TO QUEEN VICTORIA

PRETORIA

Pretoria, like most South African towns, dozes in the lap of the hills, dozes tranquilly in a haven of generous nature, as dozed her Dutchmen in the midst of growing civilisation. The place from the distance is fair to the eye, poplar-groved, verdant, and picturesque, with the glimmer of red roofs cutting against the green, and veils of gauzy clouds, now grey, now purple, now azure, interlacing the hills and linking them with the sky. Its quaint, old, low-storeyed houses—in some cases thatched like bungalows—and its more modern tenements roofed with zinc, and bounded by pleasant rose-gardens tangled with flowers, seemed to the new-comers strangely suburban in contrast with the imposing Government buildings and shops which were soon alive with all the fluster of nineteenth-century money-getting.

For the great entry made, the capital was swift to resume its everyday aspect, and trade grew even brisker than before. Famine prices reigned: though in some hotels where comforts were many, baths and sanitary arrangements were primitive. The Boers were busy “making hay while the sun shone,” consequently living became twice as expensive as in England; and, what was worse, with the enormous and somewhat voracious army to be fed, supplies threatened at no very remote date to become exhausted.

At first all things seemed to denote that the war was practically over, that nothing remained but to accept the surrender of the defeated Boers, and to settle quickly the administration of the conquered Republics. By degrees, however, disappointment set in—disappointment not unmixed with alarm. The redoubtable Christian de Wet had theories of his own; he put on his shoulders the mantle of the deposed Cronje, and set to work to show his generalship by destroying the railway in the south, cutting the telegraph wires, and generally harassing the lines of communication. Indeed, there was every appearance that the late investing forces might in their turn become invested in the capital. Postal and telegraphic communications were cut, supplies and reinforcements were menaced, and gradually the sunny outlook of conquest grew nebulous.

The defeated forces also began to concentrate at Machadodorp, beyond Middelburg, where Mr. Kruger was actively engaged in conference with his friends. They were not devoid of funds, for it was found that before leaving Pretoria the Boer officials had provided themselves with £300,000 from the National Bank, and while this sum lasted and he remained in the country, it was argued that Mr. Kruger’s schemes of bribery and corruption might be expected to continue, and even develop. Still Lord Roberts was undismayed! He had foreseen attacks on his communications, but had hazarded all on the one throw of reaching the capital before the Boers could gather together their forces for organised resistance, pushing forward in the only way possible if the conquered were to be left breathless. Napoleon’s advice to one of his marshals, “A commander-in-chief should never give rest either to the victor or the vanquished,” had been followed to the foot of the letter, as the French say.

In this notable march the marvellous genius of Lord Roberts had been shown in many ways, but in courage before all. He had adapted his fighting dispositions on a system specially suitable to the idiosyncrasies of the Boers—had observed their natural disinclination to take the initiative, their failure to act on the offensive rather than the defensive, and, on this discovery, had invented new tactics which were exactly appropriate and eminently successful. His infantry had made the centre of the advancing line to east and west of the rail, perpetually threatening the enemy with frontal attack, while active and competent wings of mounted troops unceasingly wheeled round both flanks, threatening to turn them so soon as opportunity should offer. Thus the Boers, for fear of being outflanked, were forced to extend their front till the central position—at the railway line—became too weak for resistance, and they had of necessity to retreat, and continue to retreat, till they were too exhausted to do more than run.

At the Chief’s masterly combinations, his ingenious synchronal schemes, his almost prophetic foresight regarding the positions of the enemy, and the effect of his every move upon those positions, it is impossible not to marvel—as at the amazing boldness and rapidity of execution with which was developed a design which brought him with his enormous army in little more than a month from Bloemfontein to Pretoria.

From the following general order issued on his arrival at his destination it is possible to understand the magnitude and the daring of the Chief’s plan, which, merely to read of, renders one almost breathless:—

“Pretoria, June 7.

“In congratulating the British Army in South Africa on the occupation of Johannesburg and Pretoria, the one being the principal town and the other the capital of the Transvaal, and also on the relief of Mafeking after a heroic defence of over 200 days, the Field-Marshal Commanding-in-chief desires to place on record his high appreciation of the gallantry and endurance displayed by the troops, both those who have taken part in the advance across the Vaal River and those who have been employed in the less arduous duty of protecting the line of communication through the Orange River Colony.

“After the force reached Bloemfontein on March 13, it was necessary to halt there for a certain period. Through railway communication with Cape Colony had to be restored before supplies and necessaries of all kinds could be got up from the base. The rapid advance from the Modder River, and the want of forage en route, had told on the horses of the cavalry, artillery, mounted infantry, and the transport mules and oxen, and to replace these casualties a considerable number of animals had to be provided. Throughout the six weeks the army remained halted at Bloemfontein the enemy showed considerable activity, especially in the south-eastern portion of the Orange River Colony, but by the beginning of May everything was in readiness for a further advance into the enemy’s country, and on the 2nd of that month active operations were again commenced.

“On May 12, Kroonstad, where Mr. Steyn had established the so-called government of the Orange Free State, was entered. On May 17, Mafeking was relieved. On May 31 Johannesburg was occupied, and on June 5 the British flag waved over Pretoria.

“During these thirty-five days, the main body of the force marched 300 miles, including fifteen days’ halt, and engaged the enemy on six different occasions.

“The column under Lieutenant-General Ian Hamilton marched 400 miles in forty-five days, including ten days’ halt. It was engaged with the enemy twenty-eight times.

“The flying column under the command of Colonel B. Mahon, which relieved Mafeking, marched at the rate of nearly fifteen miles a day for fourteen consecutive days, and successfully accomplished its object, despite the determined opposition offered by the enemy.

“The newly raised battalion of the City of London Imperial Volunteers marched 500 miles in fifty-four days, only once having two consecutive days’ halt. It took part in twenty-six engagements with the enemy.

“During the recent operations the sudden variations in temperature between the warm sun in the daytime and the bitter cold at night have been peculiarly trying to the troops, and owing to the necessity for rapid movement the soldiers have frequently had to bivouac after long and trying marches without firewood and with scanty rations.

“The cheerful spirit in which these difficulties have been overcome and hardships disregarded are deserving of the highest praise, and in thanking all ranks for the successful efforts to obtain the objects in view, Lord Roberts is proud to think that the soldiers under his command have worthily upheld the traditions of her Majesty’s army in fighting, in marching, and in the admirable discipline which has been maintained throughout a period of no ordinary trial and difficulty.

(Signed) Roberts, Field-Marshal.”

As may be imagined, the man who could accomplish so much in so short a span of time remained unperturbed by a vision of clouds on the horizon. He knew that though with the fall of Pretoria the campaign nominally ended, there were many minor passages at arms to be expected in various parts of the two Republics. There were the remnants of Botha’s army to north and east; there were De Wet and his marauders playing havoc with lines and telegraph wires, prowling in search of ill-defended convoys, and inspirited to fresh deeds of aggression by the successful capture of Colonel Spragge’s Yeomanry; there were Potchefstroom and Klerksdorp to be occupied by Sir Archibald Hunter, and Griqualand to be finally pacified by Sir Charles Warren.

Still, it was unpleasant to receive the report that while the main army had been advancing, an immense force of Boers, through a series of unfortunate mistakes, had succeeded in capturing in the vicinity of Vredefort Road, a convoy and an escort of a company and a half of Highlanders on its way to Heilbron. The outline of the unhappy affair was painful in the extreme. As the mysterious circumstances attending the movements of the convoy have not yet been fully sifted, it would be unfair to accept the numerous criticisms offered on the subject, and details regarding the capture are so lost in the “fog of war,” that it is difficult to give an account of the series of muddles that brought about disaster. It appeared that though the enemy were lurking everywhere the convoy was travelling from Winburg under escort of only a company and a half “odd” men of the Brigade with orders to pick it up at Kroonstad, which place was subsequently changed to Heilbron. At Vredefort the party were to leave the rail and go by road; but shortly it received orders to await an escort that was being sent from Heilbron. General Hector MacDonald wired that it should not proceed further till escorted by a strong force of mounted troops, infantry, and artillery, as he himself, during his five days’ march, had been repeatedly in collision with the foe. The officer in command laagered up. Next day an orderly reconnoitred and failed to detect the presence of the enemy. Suspicion had been aroused, however, by the disappearance of a Colonial conductor, who, it seems, used the occasion to report to De Wet, who promptly seized the time and the opportunity. He sent in with a flag of truce a terse message, “I have 1200 men and five guns. Surrender at once.” An hour earlier Major Haig with 600 men, marching from Vredefort Road, had got to within two miles of the convoy, but hearing that the railhead was threatened had turned back. The convoy was therefore at De Wet’s mercy, and he knew it. He refused to give any terms, so the small party capitulated! General Hector MacDonald, in defence of his Highlanders, who were evidently not at fault, gave a concise account of the circumstances attending the misadventure—an account more trustworthy than those of outsiders—

“While the Brigade was at Wynberg, a company of the Black Watch was sent as escort to a convoy of pom-pom ammunition to Smalldeel railway station, and a day or two later half a company of Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders with captured arms and ammunition, and we were informed that they would join us at Kroonstad. The Brigade, however, instead of going to Kroonstad, marched by way of Ventersburg and Lindley to Heilbron, while the detached companies marched by the railway to Roodeval. As we were opposed—practically surrounded—for the last five days of our march, a wire was sent to Smalldeel not to send in a convoy until it could be escorted by a strong force of mounted troops, infantry, and artillery. The Commandant at Smalldeel, however, sent away the convoy under escort of the company and a half of Highlanders, with the result that it was captured. Perhaps the Commandant was acting under orders from the army headquarters, and that remains to be seen.”

Certain it was that the Highland Brigade, who had already been subsisting on frugal, one may say starvation, fare was left in a sorry plight, and fully appreciated the significance of the saying that too many cooks will spoil the broth. On the shoulders of which of the cooks the blame will eventually rest remains to be seen.

It was the opinion of some that sufficient precautions were not taken to insure the expedition’s transmission of supplies, and the entrenchment and strong fortification of small bodies of troops sent to guard the line of rail; and also that there was an insufficiently co-ordinated system of intelligence, in consequence of which commanding officers moving with detached forces were without definite information regarding the movements and destination of other forces, friendly or inimical, which might have to be encountered.

The mishaps of Sanna’s Post—the capture of the Yeomanry and other corps—were thought to have been occasioned by the absence of a general staff—a general staff trained by years of practice to the exigencies of life in the field. Such a staff of trained and picked officers was educated by Napoleon for his use under his personal supervision, while Lord Roberts, with a gigantic army of 200,000 men, had a merely improvised machine. He had certainly Lord Kitchener at his elbow, but this officer’s duties developed into those of the “handy-man”—now organiser, now fighter, now administrator in rebellious districts—thus depriving the Chief of the clockwork apparatus that should be represented by the General Staff, at a time when generals and troops, like engines and railway carriages, had to be timed to arrive and depart from stations on the hard-and-fast principles of Bradshaw.

At this date with Lord Roberts in Pretoria were two and a half infantry divisions, a cavalry division, and a mounted infantry division, Wavell’s Brigade having been left at Johannesburg, while the other half proceeded to the Capital.

General Hunter’s Division, joined by Colonel Mahon’s force, was operating at Ventersdorp, while Colonel Plumer without opposition occupied Zeerust, the officials agreeing to take the oath provided they were protected from their fellow-countrymen. Elsewhere, across the Orange River Colony, the troops were fairly well expanded. General Colvile with the Highland Brigade was near Heilbron, and south of him Lord Methuen, while at Lindley was General Paget. At Senekal and Hammonia were General Clements and General Rundle respectively. South of these again, Generals Chermside and Brabant were operating.

It was imagined that the combined vigilance of these officers had entirely protected the communications in the Orange River Colony, but on the 7th of June the unquenchable Dutchmen succeeded in cutting line and telegraph wire north of Kroonstad, and in taking prisoners most of the 4th Battalion of the Derbyshires (Sherwood Foresters), who were guarding the district. Of the battalion, the Colonel, a lieutenant, and thirty-four rank and file were killed, five officers and ninety-nine men were wounded, and the rest, save six, made prisoners!

The story ran thus: At dusk on the 4th, the Derbyshire Militia Regiment arrived at Roodeval and pitched their camp in the lee of a string of kopjes that shelved away to the west, and terminated in a high hump which, jutting out of the plain, commanded rail, camp, and the surrounding hills. Owing to the darkness it was impossible to do much in the way of reconnoitring, and though some scouts and natives warned the commanding officers that Boers had been espied in the vicinity, little notice was taken. The pickets, which had been posted on a range of kopjes north of the camp, were strengthened, and some few shots fired at distant snipers. Then the party laid themselves down to rest, and slept placidly. Before dawn they were awakened by the furious crackling of musketry, and even as the men turned out with their rifles, they dropped. One after another as they left their tents fell victims to the unseen foe. The fact was, the pickets had been attacked and driven in, and the enemy occupied the range which commanded the British troops. Presently the early morning was humming with shot and shell, the Boers now having brought four big guns and a pom-pom to bear on the unfortunate camp and the bald plain that surrounded it. Valiantly the militiamen, raw and unfledged warriors as they were, fought; long, bloody, and disastrous hours passed, and they, falling thick as autumn leaves, continued to hold out in a completely defenceless position till the plain was littered with dead and wounded—more than eighty of them now lying in a trap from which it was impossible to escape. Colonel Baird-Douglas,[1] wounded in four places, fought like a lion, encouraging his men, and vowing to shoot the first who should display a white flag. Then he dropped exhausted and breathed his last. Finally 420 prisoners were taken, including the following officers of the 4th Derbyshire Regiment:—

Captain J. Humber, Captain C. P. Piers, Captain A. M. W. Mohun-Harris, Captain E. M. Wilmot, Captain R. C. Fenwick, Captain and Adjutant R. Britten, Lieutenant P. C. Shepard, Second-Lieutenant A. C. Hewitt, Second-Lieutenant J. L. Heymann, Second-Lieutenant H. L. Napier, Second-Lieutenant H. M. Milward, Second-Lieutenant J. H. W. Becke, Second-Lieutenant J. H. Mathias, Second-Lieutenant H. S. Anderson, Second-Lieutenant E. N. T. Collin, Hon. Lieutenant and Quartermaster M. M’Guire. Among the killed were:—Lieutenant-Colonel Baird-Douglas and Lieutenant Horley. Among the wounded:—Colonel Wilkinson, Captain Bailey, Second-Lieutenants Hall and Lawder, Lieutenant Blanchard, Canadian Infantry (attached to 4th Derbyshire).

It was said that after the capture the commandants, on bringing the prisoners to the station, were seen cordially shaking hands with a railway official as though exchanging congratulations. This circumstance was one of many which bore witness to the innumerable acts of treachery and duplicity with which commanding officers had to contend.

On the same day, in the same locality, there was another engagement, which resulted in the capture of a number of the Railway Pioneer Corps. According to an account in the Bloemfontein Post, the corps was awakened at 5.26 in the morning by an unusual stir among the sentries. A moment afterwards a voice was heard asking, “Can any one speak Dutch?” A man, evidently a burgher, approached Captain Grant McDonnel and Lieutenants Blanchard and Hayes with a note from the Boer commandant in the vicinity, stating that he had 1200 men and five guns with him, and adding that he would give the British force ten minutes in which to surrender. The bearer, after delivering the note, went back to a large body of Boers mounted on horses, who had by this time approached so close as to be plainly visible.

The Pioneer Corps, realising their dangerous position, endeavoured hastily to improvise a barricade with a number of railway trucks, and also requisitioned a large quantity of biscuit and meat tins for the purpose. The orders of Captain Gale were speedily carried out, and soon his little force, numbering 160, were completely sheltered behind the barricade. The Boers, after waiting the specified ten minutes, and perceiving the efforts of the British to offer resistance, immediately opened fire, pouring volley after volley on the force. Captain Gale and two pioneers fell from the rifle fire, while shrapnel shells bursting near killed three men. The enemy then directed their heavy artillery on the barricades and station buildings, the latter being practically destroyed. The Boers were now only fourteen hundred yards away, and well hidden. An endeavour was made to have the wounded conveyed to safety behind a large tank, but a shell from the Boer guns exploded among the horses and the animals stampeded.

Firing from heavy guns was afterwards heard coming from the opposite direction to the Boers. Hopes were high among the gallant force that relief was at last arriving from Kroonstad. The pioneers, however, soon became too painfully aware that the firing came from another body of the enemy, who had surrounded the 4th Derbyshire Regiment the same morning. Although the firing continued, an outlying patrol attempted to reach the pioneers. The whole of the Boer guns were now worked with increased energy, and soon the want of ammunition compelled the British force to surrender. The report then went on to say that Commandant De Wet, mounted on an English charger, advanced and asked the number of British killed. Looking at the dead body of Captain Gale, the Boer commandant remarked sympathetically, “Poor man. Very sad. Bury him at once.” He also courteously allowed the body to be wrapped in a Union Jack. De Wet is a tall, heavily built man, with a brown beard. He wore a tweed suit and an overcoat, and carried a rifle and bandolier. Attached to his gold chain was a medal, on which was a representation of Kruger’s head. De Wet was very polite to his captives, and kindly expressed his sorrow at having to destroy two thousand bags of mails. Unless he did so, he added, the young Boers would open the letters.

The bags were afterwards ripped open, and the Boers looted the baggage. One burgher found a number of bank notes as part of his spoil, while others obtained tobacco, cigars, and various medical comforts. Lieutenant Thurston, Cape Pioneer Railway Regiment, and Lieutenant Staffkett, Cape Pioneer Railway Regiment, were made prisoners. Some of the prisoners were called together and made to take off parts of their dress, which the Boers then donned. The British wounded were well attended to, and were subsequently removed to the Yeomanry Hospital at Kroonstad.

As a consequence of these attacks De Wet obtained possession of the line, which became so twisted and uptorn as to resemble unfinished Jacob’s ladders to heaven, while Pretoria found itself minus its longed-for home letters, and standing hourly in fear of running short of food. Still affairs were going on as though nothing had happened. The Town Council temporarily continued its duties. An English Burgomaster was chosen, and a new Court of Justice was established. Colonel Maxse became the head of the police, and many Colonials who volunteered for civil employment were given posts of importance. Owing to the many acts of duplicity practised by the Boers who had surrendered, more stringent regulations regarding oath-breakers were promulgated. The publication of malicious and false reports was forbidden, and a sharp look-out was kept over the movements of the spies with which the capital was still swarming.

One hundred and forty-eight officers, and 3039 men were released, and these were rearmed from the 2000 stands of arms which were given up in Pretoria on and after the British occupation. The list of the officers who had been suffering imprisonment at the hands of the Boers is a long one, and dates almost from the outset of the war:—

18th Hussars—Lieutenant-Colonel B. D. Moller, Major H. A. F. Greville, and Captain and Adjutant W. P. M. Pollock. Army Veterinary Department—Veterinary Lieutenant F. H. Shore. 1st King’s Royal Rifles—Lieutenant B. J. Majendie and Lieutenant F. M. Crum. 2nd Royal Dublin Fusiliers—Captain M. P. E. Lonsdale, Lieutenant C. Garvice, Lieutenant C. T. W. Grimshaw, and Second Lieutenant T. H. C. Frankland. 10th Mountain Battery Royal Garrison Artillery—Major G. E. Bryant, Lieutenant G. D. Wheeler, Lieutenant G. R. Nugent, Lieutenant W. H. Moore, and Second Lieutenant G. T. W. Webb (attached). 1st Gloucester Regiment—Major S. Humphery, Major W. R. P. Wallace, Captain S. Duncan, Captain Connor, Lieutenant A. Bryant, Lieutenant F. C. Nisbet, Lieutenant R. M. M. Davy, Lieutenant F. A. Brent, Lieutenant C. S. Knox, Lieutenant W. A. M. Temple, Lieutenant A. H. Radice, Lieutenant J. Ingram, Lieutenant P. H. Short, Lieutenant R. L. Beasley, Second Lieutenant W. S. Mackenzie, Second Lieutenant H. H. Smith, Lieutenant and Adjutant W. L. B. Hill, Lieutenant and Quartermaster R. J. Gray. 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers—Lieutenant-Colonel F. R. C. Carleton, Major F. H. Munn, Captain A. R. Burrowes, Lieutenant A. E. S. Heard, Lieutenant C. E. Southey, Lieutenant W. G. B. Phibbs, Lieutenant H. B. Holmes, Lieutenant A. H. C. MacGregor, Lieutenant A. L. J. M. Kelly, Second Lieutenant R. J. Kentish, Second Lieutenant C. E. Kinahan, and Second Lieutenant R. W. R. Jeudwine. Rhodesian Horse—Lieutenant A. E. Harenick. Natal Carabineers—Lieutenant A. J. Gallwey. 2nd West Yorks Regiment—Major H. de T. C. Hobbs. 2nd Northumberland Fusiliers—Major W. E. Sturges, Captain E. W. Fletcher, Captain F. B. Morley, Second Lieutenant G. R. Wake, and Second Lieutenant L. B. Coulson. 2nd Dorsetshire Regiment—Lieutenant F. W. Radcliffe. 2nd Royal Irish Rifles—Captain A. V. Weir, Lieutenant E. J. Christie, Second Lieutenant L. G. B. Rodney, Second Lieutenant P. G. W. Maynard, Captain V. J. Kelly, Captain W. J. M’Whinnie, Captain A. C. D. Spencer, Lieutenant E. H. Saunders, Second Lieutenant T. L. B. Soutry, and Second Lieutenant J. C. Bowen-Colthurst. 1st Suffolk Regiment—Lieutenant S. J. B. Barnardiston, Captain W. G. Thompson, Captain C. A. H. Brett, and Second Lieutenant F. W. Wood-Martin. 2nd Devonshire Regiment—Lieutenant-Colonel G. M. Bullock, Major J. M’N. Walter, and Lieutenant G. N. F. Smyth-Osbourne. 2nd Essex Regiment—Lieutenant W. F. Bonham. Royal Field Artillery—Lieutenant-Colonel H. V. Hunt. 66th Battery Royal Field Artillery—Major W. Y. Foster, and Lieutenant G. L. Butler (attached). 14th Battery Royal Field Artillery—Major A. C. Bailward, Lieutenant A. C. Birch, and Second Lieutenant C. F. Holford. Royal Scots Fusiliers—Captain D. H. A. Dick, Captain H. H. Northey, Lieutenant E. Christian, Lieutenant M. E. M’Conaghey, Lieutenant C. F. H. Rumbold, and Lieutenant G. C. Briggs. 1st Connaught Rangers—Captain G. H. Ford-Hutchinson, and Second Lieutenant E. V. Jones. Cape Mounted Police—Inspector E. W. Blyth, and Sub-Inspector W. A. Genllond. South African Light Horse—Captain H. Fitzherbert. 12th Lancers—Lieutenant N. M. H. Tristram. 2nd Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant H. Chandos-Pole-Gell. Reserve of Officers—Lieutenant C. M. Grenfell, late 10th Hussars. 6th Dragoon Guards—Lieutenant F. E. Till. Royal Horse Guards—Captain W. F. Ricardo. 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers—Captain W. F. Elmslie and Captain G. H. B. Freeth. Royal Lancaster Regiment—Major G. A. Carleton. King’s Royal Rifles—Major O. S. W. Nugent. 2nd Wiltshire Regiment—Major H. A. Stock. Royal Engineers Militia—Lieutenant J. H. Prior (attached Suffolk Regiment). 1st Oxfordshire Light Infantry—Major F. J. Evelegh. Kitchener’s Horse—Captain W. Vaughan, Captain A. S. Arnold, Lieutenant Burghuys, Lieutenant H. D. Duban, Lieutenant W. J. Horne, Lieutenant J. Sampson, Lieutenant L. A. Myburgh, and Lieutenant N. A. N. Black. 6th Dragoons—Lieutenant G. K. Ansell. 2nd Bedford Regiment—Lieutenant G. D. Jebb. 1st Royal Munster Fusiliers—Lieutenant D. Best (? Lieutenant T. A. D. Best. Inniskilling Fusiliers). 2nd Lancashire Fusiliers—Lieutenant-Colonel C. J. Blomfield. Victoria Rifles—Captain T. M. M’Inerney. Scouts—Lieutenant W. Hockley. British South Africa Police—Lieutenant H. Chapman. Royal Horse Artillery—Major J. C. Wray, Captain H. Rouse, Captain G. H. A. White, Lieutenant F. H. G. Stanton, and Lieutenant F. L. C. Livingstone-Learmonth. Northumberland Fusiliers—Lieutenant H. S. Toppin. Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry—Lieutenant H. T. Cantan. 2nd Royal West Kent—Lieutenant R. J. T. Hildyard. Army Service Corps—Lieutenant C. J. Croxford. Indian Staff Corps—Lieutenant R. J. Stewart (attached Army Service Corps). Roberts’s Horse—Veterinary Captain P. D. Bray, Lieutenant J. F. Hawkins, Lieutenant H. R. Horne, and Lieutenant T. J. Truter. King’s Royal Rifle Corps—Lieutenant G. H. Martin. Welsh Regiment—Lieutenant R. H. Metge. 1st Royal Dragoons—Second Lieutenant T. D. Pilkington. Royal Artillery, Staff—Captain H. T. Tennant. Durham Light Infantry—Second Lieutenant L. J. P. Butler. South African Light Horse—Captain J. C. Kirkwood. Cape Police—Captain A. Bates. Brabant’s Horse—Captain P. M. W. Little, and Lieutenant H. A. Steele. 9th Lancers—Lieutenant S. R. Theobald. Yorkshire Light Infantry—Captain G. G. Ottley. 1st Australian Horse—Lieutenant J. W. Wilkinson. 6th Dragoons—Lieutenant N. W. Haig. Prince Alfred’s Volunteer Guards—Lieutenant W. B. Everton. Lumsden’s Horse—Lieutenant C. E. Crane. Royal Engineers—Lieutenant M. T. Webber. 10th Hussars—Lieutenant Anderson Pelham, and Lieutenant Crichton. 2nd East Kent—Lieutenant W. G. F. Barnard. Eastern Province Horse—Lieutenant J. M. P. Bowker. 16th Lancers—Captain C. J. Eccles. Cameron Highlanders—Captain MacEwen. Intelligence Department—Captain L. G. Dennison. Police Magistrate—C. H. Hilliard. Newspaper Correspondents—Lord Rosslyn, Lord C. Manners, and M. H. Donohue.

The following officers, prisoners of war, were found in hospital:—

Lieutenant the Hon. D. R. H. Anderson-Pelham, and Lieutenant C. W. H. Crichton, 10th Hussars (convalescent after enteric fever); Lieutenant H. Chapman, British South Africa Police (contusion, convalescent); Lieutenant G. H. Martin, King’s Royal Rifle Corps (tonsillitis, cured); Lieutenant R. H. Metge, 1st Welsh Regiment (neuralgia, cured); Lieutenant G. C. Briggs, 1st Royal Scots Fusiliers (doing well); Major F. H. Munn, Royal Irish Fusiliers (neuralgia, cured); Major J. C. Wray, Royal Horse Artillery (convalescent); Lieutenant N. W. Haig, 6th Dragoons (enteric fever, seriously ill, but improving).

Nine hundred and ninety prisoners were removed, however, and, it was believed, were taken some forty miles from Komati Poort.

On the 8th a curious experience was related by some of the Canadian Mounted Infantry, who, happening to lose their way and pass, unchallenged, the Boer lines, found themselves at the little town of Hebron. The inhabitants imagining them to be the forerunners of a British force, promptly surrendered arms and ammunition. The Canadians, with a due sense of humour, engaged in the formalities with becoming gravity, commandeered an ox-waggon, loaded it with their booty and returned again through the Boer lines, plus eighty-eight rifles and a big store of ammunition!

THE BATTLE OF DIAMOND HILL

The outlook was not a cheery one. The enemy, split into small factions, were bent on playing havoc north and south, and horrible rumours were afloat which contrived to annoy, perplex, and discourage those who, in the absence of newspapers and correspondence, gave rein to their imagination. General Maxwell, who was acting as Governor of Pretoria in this emergency, inaugurated a system of official bulletins, which served to distribute what intelligence there might be, and sustain the drooping spirits of the community. The prolongation of the war, after all seemed to have been skilfully accomplished, was depressing to even the most ardent and bellicose mortals. Still more so was it to those who had had their fill of fighting, and who could not number the list of their engagements even with the fingers of both hands. It was known that Botha, after the surrender of the city, had retired with a small force to a crevice in the hills some fifteen miles east, astride the Delagoa Bay Railway, and that round him he was gathering a goodly number of burghers, who assisted him in intimidating other burghers who might have been willing to tender their submission. As all overtures towards peaceable negotiations failed, it was necessary to take definite action, and this on the 11th of June Lord Roberts accordingly did. A great combined enveloping movement was planned out. General French, with Porter’s and Dickson’s Cavalry Brigades, and Hutton’s Mounted Infantry, marched out on the left of the Chief, while General Ian Hamilton with Broadwood and Gordon’s Cavalry Brigades, and Ridley’s Mounted Infantry, and General Bruce Hamilton’s Infantry Brigade on his right, prepared to assail the tremendous frontage of the left of Botha’s position. The Dutchman, perched on a series of steep and irregular hills, and strongly protected in front, had placed most of his force on his flanks. These he knew by experience to be his vulnerable points, and against these he divined that Generals French and Ian Hamilton would be operating. General Pole-Carew, in the centre, advanced his Division, numbering some 6000 bayonets and twenty guns, in support of General Ian Hamilton. He moved eastward along the line and engaged in a duet with the enemy with long-range guns, a duet which lasted during the whole day. It was found that the enemy’s position extended some sixteen miles, their left, the Diamond Hill, being so strong and so extended that movement of an enveloping kind was thought to be almost impossible. Nevertheless, while General French (assisted by Hutton’s Mounted Infantry), through country inimical to cavalry operations, was perilously and vigorously engaged in making a wide detour in order to envelop the right flank of the enemy and hold him from swelling his numbers elsewhere, General Ian Hamilton on the enemy’s left flank (some six miles south of the line), his ambitions centred on Diamond Hill and the line of rail beyond, operated correspondingly. Far to right, in a somewhat crab-like fashion, moved the cavalry; Gordon’s Brigade—the outer pincer as it were—wheeled round the almost impregnable stronghold of the Boers; to left, Ridley’s Brigade and De Lisle’s Corps of Mounted Infantry—forming the left or inner pincer—twisted towards Pienaar’s Poort, while Broadwood’s Brigade—the head and front of the creature—endeavoured to spit forth and pierce through this central gap, and if possible get behind the Boers on Diamond Hill. Early in the day the southern slopes of Diamond Hill became the scene of contest between Ridley’s Brigade and the enemy, whose rifles poured their sleet over the advancing mass and whose guns clamoured loudly in the distance. Broadwood’s Brigade, meanwhile, began a bold advance—across a spruit and over a plain to a passage towards the railway line—an advance which was hailed more boisterously than pleasantly by a converging storm from the enemy’s heavy guns. Still the cavalry pushed forward, while Lieutenant Conolly with two horse guns was set to clear the course. But the Boers, inch by inch, stubbornly contested the way. The stentorian tones of warring artillery were heard in an argument that lasted hours, while parties of Boer riflemen approached with such audacity with a view to the annihilation of the gunners of Q Battery and the capture of their pieces, that for protection sake the 12th Lancers were ordered to charge. Unfortunately, at this critical juncture their commander, the Earl of Airlie, who already had had his horse shot under him, was seeking a new charger. He joined his regiment in time to lead to the attack, but taking a more northerly direction than was intended, he found himself exposed to a murderous tornado from the southern slopes of Diamond Hill. Nevertheless, the charge of the valiant band, small though it now was, had a glorious result. Away scudded the Boers to both sides, scattering over the distance towards Diamond Hill, while their oppressive propinquity to the British guns and Broadwood’s right flank was brought to an abrupt close. This done, Lord Airlie decided, as the horses were too jaded and overworked to engage in effective pursuit, to become no further involved. He was about to withdraw his regiment when suddenly a bullet caught him, and, almost instantly, he fell dead. Thus the Empire lost one of its finest soldiers, one of its most honourable, well-beloved of men.[2] The charge cost the regiment two officers and seventeen troopers, a deplorable loss considering its diminished size since the commencement of operations. At the same hour, while Gordon’s Brigade was heavily engaged on the right, the Boers became so obstreperous that the Household Cavalry had been ordered to charge. This order was obeyed with zest. The Dutchmen, numerous as they were, took in at a glance all that was meant by the approaching whirlwind—a flashing avalanche of naked blades—and turned tail. Away they fled over their grassy ridges, seized their horses and made off so quickly that none of the Lifeguardsmen and few of their chargers were sacrificed to the dashing exploit. It was thought that the whole body of the foe were on the move, but this was not the case. The congregating crowds of the enemy amid the scrub-covered ridges around the main position had yet to be cleared off. Accordingly, soon after noon, the 21st Brigade (Bruce Hamilton) advanced, cleverly clambering up the crests, which had previously been scoured by artillery, and finally succeeded in folding back the formidable wave of Dutchmen which guarded the line, and forcing them, such as could escape, amid a hurricane of bullets, to gallop to fresh cover. Dusk set in early, but the troops, sticking to the ground they had won, covering a front of some 25 miles, there bivouacked for the night.

Early the next day (the 12th) the Dutch overture began, the foe operating vigorously with their long-range guns. They were evidently unappeased, and meant a dogged resistance. General Ian Hamilton was among the first to be hit, but not dangerously. The incident caused not a little concern, for this remarkably energetic officer had become, as it were, almost hoary with fighting the Boers. From early days when he commanded the infantry at Elandslaagte to the splendid defence at Wagon Hill he had been eternally to the fore, brilliant in intellect and unfailing in dash and daring. After his entry to the Free State he had fought his way from Israel’s Poort, Thabanchu, Houtnek, and on through all the varied phases of the advance of the right wing of the army towards Pretoria. It was no marvel that the thought of his even temporary disablement caused consternation. Fortunately it was discovered that no bones were broken, and the gallant officer, though in some pain, refused to leave the field.

At midday General Bruce Hamilton’s Brigade made a brilliant attack on the Diamond Hill plateau. The Derbyshires to the right, the City Imperial Volunteers in the middle, the Sussex on their left, grandly advanced amid an enfilading fire of considerable warmth, which only ceased its horrible activity when the 82nd Field Battery, under Major Conolly, by a feat of herculean energy, was dragged to the rocky heights, and vomited vengeance at a distance of 1700 yards from the stubborn enemy. But though it ultimately had the effect of silencing the Boers, it did not accomplish its arduous task without grievous loss. Gunners were hit on all sides, and horses dropped in the moment of unlimbering, but the gallant work never ceased, and, though a scene of carnage reigned around, the guns with unflinching and heroic persistence continued to pour on the hills their cleansing fires for two mortal hours. In the late afternoon the Guards came into action, and more guns, the Boers having rapidly taken up a position near the railway, and to the drumming of mighty pieces and the whistling tune of musketry the twilight set in. Face to face the belligerents grew lost in mist. Preparations were then made for the complete rout of the Boers on the morrow, but when morning arrived it was found that the Dutch hordes had made themselves scarce. Pursuit was attempted, but the horses were too exhausted for more heavy work. The Westtralians, however—150 of them belonging to Colonel de Lisle’s Corps—were unappeased. They pushed on to a point whence the Boer army, a crowd of some 4000, with waggons, cattle, and guns, could be seen crossing Bronkher’s Spruit. That place of grievous memories, where Colonel Anstruther[4] fell victim to Boer perfidy, awoke its own ghosts, for scarcely had the Dutchmen reached the fatal area than an avenging sleet from the magazines of the Westtralians brought them to a state of panic. In an instant Dutchmen, waggons, guns, were scattering in all directions, while the Colonials, expending 20,000 rounds of ammunition, coolly plied their rifles in their coign of vantage till the numbers of the enemy were sensibly thinned by death, wounds, or flight. Thus was given the finishing touch to a battle which had a double purpose. It served to clear the way for forty miles to the east and relieve Pretoria of the too close attentions of the massed enemy, and it engaged many of the Boers who had fallen back from Laing’s Nek on the taking of Pretoria, thus assisting General Buller’s operations at Volksrust, which have yet to be described. Sir Redvers, in his turn, aided the main scheme by causing the Boers to feel that their rear would shortly be threatened, and that even retreat to the east must now have its geographical limits.

General French was unable to fulfil his part of the programme, firstly, because the Boers saw through his plan, and secondly, because his Division was merely the shadow of the goodly Division that had flown to Kimberley in February, and his operations were entirely handicapped, not only by the nature of the country, but by the nature of his tools. General Ian Hamilton was little better off. Broadwood’s Brigade, which once had numbered 1800, was now reduced to 400, while the Household Cavalry mustered only 63, the 12th Lancers 120, and the 10th Hussars 200. Not only were the regiments reduced in numbers, but their mounts were now of the most heterogeneous description, Basuto, Argentine, and Cape ponies doing duty for chargers, and in many cases utterly unequal to the exertion expected of them. Without this explanation it would be difficult to comprehend why so apparently large a force should have been unable to do more than rout the enemy. But when it is once understood that a considerable part of Lord Roberts’s army was now represented merely on paper, the difficulties of the latter part of the campaign may be better conceived.

The C.I.V.’s had two days of stiff battle. A private, giving an account of his experiences, declared that they were the heaviest days’ fighting he had seen. “The C.I.V.’s were in the firing line both days, and our casualties were about sixty. One of our lieutenants had a very sad death just in front of my company. I have heard two names given to the action, but I don’t know which is correct; they are Diamond Hill and Donkerskoek. Our General said it was a second Spion Kop, the Boer position being so fine, and the firing from the trenches so heavy. Our regiment had got to within about 400 yards of the position, and had fixed bayonets, but had to give up the idea of charging, for if we had half the regiment would have been swept away. One of the Boer doctors was down at our hospital after the first day’s fight, and he told us that the Boers had lost about 600 that day. They must have lost another 600 the next day, as our artillery was much nearer, and simply poured shells into them all day.”

The total losses were about 200, but most deeply deplored by all ranks was the gallant commander, the Earl of Airlie. He was as brave as he was popular, and, like all his famous fighting race, was a soldier born, not made. Besides his record of previous service, he had distinguished himself in the Modder River battle, and was twice mentioned in despatches by Lord Methuen. On one of these occasions he made himself notable for the splendid dash with which he dismounted a section of his men and drove back a party of Boers who were enfilading the British force. In May he was wounded in the fighting round Welkom, was nursed to health at Bloemfontein by Lady Airlie, and went again to the front just before the surrender of Pretoria. Two other distinguished officers fell: Major the Hon. L. Fortescue, and Lieutenant the Hon. C. Cavendish, 17th Lancers.

Besides those already noted the list of casualties during the various engagements contained the names of:—

Killed:—12th Lancers—Lieutenant G. C. de C. Wright. 82nd Battery Royal Field Artillery—Second Lieutenant W. S. Luce. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Lieutenant Drage. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Captain C. J. K. Maguire. City Imperial Volunteers—Lieutenant W. B. L. Alt. Wounded:—12th Lancers—Second Lieutenant H. R. Milvain. F Battery Royal Horse Artillery—Captain R. England. Royal Lancaster Regiment Mounted Infantry—Captain J. M. Graham. Indian Staff Corps—Captain E. Barnes. New South Wales Mounted Infantry—Captain W. Holmes, Lieutenant W. R. Harrison. Kitchener’s Horse—Lieutenant J. S. Cape. 1st Royal Sussex Regiment—Second Lieutenant G. C. Morphett. 1st Derbyshire—Captain T. H. M. Green, Lieutenant A. S. Murray. 2nd Canadian Mounted Rifles—Captain A. C. Macdonald. 8th Hussars—Captain E. A. S. O’Brien. 1st Coldstream Guards—Lieutenant Brett. Royal Army Medical Corps—Major H. G. Hathaway. Missing:—12th Lancers—Captain F. Egerton Green.

GUARDING THE COMMUNICATIONS—LORDS METHUEN AND KITCHENER

While the battle for the Delagoa railway line was being planned, Lord Kitchener, with a small force, pushed south and joined Lord Methuen (whose force was at Heilbron) at Vredefort station on the evening of the 10th of June. Together they decided to hunt the marauders.

In passing, it is interesting to note that at this time the following militia corps were doing unostentatious but valuable and perilous service on the lines of communication:—

3rd Royal Scots; 3rd Royal West Surrey; 3rd East Kent; 3rd Royal Lancaster; 4th Royal Lancaster; 6th Royal Warwickshire; 3rd Norfolk; 4th Somerset Light Infantry; 4th West Yorkshire; 4th Bedfordshire; 3rd Yorkshire; 6th Lancashire Fusiliers; 4th Cheshire; 3rd South Wales Borderers; 3rd King’s Own Scottish Borderers; 4th Scottish Rifles; 3rd East Lancashire; 4th East Surrey; 4th South Staffordshire; 3rd South Lancashire; 3rd Welsh; 4th Derbyshire; 6th Middlesex; 9th King’s Royal Rifles (North Cork Militia); 4th North Staffordshire; 3rd Durham Light Infantry; 4th Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders; 3rd Leinster; 5th Royal Munster Fusiliers; 5th Royal Dublin Fusiliers.

On the 11th Lord Methuen proceeded to scour the railway line, and found the enemy prowling within rifle range on either side of his route. Whereupon, at Rhenoster River, he overtook and engaged De Wet, over whom a temporary victory was gained. The British commander succeeded in capturing camp and etceteras, and scattering the Dutchmen in all directions, though De Wet himself, with his usual nimbleness, disappeared. During the day’s engagement Lieutenant Erle, 12th Battalion Imperial Yeomanry, was slightly wounded.

On Tuesday the 12th the force hurriedly advanced towards Kroonstad, owing to a report that that town, garrisoned by a single battalion of the Argyll and Sutherland Militia, had fallen a prey to the enemy. Fortunately it was discovered that the rumour was groundless, and Lord Methuen continued his southern march. On the 13th and 14th the Boers pursued their system of annoyance around the railway, and directed a storm of bullets on a construction train which had arrived under the personal direction of Colonel Girouard, R.E., for the purpose of repairing the depredations of the past few days. Luckily, thanks to the pluck of the construction party (they were short of rifles, owing to many having been left in the rear train), a very able defence was kept up all night, until a party of mounted infantry—who at the first sound of firing started to the rescue—arrived with their guns and routed the foe. They came none too soon, for the Boers had made a fairly big haul, and carried off some forty of the construction workers as prisoners. The mounted infantry scurried after the retiring Dutchmen, but, as usual, these had knowingly melted into twos and threes and were uncatchable. In the attack on the train one man was killed and eleven wounded, including Lieutenant Micklem, Royal Engineers, Second Lieutenant Bigge, Volunteer Royal Engineers.

Meanwhile, at Virginia the garrison had an exceedingly trying time; but owing to the energy of Colonels Capper and North and the troops under them, and the conspicuous coolness and valour of Lieutenant Mitchell, the Boers were repulsed. At daybreak on the 14th some 800 Boers, with one or two pom-poms, a Maxim, and a field gun, ensconced themselves in the dense scrub surrounding the Zand River post. The garrison consisted of four companies 3rd Battalion Royal Lancasters under Colonel North (about 250 fit for duty), four companies Railway Pioneer Regiment under Major Seymour (300 fit for duty), and some 25 men of the Royal Irish Regiment (16 fit for duty) under Lieutenant Davenport. The position was a somewhat extended one, the left being in advance trenches on broken and jungly ground. This point the Boers attacked with determination, and were as determinedly resisted by Lieutenant W. Mitchell and No. 3 Company Railway Pioneer Regiment. The enemy in the dense bush were practically surrounding the British party, but these fought doggedly, engaging their assailants at very close quarters and keeping them at bay till nearly noon, when the Dutchmen were ultimately driven out of their hiding-places by an advance through the scrub of a line of reserve Railway Pioneer Regiment, aided by half a company of Militia. Thus driven forth, they made haste to retire before the arrival of a body of 170 Yeomanry (under Lieutenant Crane), which had hastened to the rescue from the south. The losses were comparatively small, owing to the marvellous grit of young Mitchell, who, though wounded at the onset in both thighs, continued for six hours to encourage and direct his men (there were only 22 of them scattered in several small trenches), ordering them not to waste ammunition, cheering them, and concealing from them, till the worst was over, the fact that he himself was seriously wounded. Another gallant officer, Major Seymour, distinguished himself, but he paid for his valour with his life. He was killed while advancing with the extended line through the bush to clear out the snipers. Lieutenant Clement of No. 2 Company of the Railway Pioneer Regiment was mortally wounded.

On the 18th Lord Kitchener, having restored communications, returned to Pretoria, and Lord Methuen moved to Heilbron. Precautions to avert further interruptions on the railway had been taken by establishing posts within communicable distance of each other all along the line, connected by a continually perambulating military train carrying field and automatic guns.

A combined movement had again to be planned for the surrounding of De Wet, who, though defeated on the 13th by Lord Methuen, and subsequently by Lord Kitchener, was still displaying an elasticity of disposition greatly to his credit, if discomforting to his pursuers. He and his followers now rebounded in the direction of Heilbron, where on the 18th he endeavoured to arrest the entry of Lord Methuen and a large convoy which he was escorting. A smart engagement ensued, which, it was thought, would have the effect of clearing the air. But peace was short-lived, as we shall see.

The war at this time, though full of inspiriting events, was as hard, perhaps harder, for the soldier than ever. There were the same chances of being wiped out by shot, shell, or disease, but the honour and glory of laying down one’s life for one’s country was bereft of its glamour. Tommy Atkins now needed all his patience, all his pluck. There are men who can face hostile artillery, but will squirm before a dentist. In these days there were many seasoned fighters, who might be excused if they shrunk from the railway accident or promiscuous sniping from invisible farms, which was part and parcel of the guerilla form of warfare adopted by the remnant of the Boer army—the malcontents, who, subversive of discipline and hating the British race, had decided to fight to the bitter end. Comments regarding the attitude of some of our troops have been made by many who lack the large mind to look at the enormous army as a whole, and who find pleasure in examining only its flaws with the microscope and holding them up to public contempt. Such comments it is unnecessary to reproduce. The brilliant British army, like all great and brilliant things, must necessarily have the defects of its qualities, and it is with the immense qualities and not the infinitesimal defects of victors that the faithful recorder has to do. To return, then, to the nerve-trying ordeals that formed part of the almost daily programme of the soldier’s duty.

At Honing Spruit, situated on the rail twenty-one miles north of Kroonstad, an exciting affair took place on the 22nd of June, all the more exciting as those engaged had but a few days previously been rescued from durance vile in Pretoria prison. On the 14th a party of 16 released officers from various regiments, with some 400 men, was ordered to Elandsfontein, the station outside Johannesburg, which had been so admirably secured by Colonel Henry’s force.

On the 21st this party was moved on to Katbosh Camp, a mile or so beyond Honing Spruit, where were stationed two companies of the Shropshires and some mounted Canadians under the command of Colonel Evans. The officers of the composite force were: Colonel Bullock, of the Devonshires, commanding; Major Stock, of the Wiltshire Regiment; Major Carleton, Royal Lancasters; Captains Elmslie and Freeth, of the Lancashire Fusiliers; Lieutenants Bryant, Temple, Radice, Smith, Mackenzie, and Gray, of the Gloucestershire Regiment; Jones, of the Connaught Rangers; Best, of the Inniskilling Fusiliers; Prior, Engineer Militia; Colson, of the 5th Fusiliers; and Wood-Martin, of the Suffolk Regiment. These, all of them, had had sufficiently horrible experiences, both during the hardly fought engagements in which they had been taken prisoners, and in the period of incarceration at the Model School, and vowed never again to be caught alive in the trap of the Dutchmen. They then hardly realised how near that trap they were.

The night was unusually cold, and travelling in coal trucks was scarcely an inspiriting beginning. In the gloom of early dawn the train reached Honing Spruit Station. Some of the officers alighted and exercised themselves to restore circulation—they were numb and weary—and in doing so espied, in the east, the dark outlines of mounted figures approaching. They promptly gave the alarm. Colonel Bullock proceeded in all haste to get the men out of the trucks, and speedily they were formed up round the station. An effort was then made with such picks and shovels as were at hand to dig trenches. But these were a mere apology for shelter. They made, however, according to an officer who scraped his little burrow for himself, a “moral” support. Of other support, it must be owned, they had little. A few officers were provided with Mausers, carbines, and bandoliers of ammunition, but the force for the most part were saddled with Martini-Henry rifles and black powder ammunition—rifles discarded by the Boers, and left by them in the arsenal at Pretoria. These venerable weapons were sighted at 1200 yards—the ordinary range of Lee-Mitford or Mauser may be taken at 1500 to 2000 yards—and were served out of necessity, owing to the insufficiency of ammunition for Mauser rifles. Thus handicapped at the outset in the way of weapons of defence, ragged and tattered, some in boots that were dropping to pieces, some partly in uniform, partly in mufti, garbed exactly as they had been in the prison, they found themselves once again in presence of the enemy. Colonel Bullock, stouthearted and truculent as ever, at once wired for help to Kroonstad, and with the line cut on both sides of him, and the Boers blowing up culverts as they came along, prepared to make a stand against the advancing foe. Meanwhile bang! bang! went a series of explosions on every side, voicing a vindictive tale and promising unthinkable horrors to come.

According to their slim tactics, and to find out the strength of the party most probably, the Boers now sent forward a man with a white flag, declaring by the messenger, that they had many men and guns, and that if the force refused to surrender they would be annihilated. But the Boers had got hold of the wrong man. The officer who had doggedly held firm in the blood-dyed donga at Colenso till the Dutchmen had threatened to murder the wounded unless he gave in, was not the man to surrender without a tussle. Colonel Bullock quickly sent the messenger and his white flag to the right about, and made preparations for stout resistance till help should arrive. But it was a sorry piece of “bluff.” They were gunless, the old muskets were of little use, and the black powder was objectionable, as it would have betrayed their positions and the smallness of the force. It was therefore necessary to tackle the Boers with extreme caution. “At first,” said an officer who was engaged, “they were only near the line to the north of us, covering the men who were destroying the culverts and telegraph lines, but they gradually worked round to the east, and about 8 or 8.30 down came the first shell—shrapnel—from about 2000 yards away. The train all this time was in the station, and I think they wanted to damage the engine, but their shooting wasn’t good enough. The engine went a little way up the line, but found it cut, and had to return. Shells were pretty frequent now, and bullets too numerous to be exactly pleasant, but Colonel Bullock and Major Hobbs, who was second in command, were walking about seeing to everything in the coolest possible way. No. 1 Company, under Captain Elmslie, of the Lancashire Fusiliers, had made some small trenches facing north, but when the Boers worked round to the east we were, of course, enfiladed, so we got into a ditch running along the side of the line north and south. They peppered us pretty well while we were getting there, but only one man was hit in the arm. Previous to this poor Major Hobbs, who, with the Colonel, had been sitting behind one of our small shelters which did not anything like cover them, was shot through the heart and killed.” (Major Hobbs, it may be remembered, was the gallant officer who was taken prisoner while tending a wounded man in the brilliant engagement at Willow Grange.) “Young Smith, of the Gloucesters, had been sent down the ditch near the line with seven men to try and get a bit nearer to the Boers who were damaging the culverts. They had rather a warm time, and Colonel Bullock sent Freeth, the adjutant, to bring them back. Poor Smith was shot through the groin, and the bullet went right through him. Two of his men were wounded and one killed out of the seven. Smith got back with Freeth’s help all right, and I found him afterwards sitting up in bed smoking cigarettes and as unconcerned as possible.”

A small tin house at the station was used as a hospital, and a Red Cross flag was improvised with difficulty. It was composed of a pillow-case with red bands made from strips of a Kaffir blanket discovered in the house. This was mounted on the shaft of an uptilted cart, but the Boers affected not to comprehend its meaning, and sent in a man under a white flag to ask an explanation. Here the wounded were tended by Mr. Cheatle who, by a stroke of luck, happened to occupy a saloon carriage in the “held up” train. There was no other doctor. This well-known surgeon who had gone out, con amore, as it were, with Sir William MacCormac, was on his way home, thinking his errand of mercy was over. He came quickly in action again, bringing his brilliant wits to meet a somewhat desperate situation. His bandages were made from ladies’ under garments found in a wardrobe, from the bed sheets in the train, and for antiseptic powder he had recourse to the carbolic tooth-powder in the possession of some of the officers. When this came to an end he utilised boiled rags, and persistently attended to the nerve-shaken wounded, who all the time were torn with bodily agony and horror-stricken by the continual howling of shells against walls and ground.

Meanwhile the Boers plied their guns, shelling at the same time from north and east—an antiphonal duet of most appalling description. One shell broke through the saloon carriage, another buried itself in some bales of wool which luckily protected the verandah of the hospital. To this the only return that could be made was a persistent peppering with the ancient Martinis, a peppering which was carried on for several hours. The officers worked hard with their Mauser carbines. The one before quoted said he fired off fifty-five rounds, but did not know with what result, except that some Boers, exposing themselves on the sky line, very quickly got down flat on the grass after he had taken a “steady pot” at them at about 1400 yards’ distance. He went on to say: “The Boers must have known how we were armed, as it is quite against their custom to expose themselves at all. At last we saw some men coming over the hill to our right, and thought it was the relief force, but they turned out to be Boers in khaki, some of whom, I believe, had helmets, probably taken from the convoy they collared a week or two ago, somewhere in this neighbourhood.”

The telegram for help was despatched to Kroonstad about 7 A.M., but the reinforcements did not arrive till nearly 3.30 P.M. The Boers early became aware of their near approach, however, and began cautiously to remove their four guns, two of which—15-pounders—were part of their capture at Sanna’s Post. Meanwhile the small force, who had been straining every nerve and muscle for many hours, and meant to die in the last ditch rather than surrender, were anxiously looking towards the south for succour. Then, at last, the friendly scouts were seen coming over the hill. Oh! the relief of it! The welcome rumour of help gave energy to the men, who, after their long inactivity, had been suddenly thrown, vilely armed, into vigorous action, and were by now well-nigh exhausted. Away flew the hostile hordes, but not without having done a fair day’s work of destruction—line, telegraph, and culverts being wrecked, one officer and three men killed, and one officer and seventeen men wounded!

While this gang of Boers were worrying the Honing Spruit party, another had attacked the Shropshires and Canadians at Katbosh Camp, and thus deterred them from going to the assistance of their brothers in distress. But it was owing to the splendid fighting of the Canadians that the Dutchmen had found it impossible to close in round Honing Spruit, and the party at the railway station were enabled to hold out till the relieving force arrived. After the Boers left, the troops still remained in the trenches, and strengthened them as much as possible; but the Argyll and Sutherland Militia and some Mounted Infantry and a battery arrived from Kroonstad, and the battery shelled some kopjes three miles away, where the Boers—some 700 to 1000 of them, with three or four guns—were collecting. It was said that the Boer loss was six killed, and that they took away three waggons full of wounded, but this, of course, could not be verified.

Some circumstances attending the brilliant resistance of the Colonials are almost heroic. Lieutenant Inglis, with eight men of the Frontier Police on worn-out ponies, were sent from the Katbosh Camp to reconnoitre. They were suddenly surrounded by Boers, but fought furiously, with the result that they made their way through, with the loss of four, to an embankment which offered shelter. Fifty Boers then came within short range and fired on them. A response from the British remnant followed. There were presently only four of them, commanded by Corporal Morden, who, Lieutenant Inglis being disabled, took his place. Here, in the face of these terrible odds, the Corporal sent off Private Miles to inform Colonel Evans of his plight. The messenger executed his errand, and returned to assist his comrades. He was hit, but still persisted in “having a go at the enemy.” Then Corporal Morden dropped with a bullet through the brain. Miles, wet with his own gore—fainting—supported himself against a tussock and continued to direct the firing of his brother and Private Kerr. Eventually the Boers made off, but not before Kerr had been killed by a parting shot. Finally the relief party arrived, and carried the few remaining heroes back to camp. Among the day’s casualties were: Major H. T. de C. Hobbs, West Yorkshire Regiment, killed; Second Lieutenant H. H. Smith, 1st Gloucester Regiment, severely wounded; Lieutenant W. M. Inglis, 2nd Canadian Mounted Infantry, severely wounded. The total casualties amounted to thirty-one.

The programme of surprise parties, trapping of small forces, and abuse of the white flag, continued with little variety. Owing to the disposition of the British troops to east of the railway, and the scarcity of supplies and transport that militated against their mobility, the Boers were temporarily in the ascendant. It was no easy matter to have and to hold the arteries of the great army whose head was Pretoria, and yet to guard the railway lines and send reinforcements at a moment’s notice to points menaced by the agile commandos of the enemy, and consequently those who were responsible for the safety of the communications lived the life of Damocles—without that personage’s certainty of whence the fatal blow might be expected!

The maintenance of the safety of the line from Kroonstad to Pretoria was in the hands of General Smith-Dorrien, who placed at every post two companies with two or more guns. He himself eternally perambulated the line, now repairing, now mounting guns, now despatching patrols, in fact, playing with almost superhuman energy and vigilance the game of fox and geese—the fox De Wet, the geese the long tail of communications. In spite, however, of the surprising energy of the General, the dog fox—the wiliest reynard that ever challenged chase—redoubled his activities.