accordingly, on the 8th of March a force 350 strong, with one gun, under Colonel Skene, left Fort White. On the 9th General Symons, with 290 rifles and two mountain-guns, marched from Haka. The Southern Column had suffered so much from sickness that its strength in fighting-men and transport coolies had been seriously reduced. Without the aid of the Northern Column, it could not have given enough men to garrison Haka and at the same time to deal with the Tashons. It was a matter of moment, therefore, that the two columns should operate in concert. A successful and rapid reconnaissance to within eight miles of the Ywama was affected, and the two forces arrived on the opposite banks of the Manipur, or Nankathe River, within an hour of each other on the 11th of March.

The Tashons had not intended to yield without a fight.

"Innumerable stockades, breastworks, and obstructions, extending over some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their numbers; but on the south of Manipur River near the Ywama there were not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, the rest with spears."[60]

Disregarding the protests of some of the chiefs who came out to meet him, General Symons marched his men to a spot within one thousand yards of the Ywama, and fixed his camp there. The chiefs were assembled and asked if they agreed to our terms. With the inconsequence of savages, after allowing us to advance unopposed, they rejected our conditions, refusing firmly to pay tribute and demurring even to the fine. General Symons warned them of the risk they were incurring and dismissed them.

The scene on this occasion was dramatic, and is thus described by Mr. Bertram Carey, who was present:—

"The whole valley, in which formerly lay the original village of Falam, was full of armed Chins, numbering not less than 3,000 men, gathered from all sides; the host seemed to settle itself in groups of from 10 to 100 men. They were quiet in demeanour, but held their heads high and seemed quite prepared for whatever might be the result of the negotiations. The crowd was a motley one, the Tashon chiefs dressed in the gaudy tartan of the tribe, well armed with bright guns, vermilion and black parti-coloured dah scabbards, and beautifully inlaid powder-horns. The Whenohs were conspicuous by their chignons, which contrasted with the lofty head-dress of their neighbours, the Yahows, who were present carrying the strange shendu, chopper-shaped dahs in basketwork scabbards. Scattered around in bunches were the scowling Siyins, the half-breeds from Tawyan and MintÈdaung, the semi-independent clique of Kwungli, and the trans-NankathÈ tribesmen of Sokte and 'Poi' origin. The congregation was armed with a variety of weapons; spears and flint-lock guns predominated, but bows and quivers of barbed arrows were carried by not a few. Each man bore his food-supply for a few days on his back."[61]

The next two days were spent in wearisome negotiations which might have driven a less patient man to the use of force. His forbearance was rewarded, and the chiefs gave way. The tribute for 1889 was delivered, and five thousand rupees, the amount to which he had thought right to reduce the fine, was paid.

The Tashons admitted that until a few days before the forces reached Falam they had intended to fight. Their position as head of the Chin tribes and the fear of losing prestige impelled them to resist. When they found their enemies coming from two sides, they began to lose heart. All their outlying villages, who knew they must suffer first and most, prayed them to make peace.

It is evident that the rough handling of the Siyins by General Faunce had given a salutary lesson to these people. The event proved also the wisdom of marching to the headquarters of the tribe, and there compelling the public submission of their leaders.

The object of the combined march having been attained, the columns separated, the Southern returning to Haka and the Northern to Fort White. During the remaining months of open weather General Symons was occupied in gathering in the captives, improving his relations with the Chins, and in exploring the country. In April, accompanied by the Haka chief, he visited many villages to the South and was everywhere well received. On the 15th of April General Tregear met him at Haka, now linked up with Fort Tregear by a mule-track, which was brought into Haka, a distance of eighty-one miles, on the 13th of April. The Chittagong Column had met with no opposition. Their work was mainly road-making, reconnoitring, and surveying—work of the first importance in securing permanent peace. The Lushai country was as difficult as any on the Burma side.

"There is the dense jungle, which prevents one seeing a dozen yards ahead; rocks extending over large portions of the hillside are constantly met with, and when it was found impossible to avoid them much time was taken up in blasting operations. Range upon range of precipitous hills, running at right angles to the line of advance, had to be crossed, and the question of a sufficient supply of water at the different camps had to be considered in determining the trace of the road."[62]

Two large rivers had to be bridged.

It is not within the scope of the present narrative to describe the work done by the Chittagong Column. Its approach from the west had beyond doubt made General Symons's task easier, and success more certain.

On returning to Fort White, Mr. Carey resumed his immediate duty of bringing the Siyins within the fold. They had promised to submit if the Tashons made peace. He called upon them now to keep their word. Only one chief came in, and, as he brought no captives, Mr. Carey sent him away. So far from submitting, they cut the telegraph wires daily and annoyed our people. A policy of waiting and conciliation had failed. Several of the worst villages were therefore singled out and destroyed, not without some fighting, in which several sepoys were killed. Unfortunately, in two cases, in which some troops from Kalemyo were engaged, the bodies were allowed to fall into the enemies' hands. The Chin braves were able to return with two heads, more expressive of victory than guns or standards, and no doubt published in their fashion jubilant bulletins. The triumph was short-lived. A month afterwards a detachment of the 42nd Gurkhas, marching down on their way to India, destroyed the villages concerned. Before the end of April all the Siyins had made outward submission and had accepted our terms, which were that a yearly tribute should be paid and that the captives should be surrendered. Each clan was to be allowed to rebuild its villages when the captives held by it had been released, and not before. The cut telegraph wire and the two heads were brought in, and the captives were being gradually surrendered.

The results of the campaign were good and permanent. The foundation was laid for an effective control over these troublesome hill-men, and peace with security was given to the Burmans in the plains and to the Chins themselves. Raiding and slavery as institutions were condemned, and were soon to disappear altogether. Before the troops left the field one hundred and thirty-eight captives were liberated. There were a few raids made after General Symons finished his task, but they were promptly punished. There were some disturbances among the Chin tribes. They were easily checked, and systematic disarmament here, as in Burma proper, changed the temper and habits of the people.

This success had been achieved almost without bloodshed, but at a great cost to our men of suffering and loss of life from disease. The sickness among troops and followers was appalling, and the transport animals perished by hundreds. Nine men, of whom two were officers, were killed in action; two hundred and seven, of whom seventy-two were fighting-men, perished of disease. And two thousand one hundred and twenty-two were invalided, of whose seven hundred and nine were fighting-men—one-fifth of the whole force.

A permanent post was built at Haka, which was found to be a healthy place; and the headquarters of a civil officer, with control over the BaungshÈs and Tashons, was established there.

Fort White continued for some time to be the headquarters of the civil and military staff in the north. But the garrison was reduced, and as the site was always sickly, the fort was moved back to the Letha Range, retaining the name which it had received from Sir George White. Falam, the chief village of the Tashons, is now the headquarters of the civil administration of the Chin Hills.

It is worth while, perhaps, to give some account of the Chins in these the first years of British rule.

At the time of General Symons's expedition the Chins were a savage race. They had arms in abundance, flint-lock guns of English make, and spears. They were armed not so much against strangers as against each other. In former times, when they were ill-provided with fire-arms, the Burmans used to oppress them; but for a long time the position had been reversed. Intertribal feuds, however, and feuds between villages and families of the same tribe, were very common and made it unsafe to move without arms. No man who owned a gun ever left his house without it. While the fields were worked by women and slaves, armed men stood guard. So it was even less than a century ago in parts of India. What caused the feuds was a matter for speculation. Apparently disputes about debts were the most frequent; commerce, in fact, as among Western peoples, led to quarrels. As for government, even the most primitive form of tribal or village organization appears to have been imperfect. There were many chiefs, and if any one of them, as Jahoota,[63] for instance, was pre-eminent, he could not count on the obedience or support of the others. Their jealousies interfered with everything. Of their manners and customs not much was put on record in the earlier reports, which were necessarily more concerned with military matters. They made forays on the Burmans for heads and slaves. They were much given to sacrifices, and sometimes to human sacrifices. For example, it was usual to sacrifice slaves at the funerals of persons accidentally killed. Of their marriage-customs nothing is said in the early reports.

The country was not rich. There were no forests that it would pay to work, and no minerals had been discovered. The cultivation was of the primitive kind—"Taungya," or "Jhoom"—that is to say, felling the trees, burning them when dry, and sowing hill-rice and other crops in the ash. In the forests they had plenty of game, and much fish—Mahseer and other kinds—in the rivers; and the jungles were rich in fruits and roots that would support life if the grain failed. Metal of all kinds was very scarce. The hills produced none, and the Burmese Government had forbidden the export of metals from the plains. The trouble the Chins gave by cutting the telegraph wire was caused by their desire to procure metal, rather than to cause annoyance. Mr. Carey compared the attraction felt by the Chin for the unprotected wire to that felt by an English boy for an unfenced apple-orchard. The insulator spikes were beaten into hoes and the wire melted to make bullets, or bangles for the damsels. Their wants were blankets, cottons and other cloths, iron and steel for tools, lead for bullets, needles and thread and salt. In exchange they were able to offer honey, beeswax, chillies, mats, and a little lac.

The reports of 1889 were more concerned with the measures carried out for their subjugation than with descriptions of the people and their manners. In the main, what is written in the Burma Gazetteer published in 1908 is true of the Chins of twenty years ago:—

"They are a sturdy, warlike, hospitable people, slow of speech, grave of habit, paying great regard to rank and to the ties of clan, but spoilt by their intemperance, their vindictiveness, their treachery, their greed, their lack of persistence,[64] and their personal uncleanliness."

There is a quaint humour about this description which is refreshing in a Gazetteer. A race would have to be good indeed if, with such an array of vices, there was anything left to spoil.

Their villages are described as built on the hill-slopes, some of them fortified; and their houses are often solid, elaborate structures. Their dress is the reverse—a loin-cloth, none too ample, and a blanket for the men; a short skirt and jacket for the women. Home-woven check plaids are seen in a good many costumes, and some tribes have distinctive plaids, as in Scotland. The people are mainly vegetarians, but they will eat anything, from a dog to an elephant. They smoke tobacco in pipes, and they make a liquor from fermented grain, presumably rice, which is called zu. They suck up this, in the most approved fashion, through a hollow reed, out of the original still-pot. Enormous quantities of zu are consumed at Chin entertainments, which usually end in disgusting orgies.

The ChinbÔks and Chinbons.

Tribes called the ChinbÔks, claiming to be of the same stock as the Hakas but speaking a different language, are found at the head-waters of the Maw and Yaw Rivers. Farther south, at the sources of the Saw and Salin and on the eastern slopes of the MÔn Valley, live the Yendus. Below them, and southernmost of all the Chins, are the Chinbons, who from the MÔn on the east extend along the border of the Mimbu district into the Akyab and Kyaukpyu districts of Lower Burma.

These three tribes were less fierce than their kindred to the north, and possessed only the arms of savage warfare—the bow and arrow and spear. Some of them, those on the borders of the Tilin township at the headquarters of the Maw River, were noted for cattle-lifting. But the ChinbÔks on the Yaw and the Yendus on the Saw and Salin Rivers rivalled the Siyins as slave-raiders. At the commencement of the winter of 1889 there were twenty-one captives in the possession of these tribes. They had made twelve raids since December, 1888, in which five villagers had been killed and sixteen carried off. Many had been wounded in resisting or escaping, and large sums had been extracted as ransom.

It was decided, in making up the account against these savages, not to go back behind December, 1888. In that month a notable raid had been committed on Taunggyo in the Pauk township, in which thirty-two persons were carried off and held to ransom at nine pounds sterling each, which appears to have settled down as the sum beyond which the ability or affection of the Burman would not go (see p. 318). After this crime trade with the plains had been prohibited to the ChinbÔks, so far as lay in our power.

The difficulty in dealing with them lay in their want of cohesion and the absence of any sort of tribal bond. With the Shans there were the Sawbwas; with the Chins to the north there were the tribal divisions, more or less marked, with chiefs who could speak, or at any rate profess to speak, for their people. But with the people with whom we were now to come in contact there was an absence of political organization beyond the village, which was usually very small. It was necessary to visit as many as possible of the villages concerned in the raids, to receive the submission of each, and to impose fines for misconduct; and as an obligatory condition to insist on the surrender of captives, and the repayment of ransoms, not going back farther than December, 1888. Substantial guarantees for the future were also to be exacted.

It had been intended to make the dealings with these three tribes part of the operations under General Symons's control, and to give to Mr. Ross, under his orders, the immediate conduct of the negotiations. When the full proportions of the task assigned to General Symons were seen, it became plain that he could not undertake the ChinbÔks; and in consequence of Major Raikes's illness, Mr. Ross had to remain with the Southern Column. Fortunately the Chin Frontier Levy had now been raised, and had had a little time to fit itself for service. Their posts at Kalemyo, Kan, and Gangaw were wanted by the regular troops of the Southern Column. This freed the Levy opportunely, and gave the Chief Commissioner a sufficient force for the expedition into the Chinbok country. An admirable officer was at hand to conduct it, in Lieutenant R. M. Rainey (now Colonel Rainey-Robinson), the Commandant of the Levy. To him was entrusted the conduct of the business.

Lieutenant Rainey began, on the 16th of December, 1889, by dealing with twenty-one Chinbok villages, consisting of two hundred and eighty-three houses, situated on the Maw Chaung, the southernmost affluent of the Myittha, on which Tilin, the headquarters of the Tilin township, is situated. The claim against them was for cattle stolen. But cattle thefts and slaves were mere questions of accounts. They set up and proved a counterclaim for the price of slaves sold to the plaintiffs before the British occupation. Lieutenant Rainey thought it best to admit the counterclaim and let bygones be bygones, but to provide for the future. He induced the twenty-one villages to appoint a chief as their spokesman and agent in dealing with us, and to agree to pay a small tribute in kind leviable from each village as an acknowledgment of fealty to the British Government.

So far there had been no opposition. Lieutenant Rainey then moved his headquarters from Tilin to Chaungu or Yawdwin, some twenty miles south. This village is situated on an affluent of the Yaw River, and made a good base for the next part of the business. The Chins in the valley of the Yaw and its tributaries were raiders. They attempted to harass the force, and Captain Willcocks (now Lieutenant-General Sir James Willcocks, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.), the Intelligence Officer, who was surveying and reconnoitring for a further move to the south, was attacked. This compelled a resort to punitive measures, and several offending villages were destroyed. A defensible advanced post was established at Chaungzon, in the heart of their hills. These methods brought the hostile Chins to reason. From this until the close of the operations the work progressed, bloodless and unopposed. The villages submitted, captives were delivered up, headmen were appointed, and fines exacted from all villages which had raided since December, 1888.

Lieutenant Rainey then returned to Chaungu; and moving his base still farther south to Laungshe, came into contact with the Yindus and Chinbons. By the exercise of tact and patience he succeeded in bringing these sections to submit to the British Government and to release their captives. As before, headmen were appointed, the payment of tribute was promised, and guarantees for good conduct given. The work was thoroughly well done. General Symons, in his despatch on the Chin-Lushai Campaign, wrote:—

"The Chinbok operations, though in no way under my direction or command, but ably, even brilliantly, conducted by Lieutenant Rainey, Commandant of the Chin Levy Military Police Battalion, have squared well with our work and settled an adjoining belt of country beyond our capability to touch."

Lieutenant Rainey was another of the young soldiers who aided the civil administration in difficult times and showed their fitness for affairs. The country which submitted to him was made a separate civil charge, known as "The Pakokku Hill Tracts," the headquarters of which were for some years at Yawdwin and are now at Kanpetlet on Mount Victoria.

It is noticeable that the ChinbÔks and their confrÈres had been excluded from trading and from all intercourse with the plains since the beginning of 1889. On making their submission they begged that the blockade might be raised. It was evidently a useful weapon. If it had failed in the case of the Tashons and the more northern tribes, it was because it had not been effective.

We had now made ourselves felt by most of the tribes. There remained unvisited a stretch of hills separating the Minbu district of Upper Burma from Arakan. The Chins dwelling in this tract preyed on the peasantry in the neighbouring districts. During the preceding two years sixteen villages had been raided in Minbu, twenty-one persons killed and thirty-nine carried into slavery. Of these captives sixteen had been ransomed by their friends at a very heavy price. In the adjoining township of the Pakokku district there had been several forays, and seventeen persons had been captured and carried off. It was not possible at this time to find men for a comprehensive expedition against these Chins. Civil officers from the three districts of Akyab, Kyaukpyu, and Minbu were deputed, with small bodies of police, to meet at a central point. They assembled the chiefs and village headmen. The Chins were peaceful and submissive, but very few of the captives were restored. These clans belonged to the Akyab district geographically, and had not yet realized that their eastern borders had come under the British Government and were no longer to afford a happy hunting-ground for the pursuit of human game. They were found to be by no means formidable, badly armed, and little inclined to fight.

The following year (1890-1) saw the beginning of the systematic control of the Chin tribes. For administrative purposes they were roughly divided into three parts. The northern tribes were governed from Fort White, the central tribes from Haka, and the southern from Yawdwin. Captain F. M. Rundall commanded the garrison at Fort White, and also held charge of our relations with the Chins when Mr. Carey had to take leave. Our knowledge of these people was at first far from accurate, and the then recognized divisions of the tribes controlled from Port White were roughly as follows:—[65]

1. The Siyins and Sagyilains who lived in five villages, of which Koset, Sagyilain, and TÔklaing were the chief. The first Port White was built on the site of TÔklaing, which was afterwards given back to them when the fort was moved.

2. The Kanhows, inhabiting between thirty and forty villages north of Fort White, of which Tunzan, on the left bank of the Manipur River, is the capital.

3. The Mobingyis, as they were called from the Burmese name for their chief village, Molbem, which lies on a spur overlooking the Manipur River on the left bank, and was a very large village.

4. The Nwi-tes and other minor tribes akin to the Kukis of Manipur.

It is now known that the right name of the Mobingyis is Sok-te, a very large tribe, of whom the Kanhows are only a powerful clan.

5. The Ngwite and Late, who occupy the hills between Mwelpi and Manipur.

6. The Haitsi Lope, who live on the eastern slope of the Letha Range bordering the Kabaw Valley.

At the end of the last season's operations Mr. Carey had reported the submission of the Siyins and the acceptance of our terms. At the same time he had little trust in their good faith, and when Captain Rundall succeeded him at Fort White their attitude was more or less hostile. They continued to cut the telegraph wire and to give petty annoyance to the troops. The capture of some of the wire cutters gave some help to diplomacy. The Siyins submitted in order to get their brethren released. They surrendered their captives and agreed to pay tribute and keep the peace. The Kanhows proved more difficult. Captain Rundall took advantage of a dispute about the succession to the leadership of the tribe to open communication with one of the claimants.

But before anything came of it the Kanhows raided a Burman village, killing eight persons and carrying off twelve. They were ordered to restore all captives, to give up the heads taken in the raid, to pay a fine of Rs. 4,000, to submit to the Government, and to bind themselves to pay an annual tribute of Rs. 300. These terms were not complied with. Captain Rundall, therefore, marched with three hundred rifles and two guns against the village of Tungzang. The Chins fought, and lost twelve men killed and twenty-one prisoners, including some of their chief men. They had now tried conclusions and were satisfied. Thirty-nine captives were surrendered and the fine and tribute paid in full. Some of the chiefs were sent to Rangoon, and shown over some large steamers, mills, and the like, and, it is said, were impressed by the sight. However that may be, they have not given much trouble since. Some useful road work was done during this year by the Madras Pioneers. A road from Fort White to Falam, the Tashon mother-village, was constructed. As the old site of Fort White still continued to be very unhealthy, the garrison and headquarters of the civil officer were moved back to a post hitherto known as No. 5 Stockade on the Letha Range.

The Chins to be controlled from Haka were found to be divisible into five tribes:—

1. The Tashons, a large tribe having their headquarters at Falam, half-way between Haka and Fort White.

2. The Hakas, lying south of the Tashon country and round about Haka.

3. The Klanklangs, to the west of the Haka tribe and between them and Fort Tregear, on the Chittagong side.

4. The Yokwas, who lie to the south and east of the Hakas; and lastly,

5. The independent tribes, known generally by the nickname of BaungshÈ, in the hills south of the Yokwas.

Mr. D. Ross,[66] the Assistant Commissioner who had accompanied General Symons's expedition, held Haka until March, 1891, when he had to leave on account of his health. He was succeeded by Mr. D. J. C. Macnabb,[67] Assistant Commissioner, a young soldier of a well-known stock. Friendly relations with the Chins were maintained. The road from Kan, in the Myittha Valley, to Haka, was kept open by Chin labour, and the regular postal service was performed by Chins. The Myittha Valley was not raided, and generally the Haka Yokwa tribes were well behaved. Trouble, however, came from the independent BaungshÈs, with whom, owing to their want of cohesion, it was difficult to deal.

General Symons had left one weak spot in his work. There was a powerful village called Thetta, eight miles south of Yokwa. Of it he wrote:—

"It has resisted all our efforts to bring it to complete submission, although some captives have been given up and a fine paid.... It is a blot on our work to have left this village unsettled, but it commands the Kan to Yokwa road, and I considered it better to leave it to stew in its obstinacy and isolation rather than resort to drastic measures which would have had the effect of driving the inhabitants into the jungles and making the road unsafe. The boon of convoys and traders and others being able to use safely and freely the road between Kan and Haka without escorts was too great to risk the loss of it for the satisfaction of an exercise of our power which, at the best in my opinion, would have had but little effect in bringing about the desired result."

At the same time he recorded his opinion that unless the Thetta people gave in, the political officer would have to visit and compel them.

It was the old story. The Thettas thought forbearance was the sign of weakness and fear. In November, 1890, they became openly hostile. They committed a series of outrages, and at last brought matters to a head by killing Mr. Wetherell, a young police officer, and attempting the life of the political officer, Mr. Macnabb. In January, 1891, a force of one hundred and forty rifles started from Haka to punish the village. They had no guns. The village was strongly stockaded. Lieutenant James, R.E., and two Gurkha sepoys were killed, and the officer commanding decided that he could not storm the defences without heavy loss. The Chins were invited to a parley, and they agreed to pay a small fine for their misconduct and to yield an annual tribute in future.

Such an arrangement was for us equivalent to a defeat. It was decided to take up the coercion of the BaungshÈs in a businesslike manner. Two strong columns, with guns, were despatched, one from Haka with Mr. Ross as political officer, the other from Gungaw with Mr. Macnabb. They met at Thetta without opposition, and recovered the fine which the Thetta villagers had promised to pay, and traversed the BaungshÈ country, receiving the submission of the villagers.

Thetta, however, was not yet subdued. They had defied us, killed our men, and escaped with a small fine. In 1894 they began to rob and murder, and when they were called to account they behaved themselves proudly. On the 1st of January, 1895, a force under Major Keary, D.S.O., of the 6th Burma Rifles, with Mr. H. N. Tuck as political officer, occupied the village, arrested the chiefs, and disarmed the villagers. The chiefs were afterwards degraded in open Durbar.

But the year 1891 was not to close without further difficulty. General Symons, reporting to the Chief Commissioner from Haka, dated the 1st of May, 1890, wrote (para. 9):—

"The Klanklangs are almost a separate tribe, but they are BaungshÈs and live on fairly good terms with the Hakas. The Yokwas do not march with the Klanklangs, neither are they friendly with them. (10) The Klanklangs, finding themselves at the beginning of the year between the Burma and Chittagong Columns, made haste to submit to the troops entering their country, and readily agreed to easy terms imposed. (11) The settlement with the Klanklangs and their chief, Ya Hnit—whom, to suit the convenience of the Chittagong officials, we are now agreed to call 'Jahoota'—was very rightly left to me as the representative of the local Government of Burma. The Klanklang Ywama (chief village) is only sixteen miles from Haka, and Jahoota and other head chiefs live there.... I do not think this tribe will give us any more trouble. The meeting of the Eastern and Western Columns in their territory, and the continual passing of troops backwards and forwards without committal of harm or excess, has had the best effect."

In March, 1891, Mr. Macnabb, with Lieutenant Mocatta and one hundred rifles, set out to visit the Klanklangs and to meet an official from Port Tregear at Tao. The tribe, which had surrendered to General Symons, was held to be friendly. The road passed through their hills, and there was no thought of interfering with them. They had, however, been raiding on the Lushai side, and it was intended to warn them to abstain from this. On the outward march to Tao the Klanklang chiefs did not appear. They were said to be occupied in propitiating their Nats, or guardian spirits, and to be very drunk. Mr. Macnabb, therefore, postponed his interview until he came back from Tao. On the return march a large body of Chins, said to have been seven or eight hundred, suddenly fell upon the small column, which fought its way on to Klanklang with some difficulty, losing five men killed and ten wounded, and one British officer (Lieutenant Forbes) wounded. Reinforcements from Haka, under Colonel Mainwaring, met the returning column at Klanklang and saved them from further loss. Officers and men had behaved admirably. A fine of guns and money was imposed on the tribe, and preparations were made for enforcing it.

Before the preparations were complete Jahoota came suing for peace. He proved that he had been away and had had no concern in the treacherous attack, which had been organized by two subordinate chiefs in his absence. He brought in guns and other valuables in part payment of the fine, and was ordered to produce the two offenders and to raze their houses to the ground. As the culprits were not surrendered, the political officer, with three hundred rifles, visited Klanklang in May. He found that the houses had been destroyed, but the two men had fled. Some of the villages paid their shares of the fines; but others held out, and owing to the lateness of the season and want of transport, it was impossible to coerce them. Jahoota, in proof of his good faith, gave up his eldest son as a hostage, and he was left to re-establish his authority. There has been no difficulty since in managing these BaungshÈ tribes, and in the years 1894-5 they, as well as all the southern tribes, were disarmed.

The control of the rude southernmost Chins, known as ChinbÔks, Chinbons, and Yendus, was exercised at first by a subdivisional officer stationed at Yawdwin. From Lieutenant Rainey's expedition up to January, 1891, no disturbance occurred. In that month a very daring raid was made on Yawdwin itself, and the place looted under the eyes of the police garrison. Further raids followed, and a strong force of regular troops had to be sent to restore order. A military post was established within the hills. In 1896 this post also was attacked. The country was then placed under efficient administrative control. Posts were established in suitable places. A civil officer with sufficient powers was appointed to live in the hills and govern the people. His headquarters are now at Kanpetlet, on the slopes of Mount Victoria, some 6,000 feet above the sea-level. And a small force of Gurkha military police under a British officer is maintained there. Raiding has ceased, and the people have been disarmed. In other respects twenty years have not changed them much. In the Burma Gazetteer (of 1908, vol. ii. p. 393) it is recorded:—

"The inhabitants of the tract are practically all animists. The Chinbok men wear a very scanty loin-cloth, and are seldom seen without their bows and arrows. The women's dress consists of a smock and a short skirt. The females have their faces tattooed."

It may be doubted whether Western civilization will make them happier. Tattooing is more lasting and more conducive to domestic peace than paint and powder. It is cheaper in the long run.