With the capture of Twet Nga Lu and the subjugation of the Red Karens all serious trouble in the Shan States west of Salween ended. Writing in July, 1890, the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States was able to say:—

"During the year under report, which extends from the beginning of June, 1889, the Shan States have been perfectly quiet. Nowhere have there been any revolts, nowhere any insubordination or sedition; hardly anywhere, except along the frontier with Burma, any dacoities or gang robberies." (Report on the Shan States for 1889-90 by Mr. (now Sir George) Scott.)

Pretenders had become convinced that they could not succeed against the chiefs who had been confirmed in possession by the Sovereign Power, and they settled down to make the best of things. The floating army of ruffians who had supplied the fighting material in past times had disappeared, and contrived to pick up a living in more peaceful ways.

"They make very good show-figures in a Sawbwa's processions, with their tattooing from ankle to throat and their chest and arms bossed all over with armlets and charms let in below the skin. They are also admirable letter-carriers to distant States. They know all roads, they are afraid of nobody, and they seem to be able to trudge from dawn to sunset for an indefinite number of days.... It is certain, however, that the States are infinitely quieter than they have been at any time since the death of King Mindon, and probably quieter than they have been at all." (Ibid.)

The year 1889 therefore offered a good opportunity for attending to Trans-Salween affairs.

Early in this year the question of the frontier line which was to limit our responsibilities eastward was anxiously considered. Some of the States west of the Salween which had already come under our protection held or claimed ground east of the river. There were others lying wholly east of the Salween which had been subject to the dominion of Burma although they had been loosely held. Of these the most important, Kengtung and Kang Hung, held, or claimed to hold, territory east of the Mekong.

It will be easily understood that the Government was not eager to lay hold of more territory than it was bound in honour to accept as the successor of the Burmese dynasty. We had already taken as much as we could administer or garrison with efficiency. Our authority was now definitely established up to the Salween. The country lying between that river and the Mekong was known to be mountainous, unhealthy, and unprofitable, destitute of roads, a succession of steep mountain ranges which made travelling most laborious. To maintain even a handful of troops in that region would be costly. Revenue, there would be none. It was asked where were our responsibilities to end? It was not easily answered. The problem had several sides—the military, the political, and the administrative. From the soldiers' point of view the arguments in favour of making the Salween our eastern boundary had considerable force. The river gave a clear and definite frontier drawn from north to south. The advance of a possible enemy through the country between the Mekong and the Salween could not, from the nature of the ground, be made without much difficulty; whereas the defence would have, in the wide plateau with its rolling prairies on the west of the Salween, an admirable position, with easy communications open to the Irrawaddy Valley.

Looking at the matter, moreover, from a broader point of view, it was doubtful whether the British dominion in India was not outgrowing its strength. In 1886 the annexation of Upper Burma added, roughly, 120,000 square miles to the area for which the Government of India was responsible. Of this, roughly speaking, 20,000 square miles lay across the Salween. Before Upper Burma was added to the Empire it had been argued by a great military authority that if we were seriously threatened by an enemy beyond the frontier of India, it would be necessary to recall the garrison of British Burma and to let that province go for the time. If there were any foundation for this opinion the difficulty in the event supposed would be very much increased by the addition of the new province. For no addition had been made to the army in India since the annexation. There were strong reasons, therefore, for not going a yard farther than was necessary. The advance beyond the Salween meant the inclusion of some 20,000 square miles of very difficult country and the possible neighbourhood of a troublesome power.

In support of the military arguments it was urged that the Salween was designed by nature for a boundary. It cut its way, in a line running almost due north and south, through steep mountains and rocks. It was not navigable in its upper reaches; the mouth and the navigable portion of the river were in our hands. But as a matter of fact, however adapted by its natural formation for such a purpose, the Salween has not been able to limit the spread of any race or power that has settled on its banks. On the north the Chinese hold both banks. The Shans have settled indiscriminately on either side. It proved no obstacle to the extension of the Burmese power to the eastward. In short, so far from having been "an uncompromising natural boundary," as it has been called, it has not been a boundary at all except for a short length of about sixty miles where it divides the Lower Burma Salween district from Siamese territory. Moreover, it is a timber-floating river. The teak cut on either bank must be rafted down to Moulmein; and hence disputes would be sure to arise. Rivers, as a rule, are held to be bad boundaries, and the Salween is no exception.

At first sight the strategical objections to crossing the Salween appeared to derive support from a consideration of the relations to foreign powers which might follow. It was not desired to take any step which might in the near future bring us into contact with France, and thus add a new factor to the frontier problems of our Indian Empire. The Government was even more anxious to avoid action which might give offence to Siam, or have the appearance of want of consideration in our dealings with that somewhat unreasonable power.

Further examination, however, led to a doubt as to the soundness of these views. Supposing that the British Government, influenced by these motives, decided to decline responsibility for these Trans-Salween States, what would become of them? Even Kengtung, the most powerful, could not stand alone. China and Siam might be invited to absorb them, and thus a belt of territory might be placed between our boundary and that of French dominion in Tonquin China. But China, it was believed, had no wish to increase her responsibilities in these regions, where her authority was very weak. Siam might be willing enough, but her rule would be feeble and unstable, and not welcome to the Shans. Both countries on this frontier were more likely to lose than to gain. If, with the view of avoiding the inconveniences that might arise from becoming conterminous with a great Western Power in these distant countries, we should invite Siam or China, or both, to relieve us of the charge of the Trans-Salween country, what security was there that either of these powers would retain the territory given to them? We might be creating the very conditions we wished to avert. The result of a cautious policy of this kind might be to make our dominion conterminous with that of France, not on or beyond the Mekong but on the Salween itself—an intolerable position.

Looking at the matter from an administrative and local point of view, the Chief Commissioner was against stopping short of the frontier claimed by the King of Burma. It was argued that our new subjects, whether in Burma proper or in the Shan States, would not understand such a policy, and that it would have a bad effect on their feelings towards us. We might dignify it by the names of prudence and forbearance; they would ascribe it to fear and weakness. To them we should seem to have lifted a burden too heavy for our strength. We were afraid of going into places which the King had held and prepared for us.

This, however, might be disputed, or treated as a question of sentiment. But the practical objections were evident and insuperable.

Looking to the character of the country lying between the Salween and the Mekong, it was certain to be the refuge of all the discontent and outlawry of Burma. Unless it was ruled by a Government not only loyal and friendly to us, but thoroughly strong and efficient, this region would become a base for the operations of every brigand leader like Twet Nga Lu, or pretender such as Saw Yan Naing, where they might muster their followers and hatch their plots to raid British territory when opportunity offered. To those responsible for the peace and order of Burma such a prospect was not pleasant.

These arguments prevailed, and it was decided to accept without flinching the full burden of responsibility which fell on us as standing in the King of Burma's place.

The States east of the Salween which were under the King of Burma came under two categories: those which were governed directly by their own chiefs or Sawbwas, and those which were subordinate parts of certain Cis-Salween States. Kang Hung and Kengtung came in the first class, and were the most important of the Burmese possessions east of the Salween. Their position may be roughly judged by the tribute paid to the King and the contingent they were bound to supply to the royal army. The tribute consisted of gold blossoms and cups, candles, bales of silk, ponies, and embroidered pillows; and it was due not only to the King and the heir-apparent, but to the members of the Hlutdaw, or Cabinet. Kang Hung sent tribute every third year, while Kengtung sent nearly thrice the value every year. The former State furnished a contingent of 2,500 men, half musketeers and half spearmen, and maintained seven posts on the southern frontier of from 60 to 100 men. The latter's contingent was of the same strength; but seven guards, with garrisons of from 50 to 200 men, had to be maintained by Kengtung on the southern frontier.

Kang Hung was the largest in area of the Trans-Salween States connected with Burma. The greater and the richer part lay to the east of the Mekong, and was overlapped on the north-east and east by Chinese territory. It was divided into twelve "panna," or townships, six of which lay on the east and six on the west of the river. The six panna on the east were more under the influence of China than those on the west. Nevertheless, it is said that when Upper Burma was annexed there were no Chinese settlers in the eastern panna, and no interference of any kind by China with the administration of the country. Although in 1885 the King of Burma, in his secret treaty with the French, purported to cede Kang Hung to France, he had lost hold of Kang Hung altogether at that time, and he had no power then or previously to dispose of it without China's consent, although China did not meddle with the local Government.

Kengtung, which adjoins Kang Hung on the south, has had something of a history. About the middle of last century the Siamese invaded it. They were routed, and did not care to try a second venture. Later on it was the first State to revolt against Thebaw's exactions. The people, led by their chief, attacked the Burman Resident, and put him and his escort to the sword. The similar revolt at MÖngnai about the same time gave King Thebaw as much as he could do, and Kengtung was left alone. It has been related in Chapter XV how the Shan chieftains met at Kengtung and formed a Confederacy under the Limbin Prince. The chief of Kengtung had intrigued previously with the Myingun Prince with the object of inducing him to be their chief. As he was unable to come, the Limbin Prince was invited to lead. It was not the Burmese dynasty, but the person of King Thebaw they wished to be quit of.

When the Limbin Confederacy dissolved and MÖngnai and the leading Cis-Salween States came under the British flag, the Kengtung Sawbwa should have come with them. There were, however, influences which kept him aloof. The chief who had taken the lead against Thebaw had just died. His son, who was Sawbwa in 1888-9, was a mere boy, only thirteen years of age. The country between Kengtung and MÖngnai, through which he would have had to pass to meet Mr. Hildebrand, had been much disturbed and was unsafe. It was well known that his father had invited the Myingun Prince to head the revolt against Thebaw. As the party of resistance to British rule in Burma regarded the Myingun as their leader, it was possible that Kengtung might not be welcomed by the British authorities. These apprehensions, however, would have had little force had it not been for Saw Waing, the ex-Sawbwa of Lawksawk, who, with an armed following, had taken refuge in Kengtung, and had obtained much influence over the young chief. If a representative from the Chief Commissioner could have gone immediately to Kengtung he would have submitted at once; for he had no chance of standing alone, and he knew it. But it took time to decide our policy, and determine the course to be followed regarding the easternmost dependencies of Burma. It was not wonderful that the boy-Sawbwa and his advisers should await events.

South of Kengtung, lying partly between it and the Mekong and partly across that river, was a small State called Chieng Kong. This State was believed at the time to be subordinate to Kengtung and to follow the fortunes of the larger State.

The small districts which were formerly governed directly by Burma had been annexed by Kengtung about the time of his revolt against the King. They were not of importance, except that one of them, Hsenyawt, contained the chief ferry over the Salween and included land on both banks of the river. The other, Hsenmawng, was a small circle entirely surrounded by Kengtung land. These two little tracts had in the King's time been administered by Burmese officials, probably in connection with the customs levied on the ferry traffic.

Kengtung had also appropriated the district of MÖngpu, which had belonged to the MÖngnai Sawbwa, and an adjoining tract known as MÖnghsat, which MÖngnai also claimed. So far the questions concerned only the interests of our own feudatories.

Farther to the south, down the east bank of the Salween, lay four small States—MÖng Tang, MÖng Hang, MÖng Kyawt, and MÖng Hta. These four districts belonged to the Cis-Salween Sawbwa of MÖngpan. Owing to the action of the Siamese officials, who attempted to take possession of them, there was trouble in 1888, and the Superintendent had been sent across to arrange the disputed points with representatives of the Siamese authorities. The Siamese, however, did not choose to appear. They thought, it may be presumed, that having a bad case, or no case at all, they had a better chance of success by diplomatic action. On the spot, and with local evidence at hand to rebut them, it would have been difficult to prove their assertions. Nothing could be done under the circumstances but to inquire and report the facts. This was done. The Government of India were satisfied that these divisions belonged to Burma, and were part of the territory of the MÖngpan Sawbwa. The Chief Commissioner was authorised to put MÖngpan in possession. Accordingly Mr. Scott visited the districts and formally installed the Sawbwa. He found that the residents were without exception MÖngpan Shans. There were no Lao inhabitants.

Until the dissolution of the Burmese authority in 1885, there had been no thought or talk of Siamese interference. At that time, seeing the chance of advancing their frontier to the Salween, an ambition they had doubtless cherished, the Chiengmai officials had ordered the headmen of these States to appear to swear fealty to Siam. They obeyed the order as the only means of escaping destruction. They returned gladly to their hereditary chieftain.

For five weeks after Mr. Scott's visit there was perfect quiet. How it came about that this settlement was again disturbed is not quite clear. The Siamese were bent on advancing their frontier to the Salween up to the southern boundary of Kengtung. Seeing that Mr. Scott had returned and had left no evidence of British authority in the shape of official or garrison, the former game was repeated. The headmen of the four States were again summoned "to drink the water of allegiance." Three of them obeyed. The fourth, MÖng Tang, sent a representative and wrote at the same time to the MÖngpan Sawbwa excusing his conduct on the ground of force majeure, and promising to return to his lawful lord when order was finally restored.

It was not until some time afterwards that the Siamese made overt demonstrations by sending armed parties to the States, but the people were very much alarmed and ceased all communication with the west of the Salween. This reopening of the matter was not comprehended by the Shans, and it did not help to enhance our reputation in the Shan States.

South-west of these Trans-Salween possessions of MÖngpan, and separated from them by a Siamese district called Mueng Fai, lie two districts, Mehsakun and MÖngmau, forming part of the territory of Mawkmai. The history of these tracts illustrates the fluid state in which the country on the borders of the Shan States and Siam was in 1887-9, and for some time previously. Perhaps neither Burma nor Siam had any established and acknowledged authority in these regions. In 1823 the chief of Mawkmai, NÉ Noi by name, who was distinguished by the appellation of the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa, was cast into prison in the Burmese capital. He escaped, and returned to his country through Eastern Karenni, in much the same way as the Hsipaw Sawbwa at a later date. But he could not withstand the Burmese power; and crossing the Salween, with the aid of Shans from Mawkmai he "carved," to use the words of Mr. Scott's report, "the two States of Mehsakun and MÖngmau out of the jungle," and settled down there with his own people.

Here he lived for twenty years, until in 1873 he obtained a pardon and went back to Mawkmai, leaving a nephew to govern the Trans-Salween acquisitions. While he was at Mawkmai he was no peaceful neighbour, but made himself feared by the Karennis on his south border and by the Laos on the south and east. So far from being in any way subordinate to the Siamese officials at Chiengmai, he attacked the Siamese district of Mehawnghsawn and drove out the Shan, named Taiktaga San, who had been placed there by the Chiengmai authorities. He bestowed the district on his niece, by name Nang Mya. She was a lady with much force of character, who in England, in the reign of King George V. would have been a militant suffragette, and would have made short work of the ministry by marrying them all out of hand. Nang Mya, probably feeling the need of local knowledge and connections, dismissed her first husband, who bore the not very imposing name of Pu Chang Se, recalled her predecessor, Taiktaga San, from exile, and made him her consort. When the Kolan (nine fathom) Sawbwa returned across the Salween to Mawkmai, she and her new consort transferred their allegiance to the Siamese Governor at Chiengmai, without opposition on the part of the Mawkmai Sawbwa. Mehawnghsawn, it may be explained, is farther from Mawkmai than from Chiengmai, and the Salween flows between.

This transaction, however, did not affect the districts of Mehsakun and MÖngmau, which remained under Mawkmai territory without question until 1888.

When the Red Karen chief, after the old Kolan's death, attacked Mawkmai, Kun Noi, who was governing Mehsakun on his uncle's behalf, behaved disloyally to his cousin, the rightful heir to Kolan, and induced the Karenni to make him master of Mawkmai. How Kun Hmon was restored to his position in Mawkmai by a British force has been told above (Chapter XV, p. 184). He was unable, however, to regain the two Trans-Salween districts, and it was not convenient at the moment to send a party across to reinstate him. Kun Noi, having been ejected from Mawkmai by the British, turned his thoughts to Siam and opened communications with the Chiengmai authorities through his cousin, the lady Nang Mya, who governed at Mehawnghsawn, with the view of placing himself under their protection. This was the origin of the Siamese pretensions to the Trans-Salween districts of Mawkmai. They had no foundation in right. It had been for some time their ambition to advance their frontier to the Salween, but as long as Burma had a remnant of strength, they could not. They thought the time opportune when the Burmese power had gone and the British had not yet made good their hold. On the 6th of March, 1889, a band of men, some of whom were militia from Chiengmai, came and occupied Tahwepon, the chief ferry on the Salween in Mawkmai territory, and hoisted the elephant flag of Siam, claiming the whole of the borderland lying east of the river for the King of Siam.

The position of Eastern Karenni has been explained in the chapter concerning events in that country. The people are numerous and all Karen. In the thirty-eight villages in which they live there are neither Shans nor Laos. The territory had been for many years in the hands of the Karenni chief, and was colonized by his people, just as the two districts north of it had been colonized by Mawkmai. It formed the most profitable portion of the Karenni State, by reason of its extensive and valuable teak forests. The capital required to work the timber was found by British subjects from Moulmein, the Karennis furnishing the labour. The timber trade was completely stopped by the Siamese; the elephants employed on it seized and carried off. The floating of the timber which had to be sent down to Moulmein by the Salween was prevented, and communication between the east and west banks prohibited by them. Such a state of affairs was most galling to the Karennis and injurious to the dignity and to the revenues of their chief.

Such was the condition of affairs in 1889, and it became necessary to take action to prevent further mischief. It was decided by the Government of India, in communication with the Foreign Office, to appoint a Commission to survey the frontier and settle disputed points with representatives of the Siamese. Accordingly, as soon as the season permitted, a Commission was formed under Mr. Ney Elias, C.I.E., as chief. The members of the Commission were Mr. W. J. Archer, Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Chiengmai, Mr. J. G. (now Sir J. George) Scott, Major E. G. Barrow (now Sir Edmund Barrow), Captain F. J. Pink (now Colonel Francis J. Pink, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment). A survey party from the Government of India, under Captain H. M. Jackson, R.E., was attached to the Commission. Surgeon J. K. Close was appointed to the medical charge, with Dr. Darwin as his assistant. The escort, commanded by Major Clarke, O.L.I., was composed of two companies of the Oxford Light Infantry, two guns of a Mountain Battery, and a few rifles of the Shan (military police) Levy.

Early in December the Commission met at Fort Stedman, and marching down through Loikaw and SawlÔn, the Karenni capital, encamped near Ywathit, at the ferry on the Salween called Ta SanglÈ. Here they had expected to meet the Commissioners who, it was understood, had been appointed by the Bangkok Government to represent it. No one appeared, however, with credentials from Siam. Whether this was a deliberate act of discourtesy, or only a failure caused by the general debility of the Siamese administration, may be questioned. Most probably it was an instance of the common policy of Orientals and others with a weak case, who prefer to plead before a distant and necessarily more ignorant tribunal, rather than to submit their statements and evidence to a well-informed officer on the spot. Perhaps, also, the advisers of the Siamese Government avoided taking part in the inquiry in order that they might refuse to be bound by an unwelcome finding.

Under these circumstances, Mr. Elias was forced to proceed in the absence of the other side. The working season in these latitudes is short, and to have delayed action would have played the Siamese game and given them more time to harass the Karennis and appropriate their property. Although no final decision could be arrived at, the Commission could ascertain the facts, survey the country, and place the matter in a clear light before the Government of India. At least we should acquire an exact knowledge of the case, and be able to say what we were fighting about. The business, therefore, was allowed to proceed.

A standing camp was formed at Ta SanglÈ, and three parties, led by Mr. Ney Elias, Mr. Archer, and Mr. J. G. Scott, respectively, started to examine and survey the Karenni country. Ten months had passed since the Siamese had appeared in these parts. The time occupied unavoidably in a triangular correspondence between the Chief Commissioner in Burma, the Government of India in Simla, and the Foreign Office at Whitehall, had not been altogether wasted by the Siamese, who had endeavoured to get the proverbial nine points of the law on their side. They had established a series of posts along the Salween, all of them stockaded and flying the white elephant flag of Siam. In each of these posts were fairly large garrisons of from fifty to one hundred men, some of them well armed Siamese troops, others Laos and Shans—men, these latter, from the west of the Salween, who had sought refuge in Siamese territory from the troublous times of the past years.

It was found that the frontier of Trans-Salween Karenni was clearly defined by a range running from north to south, from fifteen to five-and-twenty miles from the Salween. The inhabitants, almost all Karens, had built their villages on this frontier range. As they live by the rude method of cultivation known as Taungya, they frequently move from one site to another to get fresh ground. The forests are rich in teak, but the timber was worked not by the Karens, but by Shans, or by Burmese traders from Moulmein. Everything went to show that the country had been settled and opened up by the Red Karens, and that the Siamese neither had nor pretended to have any rights over it until the time of our expedition against Sawlapaw. From inquiries made and from the number of their villages the Karen population was estimated at between three and four thousand. The Siamese had taken a very practical method of marking them for their own. All adult males without exception had been tattooed on the forearm with the emblem of an elephant, with a running number added below. At first it was thought that this might help us to compute the number of people in the country. But the tattooing had not been done systematically at the villages where the people lived, but at markets and ferries as they chanced to come from the villages around, to sell their produce or make purchases. Thus while one man in a village might be branded with the number one hundred, his neighbour in the same village might be numbered four hundred. Without visiting every village, therefore, it was not possible to learn the highest number reached, and for this there was not time.

Going north to the districts of MÖngmau and Mehsakun, claimed by Mawkmai, Mr. Elias was met by a major in the Siamese army, who claimed to be a member of the Commission representing Siam. This gentleman begged the question in dispute by welcoming Mr. Elias to Siamese territory, but made no further contribution to its settlement. The inquiry having convinced the Commission that the Mawkmai Sawbwa's right to these districts was beyond doubt, he was permitted to resume possession. He brought in his officials with an escort of his own Shans, and the Siamese officers thereupon retired. Mawkmai's possession was not disturbed again.

In the four States claimed by MÖngpan events took a similar course. An official representing Siam was found encamped close to MÖng Tung, with about one hundred and fifty men. He was requested to leave, as these States were undoubtedly British territory and had been formally so declared. He left without delay or reluctance, and the MÖngpan Sawbwa was put in possession, his nephew being appointed governor of the four States, and entrusted with the task of restoring them to order and prosperity. So far the Commission had completed their task. As the Siamese had failed to co-operate, the decisions could not be regarded as final. They were left, as the Bangkok Government may have intended, to be reopened and disputed in London. Much information, however, had been gathered about a country hitherto unknown, and a solid foundation laid for a lasting settlement of our frontier with Siam. Captain Jackson's party had worked with the energy for which he had already won a reputation in three preceding seasons in the Cis-Salween States.

"In this his fourth season," wrote the Superintendent of the Southern Shan States to the Chief Commissioner, "he had an exceedingly difficult region to survey, and he has fixed on our charts an area which would probably have exceeded the powers of any one whose physique was not in equal proportion to his zeal."

Before the Commission had finished the settlement of this strip of country from the south border of Eastern Karenni to the northern frontier of MÖng Tung, it had become evident that if they were to complete their task the whole body could not visit Kengtung. Mr. Scott, therefore, was deputed for this purpose, and left early in February. He decided to start from MÖngnai, where he proceeded in order to procure transport. The lateness of the season made it above all things necessary to march quickly, impossible with pack bullocks, the ordinary transport of the Shans, which make thirty-four stages from MÖngnai to Kengtung. The Panthays (Chinese Mohammedans) with their mules, do the same journey in twelve days. They march from daylight to midday, and after a couple of hours' halt go on till sunset. Mules have the advantage of bullocks in the matter of gear as well as in speed and endurance. The loads are fastened not to the saddle, but to a light wooden frame which fits into grooves on the saddle, and can be lifted off in a minute and as easily replaced. The process of loading and unloading is therefore greatly simplified, and much labour and time saved. Moreover, baggage of all sorts and shapes can be loaded on mules, whereas bullocks cannot carry any that will not fit into their baskets. Then a mule will walk almost as fast as a man in heavy marching-order, and will cover twelve or fifteen miles while a bullock is doing his five; so that instead of waiting for their food after a twelve-mile march until the bullocks hobble in when the sun is low, the men will get their food half an hour after they reach camp. But Mr. Scott has led us away from the business in hand in his enthusiasm for mules.

Panthay mules are not to be found waiting on a stand like taxi-cabs. It is not easy to get them for casual work. Mr. Scott, therefore, was kept some time at MÖngnai waiting for mules, and then could not get enough and had to fill the gap with elephants. From MÖngnai he went up north by the Nam Teng Valley, crossing the Nam Teng at Ko-up, where a bamboo bridge had been built over the river. The villages on both sides of the river had been raided by the brigand Twet Nga Lu, whose story has been told elsewhere (vide Chapters XV and XVI).

East of the Nam Teng River in the State of Keng Tawng, "the country for nearly twenty miles at a stretch," Mr. Scott reported, "is practically a desert. Yet all along the road old wells and ruinous monasteries and the grass-grown skeletons of former paddy-fields, to say nothing of hill-clearings, showed that formerly there must have been a large population here.... The handful of people who have so far returned to Keng Tawng have settled twenty miles farther south, round the site of the old capital. There is a magnificent banyan-tree, known far and wide as Mai Hung Kan, at Maklang.... The adjoining monastery was burnt by Twet Nga Lu's brigands, and not even the sanctity of the tree which twenty men could not span, under whose branches a fair-sized village might be built, has yet been able to persuade the monks to return. There are not, in fact, enough of the pious in the neighbourhood to support them."

Of the next State entered, Keng Hkam, the same story has to be told. The Nam Pang, a stormy river which rises in the north near Lashio, flows into the Salween near Keng Hkam. The valuable portion of this district consists of an extensive plateau extending along the right bank of the Nam Pang, where tobacco and sugar grow well, and very fine rice-fields and extensive groves of palms made the country rich.

The State suffered greatly in the Twet Nga Lu's disturbances. The old capital was absolutely destroyed, and nothing now remains but the ruins of fine teak monasteries and some ornate pagodas absolutely falling to pieces.

The chief had moved to a new town three or four miles off, but intended, now order had been restored, to build again on the old site. Many families had emigrated to the east of the Salween.

This chief, styled Myoza, accompanied Mr. Scott to Kengtung. His avowed object was to improve his mind by travel, and to learn English modes of procedure. It afterwards, however, appeared that he was attracted more by the fame of the charms of a lady of the Kengtung Royal Family than by a craving for knowledge. "He was successful in his wooing," wrote Mr. Scott, "and it may be hoped that his bride will put an end to the habit which he is developing of making inconsequent set speeches. Otherwise he is in great danger of becoming an intolerable young prig."

It is not possible here to follow the journey to Kengtung march by march. It must suffice to give some idea of the country through which the party had to go. From Keng Hkam to the Kaw Ferry on the Salween, the road was easy enough, the only difficulties being caused by the passage of the Nam Pang, across which, owing to the nature of the bed of the stream, the pack animals could not swim, and had to be ferried over. The Nam Teng, which was one hundred paces wide and twelve feet deep under the eastern bank, would have been a cause of delay had not the Shans thrown a bamboo bridge across the stream. This bridge built by the villagers, in six days it was said, was crossed easily and safely by the loaded transport mules. The bamboo is worth more to the peasants than gold and silver and precious stones. With it a Burman or Shan can do almost anything. For offence or defence, for house or furniture, for carrying water or making a raft, the bamboo is equally good.

Mr. Scott's party crossed the Salween at the Kaw Ferry, which is in the small State of Hsenyawt, which is described as a simple chaos of hills with probably not above a couple of hundred acres of flat paddy-land in its whole area. The village, which exists for the ferry rather than for any other reason, can hardly find room for more than two or three houses in a cluster, and is consequently scattered over a square mile or so of broken ground. On the other side of the Salween it is uninhabited, and the road for some distance is very difficult, climbing along the side of a gorge through which the Nam Leng runs. Mr. Scott tells us that the Panthay traders carry picks and spades to make the road as they go, and it is only their labour which has kept the route open. From the ferry the road runs north-east to Hsenmawng, which is another small State and town under the same man who governs Hsenyawt. There are two routes to Kengtung from this place. One, the northern, through MÖng Ping, bears the proud title of Lammadaw (the royal road), and was always used in Burmese times; but landslips had made it dangerous for animals, and fighting between rival leaders, for men. The other road, which kept more to the south, passing through a district named MÖng Pu Awn, was perhaps longer but better, and was followed by Mr. Scott. It follows a zigzag course. First north-east, to Hsenmawng, then south-east to MÖng Hsen, then north-west again to Kengtung. "East of Hsenmawng," writes Mr. Scott, "is a simple sea of hills, range behind range all the way to Kengtung. The main ridges run nearly due north and south, and they with their spurs and sub-features, can hardly be said to be broken by the valleys of MÖng Pu Awn or of MÖng Hsen. It is a constant succession of ascents and descents the whole way to Kengtung."

The mountains crossed were often of some height, and between the altitudes of 3,500 and 5,000 feet were covered with pine forest. The main range of Loi[40] PÈ MÖng, the great divide between the Salween and the Mekong Valleys, which averages 6,000 feet, and rises in many places to more than 7,000, carries no pine forests.

"On the spurs and sub-features, which stretch far away to the west, forming what may be almost called a plateau—a very uneven one certainly, cut up by gigantic gullies, and sprinkled with numerous eminences, but still a rough sort of tableland—pine forest is the prevailing growth, and seems to give place to oak and chestnut above 5,000 feet, which, however, is about the average of this high-land plain. Notwithstanding the ruggedness of the country which is very much like a Brobdingnagian ploughed field, the road is not by any means bad. It is very fatiguing, but for a mule-track it is very much better than the roads at many places in the Western States, where the path climbs straight up the hillside with a Roman directness of purpose, or follows stream beds and rocky gorges with a pertinacity born of an ignorance of shoe-leather. Beyond the Salween the track follows the line of the spurs, with the result that one very seldom has a back-breaking climb. The credit of this natural engineering eye seems to belong rather to the Panthay and Chinese merchants than to the natives of the country; for farther south, where the Panthay caravans pass but seldom, the paths follow the usual Shan system of going straight from point to point." It was through a country of this sort that the little party which was to receive the submission of its chief, and settle his relations with the Sovereign Power, made its way. With Scott were two other white men, Captain Pink, of the Queen's Royal West Surrey Regiment, who was a member of the Commission, and Dr. Darwin, a civil surgeon, in the service of the Burman Government. The escort consisted of eighteen old soldiers, Sikhs of the Shan levy which had lately been taken over by the army, and as many untrained recruits of the same corps. There were besides a few Burmese clerks on Mr. Scott's staff, some servants and camp-followers, the transport mules with their Panthay drivers, a few elephants—which were more imposing though less agile than the mules—and lastly the princely wooer in the shape of the Myoza of Keng Hkam, with a tail of rough spear-men to give a touch of romance to the cortÈge. Not a very imposing embassage, certainly, to represent the majesty of England, and to require the allegiance of a chief who ruled over twenty thousand square miles of country. But the leaders had the right spirit, and not a man with them, from the trained soldiers to the rough mule-drivers, but marched with his head high.

The town of Kengtung is about ten miles as the crow flies from the pass over the Loi PÈ MÖng.

"It lies in a plain about twenty miles long and perhaps fifteen broad. To the west and north this is perfectly flat and under paddy cultivation; to the east and south are low grassy hills with swamps in the hollows. The town is built on the western edge of this rolling country and overlooks the paddy-lands. It is surrounded by a wall about fifteen feet high, and machicolated at the top." (The wall and a moat were constructed by the Burman King Alompra in the eighteenth century.) "The bricks are insufficiently burnt, the wall is old and therefore crumbled away in many places, so that it is picturesque rather than formidable; moreover, some hills to the south-west would enable field-guns to drop shells wherever they pleased over the enceinte. The wall follows the line of the rolling ground, and to the north and south towers above the plain. To the west it has not this natural advantage, and jungle affords admirable cover up to the dry ditch which protects it on this side. To north-east and south swampy ground covers the approach. The walls measure four and three-quarter miles round, and have ten gates, which used to be covered by semicircular arches. Only two of these arches, however, now remain, both on the eastern face. There is very little level ground within the walls, and only the northern half of the walled town is inhabited. Even this portion is so overrun with trees as to be almost jungle, and there are several large swamps among the houses. These supply the people with water to drink and small mud-fish to eat. There are probably seven or eight hundred houses within the walls, and many of these are very substantial. Some are entirely built of brick; some have brick basements and plank walling; and the number of bamboo houses is very small. All the better-class houses are roofed with small tiles made locally. To judge from the Sawbwa's audience-hall, these tiles are not a very satisfactory protection against rain, but they at any rate prevent the fires which do such frequent mischief in other Shan towns. The monasteries are numerous, and some of them are adorned with elaborate carving and wall paintings. They are much like the ordinary Burmese or Shan Kyaung (monastery) in general architecture, but there is an indefinable suggestion of Tartar influence about them. This is particularly noticeable in the massive gateways which immediately suggest the paifang of China."

There was a very large colony of Shan Chinese to the east of the town. They had large gardens and kept innumerable goats, pigs, ducks, and fowls.

"Their houses are all built of bamboo, and their villages, like those of China, are inconceivably dirty, though in their person the inhabitants are clean enough."

To the industry of these people is due the manufacture of tiles and of the pottery work, which is sold cheap and of great variety in Kengtung bazaar. The inhabitants of the plain in which the city lies were, Mr. Scott estimated, about twenty thousand. There were some military surveyors in his party, but owing to the very critical state of affairs for some time after the city was entered, it was thought better not to send them out to survey.

Such, briefly, was the city of Kengtung when the small British party entered its gates on the 14th of March, 1890. The elephants, although they marched slowly, and may have been execrated at times on that account, undoubtedly added pomp to the somewhat insignificant procession which entered the city. What followed is best told in the words of Mr. Scott's report. (Report on Southern Shan States for the year 1889-90.)

"We were met at the edge of the plain by the Tawphaya, the Sawbwa's cousin and Chief Minister, along with a number of the principal officials, and marched in procession to the town. Great part of the road was lined by villagers, who stood in many places three or four deep to see us pass. We camped on the site of the old Burmese post, and were visited almost immediately after our tents were pitched by the Sawbwa and his half-brother, the Kyem Meung (heir-apparent). The Sawbwa is sixteen, and looks older. The Kyem Meung's age is a matter of dispute between the Ministers, his mother, and himself. Dates vary over three years, but he looks a good deal younger than his brother.

"A formal return visit was paid to the Sawbwa next day. He is building himself a new brick haw (palace), and the old palace, which is a dingy wooden erection, is said to be so rickety that it would have infallibly collapsed with the number of people who were to be present at the reception. We were therefore received in the court-house, which looks rather like a railway goods shed outside, but has been rather highly decorated within. The gilding is now, however, worn and tawdry. There is a large gold throne at the farther end, enclosed within a railing, and reached by folding doors from behind, like the Mandalay Yazapalin, which it otherwise resembles in construction. The Sawbwa and his brother sat on chairs in front of this, outside the railing, and we were placed between them. There was an enormous gathering of officials both of the town and the neighbourhood, and of the prominent merchants of the town, and the conversation was kept up by these and by the Kyem Meung, for the Sawbwa had never a word to say beyond Yes or No. The merchants all talked of the opening up of communications with the West, and particularly of the construction of a railway. Trade at present is entirely with China. The old Chiengmai trade is greatly interfered with, and almost put an end to by taxations, restrictions, and imposts levied at the Siamese frontier posts. The general impression received was that the merchant class and the bulk of the ministers were delighted with the establishment of British authority in Kengtung. There is a huge drum near the door of the audience-hall. It is made of hide stretched on a wooden frame, and is about the size of a puncheon. This is said to have been made by the 'hill-people,' but by what hill-people and where, nobody knew. One stroke on this Sigyi announces that the Sawbwa has ascended the throne; two, that he has left the palace to go through the town; and three strokes summon all officials and armed men within hearing to the palace without an instant's delay. We heard three strokes on this drum a good many times during the next few days.

"On the night of the 16th of March, the second day after our arrival, there was a pwÈ (a posture dance) inside the Sawbwa's enclosure. Eight of our Panthay mule-drivers, who had been out searching for stray mules, went in after dark to buy cheroots at the usual bazaar. They were set on by the Sawbwa's men. Most of them escaped, but one man was seized, held with his face to the ground and shot in the back by the Sawbwa himself. He was then set free and went back to his camp. Two other shots were heard, and one of the Panthays has never since been seen. The Panthay camp was some distance away in the plain, and before I had got more than the excited account of one of the Panthays, who fled from the palace to our camp, I had demanded, next morning, an explanation from the Sawbwa, and the production of the man who had fired the revolver. I got no explanation, except that the Sawbwa had issued an order that none of our followers were to be allowed to go about in the town wearing arms. In a country where every male above six years wears a dagger, this was an absurdity. The order had not, moreover, been communicated to our people. I therefore demanded the surrender of the offender, and had issued this order before the Panthays managed to summon up courage enough to denounce the Sawbwa himself as the murderer. It was impossible to recede. It was necessary for British prestige and for our own personal safety to settle the case. Our followers expected to be massacred in their beds; the Sawbwa feared that he would be seized in his palace, and filled it with armed men. For two days the suspense was rather trying. I then announced that if my orders were not complied with, I would march down to the haw the next day. This brought up the Tawpaya and several other ministers, with a petition that I would decide the case as it stood. They produced no witnesses, and did not deny that the Sawbwa was the offender. I therefore sentenced him to pay Rs. 500 compensation to the wounded man and Rs. 1,500 if the missing man was not produced within five days alive and well. This sentence, I informed them, was a concession to the low state of their civilization and the ignorance of the Sawbwa. The Rs. 500 were paid a couple of hours afterwards, and the Rs. 1,500 a few days before we left.

"The incident was all the more embarrassing, because none of the details of the Sawbwa's relations with the British Government had been settled. He had been reduced to such a state of fear that it was only by again threatening to march down to the haw that I was able to persuade him to come and discuss the terms under which he received a sanad of appointment from the British Government. When he did come, however, his manner was much more satisfactory, and he accepted in every detail the terms of the sanad and promised to attend future Durbars of the Shan chiefs. Other matters which had to be arranged with him concerning his western frontier were also easily put in train for settlement."

It is impossible to read this brief account without doing homage to the well-considered audacity of Mr. Scott's action, which ended once for all any inclination on the part of Kengtung to resist the British Government.

During the next few days the terms of the Sawbwa's patent of investiture were finally arranged. In his leisure time a wealth of information regarding the province and its wonderful variety of races was acquired by Mr. Scott, which it is regretted for the reader's sake cannot be given here.

On the 29th of March, three days before the time fixed for leaving Kengtung, a Durbar was held for the purpose of formally presenting the chief with his patent of appointment. It was attended by all the officials connected with the Kengtung State. The only foreigners present were the princely wooer from Keng Hkam and the brother-in-law of the MÖngnai Sawbwa. But so large is the area of the State that the assemblage was as numerous as if it had been a general Durbar of the Shan States at Fort Stedman. Mr. Scott improved the occasion by impressing on them that British supremacy meant peace and trade.

"As is usual with a speech in the Shan States, a running comment was kept up in different parts of the audience on the various points enumerated, and on the whole it seemed that their comprehension was satisfactory and their resolution praiseworthy. The ministers promised by the Sawbwa complete obedience to the Chief Commissioner in all matters connected with the State; and the Sawbwa himself was divided between admiration for the repeating carbine which he received as a present and a laudable desire to be amiable."

The party left Kengtung on their return journey on the 1st of April, and marched back by a southerly route through the four small States belonging to MÖngpan, where some disputes had arisen which required Mr. Scott's orders. These questions were finally settled for the time at least at MÖngpan, and Mr. Scott then returned to Fort Stedman, which he reached after an absence of six months, on the 6th of June, 1890. He had been away on this distant work all the open season of 1889-90. Although the Shan States in his immediate charge had not been visited by the Superintendent, there had been no trouble. The Sawbwas as well as the British administrators were putting aside warlike things, and devoting their energies to the things of peace. The Lawksawk chief had done us good service in 1899 by capturing the Setkya Mintha, a pretender who had been a nuisance since the annexation. In 1890 he broke up and captured most of the gang that followed a noted leader Kyaw Zaw. The growth of wheat and other crops occupied the minds of other Sawbwas, while the Chief Commissioner was devising a procedure code to guide the Shan rulers in administering the law. It was necessary to frame rules which should secure substantial justice and at the same time should not be beyond the powers of the Shan judges to comprehend. Communications between the States and Burma were vigorously pushed on, although not quite as fast as the Superintendent wished and in his enthusiasm thought possible.

The work done in 1889-90 was good and lasting. Although, owing to the failure of the Siamese Government to take part in the inquiry, a further Commission had to be appointed to settle and demarcate the boundary, the decisions arrived at by Mr. Ney Elias were practically confirmed, when the final demarcation was made in 1892-3 to some extent by Mr. Hildebrand, but for the most part by Mr. H. G. A. Leveson, of the Indian Civil Service and of the Burman Commission. The only difference of importance was that the minor State of Chieng Kong, which bestrode the Mekong and was supposed to be more or less tributary to Kengtung, was, as regards the eastern or Trans-Mekong portion, of which MÖng Hsing was the chief town, assigned to Siam.

But before the Government at Bangkok had had time to receive the homage of the MÖng Hsing chief, the French crossed the Menam and obtained the treaty of Chantabun from Siam, by which everything east of the Mekong passed to France and MÖng Hsing became French.

As to Kang Hung, in arranging matters with China we transferred all the rights in this State on both sides the Mekong—the whole, in fact, of the Sibsong Panna (or twelve provinces)—to China, on the condition that she should never cede any part of it to another power. With an almost indecent haste, China gave up a portion of the Kang Hung country to France. As a protest, we refused to pay the decennial tribute of gold flowers, which had been conceded to save the face of China after the annexation, and demanded a revision of the eastern frontier of Burma agreed with China in 1894. A new agreement was made in 1897 which gave Burma a better boundary. It is not likely that new difficulties will arise on this side, although the boundary has not been demarcated. Trouble is more probable on the north, where no openings should be left. China does not forget her claim to Burma.

Kengtung showed a proper sense of his duties after Mr. Scott's lesson to him. The present Sawbwa, who was at the Delhi Durbar in 1903, is reported to have said to one of the officers from Burma, "We thought we were great men, but now we see that we are only monkeys from the jungle." So Durbars, like other forms of adversity, may have their uses, and quite as sweet.

[40] Loi in Shan means "mountain."