When Upper Burma was annexed the first step towards the constitution of a well-ordered province was to parcel out the country into districts of such a size and with such boundaries that they could be conveniently administered. The wise course was followed of preserving the old native divisions, which had probably resulted from the teaching of experience and the nature of the country and differences of race. For few innovations vex a people more than changes in the boundaries of the units of jurisdiction which touch their daily life. Hence it came to pass that all the country between 23° 37' N. and the undefined line dividing Upper Burma from China and Thibet, somewhere about 28° N., was constituted the charge of a single Deputy Commissioner, with the China frontier as its eastern boundary, and as its western limit the Hukawng Valley, the Upper Chindwin district, and further south the Katha district. The headquarters of the Deputy Commissioner and of the military garrison were placed at the town of Bhamo, from which the district took its name. The Irrawaddy cuts the district in two from north to south. The town of Bhamo lies in a plain along the left bank of the river, midway between two defiles, usually spoken of as the first and second defile, through which the waters rushing down from the region of mountains in the north have cut their way. The river is open all the year round, as far as Bhamo to large river-steamers. But the first or northern defile is always difficult, and when the river is in flood, impassable. Hence Bhamo is the gate of Upper Burma, and the port for the trade which has existed for centuries with Western Yunnan. In a very small way it is the Peshawur of Burma, and for the purpose of raids and such like the Kachin tribes play the part of the Pathans on the north-west frontier of India. The greater part of the district is hilly and covered with forest; and the Kachins, who form quite a third of the population, live in the hills. It is said that trade follows the Flag. In this case the reverse is true. The Irrawaddy Flotilla Company had prepared the way for us here. Bhamo had been the northern terminus of their steamers since 1869, and for some time the Government of India had kept a Resident there to protect the trade. But no attempt had been made to navigate beyond Bhamo. In December, 1885, a force was sent up by river to occupy the town, and an officer of the Burma Commission, Captain Cooke, accompanied it, and began to establish a civil administration. No opposition was met with. The population of the town was not in a position to resist us. Mixed with the indigenous Burmans and Shans was a considerable colony of Chinese traders—some of them Cantonese who had filtered up from the coast, others hardy and adventurous men from Yunnan, engaged in the jade and amber and rubber trades in the northern part of the district. These foreigners, although they disliked exceedingly our interference with the opium and liquor traffic, and even more our attempts in the interests of the troops to improve their methods of sanitation, were not actively hostile. The peasantry of a mixed Shan-Burman race, who cultivated the level country round and below the town, were peacefully inclined, though shy and timorous. But the Kachin tribes soon began to show their teeth and to do their best to make things unpleasant. The policy laid down from the first for the guidance of the local officers in their dealings with the Kachins was one of patience and conciliation. Perhaps too much stress was laid on this. In one case, certainly, the Deputy Commissioner's anxiety to adhere to this policy was carried to an extreme, and caused mischief. It will be convenient to take the northern portion of the district first—that part, namely, which begins from 24° 37' N. and goes right up to the Chinese boundary. It now forms a separate charge, known as the Myitkyina district, Of the wide forest area, part is in the low hill ranges, part in the plains. Twenty-five years ago, when there was not a road, the dense undergrowth and bamboo jungle, and in the lower lands the wide seas of elephant-grass, made the passage of men and transport animals most difficult and laborious. From a fiscal point of view Mogaung was supposed to be the most important part of the Bhamo district. The collection of a royalty on jade was farmed in the King's time for about Rs. 50,000, and there was also an income from the rubber-trees, mostly wild, but to a small extent cultivated. In March, 1886, a force accompanied by Captain Cooke, the Deputy Commissioner, made its way to Mogaung. The Deputy Commissioner reported that the "country was then, for the most part, brought under control and settled administration." This was a figurative and official way of saying that a person of local influence, by name Maung Kala, had been recognized and put in charge as a magistrate in the British service. After a very brief visit the Deputy Commissioner with the troops went back to Bhamo, and left Maung Kala to carry on the government as he best could, without police and with no military support nearer than Bhamo, which is at the least 150 miles from Mogaung, whether the journey is made by water or land. Even a handful of troops, lightly equipped, could not have been sent up in less than a fortnight. There was no telegraph to Mogaung. Maung Kala belonged to a family of great local influence, which had A Burman official was sent up from Bhamo by the Deputy Commissioner to succeed the murdered man. He soon found that he was not wanted at Mogaung and he retired to Sinbo, whence he could at least make a show of controlling the river-side villages. Po Saw, the son of Maung Kala, was then appointed by the people to his father's post, and whatever order or show of government there was in the country was due to him. Subsequently, in consequence of his having summarily executed a pretender who had endeavoured to impose himself on the people, the Deputy Commissioner recognised Po Saw's authority and withdrew the Burman. Nevertheless, it cannot be said that the British Government had jurisdiction in Mogaung. No revenue was collected—at least, none was paid into the Bhamo treasury. In this respect, however, Mogaung was little worse than the southern portion of the district which was administered by the Deputy Commissioner himself, supported by the garrison at Bhamo. In September, 1886, Major Cooke reported: "This district has, I believe, been one of the quietest districts in Upper Burma. The tranquillity of the district is in a great measure due to the fact that no real attempt was made to collect the revenue until July or August." Even the tranquillity so purchased was, however, only comparative, and the soldiers had quite enough to do. In the open season of 1886-7 it was not found possible to give men for an effective expedition to the north. Things had to be allowed to take their own course for the time. The Administration had no choice. Early in 1887, however, the military police began to arrive from India, and in the spring of that year five companies, mainly Gurkhas, under the command of Lieutenant O'Donnell, were posted to Bhamo. This strengthened the hands of the civil administration. It was then too late to start an expedition to Mogaung. But Lieutenant O'Donnell was sent up to Sinbo, a village of some importance on the right bank of the Irrawaddy, just above the first defile. Here a strong stockade was built and a Gurkha garrison posted in it. An Assistant Commissioner also, Mr. Twomey, was sent to watch the course of events in the north. There were three routes by which Mogaung could be reached from Bhamo. One was by going up the Irrawaddy and turning into the Mogaung River, on which lies the town. This was quite possible for a very small force which had not to carry all its supplies and transport. The object, however, was not merely to reach Mogaung, but to go to the jade-mines and explore the country. Since an explorer (Lieutenant Bayfield) made his way to the mines in 1838, no European had visited them. Nothing was accurately known of the nature of the country, of the supplies it afforded, or of the numbers and temper of the Kachin tribes which dominated it. All that could be gathered from the Chinese and others showed that there would be much difficulty in all these matters. It was suspected that the Chinese were disposed to magnify the difficulties. Nevertheless it was necessary that the force should be prepared for all emergencies, and should be in every respect self-sufficing. Hence the river route was considered impracticable. Another way was to land the force at Katha and march up through Mohnyin. Our knowledge of the route between Mohnyin and Mogaung also was imperfect. It was not under our control, and a force passing up would have to take everything with it. The third route was by the left bank of the Irrawaddy. It had this advantage, that although the marching would be difficult, boats could follow the force up the river, could meet it at fixed Much care was given to the composition and equipment of the force The Chief Commissioner selected Major Adamson, the Deputy Commissioner at Bhamo, to go with the force. To him was entrusted the task of dealing with the Kachins and of establishing the authority of the British Government. He had served for thirteen years in Lower Burma, and was known as one of the best officers in the Commission. He fully justified the confidence placed in him. Some time before the expedition started, Major Adamson summoned Po Saw from Mogaung to meet him at Sinbo. He came accompanied by many of the chief Shan residents and Chinese merchants. He promised to obey the Deputy Commissioner's orders. The Deputy Commissioner then formally appointed him to be magistrate of Mogaung in his father's room and from the date of his father's death, and paid him a large sum as arrears of salary. He was then dismissed, with orders to clear the roads of jungle and collect supplies for the troops. He was instructed also to summon all the Kachin chiefs connected with the jade-mines to meet the representatives of the British Government at Mogaung. All this Po Saw readily promised to perform. Major Adamson went back to Bhamo well pleased with his willingness to help and believing in the loyalty of his intentions. All preparations having been completed, the expedition marched from Bhamo on the 27th, by the north gate of the town. It was for these parts an unusually large and well-found force, and impressed the townspeople who crowded to witness its departure. It consisted of the following troops: Cheshire Regiment, 50 rifles, under Captain Armstrong; Kelati-Ghilzai Regiment, 101 rifles, under Lieutenant Morton; Mounted Infantry, 25 rifles; Bhamo Military Police (Gurkhas), 500 rifles, under Lieutenant O'Donnell; The land transport consisted of 350 pack-mules with drivers and two elephants, who were sent back after a few marches, as they proved to be useless. A fleet of three steam launches and thirty-three large country boats, with supplies, was sent up by river, with a force of sixty-six Native Infantry, under a native officer, on the launches. Captain Triscott, R.A., with Lieutenant Williams, R.A., as his staff officer, was in command of the whole force. A Roman Catholic missionary who spoke Shan and Kachin accompanied the expedition as interpreter. A survey party to map the country, a forest officer to report on the forests, and Mr. Warry, the Chinese adviser to the Chief Commissioner, made the staff complete. The march up the left bank of the Irrawaddy was difficult. There were two considerable streams, the Taeping and the MolÉ, affluents of the Irrawaddy, to be crossed in the first few marches. These rivers, however, caused comparatively little delay. The track kept as near as possible to the course of the Irrawaddy. Sometimes it crept along close to the river-bank, across numerous spurs separated by small streams flowing into the main river. The ascents and descents were very steep, and to make them passable for laden animals much jungle-cutting and road-making had to be done. Sometimes the gradients were so steep as to necessitate the cutting of zigzag paths. At times the animals had to be taken up the steep banks and into the forests in order to find a road. On the 2nd of January the camping-ground was on a sandy spit by the river-bank, at a village called Nanti. Here the steam-launches and the thirty-three boats met the land columns. On the 4th the march lay along the side of the first defile, where the river flows between rocky banks. The laden animals found easier going here, as there was no rank vegetation; but it was slow work, as paths had to be cut for them on the steep sides of the beds of dry streams which had frequently to be crossed. On the 4th, after leaving the defile behind, the force debouched on sandy level ground close to the stream, and halted at the village of ManhÉ, where the column had to cross the Irrawaddy. The headman of Sinbo, with some fourscore men and half as many boats which he had brought down by the Deputy Commissioner's orders, to help in the work, was waiting. Next day was devoted to the crossing. At 7 a.m. it began, and by half-past 3 p.m. the last man was landed on the right bank. The Irrawaddy at this place and at this time of the year is three hundred yards wide, with a current of about two miles an hour. The formation of the river-bed, the broad sloping banks of sand and gravel, and at places the depth of water close to the side, made the work simple enough, however laborious. The two launches could come alongside the bank, and the artillery and infantry, with arms and ammunition, were taken over in them. Then came the baggage animals, who were made to swim the river in batches of four or five at a time. A canoe, with one Burman boatman in the bow, was drawn up alongside the bank, with the bow against the stream. Then four or five men, each leading an animal, passed round to the stern of the boat and seated themselves in the canoe holding the animals by their leading-ropes. As soon as The column was now on the right bank of the Irrawaddy. The next march brought them to Sinbo, where a garrison of military police was already established in a stockade, near to which a large camping-ground had been cleared for the troops. Supplies from Bhamo had been landed and stored, and the commissariat staff was busied in arranging for their transport to Mogaung. The fleet had also arrived before the column. The launches being unable, owing to the shallowness of the river, to get up beyond Sinbo, were sent back to Bhamo. The next two marches, partly through forests partly across plains cropped here and there with rice, brought the force to the bank of the Mogaung stream. The water was deep and the current ran very strong. The crossing of this little river gave more trouble than the passage of the Irrawaddy. For Po Saw's promises proved false. He had made no preparations and sent down neither men nor boats. However, three or four boats were found at a village higher up the stream. Teak logs were lying about. Rafts were made; and the guns and commissariat stores taken over. There were not enough boats to tow the large number of pack-animals across. Mules and ponies were driven into the water in herds and forced to make their way to the other bank, which unluckily was very steep with a muddy bottom. Nevertheless they all got over except one, but many were very spent and were brought up the bank with difficulty. The road now lay on the left, or east, bank of the river, and entered a country of which nothing was known. It was dominated by the Kachin chief of the neighbouring hills, from whom the inhabitants had to purchase protection—in plain English, immunity, to some small extent, from murder and robbery. As they had been forced at the same time to pay taxes to the Burmese officials, The failure of Po Saw to carry out Major Adamson's instructions gave rise to some anxiety. Treachery was feared, and precautions were taken against surprise. The road was now in parts very difficult, over steep forest-covered hills running down close to the Mogaung River, and intersected by many steep ravines. Progress was slow, as the way had to be cleared of bamboo and other undergrowth before the pack-animals could pass. In places on reaching the proposed halting-place it was found to be a small, confined spot, and the ground had to be cleared before the camp could be pitched. A party of Chinese Shans on their way to Mogaung joined the camp at night, and were engaged to accompany the force and help to clear the road, for which they were well paid. After some sixteen miles of difficult ground, which was covered in two marches, the column struck the river again near Tapaw. Here the headman advised Major Adamson to cross to the right bank again, as the land road to Mogaung was only five or six miles, whereas the river made a detour of double that distance, first going north and then coming back to the south-east. There were no boats to be had here. After some consideration Captain Triscott and Major Adamson decided that it was advisable to send to Mogaung and summon Po Saw. They had heard from a Kachin Sawbwa whom they met on the road that the Chinaman who farmed the jade-mine revenue had been murdered, and they were now told at Tapaw that an Englishman had passed down-stream in urgent haste. Here we must go back to Mr. Warry's movements. It has been said above that Mr. Warry, the adviser on Chinese affairs, had been appointed to go with the expedition. He belonged to the Chinese Consular Service, spoke Chinese well, and understood that difficult people as well as an Englishman can. He was on most friendly terms with the Chinese in Burma, and could trust himself to them without fear. It appears that instead of marching with Major Adamson, as it was intended, he had gone by himself with some Chinamen by the river. When the expedition Hence on the 12th of January he was in his boat on the Mogaung, some seven or eight miles in rear of the marching column, when he met Mr. Rimmer, a commander in the Irrawaddy flotilla's service, coming down the stream as fast as his men could paddle. Rimmer had in his boat a Chinaman very badly wounded in the head. It was Lon Pein, who had been at one time the farmer of the jade-mine taxes under the King's Government. Rimmer's story was that he had pushed on to the town of Mogaung alone, for the purpose of examining the waterway. He reached the town on the 19th of January, and having accomplished his object was about to return at once when Lon Pein came to him and told him that he feared an attack by Po Saw's men, who sought his life. He implored Rimmer to stay and help to defend him until the troops should arrive. The people of the town appeared to be friendly enough. But believing that Lon Pein's life was in danger, he chivalrously agreed to stay. He took up his quarters in the Chinaman's house, and they made ready in such manner as they could to resist an attack. Rimmer was armed with a rifle, and Lon Pein, it may be presumed, had fire-arms of some sort. They had not long to wait. At midnight of the 10th a body of ruffians besieged the house with more vigour even than the police led by the Home Secretary against the house in Sidney Street. The house was of the kind usual in the country, raised on piles with a floor none too closely fitted. The assailants got underneath and fired through the floor, and thrust spears wherever they could find an opening. Early in the fight Lon Pein fell wounded in the head, and never recovered consciousness. Rimmer's rifle was shot in two, and his knee was grazed by a ball. However, he continued to hold out until dawn, when the assailants made off. Next day he managed to find his boat and, with the assistance of some town's-people, to carry Lon Pein to it. The inhabitants expressed their sympathy and regret, but did not explain their failure to help him. Po Saw, it appeared, had left Mogaung the day before, but Rimmer believed that Lon Pein had good cause for holding him responsible for the attack. Warry persuaded Rimmer to return with him to the protection of the troops, and they joined the column on the 13th, before it left Tapaw, and entered Mogaung with it on the 14th of January. Evidently there was mischief on foot. The leaders of the expedition, on hearing the story, decided that before advancing further it would be wise to make Po Saw show his hand. The difficulty was to get a trustworthy man to carry a message to Mogaung. There was a Mussulman, a native of India, who had come up as an interpreter, with the force, Safdar Ali by name. He might have been a descendant of Sinbad the Sailor, for he had led a life of travel and adventure. He had traded in jade, and was familiar with many parts of the country. He spoke Burmese, Shan, and Kachin, in addition to his native Hindustani, and he had taken wives of the daughters of Heth in most of the bigger places. In consequence, or in spite, of these alliances he was on good terms with the people about, and could obtain intelligence of local affairs. Safdar Ali volunteered to take a letter to Po Saw, and with a native to show him the shortest road, he departed. Meanwhile Captain Triscott and Major Adamson, with some Mounted Infantry, had gone out to examine the track, and found that for four or five miles it crossed a rice plain cut up by numerous muddy ditches which the baggage animals could not get over. Beyond this rice-ground rose some hills, at the foot of which was a morass, which the column would find very difficult to pass. They turned back to the camp, therefore, to collect labour to make the road passable. Safdar Ali, on his way back from Mogaung, overtook them, and reported that Po Saw had disappeared after the Chinaman's murder, and had gone, it was said, to raise the Kachins nearest to Mogaung. This was not cheering news, as Po Saw's influence with the Kachins had been relied upon as the means of establishing peaceable relations with them. However, the other officials of the town had been helpful; After climbing the hill, the pagodas and monasteries of Mogaung became visible; and when the level ground round the town was reached, a number of the chief people were seen, who had come out to meet the British force and make their submission. On reaching the gates a conference was held with these, while the town was reconnoitred by the soldiers for a suitable camping-place. The burgesses were evidently suffering from great fears. They dreaded the Kachins, to raise whom was the design of Po Saw. Under these circumstances it comforted them to learn that the British had come to stay, and that their town would not be left again without an English officer and a sufficient garrison. Major Adamson then proclaimed the offer of a reward of 1,000 rupees for the discovery and arrest of the murderer of Lon Pein, the Chinaman. He told them to have no fear of the British soldiers, and assured them that if the Myo-Ôk Po Saw would return to his duty even now, he would be forgiven and restored to office. By this time, a good site having been found on a sand-bank at the upper end of the town, the whole column marched through the main street, that all might see its strength, and established the camp there. Mogaung In the centre of the town were some very good houses belonging to the wealthier residents, and at the upper end the Chinese—who formed, as they do now, a large and important class of the inhabitants—had their quarters and their temple. Most of the trade in jade and rubber was in their hands, and their houses were as uncleanly here as in other towns of Burma. One of their chief employments was the manufacture of arrack, which they sold to the town's-people. The shops in their quarter reeked of it. Whatever the Indian Temperance Society may think, we cannot be accused of introducing alcohol or the vice of drunkenness into these regions. Orders were at once issued against selling liquor to the British soldiers. These orders were treated with indifference until a Chinaman was caught in the act. He was promptly flogged, and there were no more cases of the kind. Another race found at Mogaung was the cross-breeds between Chinese and Shans. "We noticed," says Major Adamson (short account, p. 27), "very many Chinese Shans.... They are strange, wild-looking people, as a rule rather short in size, but often strong and wiry. They are invariably dressed in a blue cotton jacket and loose blue Chinese trousers, and they wear their hair in a sort of long tail behind, more or less after the fashion of Chinese. They are each armed with a long sword, and as a rule each carries a bag, in which he keeps his eating utensils, food, and blanket." In the river in front of Mogaung is an island, where the boats which bring jade and rubber from the north, and all sorts of miscellaneous merchandise from Bhamo, It was Major Adamson's duty to get into touch with the people, and procure the necessary intelligence concerning local politics and conditions. There was a man of influence in the town called ShwÈ Gya, who had been appointed by Major Cooke to be the nakan, or deputy, when Maung Kala was recognized as Myo-Ôk. He could not get on with Po Saw when that person succeeded to power, and retired into private life. ShwÈ Gya was a man of some note and of strong individuality. He was a cross-breed between a Kachin father and an Assamese mother. But he had adopted the dress, habits, and religion of the Burmese Shans. He had been a soldier at one time, and understood Kachin tactics well. Being able to appreciate the power of the English, he threw in his lot with them. This man Major Adamson took into his confidence, and found him most useful and most loyal. It was necessary for Adamson to be open to all comers and at all times. As this was not possible within the camp, he moved his quarters to a rest-house in the town, taking a small British guard for his protection. On Sunday, the 15th, his mind was relieved by learning that Po Saw had returned. A Durbar was arranged, to which all the notables were summoned. The officers of the force being present, Major Adamson received Po Saw formally, and after explaining the objects of the expedition and the general policy of the British Government, namely the establishment of peace and the encouragement of trade, he censured the Myo-Ôk for his conduct, and called on him to explain it. Po Saw alleged that fear of being called to account for Lon Pein's murder had been the reason of his flight. Major Adamson accepted the excuse, and restored him to office. At the same time he assured the people that no one should be prosecuted for offences against the British Government committed before the arrival of O'Donnell and his police, who had fallen behind the column owing to the boats with their supplies having been delayed, had now arrived, and the work of building a fort for their occupation was begun. A site was chosen on a piece of ground in the middle of the town, bounded on one side by the river, of which the banks were very steep and formed a natural defence, leaving the other sides to be protected by palisades. The mornings now were very cold and foggy, the thermometer falling to 45° or 50°. About nine o'clock the fog cleared off, and the climate was delightful. The soldiers were naturally eager to move. They were eating up their stores, and if the Kachins meant mischief the less time they had to prepare it, the better. A council of war was held. Major Adamson wished to wait until the Kachins had had time to arrive. His instructions were to avoid hostilities with the Kachin chiefs if possible. Po Saw had not summoned them to meet him as he had been ordered; the letters from the British Representative were only now reaching them. The Chinese, through Mr. Warry, also strongly urged delay. Moreover, nothing was yet known about the road to the jade-mines; and as it was found that, contrary to expectation, paddy for the transport animals could be procured from the villages in the neighbourhood, the arguments against delay lost some of their force. The council decided, after discussion, to halt for ten days. During the next few days the chief work was the collection of materials for the fort and its construction, which was rapidly pushed on by Captain O'Donnell. Houses were also put in hand for the officers who were to remain in Mogaung, namely the Commandant of military police, the Assistant Commissioner, and a surgeon. Surveys were made of the neighbouring country, information about the roads and villages collected, and in short every preparation made for the advance. On the 22nd of January, ShwÈ Gya reported to Major Adamson that the Myo-Ôk Po Saw had disappeared once more. His conduct since his reinstatement had not been The final disappearance of Po Saw upset Major Adamson's plans. It was idle to expect that the influential Kachin chiefs would now come in. It was necessary to appoint a man to carry on the duties of the Myo-Ôk. ShwÈ Gya was the best man, but he was not a Shan and the people would not have accepted him. With the consent of the townsfolk another member of Maung Kala's family was chosen and placed in authority, with ShwÈ Gya as the deputy and real working man. All this was done in public, and explained to the people. At this time some letters of a friendly tone came in, with presents from some Kachin chiefs whose hills were on the road to the jade-mines. The time had come now for an advance. The fort was ready for occupation, and was defended by a substantial bamboo palisade, Captain O'Donnell, with all his police except a detachment of seventy-five, who formed part of the expeditionary force, were left to garrison it. Mr. Twomey, Assistant Commissioner, was placed in administrative charge, and orders were left for the despatch of Bo Ti and the other prisoner to Bhamo. On the 26th of January the march began. The troops forming the column under Captain Triscott's command were:—
A field-hospital, under Surgeon-Major Barron, and a train of transport animals with provisions and commissariat stores for seven days, completed his equipment. Mr. Warry, a survey party, a forest officer, the Roman Catholic priest who acted as interpreter, Safdar Ali, and the new Myo-Ôk, Poh Myah, with ShwÈ Gya, the deputy, and some armed followers, accompanied Major Adamson. Supplies were forwarded up by river to Kamaing, the first principal halting-place, thirty-three miles from Mogaung. Before the force left a reconnoitring party had been sent up to Kamaing, and had reported the road to be very difficult. The report was not found to be exaggerated. Marching through elephant-grass and thick forest, which hid everything except the immediate neighbourhood, a hardly visible path, obstructed often by huge fallen trees; camping-grounds which had to be laboriously cleared of elephant-grass On the 30th the stream on the opposite bank of which lay Kamaing was reached. It ran deep, and the banks were precipitous. Fortunately, it was only about the width of a cricket pitch. Trees were felled and elephant-grass cut, and with the aid of a big trunk found sticking up in the bed of the river, a bridge was made, over which the whole force, laden animals and all, safely crossed. "Kamaing," writes Major Adamson, "is splendidly situated on a small hill, close to the river, at the point where its two main branches unite, the larger branch, the Nampoung, coming from the Indawgyi Lake in the south-west" (ibid., p. 40). It had been a flourishing town, as the still remaining monasteries and pagodas proved. These religious buildings were, however, deserted, the last monk having died a year before. Of the whole town only a few houses remained. The place had shared the fate of all this country in the Kachin rebellion of 1883. There were still a few shops, however, where Manchester goods could be bought, and articles of food for daily use were to be had. Country spirits and opium were also on sale. Here letters came in from the two brothers who ruled the hills in which the jade-mines are situated. They were called Kansi Naung and Kansi Hla. Their tone was friendly, though they wrote with the hope of preventing the advance of our people from Mogaung. Answers were sent by mounted messengers, saying that the force was already at Kamaing and would continue its march next day, and assuring the Sawbwas of our peaceable intentions. Starting from Kamaing on the 31st of January, the bank of the Indaw River was reached after some of the most difficult marches made during the expedition. The path was passable for men but not for a long line of laden animals. It was very swampy, with tall elephant-grass on each side, which had been set on fire to make the track passable. The men had to force their way through the charred stalks, and as there was a heavy fog at the time "the faces and clothes of the whole column were speedily as black as if they had been down a coal-mine." (Short account, p. 36.) For some distance every yard of the road had to be made by cutting down the tall, coarse grass and spreading it on the surface of the swamp until it would bear the weight of the animals. So they made their way, always through the tall grass, until the Indaw River was struck. Here it was decided to form a defensible camp, in which all superfluous animals, stores, and tents should be left, with a sufficient garrison to guard them, while the main body pushed on to the jade-mines. After their experience of the country, it was held to be dangerous to move with the whole train if there was any likelihood of fighting. Two days were occupied in preparing this camp, in getting some portion of the road cleared in advance, and in holding communication with a neighbouring Kachin Sawbwa. On the 3rd of February the reduced column, in light fighting order, left Kamaing with seven days' provisions, loaded on some hundred and twenty-five mules. Each man carried two days' rations besides. Everything that could be done without, including tents, was left in the camp. It was as well, for the road continued difficult, and every bit of ground at the halting-places for the night had to be cleared. The march was sometimes in the bed of a stream sometimes through dense cane jungle growing in swamp. Hard work in deep mud, from which all sorts of noxious vapours rose, caused the men to sweat profusely, and exhausted the animals. Fortunately, through the medium of ShwÈ Gya, Major Adamson persuaded some of the Kachin villagers to approach him, and their services were hired for road clearing. On the 6th messengers from the jade-mine Sawbwas, Kansi Naung and Kansi Hla, were met, carrying letters for the Deputy Commissioner. The letters were quite friendly in tone, and invited the British force to halt on the bank of the Uyu River, where there were grass and water in plenty. Major Adamson was much relieved to get this communication, as it seemed to give promise of a peaceable visit to the mines. The road ascended now through forest and thick bamboo undergrowth, and was very fatiguing. For the first time men were met carrying down loads of jade stone. The watershed between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy was crossed, and the road then descended into an open plateau, out of the dense and dismal forest through which our march of seven miles had been. From 7 a.m. till 2 p.m. we had been steadily marching, but we had only been able to accomplish seven miles. Heavy rain fell that night and turned the camping-ground into a bog, and made the road for next day (February 6th) very heavy. The mud and water reached to the bellies of the mules, and in places the column was forced to leave the path and cut a new way through the forest. The Namthein, an affluent of the Uyu, had to be crossed several times, the water being up to a man's knee and the bed of the stream 50 yards broad. At midday the weary force encamped on a tongue of land at the junction of the Namthein and Uyu Rivers. The camp was on a lovely spot. It faced southwards, and commanded a view of the junction of the two streams. On the right was the Uyu, a beautiful stream of from 75 to 100 yards from bank to bank, "as clear as crystal, and alive with fish, which kept rising to the surface in the evening, like trout in an English stream. The bed was generally rocky, full of large water-worn boulders; but for a short distance above In this pleasant place came a further letter to the leaders of the expedition from Kansi Naung, saying that he had given orders that the English should be treated well, and promising to come himself with presents. Next day, however, brought only disappointment. A letter came from Kansi Naung saying that illness prevented him from keeping his promise. Other signs indicated that all was not right, and ShwÈ Gya, who had been hopeful hitherto, lost heart. The military leaders were for good reasons in favour of immediate action. Major Adamson, however, took the responsibility of giving Kansi Naung more time, and wrote to him peremptorily, saying that they could not wait, and that he must come in. On the 8th of February news came that Kansi Naung was at a village on the opposite side of the river, not a mile off. ShwÈ Gya was asked to go across to see him. But he declined, saying that he knew Kachins were on his track to murder him. The right course was now clear. Adamson told the men publicly to go back to Kansi Naung and tell him that if he did not appear before ten o'clock next day the column would advance to the jade-mines by force if necessary. Later in the day the polyglot and polygamous interpreter, Safdar Ali, volunteered to go to the Kachin camp to see if he could influence the Kachins, or at any rate find out what was in their minds. His offer was accepted. At the same time all was made ready for a fight. Next day (February 9th) Safdar Ali returned with a message from Kansi Naung that the Sawbwa would come, but that ten o'clock was too early for him. Captain Triscott fixed the advancing or attacking force at one hundred rifles and one gun; the rest were not more than sufficient to defend the camp. The numbers of possible enemies might be large, and if the advance was opposed the camp also would probably be assailed. By nine o'clock the men had fallen in and were waiting for the order to march, when a large party appeared on the opposite side of the river. The leading man carried a fine pair of elephant tusks. It was evidently a friendly visit, and proved to be Kansi Naung with twelve other chiefs. The troops drawn up for a hostile advance were at once turned into a guard of honour. The military and civil leaders sat in chairs in front of the hut in which they had sheltered, and the Kachin Sawbwas on their arrival were seated on the ground in front of them. The tusks were presented and all the chiefs made their submission. Major Adamson assured them, ShwÈ Gya interpreting, that the British Government would respect their rights in the mines. They were warned against listening to Po Saw, who had been dismissed from the British service. Presents were given to each of them, and they were dismissed. On their departure the troops immediately fell in and started for the jade-mines, which were reached after an uneventful march on a rough forest path, which rose to an altitude of fifteen hundred feet. There was not much to see. "A collection of about fifty houses and what appeared to be a large quarry, while all over the place were blocks of white stone of all sizes, some of which were tinged or streaked with green." The main object of the expedition, to obtain the submission of the Kachin chiefs and assert the authority of the Government and its right to the revenue from the mines, had been attained. As no water was to be had, and there were no rations for the men, the force, after a short rest, marched back to camp. Everything had gone well during their absence from the camp. But disquieting letters had come from Mogaung, telling of a Kachin assault on the stockade. It remained now to explore the Indaw country. Taking only a small party from the camp, Adamson went in boats It was hoped that with unlimited rice plains, a magnificent lake swarming with fish, a Government that would enforce peace, with open water communications and in the near future a railroad, this beautiful country would recover prosperity. All that can be said after a generation has passed is that "it is only beginning to recover from the devastation caused by the Kachin rising of 1883" (Burma Gazetteer, vol ii., p. 120, edit. 1908). So much easier is it to destroy than to restore. The Indawgyi country being now explored, the party rejoined the main body at the Sakaw camp, and the force set out on its return march to Mogaung. They had left Mogaung on the 27th of January, and had marched for four weeks through jungles and marshes most favourable to a savage enemy skilled in ambuscade. Yet not a shot had been fired. Po Saw, however, had been busy with the Kachins. Mogaung had been attacked on the 3rd of February, and the report of this had reached Major Adamson. They were prepared, therefore, for hostilities, and before they reached Mogaung, on the 24th of February, they were attacked and lost several men. The state of affairs at Mogaung was not very reassuring. The expeditionary force had, however, to return to Bhamo. They had accomplished the work for which they had been detached. Major Adamson also was obliged to resume the charge of his district, which had been left more or less during his absence to a subordinate officer. The arrangement was that Captain Triscott should march back by the land route through Mohnyin to Katha and open up the country which had not been explored. It had been intended originally to send a small force up from Katha to meet him. This proved impracticable, but a party of military police had occupied Mohnyin. Accordingly the expeditionary force marched back by this route. They were opposed several times by bodies of Kachins, who had fortified themselves in positions across the road. These enemies, however, were easily dislodged by the guns, and a junction with the military police was effected at Mohnyin. The rest of the return march was made without incident. It was hardly to be expected in any case that Major Adamson's expedition should result in the immediate establishment of peace in the Mogaung country and in placing our relations with the Kachins on a friendly footing. To secure the submission of a wild people divided into as many tribes as there are hills in their country, and to bring them under a civilized system of government, is not the work of a few weeks. But it was hoped that more than a beginning had been made, and that time and the residence of British officers at Mogaung would do the rest. Some untoward events had occurred to render this hope vain. The conduct of Po Saw in leaving Mogaung and taking refuge with the Kachins was the main cause of the difficulties which began to be felt early in 1888. If Major Adamson had been successful in capturing Po Saw when he made Bo Ti a prisoner, and if Bo Ti had been securely detained, much of the trouble which followed during the subsequent years 1888 and 1889, and even later, would have been avoided. Unfortunately the advantage accruing from Bo Ti's capture was soon to be lost. He was sent down to Bhamo and confined in the jail there. The jail, like other buildings in Upper Burma, was made of wood. It had a stout teak palisade round it, secure enough if the guard had been trustworthy. It happened that just at that time an attempt had been made to assassinate the Colonel commanding in Bhamo. While he was dressing for mess his body-servant crept up behind him as he stood at the glass and stabbed him in the back. The servant, a native of India, was arrested at once and locked up, pending trial, in the same jail with Bo Ti. These two conspired to escape. They scooped away the ground from the base of some of the big teak posts which formed the palisade and contrived to loosen them. The guard being either asleep or in collusion with them, they got away. Bo Ti soon made his escape felt by our people at Mogaung. He joined Po Saw somewhere in the Kachin Hills, probably at Thama, and helped to raise the tribes. The influence of both these men over the Kachins was very great. In Po Saw's case it was probably more hereditary than personal. He was descended from the former ruling family, and with the Kachins as well as with the Burmans a drop of royal blood counts for much. Personally Po Saw seems to have been a treacherous and cowardly character. Bo Ti, on the contrary, was a bold leader and had some military capacity. The two together For a short time after Major Adamson left with the expeditionary force there were no disturbances. But signs and rumours of Po Saw's activity were frequent. The attempts to stop the column on its way from Mogaung to Mohnyin were organized or instigated by him. In the latter half of April the rumours began to take shape, and the Kachins were said to be on the warpath. In the third week of April the headman of a group of villages in the rice plain south of Mogaung reported to the Assistant Commissioner that Bo Ti and three chiefs of the Ithi Kachin tribe had ordered him to join a party which they were organizing for an assault on Mogaung. If he refused, they threatened to destroy the village of Taungbaw in which he lived. They required him to meet them at a given place to settle details. At this time Mr. Twomey, owing to an accidental wound, had taken leave, and Lieutenant L. E. Eliott, a young soldier who had been appointed to the Commission, held his place. The headman proposed that a strong party should be sent from Mogaung to ambush Bo Ti and his friends when they came to the trysting-place. This proposal seemed to Lieutenant Eliott to be treacherous dealing which a British officer ought not to countenance, and he refused to join in it; a piece of high-minded chivalry somewhat misplaced under the circumstances. The headman having been advised by Lieutenant Eliott not to keep the appointment with Bo Ti lest treachery should be intended, left the fort. Early next morning he ran in to report that before dawn Bo Ti, with some hundreds of men, had come to Taungbaw and were stockading themselves in the village. Taungbaw is four or five miles from Mogaung. Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, taking the mounted men and a company of Gurkhas, started at once for the scene of action, ordering reinforcements to follow. They met fugitives who confirmed When O'Donnell and his men were about six thousand paces from the hill, a signal shot was fired by the enemy's outpost. Advancing to within 400 yards, our men delivered several volleys. Each volley was answered by a Kachin cheer. Evidently they meant to make a stand. At this moment the reinforcements from Mogaung came up and it was decided to attack the Kachin position. The hill was steep and covered with thick bamboo jungle, very difficult to get through. The enemy could not be seen. Dividing his men into three parties, O'Donnell sent the mounted men round the left flank to form up in rear of the hills. Part of his infantry were sent round the right flank and told to get well under the hill. The remainder, led by the two British officers, then worked round the right flank, which seemed to offer the best openings for an ascent. As they crossed a narrow causeway in a paddy-field and a small bridge they drew the Kachin fire. On coming into touch with the first party it was told to go farther on round the hill. The order was then given to advance with fixed bayonets. The bamboo jungle prevented the men from getting on fast. A heavy fire was kept up by the Kachins, but owing to the steepness of the ascent the bullets flew high and there were no casualties. Beyond the bamboo jungle was the village stockade, which was within 30 yards of Bo Ti's position. But when the Kachins saw the Gurkhas forcing their way through this stockade, they did not wait for the bayonet, but after firing a few shots bolted down the hill, our men chasing them. At the bottom the mounted men took up the running, and it was a case of every man for himself, Unfortunately when the firing began some of the Mounted Infantry ponies were scared and broke away. Owing to this mischance the pursuit was less effective than it should have been. Even Some anxiety was felt by Captain O'Donnell and Mr. Eliott lest Po Saw, learning that the greater part of the garrison had gone out, should attack the Mogaung stockade. Only sixty-six men, some of them sick, had been left in the fort—enough, perhaps, to hold it, but not to defend the town. Fortunately no attempt was made by Po Saw. At the time of the fight he was on his way to the jade-mines. He had attempted, as it was learnt afterwards, to come to Bo Ti's assistance, but he could not reach the scene of the fight in time. The next month showed constant activity on the part of Po Saw and Bo Ti and their Kachin allies. Frequent attacks were made on boats going down or up the Mogaung River. It became necessary to send them in convoys with police guards. Villages near Mogaung were raided, and early in May Nanpapa, near Sinbo, was attacked, many villagers killed or carried away, and the village destroyed. Po Saw himself took up a position at Kamaing, where he could harass the traders on the route to the jade-mines and Indawgyi, and from which he could also threaten Mogaung. It was not possible for Captain O'Donnell to drive him away or to act on the offensive at any distance from the fort. Hence the enemy became more daring. On the 21st of May, under cover of night, a large body of Shans, under Bo Ti, got into the town and took up positions within the low brick-wall enclosures of the pagodas, which, as has been described, were scattered about in and outside the town. The garrison, under Captain O'Donnell and Lieutenant Eliott, turned out against them. A really good fight followed, in which the enemy lost forty-nine men killed and many wounded, and were driven in confusion out of the town. They were nearly all Shans, some of whom had come from the Uyu country beyond The situation at Mogaung caused some anxiety. The garrison was too weak. Its strength was now only two hundred and ninety-two men, many of whom were sick, not enough to allow a force to leave the post for a day. Two hundred men were ordered up from Bhamo, and with that addition the garrison would be able to hold their own, but it would not suffice to enable them to punish the Kachins. Bo Ti was occupying a place called Nyaungbintha, in the midst of the Ithi tribe of Kachins, by whom he was strongly backed. At Kamaing on the north was Po Saw, supported by the Thama Sawbwa of the Lepei tribe, who appeared to be most hostile. There could be no permanent peace until the strength of these tribes should be broken. At the earnest request of the Chief Commissioner two mountain-guns, with the necessary equipment, were given to the Mogaung Levy. There was some not unnatural reluctance on the part of the military authorities in India to trust an irregular force with artillery. But the excellent conduct of the men in the late fights, and the proved capacity of the gallant young soldier commanding them, overcame their unwillingness. It was impossible to allow Captain O'Donnell to attack stockades and to turn large bodies of the enemy out of strong positions without artillery. With only one British officer, or at the most two, a chance shot or a bamboo spike might deprive the force of its commander and cause a disaster. The Chief Commissioner pressed this argument, and asked to be allowed to raise the garrison of Mogaung to ten companies. Sanction was given in October. It took time, however, to raise and train the additional companies of Gurkhas; and in any case the expeditions which the conduct of the Kachins had rendered necessary could not have been undertaken until the rains had passed. In the meanwhile, until the guns and reinforcements reached them, the Mogaung officers were instructed to concentrate their men in Mogaung, not to attempt to occupy outposts; to move about patrols of fifty men when the weather permitted Present needs having been provided for, a plan of operations to be undertaken during the coming open season was framed by the Chief Commissioner, in consultation with Sir George White, and early in November it was sanctioned by the Government of India. Four separate operations were to be undertaken. 1. Against the Lepei tribe north of Mogaung, the leading chief being the Sawbwa of Thama, Po Saw's main supporter. 2. Against the Ithi tribe south of Mogaung, who were under the Sawbwa of Panga. 3. Against the Sana Kachins of the Lataung tribe, who had raided near Mogaung in May. 4. Against the Makau and other tribes in the neighbourhood of Sinbo, who were responsible for the destructive attack on Nanpapa in May, and for another in August on trading boats at Hlegyomaw on the Mogaung River. The control of these operations was taken by Sir George White at the Chief Commissioner's request, the military police in the subdivision being placed at his disposal. While the necessary preparations were being made, letters of the nature of an ultimatum were sent to the Sawbwas of Thama and Panga and other tribal chiefs, requiring them to make formal submission to the subdivisional officer at On the 7th of January, 1889, the force On the 15th of February, the men's health having been restored, the force fell to work with energy, and engagement rapidly followed engagement. On the 16th of February three villages were taken after some resistance. On the 17th the Kachins were encountered on a strongly stockaded position, which was taken and destroyed. On the 19th Thama itself was taken. The enemy here showed more fight. Three men of the Hampshires received gunshot wounds, and two officers and eleven men were injured by bamboo spikes. Captain O'Donnell's report gives the following account of this engagement, which shows the nature of the fighting in these expeditions:— "My guide, who had done splendidly up to this, lost me four valuable hours in finding the road. He struck it at last, and after a severe climb of 4½ miles, we came out near the village of Thama. On arriving at the crest of the hill Lieutenant Eliott, Assistant Commissioner, received a letter, stuck in a stick on the road, from Thama Sawbwa, in which he said we might come and burn his village, he would do nothing but hide in the jungle, &c. This put us on our guard, and we went on cautiously over the crest, and then saw what appeared to me through my glasses, a garden paling. I examined it well, but found nothing suspicious about it. However, I ordered the advance with all caution. The Hants were in front, the Gurkhas forming flanking parties in rear. When about sixty yards from the place we could not make out that it was more than a paling, when suddenly we were saluted by a volley from many guns. Three Hants men fell under this badly wounded, but the remainder walked off the road into the jungle and poured in some very steady volleys. The Gurkhas were quickly up on the right flank, and the guns were brought up and two rounds fired at the stockade, and then with a wild cheer it was rushed and taken, the rebels not waiting.... "Blood was found here. I went on, leaving the rear-guard to bring on the wounded. We came before a second stockade; we were again saluted, but no casualties occurred, and one round from a gun and another charge made us masters of this also. In this charge much damage was done us, two officers and eleven rank-and-file being spiked by bamboo spikes. Captain Macdonald and I were both spiked through the foot. After this no more opposition was met with and Thama was entered and destroyed. A search in the jungle was made, but nothing found. After the sick had been attended to I returned to camp, meeting no opposition en route." On the 21st of February a place called Muklon was assaulted and taken. Here Lieutenant Hawker, of the Hampshire Regiment, fell badly wounded—spiked in the After little more than a day's rest Captain O'Donnell moved out again, this time against the Ithi tribe to the south of Mogaung. He established a post at Nyaungbintha, in the centre of their territory. By the 28th of March ten villages of this tribe had been taken with very little fighting. The village of Waranaung, of which the chief had been loyal in every respect since the occupation of Mogaung, was carefully preserved from injury. On the 4th of April a move was made against Sana, which fell without an effort. The column now turned south to Sinbo, and from that base moved out to punish the villages concerned in the barbarous raids on Nanpapa and Hlegyomaw. The villages concerned having been taken after some resistance, the task assigned to Captain O'Donnell was completed on the 4th of May. In these four expeditions our casualties amounted to one officer and three men killed, and five officers and thirty men (including followers) wounded. The column was engaged with Kachins thirty-two times, and took forty-six stockades. Owing to the loss of a month by the sickness at Kamaing, the work was more hurried than the Chief Commissioner had designed. The results, however, were very good, and had been obtained with more ease and less bloodshed than had been expected. By the occupation of Kamaing, the trade route to the jade-mines was opened and made safe. The Marip tribe who dominate the jade-mines, and the Sassum tribe who adjoin the amber-mines, were freed from Po Saw's pressure and their loyalty assured. Villages from the Kachin tribes came in by scores to make formal submission to the Assistant Commissioner at Mogaung. Of the Thama Sawbwa's villages only Thama and two others held out; the Ithi tribe, the Kachins round Sinbo, and the Lakun tribe south of the Ithi country all From the number of casualties it might be inferred that the service was one of little danger. The inference would be wholly wrong. The column was engaged in bush or jungle fighting with the enemy almost every day, and if our casualties were not greater it was due as well to the precautions taken by the leader and to his skilful tactics as to the failure of the Kachins to defend their stockades. The heaviest part of the work fell on the Gurkhas of the Mogaung Levy (military police), who furnished the flanking parties. Without them the force must have lost heavily. "The flanking done by the Gurkhas was splendid indeed, and it is entirely owing to their jungle work that I had not more casualties." Captain O'Donnell concluded his report on the results of the operations with a notice of Lieutenant W. Hawker, of the Hants Regiment. "He was spiked through the thigh while gallantly leading his men in a charge at Mukton on the 15th of March, 1889. He was attached to the Mogaung Levy for these operations. He was senior to Lieutenant Benson, and might have taken command of the levy from that officer." But he showed "a sincere spirit in the welfare of the service" in refusing to supersede Lieutenant Benson, who belonged to the Indian Army and knew the men and their language. "He volunteered to take charge of the transport on the line of march, and this he did until Captain Macdonald was wounded. He was commanding the Hants men when he received his death-wound." FOOTNOTES:
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